Skip to main content

What Did Xunzi Learn from the Daoists?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi

Part of the book series: Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy ((DCCP,volume 7))

Abstract

Though there was no “Daoist school” in Xunzi’s time, he was familiar with the thinkers that we think of as Daoist. He rejected them, aligning himself with the school of Confucius instead, but he also learned important things from them, specifically about the natures of Heaven, the Heart, and Ritual. Ultimately, however, it was the failure of Daoism to establish limits for things like violence, social freedom, and wealth, that revealed to Xunzi the rightness of the Confucian Way.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Sivin 1978 and Smith 2003.

  2. 2.

    There are reasons to wonder whether Laozi and Zhuangzi even existed, at least as they are traditionally imagined. In what follows I make no suppositions about that but use the names to refer to the texts and their supposed authors.

  3. 3.

    Graham introduces the term “antirationalism ” in Reason and Spontaneity (Graham 1985: 159). For a development and comparison, see also Carr and Ivanhoe 2000.

  4. 4.

    See Louden 2002.

  5. 5.

    Translations from Zhuangzi are based on my own in RCCP.

  6. 6.

    See Goldin 2011.

  7. 7.

    See Huang 2015 for a more elaborate analysis of the relationship between virtue and diversity in Zhuangzi.

  8. 8.

    See Ivanhoe 2011.

  9. 9.

    To disambiguate for Western philosophers, the “heart” includes emotions as well as thought. Training the heart has more to do with cultivating the right kinds of feelings than with vetting proper motives.

  10. 10.

    See Stalnaker 2003.

  11. 11.

    My account of these terms differs slightly from those given in Yearley 1980: 471–72 and Nivison 1991: 130–31 (=Nivison 2000: 177).

  12. 12.

    These arguments are fleshed out in Kjellberg 1996: 16–19.

  13. 13.

    Hu 乎 can be read either as a question mark, as I have done here, or as a preposition, in which case the line reads “Things are appropriate in being appropriate, inappropriate in being inappropriate.” The ambiguity may be intentional: the question can be its own answer depending on how you read it.

  14. 14.

    For a different interpretation of Xunzi’s conventionalism with regard to language, see Van Norden 2000.

  15. 15.

    See for example Lau 2000: 210. By contrast, Singh 2014: 216–22 presents an interesting argument for the incompatibility of ritual and self-cultivation.

  16. 16.

    See Pines 2005.

  17. 17.

    I thank Eric Hutton for clarifying this point and providing the examples.

  18. 18.

    See Knoblock III.332, n. 65.

  19. 19.

    See the exchange between Eric Hutton and Kurtis Hagen in Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy: Hutton 2007a, b; Hagen 2007.

Bibliography

  • Carr, Karen, and Philip Ivanhoe. 2000. The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard. New York and London: Seven Bridges Press. (This book explores Graham’s notion of “anti-rationalism” and develops it as a comparative category. It is of interest both as a historical work on these two thinkers and also as an exercise in comparative philosophy.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldin, Paul. 2011. “Persistent Misconceptions about Chinese ‘Legalism.’” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38(1): 88–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graham, Angus Charles. 1981. Chuang Tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book of Chuang Tzu. London: George Allen and Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham, Angus Charles. 1985. Reason and Spontaneity. London: Curzon Press. (After a lifetime of hinting at his own ideas in articles on other subjects, this is the book in which Graham finally presents his own philosophical vision, most notably in his notion of “anti-rationalism,” which he defines as the recognition of the limits of reason.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham, Angus Charles. 1986. Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature. Singapore: IEAP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham, Angus Charles. 1989. Disputers of the Tao. La Salle: Open Court. (This is Graham’s history of Chinese philosophy from Confucius through the foundation of the Han Dynasty. It unites the insights of dozens of articles throughout his career in one big picture.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hagen, Kurtis. 2007. “A Response to Eric Hutton’s Review.” Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6(4): 441–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, Chad. 1983. “A Tao of Tao in Chuang Tzu.” In Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, ed. Victor Mair. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. (Though later revised and refined, this essay remains a useful introduction to Hansen’s influential linguistic interpretation of “dao.”)

    Google Scholar 

  • Huang, Yong. 2015. “Respect for Differences: the Daoist Virtue.” In The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Lorraine Besser-Jones and Michael Slote. New York: Routledge Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutton, Eric. 2014. Xunzi: The Complete Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutton, Eric. 2007a. “Hagen, Kurtis, The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction.” Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6(4): 417–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutton, Eric. 2007b. “A Further Response to Kurtis Hagen.” Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6(4): 445–446.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ivanhoe, Philip, and Bryan van Norden, eds. 2001. Reading in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Cited here as “RCCP.”)

    Google Scholar 

  • Ivanhoe, Philip. 1991. “Zhuangzi’s Conversion Experience.” Journal of Chinese Religions 19: 13–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ivanhoe, Philip. 1991b. “A Happy Symmetry: Xunzi’s Ethical Thought.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59(2): 309–22. (This article is an important resource for anyone interested in ecological thinking in the Warring States.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Ivanhoe, Philip. 2011. “Hanfeizi and Moral Self Cultivation” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38(1): 49–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kjellberg, Paul. 1996. “Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi on ‘Why be skeptical?’” In Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Philip Ivanhoe and Paul Kjellberg. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoblock, John. 1988. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Cited here as “K I.”)

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoblock, John. 1990. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Cited here as “K II.”)

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoblock, John. 1994. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 3. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Cited here as “K III.”)

    Google Scholar 

  • Lau, D.C. 2000. “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi.” In Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T.C. Kline III and Philip Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (This essay contains a clear exposition of a traditional interpretation of the relationship between Mengzi and Xunzi.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Louden, Robert. 2002. “‘What Does Heaven Say?’: Christian Wolff and Western Interpretations of Confucian Ethics.” In Confucius and the Analects, ed. Bryan Van Norden. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maspero, Henri. 1971. Le Taoisme et les Religions Chinoises. Paris: Gallimard. (This is a dated but still influential and provocative work. Available in an English translation by Frank Kierman.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Nivison, David. 1991 “Hsün Tzu and Chuang Tzu.” In Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus Graham, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. La Salle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nivison, David. 2000. “Xunzi and Zhuangzi.” In Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T.C. Kline III and Philip Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pines, Yuri. 2005. “Disputers of Abdication: Zhanguo Egalitarianism and the Sovereign’s Power.” T’oung Pao 91(4–5): 243–300.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosemont, Henry. 2000. “State and Society in the Xunzi.” In Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T.C. Kline III and Philip Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Kidder. 2003. “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, ‘Legalism,’ et cetera.” The Journal of Asian Studies 62(1): 129–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singh, Danesh. 2014. “Zhuangzi, Wuwei, and the Necessity of Living Naturally: a Reply to Xunzi’s Objection.” Asian Philosophy 24(3): 212–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sivin, Nathan. 1978. “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity.” History of Religions 17: 303–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, Aaron. 2003. “Aspects of Xunzi’s Engagement with Early Daoism.” Philosophy East and West 53(1): 87–129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Norden, Bryan. 2000. “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views on Human Agency.” In Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T.C. Kline III and Philip Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (This essay anaylyzes Mengzi’s and Xunzi’s philosophies of mind and clarifies an important distinction between desire and approval in Xunzi.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Burton. 1993. Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Burton. 1964. Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Burton. 1968. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Burton. 1961. Records of the Grand Historian of China: Ssu-ma Ch’ien. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yearley, Lee H. 1980. “Hsün Tzu on the Mind.” Journal of Asian Studies 39(3): 465–80.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the reviewer and particularly the editor of this volume whose suggestions, too numerous to cite individually, have added significantly to this essay.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Paul Kjellberg .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kjellberg, P. (2016). What Did Xunzi Learn from the Daoists?. In: Hutton, E. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7745-2_13

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics