Abstract
Even if a person accepts that it is permissible to end one’s life earlier than if all efforts were made to preserve it, there is no guarantee that the person would also believe in an obligation to commit suicide. After all, an obligation to die would seem to remove the autonomy we want people to have when making end of life decisions. We would also have to be concerned that such a duty, if it existed, would be misused in order to eliminate the more vulnerable members of our society including the terminally or chronically ill and the elderly. In this chapter, I develop a Kantian argument for a suicide duty. In order to respect oneself and to preserve one’s moral life, at times it becomes mandatory to end one’s physical existence. Although a discordant position to take, I will show that such an obligation can be part of a very good life narrative, and can be done in a way that nurtures communities and caring relationships.
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Notes
- 1.
She did argue that living wills and similar devices are mandatory.
- 2.
See Mary Rose Barrington’s (1980) “Apologia for Suicide” for another reasoned argument for suicide in these circumstances.
- 3.
Battin provides an excellent comprehensive development of most arguments for and against suicide in The Death Debate: Ethical Issues in Suicide.
- 4.
Scott Shershow argues that terms such as “dignity” and “sanctity” are imprecise words (Shershow 2014). I agree that the terms are inherently vague, but reject his deconstructivist approach in favor of a pragmatic one based on objective standards, as far as that is possible, and what works in the situation to achieve the goals of those involved in the conversation.
- 5.
The utilitarian argument states that if the best thing a person can do is to suicide, then that is her duty. On the other hand, the justice arguments might be based on various distributive justice principles. In one, if a person has used more than her fair share of healthcare resources, then she has an obligation to refrain from using any more, which will passively end her life.
- 6.
- 7.
According to Christine Overall, the taking of one’s own life does not respect life’s intrinsic value in the proper way (Overall 2003, 74–5).
- 8.
- 9.
Some may wonder why PP is not being used in this argument. In fact it is; I will show that such suicides respect the intrinsic value of those things affected by the action and that it is something that at least one reasonable person would reasonably believe will likely maximize utility. Satisfying these two conditions makes the action morally right.
What makes some suicides mandatory is that they are the only way an action can satisfy the Kantian QCI; therefore, I will spend more time developing this claim than showing RPU is satisfied.
- 10.
- 11.
Kant’s position can be compared to that of Buddhists’ . “Buddhism sees death as not the end of life, but simply a transition; suicide is therefore no escape from anything.” (Becker 2000, 499).
- 12.
Not everyone will agree with Kant’s claim that an innocent person commits moral suicide when he chooses to become a slave. Most people would probably agree that a slave is still a person, although owned by another.
- 13.
For the purposes of space, I will not try to list and defend the required mental states. Rather, I will stipulate that there must be certain mental states, given Kant’s theory, but what they are is a question for another time.
- 14.
Kant’s psychological theories are often primitive at best. He assumes a vast control over behavior that does not in reality exist, such as in cases of internal compulsion. The issue of internal compulsion and Kant’s inadequate psychology will be addressed in the section on psychotic sexual predators.
- 15.
The fourth condition does not work well. In end of life decisions, I will argue later, it is wrong to burden others by requesting and using their assistance unless the agent cannot kill herself by herself. On these grounds, I contend that the first three conditions are sufficient when all three are met.
- 16.
Kass argues vehemently against suicide on the grounds that people are unable to make free decisions. The illness and its consequences are too coercive to allow for free choice (Kass 1995, 228).
- 17.
- 18.
Menzel expands Hardwig’s scope to include others burdened by the continued life. If there is a high burden placed upon others and a low prospective given to the individual for staying alive, then according to Menzel, there is an obligation to die (Menzel 2000, 97).
- 19.
The combination of reason and emotion recognizes that reasonable decisions, which are part rational and part non-rational, are how people actually make ethical choices. An overly rational approach is impossible; no one would ever be able to choose one alternative over another. On the other hand, an overemotional response ignores necessary evidence.
- 20.
One arguable legal method of killing oneself is the intentional starvation of the individual. The greatest benefit to this course of action is the medical assistance and advice the individual would have during the process, which not only makes it less violent and more effective, but also creates a caring, supportive atmosphere.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
Even if there is life after death and the entity that lives on is identical to the person, not killing the person’s body shows no disrespect to the person. The independent departed is no longer a part of the dyad; hence, it has no right to decide the disposition of the body. What is done to the body, therefore, is not done to the person.
- 24.
Claiming that the person’s continued intrinsic value as a person in her various forms overcomes the loss caused by the disrespect she shows to herself by not committing suicide does little to defeat a duty to kill oneself. Considering only the person as psychological person’s and moral agent’s intrinsic values, then a bare state of affairs in which she exists has more worth than a bare state of affairs in which she does not. To respect intrinsic value and to try to bring about the outcome that reasonably will produce the best outcome, the bare state of affairs in which the person exists is preferable to the alternative. This is a simplified view that does not reflect the much more complex reality of which the individual is part.
When considering the overall psychological and embedded person, the Practical Principle actually establishes that suicide is morally right in the circumstances. Moreover, since it is the one alternative likely to satisfy the Practical Principle in many situations, it becomes a duty for them.
- 25.
Davis (1999, 118).
- 26.
There is a debate over whether euthanasia has led to a slippery slope. On one side, it is claimed that since euthanasia was legalized in the Netherlands , there does not appear to be a slippery slope developing, although there is a contention about what euthanasia is and what it is not (Battin et al. 2007; Norwood et al. 2009) Rietjens et al. 2009). On the other, it is claimed that there are a large number of euthanasia cases left unreported (900 people annually are euthanized without asking for it), and that euthanasia is being used impermissibly for persons and moral subjects who are not terminally ill (Pereira 2011). I contend that euthanasia would occur regardless of its legal standing, and it is far better to regulate it than to allow it to remain hidden, and therefore open the door to far more abuse than already may exist.
- 27.
The negative stigma might affect available statistics on suicide because of the desire for survivors to hide what happened from outside judgment (Gorowitz 1975, 213). Even today, people tend to be reluctant to put the cause of death as suicide in newspaper obituaries or discuss how the person died.
- 28.
A more detailed discussion of appropriate emotional states appears in an earlier chapter.
- 29.
- 30.
This is actually Kant’s (1993) argument for why it is rational to believe God exists (See the Critique of Practical Reason. Part I, Bk. II, Chap. V).
- 31.
Even if the Kantian argument is insufficient to prove a duty to die, at the very least it shows suicide in these situations is morally permissible and should be legally permitted.
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Cooley, D.R. (2015). A Duty to Suicide. In: Death’s Values and Obligations: A Pragmatic Framework. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 62. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7264-8_8
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