The Practical Syllogism

Abstract

The end of practical cognition may be a particular act, yet its directing principle must be something universal. Therefore, prudence in a wider sense contains both universal and particular cognitions, and takes a syllogistic form. As an example of such a syllogism, we find first of all βούλευσις or deliberation. We said something about this previously,¹ but we must now again study the essence of this main concept of practical cognition. According to the Ethica Nicomachea,² the objects of deliberation are neither eternal things, such as heavenly bodies or geometrical figures, nor natural phenomena which always happen in the same way, such as the solstices or the rising of the stars. Nor are they the things which happen now in one way, now in another, e.g. draughts or rains; nor chance events like the finding of treasures. They are rather human affairs and what are in our power. We deliberate about what may be done by us, and not always in the same way, e.g. the healing of sickness or the accumulating of wealth, and especially what involves indefiniteness. Besides, we deliberate not about ends but about means. For a physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means, they consider by what it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only, they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is the last. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the search. Thus deliberation is the search for the series of possible means within our power. Just by this special character, is deliberation distinguished from wish. In summarizing the above statements, Aristotle says: “It seems, then, as has been said, that man is a moving principle of actions; now deliberation is about the things to be done by the agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only the means; nor indeed can the particular facts be a subject of it,.... If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.” This object of deliberation is also the object of πϱοαίϱεσις, only differing in that the object of will is determined but the object of deliberation is not. “Since the object of will is one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, will must be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.”¹ The end is said to be what we wish for, and the means what we deliberate about and will.²