Abstract
In considering an object, Aristotle always attempted to reduce it to one of his categories. But when he says that the soul is substance, he does not only reduce it to the category of substance, but also in a sense makes it the substance itself.1
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© 1965 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Ando, T. (1965). The Structure of the Soul. In: Aristotle’s Theory of Practical Cognition. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7142-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7142-9_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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