Abstract
By the Protocol of 1946,7 the governments signatory to the various narcotic treaties concluded before the Second World War, transferred to the appropriate agencies of the United Nations the power and functions exercised by the League agencies in this area of international law. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations took over, inter alia, the functions of the League Council and the Assembly concerning control of narcotic drugs, and the Opium Advisory Committee of the League ceased to exist. At its first session in February 1946, the Economic and Social Council created the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,8 and entrusted it with the power and functions which were exercised by the League’s Opium Advisory Committee. The Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (hereinafter called “the Single Convention”), abolished the Permanent Central Narcotics Board and the Supervisory Body on 2 March 1968, when the International Narcotics Control Board came into being.
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Notes
See further K.J. Twitchett, “The International Drama: The United Nations on the World Stage” in K.J. Twitchett, ed., The Evolving United Nations: A Prospect for Peace? p. 14; see also Susan Strange, “The United Nations and International Economic Relations” in the aforementioned publication, pp. 100–119.
S. Strange, op. cit. supra, p. 102.
See also League of Nations, Report of Economic and Financial Committees: Commercial Policy in the post-War World, p. 33.
S. Strange, op. cit., p. 103.
See further W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, 1964, p. 62.
G. Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order, 1971, pp. 19–20.
11 December 1946.
Resolution of the first session of the Economic and Social Council, Official Records, ECOSOC, 1st session, 1946, vol. I, p. 168; see also UN General Assembly, 1st session, Plenary Meeting, 1946, Official Records, vol. 4, p. 986 et. seq.
See “The United Nations and the Fight Against Drug Abuse,” UN publication, 1972, p. 13. The Paris Protocol was the outcome of the study directed to determine the procedure necessary for bringing the new synthetic drugs under full international control, which was initiated by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its first session in November-December 1946.
UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 3.
See below, sub. sec. 5.4.2.5.
Dr. Bowett has described this type of commission as functional commissions. See D. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, p. 69.
Although Article 68 of the UN Charter provides that the “Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields,” the term “Commissions” can be extended to include such programs and/or bodies which it may set up for the promotion of its avowed objectives.
Article 71 of the UN Charter.
See below, p. 505.
D. W. Bowett, op. cit., p. 63.
See below, Chapter 13.
Nowhere in the UN Charter has the Economic and Social Council been empowered to abolish a committee/commission created by it, although the provision of Article 68, by implication, seems to have conferred this power upon it.
See further W. A. Lewis, “The Economic and Social Council” in B. A. Wortley ed., The United Nations: the First Ten Years, (Manchester University Press, 1957), pp. 34–46.
Governments and the public at large.
See Report of the International Narcotics Control Board on its work in 1970, UN Doc. E/INCB/9, p. 1. As for example, the Board, through its report in 1970, drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Conference on Psychotropic Substances would recommend governments to implement the Protocol even before its proposed coming into force because of the gravity of the situation. The Board also suggested certain remedial measures concerning this matter.
See further L. M. Goodrich & E. Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 2nd edition, p. 385.
Ibid, p. 384; see also ECOSOC Resolution, E/437, p. 42. “1. Assistance to Member Governments in obtaining information on export personnel, research facilities and other resources that the United Nations and specialized agencies can make available to Member Governments on request, and especially to the less developed countries for aiding them in their development; 2. Elaboration of plans and programs for the most efficient utilization of such personnel, facilities and resources; 3. Assistance to Member Governments which seek expert advice in securing, on terms mutually agreed upon, such advice, particularly in the form of teams of experts who would study specific problems and recommend appropriate practical solutions for the consideration of the Member Governments concerned.”
Until the end of 1965, i.e., the date of functioning of the United Nations Development Programs, such assistance was given by the ECOSOC chiefly in the form of technical assistance, independent of the specialized agencies. The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) which operated through a Technical Assistance Committee and a Technical Assistance Board, however, allowed participation by the specialized agencies. In addition to this, it encouraged other kinds of technical assistance established for valid purposes, viz. the Special Fund which was first established in 1958 on the basis of voluntary contributions of Member States, and governed by its own bodies.
G. A. Resolution 2029(XX), 1965.
See generally UN Doc. A/C. I/758; see also C. W. Jenks, Co-ordination in International Organization: An Introductory Survey, 28 British Year Book of International Law 29–89, at p. 78 et seq., (1951).
For example, WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO.
Such reciprocal representation is a common feature between the WHO and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Also, the provisional agenda for each session of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairman wherever possible, and shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to, amongst others, the President of the International Narcotics Control Board, not less than forty-two days before the opening of the session. See Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council (E/4767). In terms of Rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules of Procedure, the Secretary-General shall notify, amongst others, the President of the International Narcotics Control Board, of the date and place of the first meeting of each session.
See further D. W. Bowett, op. cit., p. 107 et. seq.
In so far as the specialized agencies are concerned (e.g., WHO, FAO etc. in this context) they all have their own budgets, which are determined by the contributions from their own members.
See further S. Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International Organization, p. 420 et. seq.
It should however be emphasized that the system of “linking membership” would by itself result in some measure of co-ordination of policies and activities. See further Goodrich & Hambro, op. cit., p. 420.
See UN Conference on International Organizations, vol. X, p. 273.
See further D. W. Bowett, op. cit., p. 65.
The growing dissatisfaction among the developing countries with regard to the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the Council’s (ECOSOC) functions led them to create both UNCTAD and UNIDO as autonomous bodies responsible to the Assembly. See further D. W. Bowett, ibid., see also S. Goodspeed, op. cit., p. 417, and W. M. Kotsching, “The United Nations as an Instrument of Economic and Social Development,” International Organization 22 (1968): 16–43.
See further W. R. Sharp, “Decision making in the Economic and Social Council,” International Organization 22 (1968): 881–901, at p. 891. Sharp classifies such consensus into two main categories, (a) routine consensus (e.g., when considering periodic reports of ECOSOC’s Commissions, specialized agencies, UNDP Council etc,) and (b) quasi-consensus (e.g., when considering the conduct of a study or an administrative change by the Secretary-General). While the former category usually reflects unanimity, the latter, minor dissents, usually in the form of abstentions from voting or explanations of votes.
For example, resolutions involving “requests” or “recommendations” relating to program operation, intensification or invitation addressed to one or more agencies or organs within the UN family in connection with the Council’s responsibility for program planning and co-ordination. See further W. R. Sharp, op. cit. supra, p. 891.
Ibid.: see also ECOSOC Resolution 1029 (XXXVII) of 13 August, 1964.
See further W. M. Kotsching, op. cit., p. 39 et. seq.
See further the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O upon Complaints made against the UNESCO, ICJ Reports, 1956.
W. R. Sharp, op. cit., p. 900.
D. W. Bowett, op. cit., p. 63. (2nd edition.)
Ibid.
See UN Doc. A/Conf.34/24.
Res. 288(X) of 27 February, 1950, Part VIII, Article 35(b).
See below, p. 507.
E/CN.7/471, p. 3. For a general survey of the international drug control system, see P. Bean, The Social Control of Drugs (1974), 35–56.
Ibid.
Some of the original members of the Commission had also worked in this field during the period of the League of Nations, e.g., M. G. Bourgois, who was the rapporteur of the last session of the Advisory Committee, was appointed representative of France in the Commission and the representative of the United States in the Commission, Mr. H. J. Anslinger, had been working in this field since he represented his country at the Limitation Conference in 1931. See UN Doc. E/CN. 7/471, pp. 1–2.
UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 8.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 10.
Under the second category came Switzerland.
In this connection the conditions of membership of the IMF, IBRD and other such specialized agencies are instructive.
The earlier resolution, i.e., the resolution of the ECOSOC adopted at its first session provided, inter alia, “or countries in which illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem.” ECOSOC, Official Records, First Year, First Session, vol. I, p. 169.
E/CN.7/471, p. 10.
See Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/4767. As examples of such commissions of the ECOSOC, mention should be made of the Population Commission, the Commission for Social Development and the Commission on Human Rights.
UN Doc. E/5715.
The resolution of the first session of the Economic and Social Council constituted the terms of reference of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
The Rules of Procedure which had been adopted by resolution 289/X of 6 March 1950 of the Economic and Social Council, were subsequently amended by the Council resolution 481 (XV) of 1 April 1953.
The full title of this Protocol was the Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs Outside the scope of the Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Success, New York, on 11 December, 1946, signed at Paris on 19 November 1948, see UN Treaty Series, vol. 44, p. 277.
The full title of this Protocol was the Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, signed at New York on 23 June 1953, see UN Treaty Series, vol. 456, p. 3.
The “others concerned” in this matter were the other states Parties to this Protocol and to the World Health Organization.
Resolution No. 730 (XXVIII)D. E/3290.
See below, sub. sec. 5.2.1.2.
The Commission, however, still performs this function under the Single Convention, see below, p. 252.
Such questionnaires had been sent to various governments in 1947 to provide information on drug addiction.
Such comments had been invited on the draft Single Convention and also on the draft of the Administrative Guide to the Single Convention. (E/CN.7/471, p. 13).
See below, p. 500.
See pages 239, 242 and 254.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 owes the Commission much for its contribution to its preRefstion.
Germany and Japan.
In certain cases arrangements for technical assistance to various national governments had to be made as a part of the re-establishment work. See further H. L. May, “Twenty Years of Narcotics Control under the UN,” Bulletin on Narcotics 18(1) (1966): 48 et. seq.
In 1946, a Narcotics Control Working Party had been established in Germany to study the question of narcotic drugs. This Working Party was constituted of representatives from each of the four zones of Germany. (E/CN.7/471, p. 24).
Resolution No. 49(IV). (E/399); see also E/CN.7/471, p. 24.
See above, sub. sec. 4.3.4.
See Resolutions 159II B(E/1065) and 505 (XVI)B(E/2508). In fact, it was the Commission’s indomitable efforts that helped keep this matter under constant review, although public opinion played a great role in this matter. It should also be mentioned that it was due to the joint efforts of the Commission and some humanitarian organizations that this evil was brought under considerable control in the Far East, by the enactment of prohibitive laws in this regard. It was not until 1959 that Thailand enacted laws prohibiting opium-smoking.
See above, sub. sec. 5.1.
At present such reports are received by the Division of Narcotic Drugs first.
Article 21 of the Limitation Convention, 1931.
This Committee has been known as the Expert Committee on Dependence-Producing Drugs since 1965.
The Commission prepared annually a summary of the laws and regulations of various countries related to the drug-problem, but at its eleventh session decided to discontinue such Annual summaries and advised the Secretary-General to prepare a cumulative index of laws annually and a document recording the changes in the national laws and thereby changes in the scope of control. See also Official Records of the ECOSOC, 22nd session.
H. L. May, “Twenty Years of Narcotics Control under the UN,” Bulletin on Narcotic Drugs 18 (1966):21.
See also Council’s Resolution No. 770(XXX)E. (E/3422).
H. L. May, op. cit., p. 15.
Council’s Resolution 49(IV) (E/437), p. 38. The Economic and Social Council, Having noted the importance of bringing a speedy solution to the urgent problem of the limitation of production of raw materials from which narcotic drugs are manufactured, and Having noted the preRefstory work initiated by the Commission with a view to holding an international conference to deal with this problem, 1. Approves the issue of the questionnaire on raw opium by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (Doc. E/251/Add.2), and requests the Secretary-General to transmit this questionnaire to the Governments concerned asking them to communicate, on or before 15 August 1947, the information called for therein and any observations bearing on the subject which they may wish to submit, and 2. Approves the decision of the Commission to draw up a qustionnaire on the coca leaf to be considered by the Commission at its next session and subsequently to be transmitted to Governments.”
Such a proposal was originally made by the French Government.
Resolution No. 395 (XIII) (E/2152).
See below, sub. sec. 6.5.
Such an effort was made by the Commission in respect of the 1953 Protocol.
The first list was prepared by a sub-committee of experts of the Opium Advisory Committee of the League. (E/CN.7/471, p. 38).
Such lists are now prepared by the Commission itself. See also Resolution of the Council No. 505(XVI) (E/2508).
See WHO/HFD/9 and Corr. 1. It was however realized that neither a trade nor a proprietary name would be appropriate for this purpose.
See the Commission’s recommendations at its seventh session; see also the Council’s Resolution No. 436(XIV)G (E/2332).
Opium, for example, because of its smell, weight etc. is not easy to transport. In order to avert this difficulty, the traffickers usually extract the morphine near the source of production. This may be done in two ways, either by diverting the product from licit cultivation or by producing it illicitly. In some cases, however, owing to difficulties in the procedure of enforcement of law, or perhaps due to lack of consciousness of the intensity of the problem, such illicit production is allowed. On the other hand, it is easier to transport hashish, which is a refined resin of cannabis. Although cannabis itself is difficult to transport, if it is transported, difficulties are encountered in determining the amount of cannabis seized because of the various methods of assessment used in different countries. Some countries determine the amount by the weight of the whole plant while some others by the number of plants destroyed. Synthetic drugs are difficult to manufacture and, therefore, the traffickers attempt to divert the licit supply into illicit traffic.
The particulars of each case of illicit traffic were to include as far as possible: “(a) The kind and quantity of drugs involved; (b) The origin of the drugs, their marks and labels; (c) The points at which the drugs were diverted into the illicit traffic; (d) The place from which the drugs were despatched, and the names of shipping or forwarding agents or consignors; the methods of consignment and the name and address of consignees, if known; (e) The methods and routes used by smugglers and names of ships, if any, in which the drugs have been shipped; (f) The action taken by the Government in regard to the persons involved, particularly those possessing authorizations or licences and the penalties imposed; (g) Any other information which would assist in the suppression of illicit traffic.”
See below, sub. sec. 13.13.
For some time (from the ninth to the eighteenth sessions) the Commission had a Special Committee on illicit traffic.
Resolution 159 HC(VII).
Resolution 436F(XIV).
General Assembly Resolution 834(IX) (1954).
The Commission persistently requested the governments concerned to supply more authenticated samples of opium for research; see the Commission’s Resolutions V(XIII) (1956), 6(XIV) (1959) and 3(XVII) (1962).
Such a method had been experimented with not only at the United Nations Laboratory but also at the Institute for the Control of Drugs at Zagreb in Yugoslavia. This method had the advantage of simplicity and unsophistication and was therefore very easily applicable in any reasonably equipped laboratory in the world. See further UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, pp. 52–53.
Its recommendation at the nineteenth session, Refsgraph 185.
See below, sub. sec. 6.5.
See below, pp. 368–370.
Turkey was not a Party to the 1953 Protocol, yet, its Act 7368 of July, 1959 is based on the principles enunciated in that Protocol. See UN Doc. E/NL/1959/85.
In 1964, at the recommendation of the Commission and the Council (see Resolution 962B II (XXXVI) a survey was carried out in Burma with a view to ascertaining the economic and social aspects of opium production and consumption in some parts of that country. It was re-affirmed after that survey that education and effective demonstration as to the abuses of drugs would be essential to eradicate such a problem. See further Commission’s Report, nineteenth session, Refsgraph 169.
Commission’s Report, eleventh session, Refsgraph 258.
Fifth session.
Twelfth session, Refsgraph 104.
UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 3.
H. L. May, op. cit., p. 28.
The case of Afghanistan deserved special attention. Afghanistan did not participate in the 1953 Conference, and in fact, production of opium in this country went unabated. If a country could produce opium in an unrestricted way, this would defeat the basic policy of restricted supply and trade. On the other hand, prohibition of export of opium would mean that the produced opium would cause illicit traffic to thrive. With this had to be taken into account the economic dependence of Afghanistan on opium until a suitable substitute of earnings for the country had been found. It was due to the persistent pressure which was exercised by the Commission on the government of Afghanistan that finally, at the thirteenth session of the Commission, the representative of the government of Afghanistan declared that his country would implement a policy of total prohibition of cultivation, import, export, purchase, sale and trade in opium. The Commission recommended to the Council a resolution for confirmation of this policy, and the Council adopted that resolution at its twenty-sixth session. See Resolution No. 689(XXVI)H.
Iran had a deep-rooted problem. At the root of the problem was the habit of opium-smoking by the Iranians. Opium was also one of the revenue-earning products of Iran. Smoking of opium was a part of Iranian socio-cultural life. It was at the initiative of the Commission that the Council adopted a resolution to operate in Iran a technical assistance program known as Special Advisory Aid to Iran (See Resolution 626 E(XXII)). Although Iran for reasons stated above was crippled by this problem, it was through the constant co-operation and guidance of the Commission that she finally passed a law in 1955 banning the cultivation of the opium poppy and the use of opium also.
Although in November 1947, the Commission requested the governments to complete the revised questionnaire which had been sent to them with a view to assessing the existing situation on coca leaf and taking further necessary action for control (see UN Doc. E/CN.7/73) the government of Peru in the same year requested that a Commission of Enquiry should be set up to study the “effects of the use of coca leaf on the population of certain regions in South America” (see UN Doc. E/CN. 7/96; see also Bulletin on Narcotics 1 (1949):41). In March, 1948 the Council, at the suggestion of the Commission, passed a resolution approving the despatch of a Commission of Enquiry to Peru. The members of the medical team of this Commission of Enquiry were elected by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Commission also suggested to the Council that in addition to the usual enquiry, it would be advisable to hold an enquiry on the spot to study the possibilities of limiting the production of coca leaves, and at its sixth session, the Council, in appreciation of the Commission’s recommendation adopted a resolution to this effect (see Resolution 123 C(VI)). In April 1949, the Government of Bolivia also requested if the Commission of Enquiry could be extended to that country and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs considered this request in June 1949. The Commission recommended that in view of the intensity of the problem in Bolivia, and in order to enable the Commission to make a thorough study of the problem, a larger fund than that granted by the General Assembly on this account would be necessary. The Economic and Social Council, in appreciation of this recommendation of the Commission, adopted a resolution at its ninth session.
Although in November 1947, the Commission requested the governments to complete the revised questionnaire which had been sent to them with a view to assessing the existing situation on coca leaf and taking further necessary action for control (see UN Doc. E/CN.7/73) the government of Peru in the same year requested that a Commission of Enquiry should be set up to study the “effects of the use of coca leaf on the population of certain regions in South America” (see UN Doc. E/CN. 7/96; see also Bulletin on Narcotics 1 (1949):41). In March, 1948 the Council, at the suggestion of the Commission, passed a resolution approving the despatch of a Commission of Enquiry to Peru. The members of the medical team of this Commission of Enquiry were elected by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Commission also suggested to the Council that in addition to the usual enquiry, it would be advisable to hold an enquiry on the spot to study the possibilities of limiting the production of coca leaves, and at its sixth session, the Council, in appreciation of the Commission’s recommendation adopted a resolution to this effect (see Resolution 123 C(VI)).In April 1949, the Government of Bolivia also requested if the Commission of Enquiry could be extended to that country and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs considered this request in June 1949. The Commission recommended that in view of the intensity of the problem in Bolivia, and in order to enable the Commission to make a thorough study of the problem, a larger fund than that granted by the General Assembly on this account would be necessary. The Economic and Social Council, in appreciation of this recommendation of the Commission, adopted a resolution at its ninth session. The work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in respect of Peru and Bolivia may be exemplified as the type of work which it did, and still does in every such case. It studied the report of the Commission of Enquiry and took further necessary action by recommending the Council to ask the governments of Peru and Bolivia to limit the production of coca leaves and to take all preventive measures for the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. At its fourteenth session, the Council adopted a resolution to this effect (Res. 436E(XIV)). Although the Peruvian government enacted laws to combat the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs (see UN Doc. E/CN. 7/170 dated 13 May, 1949), the Commission however gave its serious consideration to the proposal made by the Commission of Enquiry that the chewing of coca leaf, which was prevalent in Peru and Bolivia, was a dangerous habit with harmful effects on the individuals and the nations at large. But in view of the inherent difficulties in the abolition of chewing coca leaf, which was a part of socio-cultural life in the areas concerned, the Commission recommended a gradual suppression of this habit and in order to achieve success by taking a multiple approach viz. by crop substitution and education, it advocated the need for technical assistance from the United Nations. Such a recommendation had not only been approved by the regional meetings sponsored by the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro in 1961 and in Lima in 1962, but had also been adopted in the form of a resolution by the Council (see Res. 548E(XVIII), and necessary action in this regard had been taken in accordance with the resolution. (For Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the coca leaf: Comments of the members of the Commission on the statements made by the representatives of Peru and Bolivia at the fifth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, (see UN Doc. E/1666/Add. 1. and E/1666/Add.l/Rev.l).) For Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf: Statements circulated by the representatives of Peru, see UN Doc. E/1666/ Add.3, and for Report of the United Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf—Commentaries from the governments of Peru and Bolivia; see UN Doc. E/CN.7/235.
Examples of such Regional Conferences are: The First Inter-American Meeting on the Illicit Traffic in Cocaine and Coca Leaves held in Brazil from 21–25 March 1960, the South East Asian Regional Conference on Illicit Drug Traffic held in Pakistan from 18–23 January 1960, the Third Arab Conference on Narcotic Drugs held in the United Arab Republic from 7–11 March 1960 and the Middle East Narcotics Survey Mission (from September to October, 1959) of the United Nations. See further Bulletin on Narcotics (October-December 1960):29–42; see also H. Nargeolet and C. Vaille, “Effort to Promote European Regional Co-ordination of Action Against Drug Addiction,” Bulletin on Narcotics 25 (1973): 1–7.
See further Bulletin on Narcotics, op. cit., p. 29 et. seq.
A United Nations Consultative Group on Narcotics Mission in Asia and in the Far East met in Tokyo from 3–12 February, 1964. It was organized as a regional project under resolution 1395 (XIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. See further “United Nations Consultative Group on Narcotics Problems in Asia and the Far East,” Bulletin on Narcotics 17 (1965): 39–46.
In 1964 the government of Thailand requested the United Nations to assist them in carrying out a survey of the economic and social needs in the opium-producing areas with a view to abolishing opium cultivation in Thailand and opium-smoking amongst its hill tribes. The Economic and Social Council complied with this request and adopted a resolution (1025C(XXXVII)C) on the basis of which a UN Survey Team was sent to Thailand. This survey was carried out in 1965–6. See further “The Hill Tribes of Thailand and the Place of Opium in their Socio-economic Setting: Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium Producing Areas in Thailand,” Bulletin on Narcotics 20 (1968):7–17.
What however constitutes “drug addiction” is a matter of controversy. None of the drug-conventions including the Single Convention defined the term, yet some of them referred to it in some form or other. The Hague Opium Convention of 1912 described it as “the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine as also of the drugs prepared or derived from these substances” (Preamble to the Convention), while the Limitation Convention of 1931 did not make any attempt to define this term, although Article 15 contained the term.
See below, sub. sec. 5.4.2.5.
Although the term “technical assistance” had been used by the Commission since the operation of this program (at its eleventh session), it was subsequently changed to “Technical Co-operation,” perhaps to emphasize the importance of international co-operation in eradicating the narcotics evil. According to one authority, however, when assistance is granted for improvement of the narcotics situation, “it goes not only to a given country: it is a means for the international Community of improving its own situation which justifies the name of co-operation for such a joint endeavour.” The present writer however believes that this meaning of the term “co-operation” is applicable to all cases of assistance, since assistance to an individual country may mean assistance to the international community at large. See further H. L. May, op. cit., p. 48.
See Resolution 626D (XXII).
In its original recommendation the Commission included the proposal for technical assistance to the inter-country projects, but this was not accepted by the Secretary-General. See also Res. 222(IX) of the Economic and Social Council in which the principles by which technical assistance should be regulated have been outlined.
Twenty-eighth session, Resolution 688 (XXVI).
General Assembly Resolution 1395 (XIV).
While the League of Arab States constituted a narcotics bureau under it, in the Middle East a Narcotics Survey Mission had been established, see UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, pp. 101–102.
Some of these Consultative Groups were: the South-East Asia Consultative Group on Narcotics Control which met in Bangkok in 1960 and the Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control which met in Rio de Janeiro in 1961. See further UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 103
For example, the Seminar on Narcotics Control Problems of Developing Countries in Africa which met in Addis Ababa in 1963, and the Consultative Group on Narcotics Problems in Asia and the Far East, which met in Tokyo in 1964. See further UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 103
Such officers were sent to South East Asia in 1961 and to Latin America in 1963–5. See further UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 103.
The words “all matters” are meant to include “all aspects of drugs,” i.e., the political, legal, administrative, economic, social, medical and scientific aspects which constitute an international problem. See also the Commentary on the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 128.
See terms of reference of the Commission, Resolution 9(1), Refsgraph 2(e), see UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, p. 3.
It should be mentioned in this connection that it has been decided to continue the work which the Commission had already undertaken prior to the coming into force of the Single Convention, e.g., the research programs to develop methods for determining the geographic origin of opium (See ECOSOC’s resolutions 159LL C(VII) (1948);246F(IX) (1949), 436F (XIV) (1952) and 626H (XXII) (1956) and also UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, Refsgraphs 118–30) and also the maintenance of the United Nations Laboratory in Geneva for conducting research into narcotic drugs (G.A. resolution 834 (IX) (1954); see also ECOSOC’s resolution 667C (XXIV) (1957).
See Commentary of the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 128. Decisions of the Commission concerning changes in the Schedules of the Single Convention (Article 3), i.e., changes in the scope of control, must be communicated to those non-parties to the Convention who are Members of the UN (Article 3, Refsgraph 7 and Refsgraph 8, sub-Refsgraph (c)).
This Article specifies the following, in particular: (i) An annual report on the working of the Convention within each of their territories; (ii) the text of all laws and regulations from time to time promulgated in order to give effect to this Convention; (iii) such particulars as the Commission shall determine concerning cases of illicit traffic, including particulars of each case of illicit traffic discovered which may be of importance; and (iv) the names and addresses of the governmental authorities empowered to issue export and import authorizations or certificates.
See Article 26 of the International Opium Convention, 1925 and Article 13 of the 1953 Protocol. Although the previous narcotics conventions had not been universally accepted, it was evidenced that a non-party, having failed to carry out the provisions of a drug convention, subsequently agreed to comply with them upon a request of the Commission.
For copy of the import certificate which is at present in operation, see UN Doc. E/NR.FORM/Rev.2 or Annex of the UN Doc. E/CN.7/484/Rev. 1.
The safeguards which were recommended by the ECOSOC on the basis of the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Organization, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Criminal Police Organization may be found in its Resolution 770 XXX E, which was adopted at its thirteenth session, see UN Doc. E/3385/E.CN.7/395, pp. 39–40.
For obvious reasons, it is not possible to prepare an exhaustive list showing the names of the organizations which may be consulted by the Commission in respect of this matter. The following are the names of some such organizations which are thought to be particularly relevant for this purpose: (1) The International Narcotics Control Board (2) The International Civil Aviation Organization (3) The World Health Organization (4) The International Criminal Police Organization (5) The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (6) The International Labor Organization.
Article 7 of the Single Convention.
Article 62 of the UN Charter: “1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned. 2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence. 4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.”
Refsgraph 2 of the resolution 9(1) of the Economic and Social Council has enumerated the terms of reference by the Commission. The provisions concerning the composition of the Commission had been amended by Resolutions 199(VIII), 845(XXXII) and III, Refsgraph 1 and 1147 (XLI), Refsgraph 4.
See Official Records of the ECOSOC, forty-sixth session, UN Doc. E/4606/Rev.1, annex IV, and forty-eighth session, supplement No. 8 (E/4785), chapter III.
See also Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, op. cit., p. 122.
E.g., hallcinogenics, barbiturates, amphetamines and tranquilizers. See also UN Doc. E/CN.7/471, pp. 72–76.
E.g., ECOSOC resolution 667D(XXIV) in respect of Khat.
UN Doc. E/4767.
Some other such functional commissions are: Statistical Commission, Population Commission, Commission for Social Development, Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women.
Rule 5.
Rule 6.
Rule 20.
Rule 28.
According to Rule 67 each sub-commission “shall meet once a year unless otherwise decided by the Council,” although the “terms of office of members of sub-commission shall begin on 1 January following their election, and shall end 31 December following the election of their successors.” See Rule 69.
Rule 72 has again provided that: “The representation of any Member thus invited shall not have the right to vote but may submit proposals which may be put to vote by request of any member of the commission.”
In fact, Article 8 of the Single Convention authorises the Commission to perform these functions (as treaty functions). It formerly performed such functions only on the basis of the decisions of the Economic and Social Council.
See the Preamble to the Convention.
See also the opinion of the Turkish delegate at the Conference, who stated that the important powers conferred on it would have far-reaching implications and would directly affect the parties. Twentieth Plenary Meeting, UN Doc. A/Conf.34/24, p. 89.
The Commission’s decisions under Article 3 of the Single Convention are subject to a different review procedure. See Article 8.
See above, sub. sec. 3.3 and 3.4.
The Single Convention came into force on 13 December 1964. By Article 45 of this Convention the ECOSOC had been given authority to fix the date on which the new Board would enter upon its duties. Meanwhile, it was decided that the functions of the Board would be provisionally carried out by the Permanent Central Board and the Drug Supervisory Body.
See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fortieth session, supplement No. 2 (E/4140); see also UN Doc. E/4158/Rev.l. (1966), E/4761 (1969) and Articles 2 and 3 of the Final Act and Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Article 9), UN Doc. E/Conf.63/9 dated 25 March 1972.
ECOSOC Resolution 1106(XL), Refsgraph 5.
Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 9(1) of the Single Convention.
Article 10, Refsgraph 1. It may however be observed that although a long term of office is often found helpful in strengthening the independence of members of any office, originally a shorter period of office for members was considered necessary with a view to offering newly independent states opportunities for membership; see also Commentary on the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 143; and Records of Conference, vol. II, p. 233.
Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 9(1) of the Single Convention.
The nominations on behalf of the World Health Organization are made by its Director-General, see Resolution of the World Health Assembly 1846 (May 1965).
According to the “procedure” adopted by the ECOSOC, the Secretary-General of the UN invites, a year before the date of actual election, all concerned to nominate candidates for the Board in accordance with the requirements of its membership which are also indicated in the invitation.
UN Doc. E/4158/Rev.l., Refsgraph 13; see also UN Doc. E/4761, Annex II, Refsgraph 13.
Even a stateless person may be elected provided that such a person has been nominated.
This Committee was set up by the Economic and Social Council and given responsibility for selecting suitable candidates from the nominees of the various governments. This Committee prepares two panels, one containing the nominees of governments and the other the nominees of the World Health Organization. The Single Convention has not stipulated any specific number of candidates to be recommended under each list, and finally selected for the Board. If however a vacancy occurs, the position will be filled by the nominating authority concerned, i.e., either the nominating government or the World Health Organization. See further Commentary on the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 134.
Article 9, Refsgraph 3. The Convention has not envisaged any situation in which the principle of equitable geographical distribution may be disturbed owing to the change of nationality of a member, or in the event of his becoming a stateless person.
In terms of Article 10, Refsgraph 6, “the members of the Board shall receive an adequate remuneration as determined by the General Assembly.” No such express provision had been made for remuneration or honorarium of the members of the Permanent Central Board. However, during both the League period and the life time of the Permanent Central Board, the members were paid honoraria or allowances. See further Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. II, p. 69, G.A. Resolution 875(IX), Refs (c) of 4th December 1954, L.N. Doc. C.760. M.260, 1924 XI, vol. I, P. 471 and vol. II, p. 139.
Article 6 of the Single Convention.
In terms of Article 15 of the Convention the Board shall submit to the Council through the Commission an annual report on its work, including an analysis of the estimates and statistical information etc.
According to Article 19 of the International Opium Convention, 1925, members of the Permanent Central Board were required to maintain high standards of a technical, intellectual and moral nature.
Although Article 19 of the International Opium Convention provided, inter alia, that the “members of the Central Board shall not hold any office which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their governments.” The strict provisions which, inter alia, implied that government employees would not be eligible for membership of the Board, could not be maintained after World War II because of the emergence of many socialist countries and also because of the shortage of qualified people in sectors other than government ones. The Economic and Social Council had therefore adopted a resolution (123D(VI) of 2nd March 1948) allowing certain categories of government employees with no direct dependence upon their governments, viz. Judges, university professors and medical practitioners to become members of the Board without relinquishing their assignments with governments. The Council also authorized the appointment of civil servants to the board provided that they, during their term of office, had terminated their functions as government officials and had not taken any instruction from their governments. (Italics added.)
Similar provisions may be found in Article 19 of the International Opium Convention of 1925. See also Article 19, Refsgraph 7 of the 1946 Protocol.
The Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council have been adopted by the Council. See Resolutions 100(V), 289(X), 481 (XV), 1231 (XLII), and 1393(XLVI) of the Economic and Social Council, its decisions of 2 August 1968 (1561st meeting) of 3 June 1969 (1596th meeting) and of 17 November 1969 (1647th meeting) and Article 68 of the UN Charter.
Article 3 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 10(4) of the Single Convention. This provision is in conformity with those of Article 14 of the Single Convention, i.e., the measures which the Board has been authorized to take to ensure the execution of provisions of the Convention.
See above, sub. sec. 4.4.3.1.
The governments are required to inform the Board as to their requirements of forms in order to enable the Board to send them a good supply. If an estimate is not supplied on the prescribed form, it may not be regarded as a qualified estimate.
The Parties are required to supply information on the following matters: (a) Quantities of drugs to be consumed for medical and scientific purposes; (b) Quantities of drugs to be utilized for the manufacture of other drugs, of preRefstions in Schedule II, and of substances not covered by this Convention; (c) Stocks of drugs to be held as at 31 December of the year to which the estimates relate; (d) Quantities of drugs necessary for addition to special stocks; (e) The area (in hectares) and the geographical location of land to be used for the cultivation of the opium poppy; (f) Approximate quantity of opium to be produced; (g) The number of industrial establishments which will manufacture synthetic drugs; and (h) The quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each of the establishments referred to in the preceding sub-Refsgraph. See also Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 19(1) of the Single Convention.
It refers to the population, age of the users of drugs, the nature of health facilities available to the population concerned, relevant data on epidemiological and other health matters.
According to the present practice governments are required to send their estimates by 1 July of the year preceding that to which they refer. See Form B 4th edition, Feb. 1979.
A “country” in this context means a “State” as a whole.
A “territory” in this context means any part of a state which will be “treated as a seRefste entity for the application of special provisions relating to international trade” as enunciated in Article 31. See also Articles 40, 41 and 42.
In examining or determining estimates, the Board usually takes into account the figures of “consumption” over the preceding three years. These figures may however be allowed to fluctuate on grounds of economic development. In order to determine the most nearly accurate estimates, the Board calls on governments to ensure that their estimates for consumption should not include any amount meant for stocks or for manufacturers, wholesalers and importers, other than the amount required by retail pharmacists. In accordance with Article 49 even during the transitional period of reservation, the Parties are required to submit, inter alia, seRefste statistics on the production of opium, coca leaves, cannabis, cannabis resin extracts and tinctures of cannabis and the production and manufacture of and trade in the aforesaid drugs for non-medical purposes. The Board has also been authorized to obtain an exclusive account of drugs by means of different figures for drugs coming under different categories, viz. (a) quantities required to be utilized for the substances of other drugs (b) of preRefstion in Schedule III and (c) the substances not covered by this Convention and the relevant form B also contains three different columns for this purpose. Prior to the coming into force of the Single Convention, only a single figure was given for the estimated amount of each drug required for conversion. The quantities required for the manufacture of preRefstions for the export of which export authorizations were not required (such preRefstions have been included in Schedule III of the Single Convention) were shown in the consumption estimates. See Article 6(l)(a)(iii) of the Limitation Convention of 1931, Article 8(l)(a) of the 1953 Protocol and Article 8 of the International Opium Convention of 1925. See also below, the section entitled “A Critical Examination of the Estimates and Statistical Returns Systems”. The Board will also expect from the Parties seRefste estimates of coca leaves to be used for the manufacture of flavouring ingredient in accordance with Article 27(2) and the amount required for its utilization for other drugs in pursuance of Article 19(4). Article 19(1) (c) however does not authorize the Board to request seRefste figures for drugs to be held in different kinds of stocks.
See below, sub. sec. 10.3 and sub. sec. 10.4.2.
It is necessary for the Board to examine the estimates speedily, especially the supplementary ones, simply because in the event of any delay the country may increase its limits and thus obtain drugs which have not been accounted for. In practice, in the case of supplementary estimates, if the Board is not in session, the Board’s Secretariat take very speedy action (even by telegraphic communication) and obtain the formal approval of the Board in due course.
Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 12, Refsgraph 5 of the Single Convention.
Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 19, Refsgraphs 1, 2 and 5 of the Single Convention.
See Article 21, Refsgraph 1.
Article 31, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (b) and Article 21, Refsgraph 4.
See below, p. 413.
(a) production or manufacture of drugs; (b) utilization of drugs for the manufacture of other drugs, of preRefstions in Schedule II and of substances not covered by this Convention, and utilization of poppy straw for the manufacture of drugs; (c) consumption of drugs; (d) imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw; (e) seizure of drugs and disposal thereof; (f) stocks of drugs as at 31 December of the year to which the returns relate; and (g) ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy. (Article 10 of the 1972 Protocol).
The corresponding provisions may be found in Articles 22(1) and 23 of the International Opium Convention of 1925 and in Article 9(2) of the 1953 Protocol. The “method” includes the “method of transmission”, e.g., by air mail, where such forms will not be transmitted to the Board’s Secretariat by a member of a delegation or by a messenger. It may also ask the countries to indicate the country of origin of drugs and their destination. See Form C/S for the Annual Statistics of Production, Manufacture, Consumption, Stocks and Seizures of Narcotic Drugs and Form A/S for the Quarterly Statistics of Imports and Exports of Narcotic Drugs. All forms should be completed in typescript.
Italics added; see below, pp. 409–410.
UN Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Records, vol. II, p. 287, footnote 33.
Article 21, Refsgraph 4. The non-parties may also be subjected by the Board to measures enunciated in Article 14 of the Single Convention and Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol, i.e., the measures to ensure the execution of provisions of the Convention.
See Form C/S Table I.
Article 2, Refsgraph 3.
See also Article 22, Refsgraph 2 of the International Opium Convention of 1925, Article 9(l)(c) of the 1953 Protocol and Form A/S of the International Narcotics Control Board (first column of parts I and II of the tables).
Under the Single Convention a system of quarterly statistical reports has also been devised according to which the Parties are required to submit to the Board such statistics on Form A/S. The Annual statistics are to be submitted on Form C/S. Such periodic checking helps the Board enter a caution to a recalcitrant government when it exceeds its quota of import and/or export.
See Form A/S, item II in the first column of Part I of the tables.
See Article 20, Refsgraph 4.
Form C/S (November 1978 edition), table II, column E.
Article 13, Refsgraph 1 and Article 20, Refsgraph 1.
Article 1 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 2(4) of the Single Convention.
Form C/S, footnote (b) to table II (13th edition, 1978); see also Form A/S, instruction 11 (14th edition, 1978).
See also Article 20, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph(e) of this Convention, Article 22, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph(e) of the 1925 Convention and Article 9, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (a), clause (iv) of the 1953 Protocol. See also Form C/S of the Board (1978 edition), table II, column F.
Italics added.
Article 12, Refsgraph 2 of the 1953 Protocol.
Articles 24 and 26 of the 1925 Convention, Articles 13(1) and 14(3) of the Limitation Convention, 1931 and Article 12(2) of the 1953 Protocol.
Article 14, Refsgraph 2, and Article 6, Refsgraph 2 of the 1972 Protocol.
Article 11, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (d) of the 1953 Protocol.
Article 14, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (b) and Article 6, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (b) of the 1972 Protocol.
Article 11, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (c) of the 1953 Protocol.
Article 14, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (a), and Article 6, Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (a) of the 1972 Protocol.
In the latter situation, the Board will ask the defaulting government either to furnish additional information or to comply with its instruction. See Articles 12(4) and 13(3). The Board may also give its comments on a particular case in its reports to the Economic and Social Council for publication under Article 15.
The Secretary-General or the Commission may have reason to believe in such failure from the annual reports of governments, see Article 18, Refsgraph, sub-Refsgraph (b).
Refsgraph 1, sub-Refsgraph (e).
Refsgraph 4, sub-Refsgraphs (a) and (b).
See Article 19(2) of the Single Convention and Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol, and Article 21(3) of the Single Convention.
There are however two exceptions to this provision which have been mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-Refsgraph (b) of Refsgraph 4 of Article 21, namely, (i) “In the event of a supplementary estimate being furnished for that country or territory in respect both of any quantity over-imported and of the additional quantity required, or (ii) “In exceptional cases where the export, in the opinion of the government of the exporting country, is essential for the treatment of the sick.”
Article 29:1. “The Parties shall require that the manufacture of drugs be under licence except where such manufacture is carried out by a State enterprise or State enterprises. 2. The Parties shall: (c) Require that licensed manufacturers of drugs obtain periodical permits specifying the kinds and amounts of drugs which they shall be entitled to manufacture. A periodical permit, however, need not be required for preRefstions.”
The Board may ask for a state enterprise system under Articles 23, 26 and 28 of the Convention.
Article 15: “ 1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work and such additional papers as it considers necessary containing also an analysis of the estimates and statistical information at its disposal, and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Governments, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. These reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Commission, which may make such comments as it sees fit. 2. The reports shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution.” In practice, the present Board like the Permanent Central Board has suggested reforms of narcotic laws and regulations in many countries on a number of occasions, and the Convention also authorizes the Board to do so. See Articles 44, 45(2) of the Single Convention and Article 11(1) (c) of the 1953 Protocol.
See Article 12, Refsgraph 3.
It is doubtful whether the embargo provisions contained in Article 21, Refsgraph 4 (which comes into operation in the case of an import quota of a country being exceeded) of the Single Convention are mandatory.
The Board may in certain cases where financial aid would be necessary to improve the situation recommend to the competent United Nations Organs and to the specialized agencies that technical or financial assistance or both, be provided to the Government in support of its efforts to carry out its obligations under this Convention. See Article 14 bis. of the 1972 Protocol.
See also Article 20 of the 1953 Protocol.
Whether or not a country or territory is directly interested is to be determined in terms of its involvement in the export or import of drugs with the recalcitrant country concerned.
Article 14, Refsgraph 3: “The Board shall have the right to publish a report on any matter dealt with under the provisions of this article, and communicate it to the Council, which shall forward it to all Parties. If the Board publishes in this report a decision taken under this article or any information relating thereto, it shall also publish therein the views of the Government if the latter so requests.”
Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 9(1) of the Single Convention.
See also Article 3 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 10(4) of the Single Convention.
See also last Refsgraph of Article 19 of the International Opium Convention, 1925 and Refsgraph 3 of Article 11 and sub-Refsgraph (a) of Refsgraph 4 of Article 12 of the 1953 Protocol, where a majority had been recommended for decisions by the Permanent Central Board.
In terms of Article 11, Refsgraph 3, “the quorum necessary at meetings of the Board shall consist of eight members.” (Article 4 of the 1972 Protocol).
Article 19.
Article 12, Refsgraph 3 of the Single Convention and Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 12, Refsgraph 5 of the Single Convention.
Before the coming into force of the Single Convention, the limitation regime was applied only to substances which came under the Limitation Convention of 1931, and the Protocols of 1948 and 1953, i.e., it was applicable only to manufactured drugs (except extracts and tinctures of cannabis) and to opium. It was not applicable to extracts and tinctures of cannabis, cannabis resin and coca leaves.
“(a) The quantity consumed, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for medical and scientific purposes; (b) The quantity used, within the limit of the relevant estimate, for the manufacture of other drugs, of preRefstions in Schedule III, and of substances not covered by this Convention; (c) The quantity exported; (d) The quantity added to the stock for the purpose of bringing that stock up to the level specified in the relevant estimate; and (e) The quantity acquired within the limit of the relevant estimate for special purposes.” In terms of Refsgraph 2 of Article 21, “From the sum of the quantities specified in Refsgraph 1 there shall be deducted any quantity that has been seized and released for licit use, as well as any quantity taken from special stocks for the requirements of the civilian population.”
Article 9(2) (a) of the 1972 Protocol, amending Article 19(2) of the Single Convention: “Subject to the deductions referred to in Refsgraph 3 of Article 21, the total of the estimates for each territory and each drug except opium and synthetic drugs shall consist of the sum of the amounts specified under sub-Refsgraphs (a), (b) and (d) of Refsgraph 1 of this article, with the addition of any amount required to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the preceding year to the level estimated as provided in sub-Refsgraph (c) of Refsgraph.”
See below, pp. 399–400.
Such statistics are to be sent to the Board by 30 June of the year following that in which the excess has occurred, see Article 20(2)(a).
See also Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 12(5) of the Single Convention, see further, Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 19.
See Article 42.
Article 14(2) of the Limitation Convention of 1931 and Article 8(11) of the 1953 Protocol.
The Permanent Central Board could impose an embargo upon a country only in the case of excessive imports.
Article 13(2)(c)(i) of the Limitation Convention of 1931.
See especially Refsgraphs 4 and 5 of Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 9 of the Single Convention.
See further Commentary, pp. 312–314. 253(b). See below, Ch. 12, fns. 46 and 47. 253(c). Article 19. Refsgraph 2.
Article 9(2).
Article 9(1) of the Single Convention read with Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol and Article 6 of the Single Convention.
See Reports of the Board to the Economic and Social Council.
Annex to Resolution 1196(XLII).
See below, sub. sec. 5.4.2.6.
The position of such members of the Board may, to a certain extent, be compared with that of an ad-hoc judge of the International Court of Justice. So far, in all but one case, (The Asylum Case, ICJ Reports, [1950]), ad-hoc judges have found in favor of their own governments. It is argued that for the same psychological reasons, i.e., the fear of loss of popularity or even of their own assignments on their return to their respective countries, such judges feel obliged to find in favor of their own governments, see further R. P. Anand, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, pp. 107–116.
Article 10(6).
See ECOSOC’s resolution 1196 (XLI I), Refsgraph 5; see also UN Treaty Series, vol. I, p. 15, Article VI entitled “Experts on Missions for the United Nations.”
Article 10, Refsgraph 2: “The term of office of each member of the Board shall end on the eve of the first meeting of the Board which his successor shall be entitled to attend.”
See also Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol.
Article 12, Refsgraph 2.
Article 12, Refsgraph 3.
Article 21, Refsgraph 1.
Article 21, Refsgraph 4 and sub-Refsgraph (b) of Refsgraph 1 of Article 31.
Article 5, Refsgraph 6 of the Limitation Convention of 1931 and Article 8, Refsgraph 7 of the 1953 Protocol.
It is however appreciated that until any definite criterion of the medical and scientific needs of drugs of various countries has been established, which is still an impossibility (infra), the determination of estimates by statistical means only will be inappropriate.
See above, p. 267.
Article 14, Refsgraph 2: “The Board, when calling the attention of the Parties, the Council and the Commission to a matter in accordance with Refsgraph 1 (d) above, may, if it is satisfied that such a course is necessary, recommend to Parties that they stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory concerned, either for a designated period or until the Board shall be satisfied as to the situation in that country or territory. The State concerned may bring the matter before the Council.” This Article is to be read with Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol: See also the Commentary on the Protocol op. cit., p. 31.
Article 21(4) (b)(ii).
Article 12, Refsgraph 3 and Article 13 of the Single Convention and Article 21 bis. of the 1972 Protocol.
Article 8, Refsgraph (b).
Article 8 of the Single Convention.
Article 8, Refsgraph (c) of the Single Convention.
The WHO Expert Committees concerned with drug dependence were known until 1956 as Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to produce Addiction, from 1956 to 1964 as Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs, and from 1964 to 1966 as WHO Expert Committee on Dependence Producing Drugs. For history, terms, reference and official obligations of the Expert Committee on Habit Forming Drugs, see WHO Doc. WHO/HFD/11 dated 14 December 1949.
The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization, WHO publication, 1958, p. 419.
See above, footnote 277.
WHO/HFD/11 of 14 December 1949, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 4.
Article 11, Refsgraph 4.
Regulations for Expert Avisory Panels and Committees, see Basic Documents of the WHO, 1975 (25th Edition), “Definitions,” p. 89; see also Resolution of the World Health Assembly 4.14 and amendment made by the Thirteenth World Health Assembly (Resolution WHA 13.49).
Regulation 4.6, see Basic Documents of the WHO, op. cit.
Regulation 4.5.1.
Regulation 4.4.
Regulation 4.2.
Article 32 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization.
Regulation 5.2.
Regulation 5.1. Neither the provisions of the Constitution of the WHO nor the Rules of Procedure for Expert Committees and their Sub-Committees indicate the procedure for determining as to whether or not a matter qualifies for receiving special instructions or opinions from any government or authority external to the World Health Organization. However, it may be observed that the word “special” indicates that it is a matter which does not fall within the ordinary competence of such a committee, and that special instructions or opinions are required owing to the technicalities attached to a matter.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure for Expert Committees and their Sub-Committees as adopted by the First World Health Assembly (Official Records, WHO, 1399,334) and amended by the Second, Fourth and Tenth World Health Assemblies (Resolutions WHA 2.84, 4.57 and 10.45).
Rule 3, Refsgraphs (a) and (b) of the Rules of Procedure for Expert Committees and their Sub-Committees.
Regulaton 2.3.
A. Loveday, Reflections on International Administration, p. 188.
Regulation 7.2.
Regulation 7.3.
Regulations 2.1.1. to 2.1.3.
This Committee, however, believed that there might be some situations in which drugs might induce physical dependence more significantly than psychic dependence. See further WHO Technical Report Series 363 (1967): 7.
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 6; see also 526, 1973 (Sec. 3), p. 16. According to Dr. D. C. Cameron, this definition “omits consideration of any possible need to control the production and distribution of a dependence-producing drug.” See Dr. D. C. Cameron, “Drug Dependence: Some Research Issues,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 43(4) (1970): 589.
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969) p. 6.
Ibid., p. 18.
This Expert Committee, like all other such committees, may also be assisted by an Expert Sub-Committee or a joint Sub-Committee in fulfilling its functions. Such committees may be established either temporarily or permanently by the Health Assembly or the Executive Committee at the suggestion of the Expert Committees. The rules governing the functions, appointment of the members, election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, Secretaryship and agenda shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to sub-committees. A member of an Expert Committee may not as a matter of right participate in the proceedings of a sub-committee. See Regulations 9.1, 9.2, 9.4 and 9.5.
The reasons for this, according to the Committee, were: “(1) Small changes in chemical structure may cause great changes in dependence liability; (2) Drugs with different chemical structures may fall within the same pharmacological groups and cause similar types of drug dependence; and (3) Within any group there is wide variation in activity and degree of abuse liability. Furthermore, kinds of drug dependence differing from those now known may appear in the future.” See WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 18.
See further WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (1969), WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 6–7.
See below, sub. sec. 5.4.2.2.
WHO Technical Report Series ibid., p. 11.
Official Records of the WHO 143 (1965): 31–32 (Res. WHA 18.47).
WHO Technical Report Series 312 (1965): 7.
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid.; see also Isbell and Chrusciel, “Dependence Liability of Non-Narcotic Drugs,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 43 (supplement) (1970).
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 18.
Ibid.
Benzodiazepines and some long-acting barbiturates.
The Committee, in 1969, referred to LSD in this category, vide WHO Technical Report Series, 407, op. cit., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 19.
W. B. Eddy, H. Halbach, H. Isbell and M. H. Seevers, “Drug Dependence: Its Significance and Characteristics,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization (1965): 721 ; see also World Health Organization Expert Committee, “Dependence Producing Drugs, Fourteenth Report,” Bulletin on Narcotics 17 (October-December 1965): 43–46 and WHO Technical Report Series, 273, 1964, p. 15 (Annex 1).
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (1966), Doc. E/4294; (1968) Doc. E/4455 (Economic and Social Council Official Records); see also Permanent Central Narcotics Board and Drug Supervisory Body (1967), Final Report, Doc. E/OB/23-E/DSB/25 (Economic and Social Council Official Records).
One of the recommendations made by the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence in 1963, which was to include “a product obtained from any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf” in Schedule I of the the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, had not been accepted by the Narcotics Commission. The Committee subsequently appreciated that the structure of a drug should not be considered to be a reliable guide to probable dependence-liability for purposes of control. See Commission on Narcotic Drugs (1968), UN Doc. E/4455, p. 5, E/3648; E/CN.7/432, p. 36. The original recommendation of the Committee had however subsequently been amended. See also WHO Technical Report Series 273 (1964): 8 and 343 (1966): 8.
See WHO Technical Report Series 57 (1952):11 (sec.7);95 (1955): 12 (sec. 12); 211 (1961): 11 (sec. 3); 273 (1964): 15; 312 (1965): 11 (sec. 9); and 478 (1971): 32–4 (sec. 4.4). The Use of Cannabis: Report of a WHO Scientific Group. This report contains the collective view of an international team of experts, and does not necessarily represent the decisions of the WHO.
On coca leaves and cocaine, see WHO Technical Report Series 312 (1965): 10 (sec. 8) and 273 (1964): 6 (sec. 2).
On Methadone Maintenance, the Committee reviewed its previous recommendations, and subsequently confirmed that as several methods of use had been devised, and as persons taking it regularly might have a dependence of the morphine type, it would be necessary to keep in view the question of final withdrawal of it from these patients. See WHO Technical Report Series 343 (1966): 9 (sec. 6); see also Sixteenth Report of the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 20–21.
The Expert Committee also reviewed the first Draft Protocol and the Revised Draft Protocol on Psychotropic Substances. See UN International Narcotics Control Board (1968), First Report, Doc. E/INCB/1 (ECOSOC: Official Records); 1969 Doc. E/4606/Rev.l., p. 71 (ECOSOC: Official Records); and p. 106 (Annex IV). The Expert Committee on Drug Dependence pointed out that “(a) since the term ‘psychotropic’ has come to be widely applied to a large class of drugs used extensively in medical therapy and (b) since many of these drugs do not produce drug dependence, there was considerable likelihood that the use of the unqualified, broad term ‘psychotropic’ to designate only the dependence-producing members of the larger class would lead to confusion and misunderstanding on the part of persons not familiar with the details of the Protocol. The Committee therefore suggested that consideration be given to the addition of a qualifying term, such as ‘dependence producing’, when speaking of psychotropic substances to be controlled under the Draft Protocol.” WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970): 9 (Refs. 3).
For example, regarding the need for control measures for certain psychotropic substances not under international control, see WHA Resolution 21.42, Official Records of the WHO 168 (Twenty-first World Health Assembly, Part I): 20.
The Expert Committee on Drug Dependence emphasized once again that a qualifying term such as “dependence producing” would be most necessary when control measures for “psychotropic substances” under the Protocol would be considered, see WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970): 9 (sec. 3), and 460 (1970): 7 (sec. 2).
WHO Technical Report Series 460 (1970): 7 (sec. 2).
See also Article 14(l)(b) of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 36, Refsgraphs 1 and 2 of the Single Convention.
See further WHO Technical Report Series 57 (1952): 11 (sec. 8); 76 (1954): 11 (sec. 8); 116(1957): 10 (sec. 10); 273 (1964): 11 (sec. 7); 312 (1965): 9 (sec. 7); 343 (1966): 11 (sec. 8) and 407 (1969): 17 (sec. 3). See also Official Records of the WHO 1965 143, 31 (WHA Res. 18.47); 1967, 160, 26 (WHA. Res. 20.42 and WHA 20.43); and 1968, 168, 20 (WHA. Res. 21.42).
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 11 (sec. 1.4), op. cit., p. 94.
Ibid., p. 18 (sec. 3). 328 Ibid.
WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970): 11 (sec. 4.1.)
Group (b) :”Drugs extensively used in medical practice, or with the potential for such use, but also presenting a substantial risk to public health. This group might include certain drugs that produce barbiturate or amphetamine type dependence. Such drugs would be available under strict control for medical practice.” WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 18–19 (sec. 3).
See below, pp. 285–286.
WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970): 11.
WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970) pp. 11–12, and 407 (1969) pp. 18–19.
WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970) p. 12.
Ibid., p. 12. The data assembled on each of the drugs included information on the following: “(a) name (b) structural chemical formula (c) symptoms of intoxication, (d) tolerance (e) psychic dependence (f) physical dependence (g) certain pharmacological characteristics (h) major dangers of abuse and (i) a tentative abuse- political rating, together with appropriate references in several languages.”
Ibid., p. 13 (italics added).
Ibid.
See above, pp. 285–286.
WHO Technical Report Series 437: 18.
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 19.
WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970): 19.
As to the nature of the broad control to be applied to group (e) preRefstions, the Committee suggested that manufacturers be licensed, and that complete records be kept as to (1) the amount of the basic drug used in their manufacture (2) the nature of the properties, and (3) the initial disposal of such properties. The Committee also suggested that the amount of drugs belonging to groups (b) and (c), utilized in making group (d) preRefstions, be reported to existing international organs. See WHO Technical Report Series, 437, p. 20.
Ibid.
WHO Technical Report Series 526 (1973): 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
See below, sub. sec. 5.4.2.5.
WHO Technical Report Series 312 (1965): 11.
“Drug monitoring is defined as the systematic reporting, recording, and evaluation of adverse reactions to drugs generally available with or without prescription.” Information on adverse reactions may be made available either through voluntary reporting, by practising doctors and hospitals, to designated centres, or by epidemiological techniques “aimed at systematic coverage of seRefste hospitals, representative samples as of the physician population etc.” The former type of monitoring is known as “spontaneous monitoring” and the latter as “intensive monitoring.” See further WHO Technical Report Series 425 (1969): 6; see also Res. WHA 20.51 (Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions, 11th edition, 1971).
WHO Technical Report Series 312 (1965): 11.
WHO Technical Report Series 425 (1969) p. 7.
Ibid.
See further WHO Technical Report Series 498 (1972) especially at pp. 23–24.
WHO Technical Report Series 363 (1967).
WHO Technical Report Series 9 (1950).
WHO Technical Report Series 363 (1967): 7–8.
Ibid., pp. 8–17; see also 437 (1970): 8 and 460 (1970): 8.
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 14; see also D. C. Cameron, “Abuse of Alcohol and Drugs: Concepts and Planning,” WHO Chronicle 25(1): 8–16.
See further UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report of the Twenty-second session, (Economic and Social Council, Official Records), UN Doc. E/4455.
See also WHO Technical Report Series 273 (1964): 13 (Annex 1); and N. Eddy, H. Halbach, H. Isbell and N. Seevers, op. cit., Bulletin of the World Health Organization (1965): 721.
The main principle behind the maintenance program is to determine whether some of the pathological effects of drug dependence may be alleviated without necessarily achieving full recovery on the part of the addict. See WHO Technical Report Series 460 (1970) sec. 3.3.2; see also 437 (1970): 25 (sec. 8); 407 (1969): 20 (sec. 6); and 343 (1966): 9 (sec. 6).
See, in general, WHO Technical Report Series 460 (1970).
See above, footnote 318 and sub. sec. 5.4.2.5.
WHO Technical Report Series 116 (1957): 11.
WHO Technical Report Series 142 (1958): 11; 160 (1959): 10, 14 (Annex 2); 229 (1962): 12; 273 (1964): 11 and 312 (1965): 12; see also Reports of the WHO Expert Committee on Mental Health, WHO Technical Report Series 363 (1967): 24 et. seq.
WHO Technical Report Series 526 (1973): 35. Of the existing information storage and retrieval systems, mention should be made of the index of the Pharmacology of the opium alkaloids, and the UN Narcotics Laboratory, apart from such laboratories in Canada, the UK and the USA. See further H. Krueger, N. Eddy and M. Sumwalt, “The Pharmacology of the Opium Alkaloids,” (US Public Health Reports, Suppl. 165, 2 vols. (1941);
WHO Technical Report Series 131 (1957): 7.
WHO Technical Report Series 437 (1970): 24–25.
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid.
WHO Technical Report Series 460 (1970): 15 et seq.
See further “UN/Thai Program for Drug Abuse Control in Thailand,” Progress Report No. 1 (Sept. 1972-June 1973), UN Doc. NAR/THA 1; See also Bulletin on Narcotics 26(1) (1974): 63–64.
WHO Technical Report Series 551 (1974): 85.
WHO Technical Report Series 363 (1967): 35 et. seq.
Ibid., p. 36.
See also Report of a WHO Scientific Group on the Use of Cannabis, recommendations had been made for multi-disciplinary research centers and information resources, WHO Technical Report Series 478 (1971): 38.
See also WHO Technical Report Series 425 (1969): 20; and 460 (1970): 35.
Ibid., pp. 39–41.
WHO Technical Report Series 407 (1969): 22.
WHO Technical Report Series 460 (1970) p. 33.
Ibid., pp. 34–37.
Ibid., p. 64.
WHO Technical Report Series 551 (1974).
Ibid., p. 8.
The broad measures suggested by the Committee were: to limit the availability of specified dependence-producing drugs, to reduce social acceptance of, interest in, and demand for dependence-producing drugs, to modify the interests and attitudes of persons at high risk of using dependence-producing drugs in a manner likely to be associated with personal and social problems, so as to reduce the probability of such use, and to reduce the incidence and severity of complications (mental, physical, behaviorial, social etc.) experienced by persons involved in the non-medical use of dependence-producing drugs. Ibid., especially, at pp. 33–35.
WHO Technical Report Series 551 (1974): 34–35; see also “Problems of Non-Medical Drug Use,” WHO Chronicle 29 (1975): 97–101.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1973), Report of Meeting on Education in More-Developed Countries to Prevent Drug Abuse, Paris 11–20 December 1972 (ED/MD/26), p. 8.
WHO Technical Report Series 551 (1974): 48–49.
Social control may be either primary or secondary. While primary control stems from family or person-to-person relationships, secondary control derives from the laws, customs and mores of the community in which a person customarily lives; op. cit., p. 21. See also T. Asuni, “Socio-Psychiatric Problems of Cannabis in Nigeria,” Bulletin on Narcotics 16 (1964): 17–28 and L. N. Robbins, A Follow-up of Vietnam Drug-Users, interim final report, Washington, D.C. Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (Special Action Office Monograph, Series A, 1).
WHO Technical Report Series 551 (1974): 51 et. seq.
Ibid., p. 49.
See also Article 8 of the International Opium Convention, 1925.
Articles 8 and 10 as amended. Incidentally, prior to the 1946 Protocol, the Health Committee of the League had been authorized to take decisions in these matters.
Article 11, Refsgraphs 3 and 4 as amended by the Protocol of 1946. Prior to this Protocol, the Health Committee of the League and ad hoc committees had been authorized to take decisions in these matters.
Article 3, Refsgraphs 3(iii), 4, 5 and 6.
See Article 2, Refsgraphs 4, 5 and 6.
See further Claude-Henri Viganes, La Convention sur les Substances Psychotropes, 12 Annuaire Français de Droit International 641–656, at pp. 644–645 (1971).
Certain committees operating within some of the specialized agencies of the UN have a different character from that of the WHO Expert Committees, e.g., the Regional Commissions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations are of a political character.
Since, by nature, it is an ad hoc committee, the regular routine tasks which are relevant to its work are, in its substance, performed by the Secretariat of the WHO. Hence there seems to be room for argument that an Expert Committee may in certain cases form its opinions on the basis of the work done by the Secretariat. This situation also gives rise to the question whether it is appropriate to give much weight to the opinions rendered by such committee which meets only occasionally and for short periods.
For example, all advisory committees of the International Civil Aviation Organization are composed of government representatives.
H. G. Schermers, International Institutional Law (vol. I), p. 100.
As experts are selected by the Director-General of the World Health Organization, it may be relevant to point out that the selection of such experts may be motivated by the exclusive individual considerations of the Director-General himself. In selecting such experts, caution should be exercised in approaching a government. In fact, it may not be advisable at all for the appointing authority to approach a government for an expert, because although a senior official, by virtue of his holding a very high position in his own service, may expect to be nominated, he may not be the right person for such an assignment. His government, however, on being approached, may be obliged to nominate him. All complications and embarrassment can be avoided if the appointing authority had the skill “to find the right man and inquire whether in the event of his services being required on a committee he could be released.” During the League period, various rapporteurs submitted names of various candidates to the League Council for its consideration. On a discussion between the rapporteurs and Directors a tentative list of candidates was prepared, which when received the Secretary-General’s authorization, allowed the Director concerned to get in touch with the respective government representative(s). The Director-General of the International Labor Organization also submits names for the expert committees directly to the Governing Body, which do not usually question any such proposal.
G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, p. 683.
H. G. Schermers, op. cit., p. 104.
According to Loveday, one way of deciding whether or not to appoint government representatives to a committee is that whenever a council “in order to save its own time or for any other reason has occasion to seek as formal an agreement as possible among governments, whether those represented on it or others, it is natural that it should appoint a committee of governments in preference to an advisory committee of experts. The function of such a committee is to negotiate rather than advise.” A. Loveday, op. cit., p. 164. The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations was also composed mainly of government representatives for obvious reasons. Its function was primarily to devise methods for reducing the burden of double taxation. In view of the complexities of the problems, and also in view of the immediate financial bearing upon various governments, the participation of government officials in such a committee was found necessary.
A. Loveday, op. cit., p. 32.
According to Loveday, the major conditions for the success of the work of an international advisory committee are: (a) that the committee acquires a corporate sense, a pride in itself, and a consciousness of its responsibilities; (b) that its members are competent to deal with the subjects on its agenda; (c) that owing to the personalities which compose it and/or to the standard of its reports it has sufficient authority to induce those to whom its reports are submitted (and in the last instance governments) to act on its advice; (d) that the committee members receive in adequate time before their meetings carefully prepared memoranda, which at once summarize the essential facts relevant to the points on the agenda and constitute a guide to their discussions. A. Loveday, op. cit., pp. 154–155.
All standing advisory committees shall have the power to advance suggestions/advice and, in fact, this advisory function is a continuing process, in the sense that in many cases advice is given in continuation or on the basis of previous suggestions or advice. Also, such a committee may keep a matter under review and put forward suggestions regularly.
The ad hoc committee system is very predominant within the International Labor Organization.
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Chatterjee, S.K. (1981). The Organizational Framework of the United Nations in Relation to the Control of Drugs. In: Legal Aspects of International Drug Control. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7066-8_5
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