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An Examination of the Agreements and Conventions on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs Concluded between 1920 and 1944

  • Chapter
Legal Aspects of International Drug Control

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Abstract

The purpose of this Agreement was indicated in its Preamble which expressed a determination “to bring about the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in and use of prepared opium, as provided for in chapter II of the International Opium Convention of 23 January, 1912, in their Far Eastern Possessions and Territories, including leased or protected territories,” in which the use of prepared opium was temporarily authorized. The Parties to this Agreement were also desirous “on the grounds of humanity and for the purpose of promoting the social and moral welfare of their peoples, of taking all possible steps for achieving the suppression of the use of opium for smoking with the least possible delay,” and therefore, they decided to conclude an agreement supplementary to the International Opium Convention of 1912.

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Notes

  1. Signed at Geneva, 11 February 1925, L.N. Doc. C.82.M.41.1925.XI. The provisions of this Agreement were not to be applied to opium solely meant for medical and scientific purposes.

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  2. China, France, Great Britain, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and Siam.

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  3. Article 1, paragraph 1.

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  4. Article 1, paragraph 2.

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  5. Article 1, paragraphs 3(a) and (b)

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  6. Article 4.

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  7. Article 3.

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  8. Article 7.

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  9. Article 8.

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  10. See Final Act of the Conference on the Application in the Far East of Chapter II of the International Opium Convention of 23 January 1912, convened at Geneva on 3 November 1924; L.N. Doc. C.82.M.41.1925.XI., p. 12.

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  11. See further, S. H. Bailey, op. cit., p. 31.

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  12. See Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol.

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  13. Opium Advisory Committee, Minutes of the Fifteenth Session, L.N. Doc. C.575.M.282.1932.XI., p. 88.

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  14. L.N. Doc. C.575.M.282.1932.XI., p. 89.

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  15. Sir John Campbell.

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  16. L.N. Doc. C.575.M.282.1932.XI., pp. 89–90.

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  17. Ibid., p. 90.

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  18. Signed at Geneva on 19February 1925; L.N. Doc. C.88(1).M.44(1).1925.XI.

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  19. See Preamble to the Convention.

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  20. Article 3.

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  21. “By Indian Hemp is understood the dried flowering or fruiting tops of the distillate plant cannabis sativa L., from which the resin has not been extracted, under whatever name they may be designated in commerce.” The Sub-committee considered that it was impossible to designate them all by reason of the numerous and varied names by which they were known in the different countries and decided merely to designate them as a whole, mentioning some of the best known among them; hashish (Arabian and Egyptian), esrar (Turkish), Chira (Tunisian) and diamba (Brazilian). See Records of the Second Opium Conference, vol. I, L.N. Doc. C.760.M.260.1924.XI, Annex 28, p. 498.

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  22. See Note by the Indian Delegate in the Records of the Second Opium Conference, op. cit., p. 499.

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  23. Article 10. On the other hand, if the Health Committee had found that a certain drug would not give rise to the drug habit on account of the medicaments with which the said drugs was compounded, the Council of the League was to be communicated the findings of the said Committee to the Contracting Parties, and consequently, the provisions of the Convention would not be applicable to that particular drug.

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  24. See the Section on the Health Committee of the League, cit. supra. 25. Ibid.

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  25. See above, p. 95.

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  26. Article 12.

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  27. Article 13, paragraph 1.

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  28. Article 13, paragraph 3.

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  29. Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 5.

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  30. Article 13, paragraph 6.

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  31. It may be observed that such a practice would give rise to a variety of authorizations, whereas a uniform import-export practice was aimed at.

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  32. Article 13, paragraph 7.

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  33. Article 18.

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  34. Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Danzig (Free City of), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Siam, Turkey, Uruguay, United Kingdom and Venezuela.

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  35. China and the United States of America withdrew from the Conference; see also footnote 52.

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  36. Article 14.

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  37. A diversion certificate was to be issued only after the receipt of an import certificate, in accordance with Article 13, from the government of the country to which it was proposed to divert the consignment, and was required to fulfil all the conditions as laid down by Article 13 of the Convention. The country authorizing the diversion of the consignment was permitted to detain the copy of the original export authorization (or diversion certificate) accompanying the consignment, would then return it to the country which issued it, notifying therewith the name of the country to which the diversion had been authorized.

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  38. Article 17.

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  39. Records of the Second Opium Conference, vol. I, op. cit., Annex 24, p. 484. Sub-committee “E” was entrusted with the task of examining a number of proposals with a view to strengthening the provisions of national and international control over the drugs to which this Convention applied.

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  40. Report of the Opium Advisory Committee, Annex 1, p. 375. L.N. Doc. C.760. M.260.1924.XI.

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  41. Ibid., pp. 377–378.

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  42. Ibid., p. 380.

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  43. Report of Sub-Committee “F,” Annex 26 (vol. I), p. 492. L.N. Doc. C.760. M.260.1924.XI.

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  44. Ibid.

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  45. Ibid., p. 493. Sub-committee F also opined that “By allowing this word to stand, we should end by including within the scope of those provisions of the Convention products which have a totally different medicinal effect or which are in any case not dangerous in the sense of those drugs we are considering.” (p. 493).

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  46. Ibid., p. 494.

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  47. Ibid., see also the First Reading of the Draft Convention, Article 1, p. 252 et. seq., L.N. Doc. C.760.M.260.1924.XI, vol. I.

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  48. Ibid., Annex 27, p. 496.

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  49. Article 5: “The Contracting Parties shall enact effective laws or regulations to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export and use of the substances to which this Chapter applies. They shall co-operate with one another to prevent the use of these substances for any other purposes.”

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  50. The Chinese delegate withdrew because there was no consensus on the prohibition of opium-smoking and smuggling by the governments in the possessions and territories in China. L.N. Doc. C.760.M.260.1924.XI. vol. I, p. 497.

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  51. Records of the Second Opium Conference, vol. I, op. cit., (Annex 6a), p. 437.

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  52. Ibid.

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  53. Ibid.

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  54. Ibid., p. 438.

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  55. Ibid., (Annex 21), p. 479.

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  56. Ibid., p. 480.

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  57. See below, the discussion on the Limitation Convention, 1931, sub. sec. 4.4.4.2.

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  58. Sir Malcolm Delevangne.

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  59. Records of the Second Opium Conference, vol. I, op. cit., p. 375.

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  60. Ibid.

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  61. This chapter related to Control of International Trade.

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  62. Records of the Second Opium Conference, vol. I, op. cit., p. 378.

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  63. Ibid., p. 379.

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  64. See further the note of M. Brenier on a system of control with indirect limitative effects, op. cit., Appendix 5, p. 396.

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  65. Ibid., p. 398.

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  66. Ibid., Annex 21, pp. 478–480.

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  67. See below, Conclusions (UN Period), footnote 52.

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  68. The proposal was, however, accepted unconditionally by Greece, India, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Persia and Turkey made reservations, while Egypt proposed an amendment to insert “for other than medical and scientific purposes.” Ibid., Annex 21, p. 479.

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  69. Hereinafter called the Bangkok Agreement. Held at Bangkok from November 9th to 20th, 1931. L.N. Doc. C. 577.M.284.1932.XI. (Minutes of the Meeting)

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  70. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI, p. 9.

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  71. Ibid.

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  72. Ibid., the Siamese government however reserved its right to sell dross to persons medically certified as dross-addicts.

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  73. 74.

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  74. The Commission was not allowed to visit China, and hence no recommendation could be made on the Chinese situation.

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  75. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI., p. 21.

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  76. Ibid.,

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  77. Ibid., pp. 21–22.

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  78. The new regulations concerning licensing of addicts came into force in Formosa in 1929. The addicts were classified into three categories: (a) opium smokers of incurable type; (b) those smokers who could be cured on compulsory treatment; and (c) those who were not confirmed opium smokers and from whom opium should have been withheld.

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  79. 1930.

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  80. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI, p. 13.

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  81. Ibid., p. 14.

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  82. Ibid., p. 14.

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  83. Ibid.

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  84. Ibid., p. 15.

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  85. Ibid., p. 16.

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  86. Ibid., p. 17.

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  87. Ibid.

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  88. Ibid.

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  89. A mobile brigade was set up in 1927 in an effort to suppress the illicit traffic by land. In 1930, an armed coastguard vessel had been brought from the government of the Netherlands Indies with a view to strengthening prevention of smuggling by sea.

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  90. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI, p. 22.

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  91. Ibid., pp. 22–23.

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  92. Ibid.

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  93. Ibid.

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  94. Ibid., p. 11.

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  95. Ibid.

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  96. Ibid.

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  97. This point was rightly raised by the Dutch delegate. It implied that a lowering of price for retail sale would not give any guarantee as to reduction of illicit sale. It would increase the total sale, both licit and illicit.

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  98. Ibid., p. 6. (L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI)

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  99. Ibid., pp. 137–146.

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  100. See Chapter 8.

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  101. See further the statement made by the Dutch delegate on this point; see also the practice followed in the case of other commodity agreements. L.N. Doc. 577.M.284.1932.XI, pp. 10–12.

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  102. Ibid., p. 123.

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  103. Ibid., it recommended that both fines and imprisonment should be the punishment “for offences having the character of illicit traffic.” An attempt to induce a minor to smoke opium should be made an offence punishable with a heavy penalty.

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  104. Ibid., p. 23.

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  105. See further the General Statement made by the Dutch delegate. Ibid., pp. 10–12.

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  106. Recommendation No. 15.

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  107. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI. Annex 6, p. 124.

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  108. Recommendation No. 17.

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  109. Recommendation No. 4.

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  110. See the opinion of the Dutch delegate, L.N. Doc. C.577.M.283.1932.XI., p. 10.

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  111. Recommendation No. 18.

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  112. Recommendation No. 19.

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  113. The United States however justified its presence on the strength of The Hague Convention of 1912.

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  114. L.N. Doc. C.635.M.254.1930.XI., p. 137.

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  115. S. H. Bailey, op. cit., p. 34.

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  116. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI., p. 24.

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  117. See also the statements made by the Dutch and US delegates. The US delegate said: “It will, I think, be admitted that the habit of opium-smoking is injurious, and that this holds true no matter where the addict resides. For that reason, my Government has felt that there is no moral justification for a double standard in this matter, and that it would be entirely inconsistent to permit the use of smoking opium by a rationing system or otherwise in the Philippine Islands, while recognising the fundamental evil of the habit by absolutely proscribing the drug in the home country.” Ibid., p. 12 and p. 24 respectively.

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  118. See the proposal made by the British delegate, ibid., p. 26.

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  119. Ibid., p. 16; this view was also supported by the Indian delegate, p. 21.

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  120. See Recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry, L.N. Doc. C.577. M.284.1932.XI., p. 125.

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  121. For the text of this Agreement see 51 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 337. See also generally, W. W. Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem—The Geneva Conferences, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1925.

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  122. L.N. Doc. C.577.M.284.1932.XI (Annex 7), p. 126. See also L.N. Doc. 635.M.254.1930.XI.

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  123. L.N. Doc. C.455.M.193.1931.XI (26 August 1931).

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  124. International Administration of Narcotic Drugs, 1928–1934, Geneva Special Studies, vol. VI, No. 1. Geneva Research Centre, p. 6.

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  125. See above, p. 137.

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  126. See above, sub. sec. 4.2.3.2. Although the Bangkok Conference recommended limitation and control of poppy cultivation, instead of limitation of the manufacture of drugs, the underlying policy in both instances would be the same, i.e., a restrictive supply at the source.

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  127. The Opium Convention of 1912 and the International Opium Convention of 1925.

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  128. Article 25.

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  129. See below, sub. sec. 11.2.5.

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  130. See below, pp. 159–165.

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  131. Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Convention.

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  132. Article 2.

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  133. Article 5, paragraph 4.

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  134. Article 2, paragraph 3.

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  135. See below, sub. sec. 4.4.4.2.

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  136. Article 5.

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  137. Article 5, paragraph 3.

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  138. See above, sub. sec. 3.4.2.

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  139. In the case of any drug which was or might be included in Group II a summary statement was sufficient.

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  140. See below, p. 151.

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  141. Article 21 of the International Opium Convention, 1925.

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  142. See further B. Renborg, op. cit., p. 100; see also Statistical Form B(G).

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  143. Article 6, paragraph 2.

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  144. Article 9.

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  145. See also B. Renborg, op. cit., p. 137.

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  146. Articles 16 and 17.

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  147. See below, sub. sec. 4.4.4.1.

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  148. It is understood that in a certain year world manufacture fell below the world requirements and as a result, the world stock had to be depleted. It was however re-constituted in the following year by increased manufacture within the limits of the estimates. See further B. Renborg, op. cit., p. 139.

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  149. Article 11.

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  150. See above, p. 100.

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  151. Article 11, paragraph 6.

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  152. Article 12, paragraph 2.

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  153. See above, p. 92.

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  154. For the determination of which account would have to be taken of the provisions of Articles 5 and 14 of this Convention.

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  155. Article 14, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (i).

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  156. See above, p. 92.

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  157. See below, pp. 157–162.

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  158. See also S. H. Bailey, op. cit., p. 79.

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  159. See below, pp. 168–178.

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  160. Article 15.

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  161. Article 17.

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  162. A specific provision was made regarding diacetylmorphine that in all cases it was to be either destroyed or converted.

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  163. Article 19.

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  164. See further S. H. Bailey, op. cit., 89–90.

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  165. See further B. Renborg, op. cit., p. 139.

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  166. Article 5, paragraph 7.

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  167. Dr. Knaffl-Lenz was a member of the Health Section of the Health Committee in 1923. The Opium Section entrusted him with the task of considering the problem concerning prohibition of the manufacture of heroin. The report which he prepared, on the basis of the information supplied by sixteen European States representing a population of 250 millions, established an estimate of 400 milligrams of raw opium per head under the existing conditions and information of the time.

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  168. Report on the Work of the Opium Committee, (1924). L.N. Doc. C.588. M.202.1924, Annex 35, p. 57.

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  169. L.N. Doc. O.C. 1112.

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  170. L.N. Doc. C.C.P. 89.

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  171. L.N. Doc. C.H. 1090, p. 16.

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  172. See the Memorandum submitted by Dr. Wasserburg to the Sub-Committee for the limitation of manufacture of narcotics drugs. L.N. Doc. C.H. 849.

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  173. L.N. Doc. C.H. 109(a), p. 10.

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  174. Reports of the Plenary Meeting of Official Representatives of the Manufacturing Countries) L.N. Doc. C.669.M.278.1930.XI., p. 2.

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  175. See further B. Renborg, op. cit., p. 136.

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  176. Ibid., pp. 114–115.

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  177. Some countries made excessive estimates of the “reserve stocks” required and this was pointed out by the Supervisory Body. L.N. Doc. 610.M.286.1933.XI., pp. 6–7.

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  178. See also S. H. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 92 et. seq.

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  179. See Articles 12 and 14.

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  180. Article 5, paragraph 6.

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  181. Records of the Conference, vol. I, op. cit., p. 221.

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  182. S. H. Bailey, op. cit., p. 95.

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  183. Ibid., p. 73.

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  184. Ibid., pp. 73–74.

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  185. Article 13 of the Convention.

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  186. Relevant parts of Article 22 of the International Opium Convention, 1925: Paragraph 1: “The Contracting Parties agree to send annually to the Central Board... as complete and accurate statistics as possible relative to the preceding year, showing: sub-paragraph (b) “Manufacture of the substances covered by Chapter III, Article 4(b), (c) and (g) of the present Convention and the raw material used for such manufacture. The amount of such substances used for the manufacture of other derivatives not covered by the Convention shall be separately stated.”

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  187. Article 22(1) (c) and (e) of the International Opium Convention, 1925: sub-paragraph (c) “Stocks of the substances covered by Chapters II and III of the present Convention in the hands of wholesalers or held by the government for consumption in the country for other than government purposes.” sub-paragraph (e) “Amounts of each of the substances covered by the present Convention which have been confiscated on account of illicit import or export; the manner in which the confiscated substances have been disposed of shall be stated, together with such other information as may be useful in regard to such confiscation and disposal.”

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  188. Article 22, paragraph 2 of the International Opium Convention, 1925: “The Contracting Parties agree to forward to the Central Board, in a manner to be prescribed by the Board, within four weeks after the end of each period of three months, the statistics of their imports from and exports to each country of each of the substances covered by the present Convention during the preceding three months. These statistics will, in such cases as may be prescribed by the Board, be sent by telegram, except when the quantities fall below a minimum amount which shall be fixed in the case of each substance by the Board.”

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  189. Article 5, paragraph 6.

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  190. Reports of the Plenary Meeting of Official Representatives of the Manufacturing Countries, op. cit., p. 3.

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  191. See above sub. sec. 4.4.4.1.

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  192. See further Reports of the Plenary Meeting of Official Representatives of the Manufacturing Countries, op. cit., p. 4.

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  193. Ibid.

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  194. The manufacturers, in the case of conversion of morphine into Codeine, treated the question in a manner quite different from that followed by the Opium Advisory Committee. Ibid., p. 5.

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  195. Ibid.

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  196. Ibid., p. 6.

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  197. Ibid., until about three years before the Limitation Conference, Turkey did not manufacture any drug at all.

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  198. Ibid.

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  199. L.N. Doc. C.168.M. 62.1931.XI., p. 5.

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  200. Ibid.

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  201. Records of the Limitation Conference, vol. I, pp. 105–106.

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  202. L.N. Doc. C.286(1). M.174(1).1936.XI (1 January 1937).

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  203. See above, sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this chapter.

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  204. In many parts of the world illicit factories and laboratories had been discovered. The Opium Advisory Committee had reported innumerable cases of clandestine traffic in drugs between 1929 and 1936. See Reports of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs to the Council on the work of Twentieth, Twenty-first and Twenty-second sessions, L.N. Doc. C.253. M.125.1935 XI, C.278.M.168.1936.XI and C.285.M.186.1937.XI.

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  205. See Preamble to the Geneva Agreement on Opium, 1925, and the recommendations made in the Agreement for the prevention of traffic in drugs and punishment of traffickers, Articles III, VII and VIII; see also the Bangkok Agreement of 1931, especially Recommendation Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 16.

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  206. J. G. Starke, The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 31 American Journal of International Law (1937) p. 3.

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  207. Ibid.

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  208. See further L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI. Annex 1, pp. 177–179, at p. 179.

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  209. See further L.N. Doc. O.C. 1636, 1936.

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  210. Article 15 of the Limitation Convention, 1931. “The High Contracting Parties shall take all necessary legislative or other measures in order to give effect within their territories to the provisions of this Convention. The High Contracting Parties shall, if they have not already done so, create a special administration for the purpose of: (a) Applying the provisions of the present Convention; (b) Regulating, supervising and controlling the trade in the drugs; (c) Organizing the campaign against drug addiction, by taking all useful steps to prevent its development and to suppress the illicit traffic.”

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  211. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Minutes of the Sixteenth session, L.N. Doc. C.480.M.244.1933.XI., p. 85.

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  212. See further J. G. Starke, op. cit., p. 3 et. seq.

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  213. Records of the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI., p. 185.

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  214. Ibid.

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  215. This Article did not, however, indicate whether these offences would be punishable in equal severity to those imposed for offences enumerated in Article 2.

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  216. Article 29 of the International Opium Convention, 1925: “The Contracting Parties will examine in the most favourable spirit the possibility of taking legislative measures to render punishable acts committed within their jurisdiction for the purpose of procuring or assisting the commission in any place outside their jurisdiction of any act which constitutes an offence against the laws of that place relating to the matters dealt with in the present Convention.”

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  217. See further J. G. Starke, op. cit., p. 3 et seq.

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  218. Offences which have been detailed in Article 2 of this Convention.

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  219. See further J. G. Starke, op. cit.

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  220. L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.X., p. 194.

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  221. Article 11.

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  222. Article 11(2) (a), (b) and (c).

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  223. Article 11(4).

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  224. Article 12(2) (a), (b) and (c).

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  225. Article 13.

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  226. Article 13(1) (b).

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  227. See further L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI, p. 198.

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  228. Ibid., p. 199. The Sudanese government also preferred the system of communication through the diplomatic channels, since that was the existing practice of that government. Ibid., p. 198.

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  229. See further G. Schwarzenberger, Economic World Order? A Basic Problem of International Economic Law, p. 25.

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  230. L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI., p. 180.

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  231. See the opinion of the delegate of the USSR, L.N. Doc. C.341. M.216.1936.XI., p. 180.

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  232. See Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed to Study the Draft Convention Submitted by the International Criminal Police Commission, as presented to the Opium Advisory Committee during its sixteenth session, (Annex 1), L.N. Doc. C.341. M.216.1936.XI., pp. 178–179.

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  233. The Convention also presumed “crimes by analogy,” which is a very impractical presumption because many countries do not recognize this principle, e.g., W. Germany; see Dr. N. Henrichs, “Problems of Competence in International Law with regard to the Punishment of Narcotic Drug Offences and the Extradition of Narcotic Offenders,” Bulletin on Narcotics, 12 (1) (1960): 1–7, at p. 3.

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  234. This view was expressed by the Austrian delegate at the Conference; see L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI, p. 181 (Annex 2).

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  235. L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI., p. 184 (Annex 2).

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  236. Ibid.

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  237. Such an apprehension was also expressed by the Swedish delegate at the Conference; L.N. Doc. ibid., p. 183 (Annex 2). Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 15 that “the present Convention does not affect the principle that the offences referred to in Articles 2 and 5 shall in each country be defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with the general rules of its domestic law” was reassuring, although it appears to be contradictory to the basic purpose of the Convention.

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  238. J. G. Starke, op. cit., p. 45.

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  239. See the opinion of the Egyptian delegate, L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI., p. 186 (Annex 2).

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  240. L.N. Doc. Ibid., pp. 182–184. The Swiss delegate also pointed out that the “Federal and Cantonal Criminal laws draws a distinction, as regards the various forms of offences, between the punishable forms of the perpetrated offence and attempts and preparatory acts, which are not punishable. Some preparatory acts, as in the case of counterfeiting currency, may be punishable. To be so, however, these acts must be specifically declared to be punishable by law.” L.N. Doc. ibid., p. 183. The Spanish delegate however commented on the draft Convention that the draft “departs to a certain extent from this distinction” (i.e., distinction between preparatory act and an attempt), “since, although it appears to maintain it, it recognizes a greater possibility than has hitherto been admitted as regards the punishment of preparatory acts. It might be preferable, if it is desired to punish these acts in certain cases, to abandon the criterion of a ‘commencement of execution,’ because this already constitutes an attempt, and in the enumeration of those acts to adopt, owing to their exceptional nature, the ‘numerus clausus’ criterion. It would even be better to leave the determination of preparatory acts and attempts to the legislation of each country...” L.N. Doc. ibid., p. 188.

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  241. The vague expression, “preparatory act” was however avoided in the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency which “deals with offences involving more serious and more precise preparatory acts.”

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  242. Comments of some of the delegates at the Conference; see L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI., p. 186 (Annex 2).

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  243. The question of a drug changing hands by means of a gift or loan was mentioned by the Spanish delegate, L.N. Doc. ibid., p. 187.

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  244. L.N. Doc. ibid., p. 189.

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  245. The Canadian delegate found justification for such a provision on the strength of a similar provision contained in Canadian legislation, L.N. Doc. ibid., p. 182.

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  246. See also Dr. Henrichs, op. cit., p. 6.

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  247. Starke observed that “this Article has not entirely lost its significance. A new dimension has been added to it as a result of the post-war practice of concluding peace-time status of forces agreements, wherejurisdiction may be exercisable by the sending State in the territory of the receiving State over members of the visiting force, and over accessory civilian or depot personnel.” op. cit., p. 46.

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  248. Such an opinion was expressed by the Sudanese delegate at the Conference. Colombia and India also objected. See L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI., p. 186 (Annex 2).

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  249. J. G. Starke, op. cit., p. 45.

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  250. France, Germany and Great Britain.

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  251. See R. v. Governor of Holloway Prison, ex parte Buddenborg 14T.L.R. 252 [1898]; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Calberla 2K.B. 861 [1907]; and R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte van de Auwera 96 T.L.R. 821 [1907].

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  252. The term “political offence” is usually associated with “diplomatic asylum.” The definition of the term “political offence” is enmeshed with controversy. According to Judge Alvarez, any act “which purports to overthrow the domestic political order of a country must be regarded as a political offence.” The Asylum case, I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 298. According to one authority, the definition of a “political offender” may even be extended to mean a person who is “persecuted for political reasons,” as explained in a purely declaratory manner in Article 2 of the Montevideo Convention, 1939, see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Azevedo in the Asylum case, ibid., at p. 334; for a very instructive discussion of the various aspects of extradition, see Francis (Sir) Piggott, Extradition: A Treatise on the Law Relating to Fugitive Offenders (London, 1910). According to Schwarzenberger, “In international law, the concept of political crime is entirely a creation of treaties. Thus, parties to treaties on extradition or diplomatic asylum are free agents in defining this term by objective or subjective criteria or restricting its meaning by the exclusion of certain crimes from the category of political crimes.” G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. I (London, 1957), p. 262. He also pointed out that, if “as in the Havana Convention of 1928, the parties have failed to express their intention, the question resolve itself into one of treaty interpretation.”

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  253. This point was emphasized by the delegates of Canada, Spain, Sudan and the USSR at the Conference, L.N. Doc. op. cit., (note 249) p. 191 (Annex 2).

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  254. Article 9, paragraph 4 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 1936: “The High Contracting Party to whom application for extradition is made shall, in all cases, have the right to refuse* to effect the arrest or to grant the extradition of a fugitive offender if his component authorities consider that the offence of which the fugitive offender is accused or convicted is not sufficiently serious.”

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  255. *italics added.

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  258. Ibid.

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  259. Article 11, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b).

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  260. This Article primarily dealt with the provision concerning transmission of letters or request relating to the offences referred to in Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention.

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  261. L.N. Doc. op. cit., p. 197 (Annex 2).

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  262. See further W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, p. 11 et. seq.

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  263. Ibid., p. 21.

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  264. Ibid., p. 62; see also P. Jessup, Transnational Law, pp. 15–16.

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  265. G. Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers of International Law, pp. 16, 29 and 34.

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  266. According to Schwarzenberger, “Functional international co-operation is an ambiguous term. It may stand for a specific approach to the solution of any international problem, but it has come to mean more particularly international co-operation in economic, social, cultural and educational matters. This restrictive use of the term is not accidental. In principle, any social question can be treated from a functional point of view. Then, ends and means are considered with sole reference to circumstances which are intrinsically relevant to the constructive solution of the problem in hand. Conversely extraneous factors are ignored. Thus, to any extent to which international functional co-operation requires a curtailment of sovereignty, it is assumed that, in the interest of the task in hand, States are willing to acquiesce in a corresponding restriction of their freedom of action. Functional co-operation in this sense is a typical community attitude. An international community would be expected to approach any cital problem in this spirit, whether it were that of peace-making, peaceful change, collective security, disarmament or economic co-operation.” G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, p. 420.

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  267. See below, pp. 199–201.

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  269. See above, p. 187.

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  271. Ibid., p. 237.

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  272. i.e., the Opium Advisory Committee.

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  275. See further W. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 90.

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  278. See above, sub. sec. 2.2.2.2.

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  279. The Permanent Central Board was, however, given extensive power of inquiring into the drug-situation in a country, and of bringing such a situation to the attention of the Contracting Parties, and of the Council of the League. The Board could also recommend total ban on export until that situation had been improved. See further Articles 24 and 25.

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  280. Article 5.

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  281. See Minutes of the Conference, op. cit., p. 133; see also Renborg, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

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  282. This Convention came into force on 25 September 1928. Ratification by ten Powers was required.

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  283. See further S. H. Bailey, op. cit., p. 75.

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  284. See Article 24.

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  285. See further H. L. May, “The Evolution of the International Control of Narcotic Drugs,” Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. 2 (1) (July, 1950) p. 3.

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  290. Ibid.

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  291. Ibid.

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  292. All orders received would have to be referred in the first instance to the central office, which would record them and certify, after examination of previous records, whether they could be executed in whole or in part without exceeding the country’s estimate. The governments of the exporting countries would undertake not to authorize the export in whole or in part of the drugs ordered until a certificate had been produced from the central office certifying that the order of a part of it fell within the limits of the importing country’s estimate. It was primarily a matter of honest and efficient book-keeping. See further L.N. Doc. op. cit., p. 7.

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  293. Ibid., the Soviet delegate stated that it could not associate itself with any proposal that would place the central office in the hands of the manufacturers.

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  294. See above, pp. 160–162.

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  295. See above, pp. 162–163.

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  297. See above, p. 170.

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  298. See further L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (vol. I), 8th ed., p. 698.

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  300. Valentine, Police Commissioner of New York City v. US ex rel. B. Coles Neidecker, 299 US 5 at p. 9 (1936).

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  301. In the case of federal countries, where the laws relating to crimes vary from State to State, no general principle has yet been established as to whether the federal or local law of the requisitioned State would be applicable. See Factor v Laubenheimer, 290 US 276 (1933). This decision was however criticized on the grounds that in rendering its decision, the court took the terms of the treaty into account only, and ignored the technical considerations involved in the case. See further J. Brierly’s report to the Committee of Experts of the League of Nations, 1926, L.N. Doc. L. 1926.V.8., p. 3; see also the Harvard Draft Convention of Extradition of 1935, 29 American Journal of International Law (supplement) 1935. In these two documents it was suggested that the degree of punishment in both countries should be taken into consideration.

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  302. See further R. E. Clute, “Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition,” 8 American Journal of Comparative Law, 1959, p. 17. The Fugitive Offences Act, 1967 which was formulated in pursuance of the Scheme of Commonwealth rendition, as adopted in the Commonwealth Conference of 1966, maintained that rendition should not be ordered if in the opinion of the Secretary of State or a relevant court that the nature of the offence is political or that the accused would not be punished for political reasons. See mainly S. 14.

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  304. In 1924 and 1925. The Japanese delegate maintained that Japan would find it difficult to recognize the principle embodied in Article 4 (which became Article 8 in the final version of the Convention) as a general rule.

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  306. Ibid.

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  309. See further Henrichs, op. cit., p. 4.

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  310. See below, sub. sec. 11.1.4 and 11.2.4.

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  311. The term “national interest” has been used in International Relations to mean the interests upheld by individual nation(s) at all costs which may clash with global ideals. For a good analysis of “national interest” as is used in International Relations, see J. Frankel, National Interest (London, 1970); H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, 1967); and W. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 47 et. seq.

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  312. See further J. D. B. Miller, The Nature of Politics, p. 13 et. seq.

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  316. Ibid., p. 510.

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  317. See below, pp. 200–202.

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  318. For a good account of the factors leading to the creation of the League, see F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations.

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  320. Ibid., p. 5.

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  321. Ibid., p. 7.

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  322. For the concept of Imperial Universality, see G. Schwarzenberger, The League of Nations and World Order, p. 4.

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  323. Ibid., p. 18.

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  325. See below fn. 52 (UN Period) (conclusions)

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  326. For these examples see further, G. Schwarzenberger, Economic World Order?, pp. 132–134.

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  334. The other rules set out by this Article were: to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children, to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under the control of the Members of the League, to entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, trade in arms and ammunitions with the countries in which the control of this traffic was necessary in the common interest, to secure and maintain freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League and also to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

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  339. Ibid.

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  340. The expression “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” begs questions. What is the standard which determines a “civilized nation”? For a good discussion of such general principles, see C. Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International Law, chapter 4.

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  342. Article 24 of the International Opium Convention, 1925, Article 14 of the Limitation Convention, 1931, and Articles 2, 4, 9 and 10 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 1936.

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  1. International Law and the Law of European Institutions, School of Business Studies, City of London Polytechnic, London, UK

    S. K. Chatterjee LL.M., Ph.D. (London) (Senior Lecturer)

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Chatterjee, S.K. (1981). An Examination of the Agreements and Conventions on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs Concluded between 1920 and 1944. In: Legal Aspects of International Drug Control. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7066-8_4

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