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International Action for the Control of Trade and Traffic in Drugs between 1909 and 1919

  • Chapter
Legal Aspects of International Drug Control

Abstract

In this chapter an attempt will be made to show the progress made by states in their first effort to control the trade and traffic in opium and other allied substances by convening an international conference which is known as the Shanghai Opium Conference.1 An attempt will also be made to depict the conflict of interests, both economic and political, among states and also the state of the economic order until the First World War. Such a study will help assess the improvements, if any, made in international economic relations during the period under consideration and establish working hypotheses for further research. An account will also be given of the activities of non-governmental organizations which were engaged in this area of international law. The aim is to produce a purely factual narrative, as neutral as possible, and to draw logical conclusions; speculation on motives will be kept to a minimum; otherwise, the whole study would be rendered too hypothetical.

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Notes

  1. In his inaugural speech the President of the Shanghai Commission mentioned, inter alia, the following: “It devolves upon me to pronounce with emphasis that this is a Commission, and as those who are informed—as all of you must be in matters that pertain to international affairs of this kind—a Commission is not a Conference. The idea of a Conference was suggested, but it seemed wise to choose this particular form of action rather than a Conference, because, for the present at any rate, we are not sufficiently well informed, and not sufficiently unanimous in our attitude, to have a Conference with any great hope of immediate success.” Report of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909, 1–26 February 1909, vol. I—Report of the Proceedings, p. 12.

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  2. H. Wright, The International Opium Commission, A.J.I.L. 648–673 (1909).

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  3. Siam had no treaty relations with China, but was considered to be an important participant on account of her monopoly in the manufacture and distribution of smoking opium. For Russia, vicinity was considered to be the principal factor for participation.

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  4. Report of the International Opium Commission (IOC), 1909, op. cit., p. 10.

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  5. Ibid., p. 34. Apart from adopting a general policy for the suppression of the illicit traffic in opium, the Commission decided to formulate appropriate policies of an international character which would assist China in fulfilling her goal of eradicating the opium evil from the country.

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  6. Ibid., p. 20.

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  7. Brackets added.

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  8. Report of the IOC, 1909, vol. 1, p. 11. The President of the Commission observed that, “The emotional stage finds expression in agitation. We have had agitation. Now I believe we are at least midway in the second or scientific stage, when men deal with ascertained fact, and on the basis of ascertained fact reach certain conclusions of a practical character that will enable those upon whom the responsibility rests to arrive at some final conclusion.”

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  9. Report of the IOC, vol. 1, ibid., p. 34.

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  10. Telegram from the President of the United States of America (President Roosevelt). See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 14.

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  11. See above, (chapter 1, pp. 30–31).

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  12. For example, the use of opium was widespread among the Chinese population in Macao, Portugal. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Portugal and China of 1887 also covered the trade relationship in opium between the two countries and the Superintendencia da Fiscalicacao da Importacao e Exportacao de Opio Cru had control over the importation and exportation of opium. In spite of such regulations, private individuals in Macao started the industry of boiling crude opium into smoking opium and shipping it abroad, which was ultimately taken over by a Chinese Syndicate. Macao had a large internal consumption, and opium was sold in smoking dens “where the coolies would call for a chat and a smoke to pass the time of day,” apart from sale through licensed shops. See further P. Lowes, The Genesis of International Narcotics Control, p. 132; see also the Memorandum on the Opium Question presented to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai by the Portuguese delegate, Report of the IOC, 1909, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 8. (Trade in opium between Macao and China was subject to the tariff annexed to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, which was in force in 1887.)

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  13. In 1905 the value of the opium export amount to 730,000 pounds Turkish. As the Turkish government published neither accounts nor estimates of revenue and expenditure, it was impossible to state the revenue tariff from opium. See further H. Wright, op. cit., p. 667.

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  14. Turkey has recently adopted preventive measures (in a rather limited way) with regard to the growth of poppies and production of opium.

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  15. Report of the International Opium Commission, vol. 2, p. 167. Australia herself imported a considerable amount of opium prior to the proclamation of 29 December 1905 imposing the prohibition of opium other than for medicinal and legitimate purposes. The following table gives an account of the import and export of opium into the Commonwealth prior to the date of prohibition. See Report of the International Opium Commission, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 168.

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  16. New Zealand was the only country having no problem with regard to traffic in opium, see above, p. 18 (chapter 1).

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  17. In this connection see D. E. Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India, op. cit., p. 340. According to him, the “beginnings of international action against the drug traffic form no essential part of Anglo-Chinese opium relations.”

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  18. China, India and Portugal.

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  19. See below, pp. 119–121.

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  20. See below, pp. 271–273.

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  21. See below, chapter 4, Sec. 4.4.

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  22. See further, Report of the IOC, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 84.

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  23. See chapter 4.4.

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  24. Text of Resolution No. 2: “Be it Resolved therefore, that in the judgment of the International Opium Commission, the principle of the total prohibition of the manufacture, distribution and use of smoking opium is the right principle to be applied to all people, both nationals and dependents and protected; and that no system for the manufacture, distribution or use of opium smoking should continue to exist, except for the express purpose and no other of stamping out that evil of opium smoking in the shortest possible time.” See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 47.

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  25. See Resolution No. 2 of the Shanghai Opium Commission.

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  26. The dissent expressed by the Chinese delegate from the opinion voiced by the Dutch delegate was that “Whereas, the total eradication of the use of opium within a few years is to be considered a high but at present unattainable ideal.” See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 62.

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  27. Ibid., p. 63.

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  28. Ibid.

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  29. Ibid.

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  30. Text of the US Resolution: “That whereas, the reports submitted to the International Opium Commission by the Delegates present indicate that though each Government represented is best able by its National Laws to control its own internal problem as regards the manufacture, importation or abuse of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations, yet that not Government, represented may by its National Laws wholly solve its own opium problem without the conjoint aid of all those Governments concerned in the production and manufacture of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations: Be it Resolved, therefore, that in the judgment of the International Opium Commission, a concerted effort should be made by each Government represented in the Commission to assist every other Government in the solution of its internal opium problem. That, whereas, the reports submitted to the International Opium Commission by the Delegations present, directly or immediately recognize that the foregoing resolutions cannot be made effective except by the conjoint action of the Government concerned: Be it Resolved, therefore, that the Commission as a whole, record its sense in favour of the principle of an International Conference for the solution of the problem.” See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 48.

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  31. Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 53.

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  32. Ibid.

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  33. Certain other speakers were, however, of the opinion that this resolution was very similar to Resolution No. 4. The proposal was advanced by the Japanese delegate, His Excellency T. Miyaoka. See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 53. In this connection the suggestion of the British delegate in respect of Resolution No. 4 (which was an American resolution) may also be referred to. The original American Resolution read as follows: “That, whereas, the reports submitted to the International Opium Commission by the Delegations present, record that each Government has strict laws which are aimed directly or indirectly to prevent the smuggling of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations into their respective territories. Be it Resolved therefore, that in the judgment of the International Opium Commission, it is the duty of all countries which continue to produce opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations, to prevent at ports of departure the shipment of opium, and of its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations to any country which prohibits the entry of opium or of its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations.” See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 47. The British delegate suggested that the phrase “which continue to produce opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations” in the second paragraph of the Resolution should be omitted on the grounds that this would put pressure not upon one country only but upon all countries. The phrase, “it is the duty of all countries to adopt reasonable measures to prevent etc.” was incorporated in the Resolution No. 4 (in its final version) at the suggestion of the British delegate. See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 51.

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  34. See below, p. 54 and 200–201.

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  35. In this connection the observation made by the British delegate is worth quoting: “What validity by any action of this Commission should be given to the resolutions which we have now adopted? I venture to think that the proper course for us to adopt is to move that the PRESIDENT, on behalf of the Commission, do sign the resolutions as having been passed by the Commission. It seems to me that it would be more properly done thus than by getting signatures from all the members of the Commission, and I beg to move accordingly in that sense.” See Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 81.

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  36. Undoubtedly, the initiative was taken by the Right Reverend Bishop Brent, but certain unofficial bodies also contributed to the anti-opium movement, and their efforts should also be recognized.

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  37. The Missionary Conference held at Edinburgh in 1910 had passed a resolution on the subject, and a national day of humiliation and prayer had been decreed for 24 October, the fiftieth anniversary of the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin (24 October 1860). See The China Year Book (Shanghai: North China News and Daily Herald, 1916), p. 663.

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  38. The China Year Book, (1916), p. 663. His inquiries confirmed that no opium was grown in the provinces of Shansi and Szechuan. There had been a reduction in the cultivation of poppies of 30% in Shansi, 25% in Kansu, 70% in Sweichow and 75% in Yunan.

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  39. Ibid.

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  40. Parliamentary Debates, vol. 56, (7 August 1913): 1783.

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  41. As a result of the unscrupulous purchases for speculative purposes, some 60,000 chests of Indian opium were accumulated at Shanghai towards the end of 1914. See W. T. Dunn, The Opium Traffic in its International Aspects, p. 120. As the Indian stock had been continuously increasing at Shanghai, the Department of Foreign Affairs in June 1913 proposed to pay the charges for sending the accumulated opium back to India but the British Government declined to accept this offer. See The China Year Book, (1914), pp. 699–701.

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  42. Returns of Trade, vol. 3, (1971): p. 806.

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  43. See generally W. T. Dunn, op. cit.

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  44. Trade Reports vol. 4 (1917): p. 1112.

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  45. Japan not only manufactured opium but cultivated opium poppies also mainly in Formosa and Korea. The Korean Independence Committee wrote to the US Minister at Peking: “The Japanese Government has established a bureau for sale of opium and under the pretext that opium was used for medicinal purposes has caused Koreans and Formosans to engage in poppy cultivation. The opium secretly shipped into China.” The New York Times, 30 March 1919, p. 20, quoted in W. T. Dunn, op. cit., p. 128.

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  46. Report of the International Opium Commission (IOC), vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

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  47. With reference to the structure of the Commission the British delegate, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, commented that the Commission was not appointed with a scientific basis. He thought that apart from Dr. Hamilton Wright and the Japanese delegate, who was a scientist, there was none among them competent to deal with such matters as anti-opium remedies or the medical and scientific aspects of opium. Dr. Hamilton Wright, however, pointed out that “there was on the Chinese Delegation also a medical expert, trained in the West, who speaking from a scientific point of view, was quite competent to judge on the subject under discussion.” Dr. Wright emphasized that three experts would be enough for a Commission of this type. See further Report of the IOC, vol. 1, pp. 37–38.

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  48. The Right Reverend Bishop Brent observed that, “As in the past, so in the future, and in the present, sentiment is bound to be the final arbiter in all great questions, and no legislative or practical action can avail unless public opinion, rightly informed, acts spontaneously, strongly and naturally in the direction of formal, enacted law.” Report of the IOC, vol. 1, p. 42.

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  49. Ibid., p. 82.

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  50. Statement made by the President of the Commission when addressing the House (see Report of the International Opium Commission, vol. 1, p. 42). In evaluating the work of the Commission, Dr. Hamilton Wright observed the question had been “elevated from the narrow confines of dual agreements and treaties to a plane where every civilized nation may have a voice in its final settlement.” Dr. Hamilton Wright, International Opium Commission, Part 2, 3 A.J.I.L. 828–868, at p. 867 (1909).

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  51. L. E. Eisenlohr, op. cit., p. 20.

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  52. See below, pp. 45–51.

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  53. P. D. Lowes, op. cit., p. 158.

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  54. Quoted in Dr. Lowes’ The Genesis of International Narcotics Control, op. cit., p. 159.

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  55. On 2 February 1911, F.O. 415 (Correspondence relating to Opium, Public Records Office).

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  56. 55(a). Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), vol. 8,: 1104. Mr. Laidlow was also on the British Delegation at the Shanghai Commission.

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  57. Britian did not show much interest in attending the Conference. She made a plea for the Conference to be deferred until the Indo-Chinese Opium Agreement had been signed. Also, the cable from the American Minister at the Hague will stand as evidence: “... the Minister of Foreign Affairs is in possession of confidential information that Great Britain does not desire the Conference for an early date...” Quoted in Dr. Lowes’ The Genesis of International Narcotics Control, op. cit., p. 174.

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  58. Report of the IOC, 1912, vol. 1, p. 2.

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  59. This Convention was signed at the Hague on 23 January 1912. L.N.Doc. C.82.M.41. 1925.XI.

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  60. “... désirant marquer un pas de plus dans la voie ouverte par la Commission Internationale de Shanghai de 1909...”

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  61. China virtually became the smuggling ground of opium, although opium is indigenous to China. The Chinese government fought for many years to prevent the importation of drugs into the country. Although importation was prohibited by law, smuggling continued. In fact, the natives of many Powers including her own were engaged in the traffic in drugs, and all her efforts to prevent smuggling failed due to lack of co-operation from those Powers. Consequently, it was widely held that in order to protect her own people against this humiliating situation, China in the First World War became engaged with European Powers and granted extra-territorial rights to the nationals of the Treaty Powers. This of course meant that China had to reduce her action against the importation of those goods in which the Treaty Powers were involved. As the product of foreign-grown poppies was not to be excluded, the Chinese people began to cultivate the plant. It was a vicious circle. It was due to the immense importance attached to this problem that the Chinese delegation insisted that the Articles with regard to China should be included in the main Convention. See Summary of the Minutes (unofficial) of the International Opium Conference (IOC), (The Hague, 1 December 1911 to 23 January 1912), p. 102.

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  62. Signed on 28 June 1919.

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  63. 7 December 1911. See further Summary of the Minutes (unofficial) of the IOC, p. 10.

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  64. Ibid.

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  65. Ibid., p. 11.

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  66. L.N.Doc. C424. M. 187.1923 III, pp. 84–85.

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  67. Summary of the Minutes (unofficial) of the IOC, Fifth Plenary Session, p. 19.

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  68. Article 5 of the Opium Convention, 1912.

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  69. The exact proposal of the British Government was the following: “The Customs shall be empowered to detain imported consignments, except in transit, of the above drugs, until satisfied that the consignee is a licensed manufacturer or dealer, or a person duly authorised to receive the drugs.” “Exportation to foreign countries, whether adhering to the Convention or not, and to other portions of the British Empire, to be permitted only upon production to the Customs authorities of a certificate from the country of destination, that the consignee is authorised to import the drugs either in accordance with the stipulations of the Convention or with local laws and regulations which, in the opinion of the Customs authorities, are equally stringent.” Summary of the Minutes (unofficial) of the 10C, p. 49.

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  70. “... Determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine as also of the drugs prepared or derived from these substances, which gave rise to or might give rise to similar abuses.”

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  71. Article 9: “The Contracting Powers shall enact pharmacy laws or regulations to limit exclusively to medical and legitimate purposes the manufacture, sale and use of morphine, cocaine and their respective salts unless laws or regulations on the subject are already in existence. They shall co-operate with one another to prevent the use of the drugs for any other purpose.”

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  72. Summary of the Minutes (unofficial) of the IOC, Eighth Plenary Session, p. 46.

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  73. See S. H. Bailey, op. cit., p. 26.

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  74. Article 20: “The Contracting Powers shall examine the possibility of enacting laws or regulations making it a penal offence to be in illegal possession of raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine and their respective salts, unless laws or regulations on the subject are already in existence.”

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  75. Summary of the Minutes (unofficial) of the IOC, op. cit., p. 3.

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  76. A very good account of opium monopoly has been given by E. N. La Motte. The author observed, inter alia, that “The Opium Monopoly was not established for any humane or altruistic purpose. It was not established to provide the medical profession with a drug for the relief of pain, to ease the agony of the injured and wounded, or to calm the last days of those dying with an incurable disease. This, which may be called the legitimate use of opium, is not the object of the Opium Monopoly. Used only in this manner, there would be no money in it. It is only when opium is produced in quantities far in excess of the legitimate needs of the world that it becomes worth while—to the Opium Monopoly. That Monopoly was established not to relieve pain and suffering, but with the deliberate intention of creating pain and suffering, by creating drug victims by the thousand.” See E. N. La Motte, The Opium Monopoly, p. 80.

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  77. Summary of the Minutes (Unofficial) of the IOC, Twelfth Plenary Session, pp. 76–77.

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  78. Ibid., p. 83.

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  79. Article 23, paragraph 2.

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  80. Only twelve Contracting Powers were concerned with the formulation of this Convention, nevertheless, their determination was expected to have an important influence upon the rest of the world.

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  81. Summary of the Minutes (Unofficial) of the IOC, op. cit., p. 104.

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  82. Dr. Hamilton Wright pointed out that “If this Convention was signed by the United States plenipotentiaries and ratified according to the usual procedure, it would be carried out in good faith, and if they pledged themselves to enact or propose legislation in a certain time that legislation would be passed or proposed and would be made effective.” Op. cit., p. 105.

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  83. Britain did not ratify the Convention on the grounds that clarification as to the advantageous position of the smaller Powers would be necessary before ratification.

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  84. The case of Switzerland was rather different. The Swiss government abstained on the grounds that Switzerland was not an opium-producing country, and that the use of opium was restricted to medicinal purposes only, under the strict control of the Cantonal laws and regulations of the National Pharmacopaeia. It was, however, believed that the Swiss government’s abstention would jeopardize the results of the Convention, presumably because other similar countries might follow suit on the same grounds, and thus make the problem of adhesion more difficult. See Summary of the Minutes (Unofficial) of the Second International Opium Conference (The Hague, 1–9 July), 1913, Resolution of the Third Plenary Session, pp. 18–19.

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  85. The Lotus case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 18.

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  86. J. L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law, p. 10.

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  87. J. L. Brierly’s paper “The Shortcomings of International Law” in The Basis of Obligation in International Law, p. 79.

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  88. G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of World Society, (2nd edition), p. 12.

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  89. See below, pp. 200–202.

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  90. At the time the Second Opium Conference rose, the number of States who had signed the Convention was 34*, of which 12 were the original participants. Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Luxemburg, Mexico, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Salvador, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela.

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  91. *with reservation for the Belgian Congo.

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  92. The Parties that had not signed the Convention by 31 December 1912 were: Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Servia, Turkey and Uruguay.

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  93. Summary of the Minutes (Unofficial) of the Second International Opium Conference, op. cit., p. 32.

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  94. Mr. Archer (for the Siamese government) asked if it would be necessary, supposing they then deposited their ratifications, to meet again to consider whether they should be deposited or not. The President of the Conference replied in the negative. Ibid., pp. 22–23.

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  95. See below, fn. 325 (conclusions) and fn. 52 (conclusions-UN Period).

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  96. Report of the British delegate in Accounts and Papers, vol. 83 (1914–16): 11–12.

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  97. It was held for the period from June 15 to June 25. Troisième Conférence International deL’Opium Actes et Documents, Proces-verbaux Officiels.

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  98. (i) The following powers ratified the Convention: Belgium, China, Denmark, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Portugal, Siam, Sweden, United States of America and Venezuela. (ii) The following powers were prepared to ratify subject to the approval of their respective parliaments: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Hayti, Luxemburg, Mexico, Spain and Switzerland. (France, however, made it clear that her ratification would be subject to reservation as to Indo-China and India) (iii) The following powers were ready to ratify: Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands and Persia. (Their hesitancy was primarily due to some loopholes in the Convention). (iv) The powers that had not still expressed their intention to ratify: Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Germany, Greece, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Roumania, Russia, Salvador and Uruguay. (v) The following powers refused to sign the Convention: Servia and Turkey.

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  99. Translated from French: “Que la mise en vigueur de la Convention entre toutes Puissances signataires aura lieu lorsque les Puissances qui l’ont déjà signée et celles qui ont exprimé leur intention d’y adhérer, l’auront ratifiée. La date d’entree en vigeur de la Convention sera celle fixée par le paragraphe 1 de l’article 24.” See Actes et Documents; Third International Opium Conference, (Proces-verbaux Officiels), ibid., p. 49.

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  100. The Chinese delegate proposed that the Convention should come into force on 1 December 1914 except in respect of those powers who had to defer ratification on constitutional grounds, and for them the Convention would come into force at the date when they had deposited their ratifications, and for the other powers at the date of successive deposit of their ratifications. Translated from French: “La Convention entrera en vigueur le 1er decembre 1914, à moins que la ratification générale par les Puissances ci-dessus mentionées no soit différée pour des raisons d’ordre constitutionel; dans ce cas la Convention entrera en vigueur à cette date pour les Puissances qui auront déposé leur ratification, et pour les autres Puissances, à la date du dépôt successif de leur ratification.” Ibid., p. 35.

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  101. “In the name of the Russian colleague and in mine I come to declare that we shall abstain on the vote of amendment made by the delegation of China. In fact, we believe that an international conference has not got the right to judge the reasons which decides a state to accept or to deny the ratification of a diplomatic instrument. The act of ratification being an act of sovereignty that should not be submitted to the appraisal of a third party.” Translated from French: “Au nom de mon collègue de Russie et au mien, je viens declarer que nous abstiendrons sur le vote de l’amendement de la Délégation de Chine. Nous estimons en effect qu’une conférence internationale n’a pas de droit de juger les raisons que déterminent un Etat à accorder ou à différer la ratification d’un instrument diplomatique, cette ratification étant un acte de souverainté qui ne saurait etre soumis à l’appréciation des tiers.” Ibid., p. 41.

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  102. Other powers such as Chile, Sweden and Switzerland accepted the views of the French delegate.

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  103. See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), Series A 2 P.C. I J. 57 (1924).

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  104. The Swiss delegate said that with regard to the question of the relation between the ratification and the coming into force of the Convention according to the terms of Article 24, to which the delegates of Great Britain have drawn the attention of this Conference remember that Switzerland has signed the Protocol of Adhesion with the expressed reservation that she cannot put into effect on her territory the disposition of the Convention within the delays required by the time-limit. This condition remains whole and entire, and is formally maintained.” Translated from French: “... en se referant a la question de la connexite qui existe entre la ratification et l’entree en vigueur de la convention aux termes de l’article 24 et sur laquelle M. M. les Delegues de la Grand-Bretagne ont attire l’attention de la Conference, rapelle que la Suisse a signe le Protocole d’adesion avec la reserve expresse qu’elle ne pourra pas mettre en vigueur, sur son territoire, les dispositions de la Convention dans les delais prevus par celle-ci. Cette reserve demeure entiere et est formellement maintenue.” Actes et Documents; Third International Opium Conference, (1914) op. cit., p. 18.

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  105. The powers which signed the Special Protocol at the Hague were: China, Hondurus, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States of America.

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  106. Such a request was made by the government of the Netherlands on behalf of the Conference.

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  107. Lee Mow Lin v U.S. (1917), 240 Federal Reporter 408 The government of the United States certainly made a major attempt by means of the Harrison Act to control manufacture of and illicit traffic in opium and other allied substances. However, in view of the results it achieved, it may perhaps be said that the Act was inadequate. It failed to restrict the use of narcotic drugs for illicit purposes. No limitation was prescribed as to the amount of drugs an individual could buy. It also fell short of effective machinery for joint action by the Federal and local authorities.

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  108. For a good account of trade and traffic in opium in China see R. Y. Lo, The Opium Problem in the Far East; and also the China Year Books.

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  109. Hansard vol. 110 (1918): 894.

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  110. Article 295 of the Treaty of Peace, 1919 reads as follows: “Those of the High Contracting Parties who have not yet signed, or who have signed but not ratified, the Opium Convention signed at the Hague on January 23, 1912 agree to bring the said Convention into force and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation without delay in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Furthermore, they agree that ratification of the present Treaty should in the case of Powers which have not yet ratified the Opium Convention be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of that Convention and to the signature of the Special Protocol which was opened at the Hague in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Third Opium Conference in 1914 for bringing the said Convention into force.” Similar provision may also be found in: Article 230 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, dated 4 June 1920; Article 174 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria dated 27 November 1919; and Article 280 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey dated 10 August 1920.

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  111. See chapter 4.

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  112. The question of the identity of the units became important in the transition from the Roman Empire to the Medieval system and from the nineteenth century system of multi-national and colonial empires to the present. See further J. Frankel, International Relations pp. 118–119.

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  113. See further J. Frankel, ibid., p. 120.

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  114. The restoration of France after the defeat of Napoleon partly reflected this need.

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  115. See further H. Maine, Ancient Law, (1965).

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  116. This was primarily owing to a halt in colonial expansion caused by the fact that most of the available areas had already been colonized.

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  117. G. Schwarzenberger, Economic World Order? A Basic Problem of International Economic Law, (1970), p. 9.

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  118. See further R. Pound, “Toward a New Jus Gentium” in F. S. C. Northrop (ed.), Ideological Differences and World Order, pp. 1–17 at p. 6.

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  119. G. Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order, p. 17.

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  120. Ibid., pp. 18 et seq.

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  121. Ibid., p. 8.

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© 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Chatterjee, S.K. (1981). International Action for the Control of Trade and Traffic in Drugs between 1909 and 1919. In: Legal Aspects of International Drug Control. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7066-8_2

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