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The Organization and Functions of Interpol and the Ingos in the Control of the Drug-Trade

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Legal Aspects of International Drug Control

Abstract

The history of the International Criminal Police Organization is not long. This Organization succeeded the International Criminal Police Commission, which had been established in 1923 at the initiative of Johann Schöber, then Vienna President of Police. The principal purposes of this Commission were twofold, namely, (a) to ensure and officially promote the growth of the greatest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws of their countries; and (b) to establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute to the efficient suppression of ordinary law crime.

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  1. It has not been possible, despite efforts, to obtain the required documents for examining the activities of the League of Arab States, in so far as the question of eradicating the illicit traffic in drugs is concerned. Incidentally, at the UN Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, only an expert from the League had been invited to participate.

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  2. For its history see International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) : History and Constitution (Interpol, 1958); see also A. J. Forrest, Interpol (London: Allan Wingate, 1955). During the 14th session of the Commission held in Bucharest in June, 1938, i.e., the time when the Second World War was looming large upon the world, a proposal had been made to move the headquarters of this organization into a neutral country. Although this proposal did not find much support, an ardent desire to take over the International Criminal Police Commission was expressed by Heydrich, the then Director of the German police force, and it was chiefly in fulfilment of his sinister interests that this organization was transferred to Berlin.

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  3. It was Mr. F. E. Louwage, the then Inspector General of the Belgian Police who revived the idea of international police co-operation after the Second World War. Although the constitution of the defunct Commission had been modified to a considerable extent to suit the purposes of the new Commission, it soon became essential to revise the constitution completely. The word “commission” was replaced by the word “organization,” under the belief that the former expression usually signifies a body of people with a limited task. See further International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) : Its Purpose, Organization and Activities, (Interpol, 1958); see also P. Marabuto, “The International Criminal Police Commission and the Illicit Traffic of Narcotics,” Bulletin on Narcotics 3 (1951): 3–15.

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  4. See The International Radio Network, (Interpol, 1956).

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  5. P. Marabuto, op. cit., p. 6.

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  6. Ibid, p. 7.

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  7. “International Co-operation in the Juridical Police Field,” Memorandum of the ICPC, Vienna, 1928, chapter X.

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  8. Report No. 5 by Dr. B. Schultz, September 1931, 8th session.

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  9. See L.N. Doc. O.C. 1581, p. 10.

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  10. See L.N. Doc. C.455.M193.1931 XI, pp. 31–32.

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  11. See also L.N. Doc. C.341.M.216.1936.XI, p. 201.

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  12. See the Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed to Study the Draft Convention Submitted by the ICPC, which was presented to the Opium Advisory committee during its sixteenth session, L.N. Doc. O.C. 1481, 1933 (Annex 1), p. 177.

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  13. See Report submitted by the Secretary-General at the XLth General Assembly session of Interpol held in Ottawa, 6–11 September, 1971, (No. 11), p. 3; see also UN Doc. E/4961 (dated 8th March, 1971), p. 3.

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  14. For example, see the International Criminal Police Review 21 (October 1948): 19 and 33 (December 1943): 24–25.

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  15. The accumulated drugs left by the German army caused a potential danger of illicit traffic in Occupied Germany. The Secretariat-General of ICPC therefore convened a conference in February, 1949 at which the representatives of the three Inter-Allied Zones in Western Germany and of the frontier countries were present. This Conference adopted certain policies which were directed towards promotion of closer co-operation between the German authorities and ICPC. Indeed, the recommendation adopted by the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in this matter was in conformity with the initiative taken by ICPC. See E/CN.7/206 and E/CN.7/217.

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  16. Such training at Interpol is financed by the member governments. See further Reports of the General Secretariat of Interpol.

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  17. For examples of such co-operation, see Reports of the General Secretariat of Interpol.

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  18. In recent years, the case of Timothy Davey, a British subject, who in spite of being a minor was convicted of drug-trafficking in Turkey is an example of this. No appeal through the government channel could originally justify a mitigating circumstance in the eyes of the Turkish authorities.

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  19. See further H. G. Schermers, International Institutional Law vol. I, p. 19.

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  20. For a contrast between inter-governmental and supra-national institutions, see further H. G. Schermers, op. cit., pp. 19–24.

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  21. See further F. Seyersted, International Personality of Inter-governmental Organizations: Do their Capacities Really Depend upon their Constitutions? 4 Indian Journal of International Law 1 (1964).

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  22. Ibid., p. 6; see also the case concerning Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN, ICJ Reports (1949).

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  23. See, for example, the Transfer and other agreements with the League of Nations and UNRRA; UN Treaty Series, Cumulative Index, No. 1., pp. 476–478. In practice, the treaty-making power of such organizations is not questioned even in the absence of provisions to this effect in their respective constitutions, e.g., the International Bureau of Weights and Measures has concluded a Co-operation Agreement with the UNESCO despite the absence of any provision to this effect in its constitution of 20 May 1875. The headquarters agreement concluded between the Hague Conference of Private International Law and the Netherlands Government is another example. The International Civil Aviation Organization has, however, been authorized by its Constitution to conclude treaties with other organizations (Articles 64 and 65).

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  24. Unlike non-governmental organizations, such organic jurisdiction of intergovernmental organizations is not amenable to the territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty of any state. Also, the judicial character and binding nature of the decisions, if rendered by the tribunals created by intergovernmental organizations, have been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal, ICJ Reports (1954). Equally, the law-making capacity of such organizations has not been disputed. See generally, C. H. Alexandrowicz, The Law-making Functions of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. In relation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alexandrowicz has rightly emphasized that the IAEA safeguards system (Article XII—according to this Article, the Agency has certain well-defined rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the particular project) “becomes obligatory only if a member state concluded an agreement approving an atomic energy project or if it otherwise obtained assistance through IAEA. Safeguards can also be made applicable upon request, in connexion with a bi-lateral or multilateral atomic energy arrangement.” Ibid., p. 147.

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  25. The authority of intergovernmental organizations to present international claims, whether by the express or implied power of such organizations, is no longer a matter of controversy. Such authority may be evidenced in the process of the Reparation Commission under Article 248 of the Treaty of Versailles to deal with the question of reparation. This Commission was also considered as a party to the arbitration between itself and the Standard Oil Company. See further Sir John F. Williams, A Legal Footnote of the Story of German Reparations, 13 British Year Book of International Law 9–38 (1932). Fischer Williams confirmed the personality of this Commission by stating, inter alia, that the “Commission was itself recognized in the Treaty of Versailles as a principal in the international world; it had ‘agents’ of its own, who were not the agents of the Creditor Powers. These agents were to be accorded by Germany ‘the same rights and immunities’ as those of ‘diplomatic agents’ of friendly Powers.” (Article 240(3)), at p. 35. On the other hand, states have presented claims to inter-governmental organizations, and such organizations have paid compensation, despite the absence of any specific provision to this effect in their constitutions. See further F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems, 27 British Year Book of International Law 357–475 (1961).

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  26. Certain inter-governmental organizations, together with states, have formed new organizations which have a separate international personality. The International Atomic Energy Agency and several Arab States have, by an international agreement concluded among themselves, established a regional radioisotope center. Seyersted rightly pointed out that this “constitutes a separate inter-governmental organization with an international personality distinct from that of the Agency and the Member States; it can for example conclude international agreements with Members and non-members.” Indeed, according to this Agreement (Article XI) the Host State “shall accord to the Center, its premises, property, funds and assets the privileges and immunities which are necessary for the operation of the Center in conformity with the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency.” (Agency Doc. INFCRIC/9/Rev. 1). See further Seyersted, International Personality of Inter-governmental Organizations, op. cit., p. 15.

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  27. In reference to the inherent powers of the UN, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, stated, inter alia, that under international law, “the organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” (p. 182). See further G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: International Organizations and Tribunals, 29 British Year Book of International Law 1–62 (1952). In its Advisory Opinion on Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal the Court also pointed out that although the UN Charter contains no express provision for the establishment of judicial bodies, a contrary interpretation may not be appropriate, and held that the capacity to establish such organs (to do justice as between the organization and the staffmembers) arises “by necessary intendment of the Charter.” I.C.J. Reports 56–57 (1954); see also I.C.J. Reports 182 (1949)

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  28. F. Seyersted, International Personality of Inter-governmental Organizations etc., op. cit., p. 20.

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  29. Ibid., pp. 39–40.

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  30. See further W. S. Penfield, The Legal Status of the Pan American Union, 20 American Journal of International Law 257–262 (1926).

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  31. F. Seyersted, op. cit., p. 49.

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  32. The standards prescribed by the International Atomic Energy Agency are in the nature of recommendations, but they are binding with regard to its own operations, and when projects are carried out with its assistance. See also the Model Code for Safety Regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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  33. Originally, opium being the only substance to have found its way into the illicit traffic, and to have caused other related problems across national boundaries, the movement which had been launched against these evils was known as the Anti-Opium Movement. The subsequent movements were not named after any particular substance.

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  34. See above, sub. sec. 1.3.2.

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  35. This Bureau is no longer in existence. (It was originally situated at 8 rue J.-A. Gautier, Geneva and subsequently at 9, Avenue Bertrand, Geneva.)

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  36. See various publications of this Bureau. This Bureau pointed out, inter alia, that it would not be appropriate for the Conference to let matters of national interest dominate and prevent a solution, and that the Conference was to be of no less interest to the non-manufacturing countries. It emphasized that the manufacturing countries had no special rights which the consuming countries did not have. See further its Report entitled “What the Conference on Limitation Should do,” (1931).

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  37. See further, for example, its Conference Press Note No. 2, dated 1 July 1931, entitled “Limitation.”

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  38. Text of a lecture delivered by the Director of this Bureau (29 April 1930) in the course of the International Conference on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, held under the auspices of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

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  39. L.N. Doc. C.115.1931.XI, Annex 3. Conf. L.F.S. 25.

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  40. L.N. Doc. C.115.1931.XL Annex 4. Conf. L.F.S. 64.

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  41. L.N. Doc. C.115.1931.XI. Annex 6. Conf. L.F.S. 69.

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  42. See below, p. 512 and Footnote 80.

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  43. See UN Doc. E/CONF.34/24, p. XXIX.

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  44. The Committee on Social Questions of the League had a considerable number of associations as “corresponding members.” Various women’s organizations through joint efforts obtained a representative on the League’s Commission on the Traffic in Women and on the Commission dealing with Slavery and Slave Trade.

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  45. In its documents, the League published the activities of certain organizations, viz. the International Law Association and the International Association of Penal Law with which it maintained a close relationship in respect of penal and penitentiary problems.

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  46. UN Doc. E/CONF.34/24, vol. I, especially at p. 120 et. seq.

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  47. Indeed, the ILO, before the War, largely depended for its existence upon the continued support of non-governmental organizations, in addition to the support given to it by the International Federation of Trade Unions.

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  48. Article 24 of the League Covenant: “1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. 2. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable. 3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.” The League of Nations also asked the World Alliance of Y.M.C.A.s to prepare a report on the work of certain Associations of certain countries in their campaign against the suppression of illicit trade and traffic in drugs.

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  49. The League showed its promptness to recognize the specialized and organized bodies, such as the International Chamber of Commerce which had been a very powerful and influential body, whereas a less influential body, e.g., the International Co-operative Alliance, found it difficult to influence the League.

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  50. See further L. C. White, International Non-Governmental Organizations, p. 254

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  51. There are three categories of consultative INGOs viz. (i) Organizations which have a basic interest in most of the activities of the Economic and Social Council, and are closely linked with the economic and social life of the areas which they represent (category A); (it) Organizations which have a special competence in certain aspects of the Council’s activities (category B); and (in) Organizations which, by means of ad hoc consultation, are able to make a significant contribution to the activities of the Council (category C). See further ECOSOC’s Resolution No. 288 (X), Part III. The INGOs in categories A and B may not only send representatives to attend the meetings of the Council and its Commissions, but also submit written statements, which are distributed to all Members of the United Nations and to the specialized agencies. An INGO in category A, however, enjoys certain special privileges, e.g., it may ask the Agenda Committee to place an item on the provisional agenda of the Council, although the Committee retains the power of final decision in this matter. If, however, the request is granted, the organization concerned may present its views at any meeting of the Agenda Committee at which the question of inclusion of the item is discussed. INGOs belonging to any of these categories may however send observers to public meetings of the Council and its Commissions.

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  52. See also D. W. Bowett, op. cit., p. 63.

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  53. At the time the conference had been convened, Interpol was an international non-governmental organization.

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  54. See, for example, UN Doc. E/CONF.34/24.vol. I, op. cit. (Twenty-sixth Plenary Meeting), p. 120 et. seq.

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  55. In this connection see D. W. Bowett, op. cit., p. 63. According to Bowett, the difference between “participation” and “consultation” is fundamental.

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  56. It may also be observed that the role played by the International Red Cross in the formulation of “humanitarian law” amounts to participation.

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  57. See S. K. Chattopadhyay: Equity in International Law: Its Growth and Development, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 381–406 (1975), especially at pages 397–398.

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  58. The Uniform Rules of Documentary Credits 1975, although not truly international rules, have attained the ratification of a good number of states, and have been binding upon the signatory states, on ratification by them. Such Rules have at least created an international law of a limited character. The directives of Interpol before its becoming an inter-governmental organization, were very seriously followed by its member states, and even in certain cases, by non-members for their own benefit.

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  59. The contributions of the International Red Cross, especially to the Law of War can hardly be ignored. See further G.I.A.D. Draper, The Red Cross Conventions, (1958).

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  60. Quoted by F. Seyersted in International Personality of Inter-Governmental Organizations etc., op. cit., at p. 50, from Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law : A Study on the Legislation, Treaties and Foreign Relations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at p. 15 and at pp. 205–206. See also the Agreement of 9/12 May 1960 between the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Comité international de la Croix-Rouge concerning the International Tracing Service (US Treaties and Other International Acts, Series No. 4736, and the Agreement of 6 June 1955 (UK Treaty Series No. 11, 1956) transferring to the Comité the direction and administration of the International Tracing Centre at Arolsen.

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  61. Draft Article 2, 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 95 (1959).

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  62. Ibid., see also O.J. Lissitzyn, Efforts to Codify or Restate the Law of Treaties, 62 Columbia Law Review, 1166–1205, at p. 1177 (1962) and F. Seyersted, op. cit., p. 51. Seyersted referred to, as an example, the Agreement between the United Nations and the Carnegie Foundation Concerning the Use of Premises of the Peace Palace at the Hague (General Assembly Resolution 84(1) of 11 December, 1946). Article XIV of this Agreement provided: “It is expressly understood that the question of the establishment of the International Court of Justice at the Peace Palace exclusively concerns the United Nations and the Carnegie Foundation, and is consequently outside the jurisdiction of any other organization; the Foundation declares its readiness to accept all the responsibilities arising out of this principle.”

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  63. In the case of the International Chamber of Commerce, however, the absence of such a truly international element in many matters (e.g., documentary credits) relating to so-called international commerce has prevented it from applying truly international law. It is more of a conflict of law situation.

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  64. See further H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations especially, pp. 106–108.

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  65. See further J. J. Lador-Laderer, International Non- Governmental Organizations and Economic Entities: A Study in Autonomous Organization and Jus Gentium, (A. W. Sijthoff, 1963), p. 379.

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  66. Ibid., p. 380.

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  67. Article 71.

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  68. See also L. C. White, op. cit., p. 4.

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  69. According to White, although “some form of international organization has existed since early times, notably the Roman Catholic Church and the religious orders (i.e., the Franciscans, the Jesuits, the Dominicans etc.), it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that, impelled by the forces released by the industrial revolution,” the modern movement toward international organization began to gather impetus.

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  70. Lador-Laderer has described it as “tribunical intervention,” which is an historic allusion to the function of the tribuni plebis of ancient Rome, as the representatives of the plebes in their clash with the patricians. The tribuni were inviolable for this purpose. They were vested with a right of intervention—auxilium—if, in some individual case, the just and established practice of the constitution had been broken, op. cit., p. 33 et seq.

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  71. Ibid, p. 30.

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  72. Ibid, p. 31.

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  73. See Article 71 of the UN Charter. See also ECOSOC’s Resolution 288(B) (X) of February 27, 1950. According to this resolution, the purpose of consultation is to enable the Council or one of its bodies “to secure expert information or advice from organizations having special competence” and also “to enable organizations which represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.” By reference to the conditions of eligibility for registration for the purpose of consultation, the same resolution provides that “any organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization for the purposes of these arrangements.”

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  74. See below, p. 512.

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  75. See Lador-Lederer, op. cit., p. 61.

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  76. There are certain INGOs, as for example, the International Red Cross, the legislative function of which is considered significant by the international community, and indeed, its contribution to the laws of war and “humanitarian law” cannot possibly be ignored.

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  77. Lador-Lederer, op. cit., p. 174. As examples of such INGOs mention may be made of the Society of Friends, Ordre de Malte and Bahais.

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  78. Lador-Lederer, op. cit., p. 189.

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  79. On the other hand, as Lador-Lederer has very appropriately pointed out, it was through the International Red Cross that certain basic postulates of the Holy Scriptures found their way into international positive law, op. cit., p. 190. It may also be appropriate to mention that such religious postulates were recognized because of their special nature, and not because of their being supported by the International Red Cross.

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  80. For example, World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations.

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  81. For example, the World Council of Churches. Although apparently engaged in religious matters, this Council has on many occasions, in extension of its religious ideas, involved itself in other matters, especially those relating to the right of self-determination of colonies.

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Chatterjee, S.K. (1981). The Organization and Functions of Interpol and the Ingos in the Control of the Drug-Trade. In: Legal Aspects of International Drug Control. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7066-8_13

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