Abstract
Our examination of the International Court of Justice and its approach to Jurisdiction and Justiciability occurs when the Court, in its modern, reconstituted, post-World War II phase, approaches the completion of a half-century of jurisprudence. After a very lean period of the late 1960s and in the 1970s when the Court, in reaction in considerable measure to the public relations disaster of the South West Africa. Second Phase decision of 1966,1 was effectively ignored by most of the member-states of the United Nations for purposes of concrete problem-solving, and when the Court, in consequence, had very few cases on its list, it has now rebounded remarkably in political popularity. In particular, the Court is today actively patronised by the very Third World state-clients that once boycotted its jurisdiction. The political paradox is that it is now the United States which, in the immediate post-World War II years, was the most vocal champion of the Court and of the principle of international judicial settlement, which has now turned its back on the Court, in a signal retreat from its erstwhile positive acceptance of Court jurisdiction.
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Notes
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads (Damrosch, ed.) (1987).
LCJ. Reports 1971, p. 16.
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Constitution of Chamber, Order of 20 January 1982, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 3; Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246.
Kensaburo, “Occidentalisation et Japonisation”, in L’avenir de la culture: Sommet culturel franco-japonais (1984), p. 39.
Tabata, “The late Professor Ryoichi Taoka: his contributions to the study of International Law”, Japanese Annual of International Law, vol. 28 (1985), p. 1.
Yokota, “International Adjudication and Japan”, Japanese Annual of International Law, vol. 17 (1973), p. 1.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid.,p. 15.
Tanaka, “The changing character of World Law in the International Court of Justice”, Japanese Annual of International Law, vol. 15 (1971), p. 1, pp. 7–8. In similar, general vein, see the views of the late Takeshi Minagawa, (who acknowledged the influence of the British jurist, Brierly), that the — “task for the Court... is to interpret and apply, but not to create and modify, law”:
Sato, “Review of Professor Takeshi Minagawa’s Kokusaiho Kenkyu with some general observations on his contribution to the science of International Law”, Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics, vol. 15 (1987), p. 13, p. 25.
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, p. 212 (Oda J., Dissenting Opinion).
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, p. 528 (Jennings J., Dissenting Opinion).
Anand, “Rôle of International Adjudication”, in The Future of the International Court of Justice, (Gross, ed.), (vol. 1) (1976), pp. 4–5.
Ibid., p. 4.
See, for example, McNair, The Development of International Justice (1956), p. 12;
Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States (1951), p. 234.
Thus Anand, in a survey of the first half century of the work of the Court (the “old” Permanent Court, and the “new” International Court) concluded that in only one case, the Austro-German Customs Union case (Series A./B., No. 41 (1931) p. 42), (where there were four interested parties on one side, three of whom had their own nationals on the bench, and two parties on the other side, only one of whom had its own national on the bench), would the absence of a national judge, regularly elected to the Court in the usual way or appointed ad hoc, have changed the final decision in the case. (The Austro-German Customs Union decision was rendered by an 8-to-7 vote).
Anand, Studies in International Adjudication (1969), p. 104.
Elias, New Horizons in International Law (1979), p. 78.
Elias, in Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (Mosler and Bernhardt, eds.) (1974), p. 23, p. 31.
Ibid.
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18.
Ibid., pp. 19–20.
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 69.
Ibid., p. 70.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392.
Ibid., p. 393.
Compare Falk, whose “pluralist” jurisprudence, which he sets up in opposition to a “provincial (that is, Western) jurisprudence” and in contradistinction to an ideal but seemingly unattainable “universalist” jurisprudence, is predicated upon the triadic scheme of division — much discussed in a more general United Nations context in the 1960s and the 1970s in connection with the debate over the legally normative, lawmaking quality of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, — of Western, Marxist, and non-Western.
Falk, Reviving the World Court (1986).
Weissberg, “The rôle of the International Court of Justice in the United Nations system: the first quarter century”, in The Future of the International Court of Justice, (Gross ed.) (vol. 1) (1976), p. 131, p. 176. And compare Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. 4, International Judicial Law (1986), p. 6.
Pescatore, “Les mesures conservatoires et les référés”, in La juridiction internationale permanente (Société Française pour le Droit International, Colloque de Lyon), (Philip, ed.), (1987), p. 315 et seq.
Bedjaoui, “Remarques sur la création de Chambres ad hoc au sein de la Cour internationale de Justice”, in La juridiction internationale permanente (Philip, ed.), (1987), p. 73, p. 75:
“Arrêtons-nous quelques instants sur les deux premiers types de Chambres [Chambres spécialisées et preconstituées, et Chambres ad hoc] qui montrent déjà combien la Cour mondiale n’est pas bâtie du tout sur le système caméraliste. “C’est une première observation importante: la Cour internationale de justice n’a pas été conçue constitutionellement et organiquement à l’image d’autres juridictions permanentes internationales... [qui] siègent en formations restreintes. Or la Cour internationale de justice ne répond constitutionnellement pas du tout à ce schéma; c’est par construction initiale. “Il n’existe pas de division du travail, il n’existe pas de répartition des tâches, il n’existe pas de section; bref il n’existe pas de Chambres ordinaires au sein de la Cour internationale de Justice...
“Or, il est impossible de reproduire à travers un juge, ou même trois ou cinq, l’équilibre géographique laborieusement obtenu à travers les 15 juges de la Cour. Laborieusement obtenu et toujours contesté de façon latente comme déjà non satisfaisant. Si la composition actuelle de la Cour, dans son kaléidoscope géographique, et dans ses équilibres internationaux, n’est pas encore jugée par certains tout à fait satisfaisante, à plus forte raison y avail-il lieu de craindre, semble-t-il, qu’une formation restreinte telle une Chambre de la Cour, ne puisse pas répondre au voeu d’universalité.”
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 3; I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246.
Lachs, “The Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice”, in Essays on the Development of the International Legal Order, (Kalshoven, Kuyper, and Lammers, eds.)(1980),p.44.
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.
The identification, Operational Indices, is Harold Lasswell’s. See, generally, Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society. A Framework for Political Inquiry (1950).
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.
U.N. Charter, Article 17: “(1) The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organisation. “(2) The expenses of the Organisation shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.”
U.N. Charter, Article 19: “A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organisation shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.”
I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 99; I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253.
I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 7; I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3.
I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253, pp. 264–8, pp. 271–2.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 7; Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.3.
Ibid., Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3. (Judge Lachs, Separate Opinion; Judge Morozov, Dissenting Opinion; Judge Tarazi, Dissenting Opinion).
I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 169; I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392; I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 215.
Court Statute, Article 63:
“1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith.
“2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.”
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, pp. 312–5.
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, pp. 178–80.
I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 215.
Ibid.
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, pp. 170–1.
Jiménez de Aréchaga, “The Work and the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 1947–1986”, British Year Book of International Law, vol. 58 (1987), p. 1, pp. 23–7.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 23, pp. 25–7.
Ibid., p. 23.
Minquiers and Écrehos, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 47.
Ofosu-Amaah, “Regional Enforcement of International Obligations”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 47 (1987), p. 80, pp. 85–6.
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, p. 563, Jiménez de Aréchaga, op. cit., at p. 23.
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12.
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.
Bilder, “Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique”, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 23 (1982), p. 1, p. 8, citing the award and the subsequent Argentine Government Declaration of Nullity. And see also “La questione del Canale Beagle (Lodo Arbitrale Britannico), Argentina-Cile, 18 aprile 1977”, Jus Gentium (Roma), vol. 1 (N.S.), N. 3B, p. 137.
And see also Salazar Sánchez, “Der argentinisch-chilenische Grenzstreit und die Mittel friedlicher Streitbeilegung”, Archiv des Völkerrechts, vol. 27 (1989), p. 455.
Jessup, The Price of International Justice (1971), p. 31 et seq.;
Weissberg, “The rôle of the International Court of Justice in the United Nations system: the first quarter century”, in The Future of the International Court of Justice, vol. 1 (1976), p. 131, pp. 176–7.
Cited in Sturgess and Chubb, Judging the World: Law and Politics in the World’s Leading Courts (1988), at p. 463.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order, I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 3; Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3. And see Bernhardt, “Das Urteil des Internationalen Gerichtshof im Ägäis-Streit”, Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer (von Münch, ed.), (1981), p. 167.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 395 (1976).
I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 3.
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 26. And see generally Klein, “Paralleles Tätigwerden von Sicherheitsrat und Internationalen Gerichtshof bei Friedensbedrohenden Streitigkeiten, Zu Fragen der Zuständigkeit und Organtreue”, in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung. Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, (Bernhardt, Geck, Jaenicke, Steinberger, (eds.), (1983), p. 467, p. 469.
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3.
Ibid. In United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, the Court applied similar principles in rejecting, as a purported bar to Court jurisdiction, the simultaneity of the seising of the Court and the seising of the U.N. Security Council with a problem.
I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), 27 October 1966.
I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.
Ibid. pp. 299–300.
Ibid., p. 45.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 49.
I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, p. 436. Some commentators, in reviewing the issue of concurrent action in the political organs (Security Council, General Assembly), and in the principal judicial organ (International Court), of the United Nations, and the resulting competence-problematic, seek to make the analogy to the problem of Litispendence under Municipal, national law. The attempted analogy would not appear to be legally well-founded, since the Municipal law doctrine is limited to a denial of simultaneous processes before more than one Court at the same time. The old Permanent Court of International Justice took a very restrictive view of the alleged Litispendence barrier, rejecting its application in German Settlers in Upper Silesia and ruling that, to be relevant, it must involve identical action, and the same parties, and a court of the same character. (PCIJ, Ser. A no. 6 (1925), p. 20). See generally, Klein, op. cit., in Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (Bernhardt, Geck, Jaenicke, Steinberger, (eds.)), p. 467, p. 474; Ciobanu, “Litispendence between the International Court of Justice and the Political Organs of the United Nations”, in The Future of the International Court of Justice (Gross, (ed.)), (1976), p. 209; Pellet, “Le glaive et la balance”, in Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dinstein, (ed.)) (1989), p. 529, p. 545. Taking account of the contemporary constitutional evolution of the United Nations and of the International Court, the constitutional separation-of-powers analogy, interpreted in its contemporary, neo-Montesquieuan sense as implying a cooperation and complementarity of the principal U.N. organs in their problem-solving, and not any old-fashioned, artificial division and allocation of competences into abstract, a priori categories, seems more appropriate today. Klein, op. cit., at p. 481, would appear right in stressing the principle of institutional Comity (Organtreue) and the obligations of mutual restraint, inter se, on the part of the principal U.N. organs in exercising their new, cooperative approach.
Cited in Sturgess and Chubb, op. cit., p. 473.
Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, p. 259, especially pp. 284–7.
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, p. 471, p. 510 et seq.; Merits. Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, p. 212, p. 216 et seq.
Rostow, “Disputes involving the Inherent Right of Self-Defence”, in The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads (Damrosch, ed.) (1987), p. 264.
Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, (I.CJ. Reports 1984, p. 169), was decided by a vote of 14-to-l (Judge Schwebel dissenting); Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392), by votes of 1 l-to-5 (Mosler, Oda, Ago, Jennings, and Schwebel, JJ., dissenting), 14-to-2 (Ruda and Schwebel, JJ., dissenting), 15-to-l (Schwebel J., dissenting) and 16-to-0, on its separate issues.
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, was decided, as to its main substantive-legal issues, by votes of 12-to-3 (Oda, Jennings, and Schwebel, JJ., dissenting).
Case of Prohibitions, 12 Rep. 65.
I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, at p. 430.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, p. 19. See the remarks, in this regard, by ex-Judge Mosler, in Festschrift für Karl Doehring (Hailbronner, Ress, Stein (eds.)), (1989), p. 607, p. 619.
Pellet, “Le glaive et la balance. Remarques sur le rôle de la C.I.J. en matière de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales”, in Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dinstein, (ed.)), (1989), p. 539, p. 559.
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McWhinney, E. (1991). A Contemporary, Operational Approach to Court Jurisdiction and Justiciability. In: Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6796-5_5
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