Abstract
I have taken evident pains to show that reductionism in all forms is fallacious; that, in fact, no statement concerning ‘being’ entails any statement concerning ‘consciousness’ (except as ‘mind’ integrated in the domain of being) and hence no proposition of physical fact can be reduced to a proposition describing epistemic fact. If the universe of meaning following consistently from the assumption of ‘consciousness’, and the one following from the axiom ‘being’, are disjunctive, no reduction of one to the other is possible. In what, then, can verification consist ?
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© 1966 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Laszlo, E. (1966). Principle of Verification. In: Beyond Scepticism and Realism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6617-3_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6617-3_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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