Abstract
In the previous chapters we have dealt with Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy in general. Some of the most important results of our investigation are the following: (1) Aquinas teaches not only analogy of inequality, analogy of proper and improper proportionality, and analogy of extrinsic attribution, as it has been generally believed after Cajetan, but also analogy of intrinsic attribution, an analogy based on the principle of similarity between cause and effect. (2) Aquinas uses analogy of intrinsic attribution in order to provide an adequate interpretation for the God-creature relationship and a justification for theological language. Aquinas’ justification of theological language rests on his interpretation of the God-creature relationship. According to his interpretation of this relationship, finite reality (creatures) points to God, since it is caused by God. Being caused by God, finite reality bears some similarity to Him because every effect resembles its cause. This interpretation of the God-creature relationship authorizes the use of human language, because finite reality itself points to God.
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References
Supra, p. 99.
The principle omne agens agit simile sibi occurs very frequently in Aquinas’ works. See, for instance: In III Sent. 23, 3, 1, 1; De Potentia, 2, 2; 7, 5; C. Gent. II, 21, 8; 22, 5; 40, 2; 43, 8; S. Theol. I, 5, 3; 45, 6. The principle is also present in Pseudo-Dionysius. See De Divinis Nominibus 2 and 9. The principle is universally accepted by the great Scholastics, as Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventura and Scotus. Scotus, for instance, says that if the principle omne agens agit simile sibi were not universally valid one would be justified to believe that “totum Universum et quodlibet in eo factum esset a musca” (Oxoniense L. IV, d. 12, q. 3, no. 12). On the history of the principle omne agens agit simile sibi see Girardi, Metafisica della Causa Esemplare, pp. 32–33.
C. Gent. III, 69c; cf. S. Theol. I, 19, 2; “Videmus quod omne agens in quantum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi simile.”
The more competent Thomists give all this interpretation to Aquinas’ inductive argument. De Finance, for instance, says that the principle omne agens agit simile sibi “est pour S. Thomas tellement première qu’il n’en essaie même pas une démonstration. Il se contente de quelques manuductions sommaires” (Etre et Agir, p. 72). See also Girardi, Metafisica della causa esemplare, pp. 22 ff.; Penido, Le role de l’analogie, p. 135 ff.
C. Gent. I, 29; cf. In III Sent. 33, 1. 2; De Potentia 7, 5.
C. Gent. III, 107, 4.
C. Gent. II, 21, 8: “Gum omne agens secundum quod actu est, oportet modum agat actionis-esse secundum modum actus ipsius rei; unde calidum, quod magis est in actu caloris, magis calefacit.” See also II, 22, 3; III, 55, 1; III, 58, 2; S. Theol. I, 42, 6; 89, 1 etc.
In III Phys. L. 4: “omne enim agens agit in quantum est actu… Unde cum unumquodque sit actu per formam sequitur quod forma sit principium movens.” De Potentia 7, 2: “Gum proprius effectus producatur ab aliqua causa secundum suam propriam naturam et formam, diversae causae habentes diversas naturas et formas oportet quod habeant proprios effectus diversos.” See also C. Gent II, 15, 3; 16, 2; 21, 3 etc.
Cf. De Potentia 7, 2; De Veritate 27, 7.
S. Theol. 2/2, 123, 7: “Finis proximus uniuscuiusque agentis est ut similitudinem suae formae in alterum inducat; sicut finis ignis calefacientis est ut inducat similitudinem sui caloris in patiente; et finis aedificatoris est ut inducat similitudinem suae artis in materia.” See also C. Gent. II, 45; De Veritate 5, 9 ad 9 etc.
In classical philosophy this is absurd because the perfection of the effect that is not found in its cause is unaccounted for, i.e. it comes from nothing. Only in a Hegelian system, where being comes from non-being, is it possible to conceive evolution in such a way that the effect can be more perfect than its cause. With such a Hegelian concept of evolution the principle omne agens agitsimile sibi is certainly incompatible. But, even without the principle of similarity between cause and effect, Hegel’s phenomenology is able to preserve something very similar to Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy. The three stages of Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy, i.e. the via affirmationis, the via negationis and the via eminentiae, bear a strong similarity to the three stages of Hegel’s doctrine of evolution, i.e. thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Aquinas, as most ancient philosophers, conceives the universe and the laws of nature in a rather static way, but not to such a degree as to exclude dynamism and progress from nature. See on this point De Finance’s excellent work, Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris, 1945).
A cause is said to be per se or natural when it produces an effect according to its proper end. A cause is said to be per accidens or accidental when there attaches either to it or to its effect some characteristic or event that is incidental, something not included in the scope of assimilating the end to itself.
Cf. De Malo 1, 3 ad 2, ad 14, ad 15; S. Theol. I, 13, 1; In V Meta. no. 789 etc. For a good classification of causa per accidens see Girardi, Metafisica delta Causa Esemplare, pp. 26–27.
A cause is said to be principal if it acts by its own native power. A cause is said to be instrumental if it acts by the power of the principal cause that employs it. 4 Cf. De Malo 4, 3; In IV Sent. 1, 1, 4, 1 ad 3; S. Theol. III, 62, 1.
S. Theol. I, 45, 5; III, 62, 1 ad 2; De Veritate 26, lc etc.
Aquinas deals with the problem of the proper effect of primary and secondary causes especially in De Potentia, 7, 5 ad 8. Aquinas says that “an effect includes something whereby it is like its cause, and something whereby it differs therefrom: and this by resaon of its matter or something of the kind. Take, for example, a brick hardened by fire; the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire: then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority: because fire is hotter than the brick: and it is hotter in a more eminent way, since the brick is hot by being made hot, while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically. Thus it is false to say of fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action, and the difficulty to quench it. Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby they are likened to God… And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God…”
In De Causis, L. 12: “Hoc modo causa est in effectu, et e converso, secundum quod causa agit in effectum, et effectus recipit actionem causae. Causa autem agit in effectum per modum ipsius causae; effectus autem recipit actionem causae per modum suum: unde oportet quod causa sit in effectu per modum effectus, et effectus sit in causa per modum causae.” See also S. Theol. I, 49, 1c; 105, 1 ad 1.
The only case in which God operates something equal to Himself is in the generation of the Word. But according to Aquinas in this case we cannot properly use the term cause The Father is not the cause but the principle (principium) of the Son.
According to Aquinas creatures are not causes of the esse but only of the fieri of their effects. A creature can only establish a limited similarity. First, because a finite cause, whose action is based on a particular perfection, can produce but particular aspects not the whole perfection of the being of its effect (cf. De Potentia 3, 1). Second, because the perfection of a finite cause, being limited to a genus or to a species, does not contain the effect except insofar as the effect agrees with its cause in genus and species (cf. C. Gent. II, 21, 8).
De Potentia 7, 1 ad 8; cf. S. Theol. I, 105, 1 ad 1.
Aquinas, sometimes, divides causes into three classes: unvicoal equivocal, and analogous (cf. e.g., In I Sent. 8, 1, 2; S. Theol. I, 13, 5 ad 1). It seems, however, that equivocal and analogous causes do not form two distinct classes. Actually according to Aquinas’ own principles no absolutely equivocal action is possible. Equivocity is a logical not an ontological category. See Girardi, Metafisca delta Causa Esemplare, p. 55: “Ne concluderemo quindi che la causalit” equiv oca ed analogica non vanno intese come due tipi distinti di causalità.”
Cf. S. Theol. I 104, 1; C. Gent. II, 21.
Cf. S. Theol. I, 13, 5 ad 1; 104, 1; De Potentia 7, 7 ad 3; De Veritate 10, 13 ad 3; and Boetii de Trinitate, 1, 4 ad 4.
The division of similarity into specific, generic and analogous goes back to Aristotle. See, for example, Metaph. 1016b, 34–1017a, 3; De Partibus Animalium 645b, 27.
Cf. C. Gent. I, 29u & 31; In I Sent. 8, 1, 2; & Theol. I, 105, 1 ad 1.
Cf. S. Theol. I, 4, 2;
Cf. In IV Sent. 1, 1, 4, 1 ad 3; 14, 4, 2 ad 2; De Veritate 26, 8 ad 1; De Malo 4, 1 ad 15; S. Theol. 1/2, 66, 6 ad 3; 83, 1 ad 2; 2/2, 148, 3 ad 2.
In I Sent. 3, 1, 3; C. Gent I, 29; S. Theol. I, 4, 2 etc.
C. Gent. I, 29 & 31; III, 97, 2; In I Sent. 8, 1, 2; S. Theol. I, 13, 5.
In I Sent. 8, 4, 3; DePotentia 7, 5 ad 5; 9, 7 Ld 2; S. Theol. I, 13, 3; 105, 1 ad 1.
See, for example, S. Theol. I, 13 2 where St. Thomas says that “our names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellects know God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him (i.e. imperfectly)... Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly.” See also S. Theol. I, 13, 2 ad 2; C. Gent. III, 49, 3 etc.
Cf. In I Sent. 45, 4; S. Theol. I, 13, 3 ad 1; 19, 11; C. Gent. I, 30. See also Anderson, The Bond of Being, p. 173; Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 103 ff., and Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 80.
S. Theol. I, 13, 3 ad 1; In I Sent. 22, 1, 2; C. Gent. I, 30. According to Aquinas all specific perfections, even angelic perfections, can be predicated of God only metaphorically (cf. In I Sent. 34, 3, 2 ad 3).
Cf. De Veritate 2, 1; S. Theol. I, 13, 3 ad 1; 19, 11. Though Aquinas never provides a general criterion for names of simple perfections I believe that the distinction between names essentially analogous and names accidentally analogous offers the ground for a simple criterion. As I have shown in my logical analysis of analogy there are two kinds of analogous judgments, namely judgments that are analogous because of a variation of meaning in the copula and judgments that are analogous because of a variation of meaning in the predicative attribute. Only judgments of the second group are essentially analogous, because their predicate attributes are essentially analogous names, while the predicate attributes of the judgments of the second group are names only accidentally analogous. This distinction between judgments essentially analogous and judgments accidentally analogous provides the following criterion for names of simple perfections: names of simple perfections are all and only those names that function as predicate attributes of essentially analogous judgments whose subject is God. However, to be satisfactory, this criterion needs the following restriction: the predicate attribute must be a concept that applies to being as such, namely a concept that applics to the whole realm of reality. Therefore I can use the criterion safely only if I have an absolute certainty, based on the very nature of the concept that it applies to anything that is real, therefore also to God. See my paper “Triplice analisi dell’analogia e suo uso in teologia” Divus Thomas (1957), pp. 419 ff.
Cf. E. Winance, “Essence divine et connaissance humaine chez St. Thomas” Revue Philosophique de Louvain (1957), p. 193.
In I Sent. 22, 1, 2; De Veritate 1, 2; De Ente c. 6; De Potentia 1, 3; C. Gent I, 30 & 34; S. Theol. 1, 13, 3 ad 1; 19, 11 etc.
In I Sent. 45, 1, 4; De Veritate 2, 1; S. Theol. I, 13, 3.
In I Sent. 22, 1, 2 ad 2.
Infra, p. 98.
In Divinis Nominibus IV, Lect. 5 & 6; cf. also S. Theol. I, 13, 6 & ad 6. Aquinas’ teaching on this point, i.e. that with regard to the mode of signification creature is the primary analogue and with regard to the perfection signified God is the primary analogue, cannot leave any doubt that the analogy used here by Aquinas is the analogy of intrinsic attribution. Only in analogy of attribution it is possible to speak of primary and secondary analogates. In analogy of proportionality there is no primary and secondary analogate: Only analogy of intrinsic attribution is capable to bring out this important feature of theological language, namely that with respect to the mode of signification analogous concepts have a creature as primary analogate and God as secondary analogate: they are an adequate representation of a created perfection, and a vague, inadequate representation of a divine perfection.
De Veritate 5, 8 ad 3; C. Gent. I, 30.
In I Sent. 34, 3, 2 ad 2.
This fourfold classification of names with respect to their applicability to God is clearly implied in the following passages: (i) quaedam nomina creaturarum non nominant tantum id quod creatum est sed etiam defectum culpae annexum; sicut nomen diaboli nominat naturam deformatam peccato: et ideo talibus nominibus non possumus transumptive uti ad divina (In I Sent. 34, 3, 2 ad 2); (ii) quaedam nomina significant perfectionem receptam secundum talem modum participandi (i.e. includunt in sua significatione imperfectum modum participandi). Talia nomina nullo modo dicuntur de Deo proprie; sed tarnen ratione illius perfectionis possunt dici de Deo metaphorice, sicut sentire, videre et huiusmodi; (iii) quaedam nomina significant principalit erperfectionem exemplatam a Deo simpliciter (i.e. significant perfectionem aliquam absolute). Talia nomina proprie dicuntur de Deo, et per prius sunt in ipso quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi, ut sapientia, bonitas, essentia et omnia huiusmodi (In I Sent. 22, 1, 2); (iv) quaedam nomina exprimunt cum perfectione modum quo inveniuntur in Deo. Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniantur per nomina a nobis imposita significari non possunt nisi per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum, vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa vel summum bonum; non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est. Talia nomina de solo Deo dicuntur, sicut summum bonum, primum ens et alia huiusmodi. Nec creaturae communicari possunt (C. Gent. I, 30. Cf. De Veritate 5, 8 ad 3).
For Aquinas’ criticism of Maimonides see especially De Potentia 7, 5 and S. Theol. I, 13, 2. For an excellent study of Maimonides’ doctrine on negative attributes see H. A. Wolfson’s “Maimonides on Negative Attributes” in Louis Ginzberg Junilee Volume, pp. 411–446.
In I Sent. 22, 1, 2 ad 1; C. Gent. I, 30.
In I Sent 8, 1, 1 ad 4.
Ibid. See also In I Sent. 34, 3, 2; C. Gent. I, 14.
In I Sent. 8, 4, 2; 35, 1 2 ad 5; C. Gent. I, 30; S. Theol. I, 13, 4; to stress the eminence of God’s perfections sometimes Aquinas makes use of the Pseudo-Dionysian terminology of super-esse, super-sapiens etc. See, for instance, In I Sent. 4, 2, 1 ad 2; 8, 1, 2; In Divinis Nominibus IV, Lect. 5 & 6.
In I Sent. 2, 1, 3 ad 2; see also In Divinus Nominibus I, Lect. 3, no. 83: “Hoc enim est ultimum ad quod pertingere possumus circa cognitionem divinam in hac vita, quod Deus est supra omne id quod a nobis cognitari potest.”
In I Sent. 3, 1, 1; 13, 1 ad 4; De Veritate 2, 1 ad 9; C. Gent. I, 30; III, 49; S. Theol. I, 3, 4 ad 2; 13, 8 ad 2. Since God is absolutely unknowable Aquinas prefers the negative way to the affirmative, as the safer of the two. In the Commentary to the Sentences (I, 34, 3, 2) he says that “convenientissimus modus significandi divina fit per negationem” and in the Summa C. Gent (I, 14) “est via remotionis utendum, praecipue, in consideration divinae substantiae.” See also De Veritate 10, 1 and Summa Theol. I, 2, 1 proem. Of course, these statements, concerning the negative way, are to be taken with a grain of salt. They do not mean that man has no knowledge of God, since Aquinas definitely teaches that man knows God’s existence and also, though very faintly, His essence. They mean that man does not know the mode of God’s essence (man has some knowledge of the res significata but he ignores the modus significandi). There is, however, no agreement among Thomists as to the meaning of Aquinas’ via negativa. Some apply the via negativa to imperfections, mixed perfections, and to the mode of signification of the names of simple perfections, but not to the res significata by names of simple perfections. They believe that man has some positive concept of the res significata by such names as truth, goodness, wisdom etc. Others apply the via negativa to all concepts without distinction. Man has no concept of the eminent way according to which God’s perfections are relaized. These perfections can only be affirmed without being conceptualized. The positive and eminent way is not a matter of concepts but of judgments. It seems to me that the texts we have examined favor the second interpretation rather than the first. Gilson is a strong supporter of this interpretation. But I cannot agree with some language used by him, for instance, the following sentence: “when we speak of essence, goodness... we are doing nothing more than repeating about him (God): he is esse” (Le Thomisme, 5 ed., 155). For, it seems to me that when we say that God is good, act,... we do not merely say that He exists. We say that He is goodness, causality, actuality, or, reciprocally, that goodness, actuality do really exist in God (cf. In De Trinitate 1, 4 ad 10). In these predications it is not only the factuality of existence that is affirmed, but a qualitative existence. It seems to me that when Gilson says that when we speak of essence, goodness, we are doing nothing more than repeating about God: He is esse, he is biased to the notion of existence. But if it is true that with reference to God all predication is analogous then this is the case not only of attributive predication but also of existential predication. Moreover if the distinction between modus significandi and res significata applies to all human concepts then the work of negative theology is not to be used only for attributive but also for existential predicates (In I Sent. 8, 1, 1 ad 4). This is no mystery when it is remembered that all human predication about God is inadequate. For in humanis, in general, when predication is existential it is not essential and when it is essential it is not existential. But any predication concerning God must be at the same time essential and existential. Therefore, when we talk about God all our predications, both essential and existential must be purified, (cf. In I Sent. I, 4 exp. text.; 33, 1, 2; C. Gent. I, 30; S. Theol. I, 13, 12 ad 2).
One of the difficulties that seems to preclude analogy of proper proportionality from theology is that when we try to set up a proportionality between God and creatures, e.g. human existence is to human essence as divine existence is to divine essence, there seems to be no similarity between the two proportions; because the relation between the elements of the divine proportion is only logical (since there is no distinction between essence and existence in God) while the relation between the elements of the human proportion is real (since there is a real distinction between essence and existence in man). For an attempted answer to this difficulty see, for instance, Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 304 ff. and Klubertanz, op. cit., p. 99 ff.
In Chapters Six and Seven we shall see that in some respects Aquinas’ analogy of intrinsic attribution is a more adequate tool than Tillich’s symbolism and Barth’s analogy of faith. Aquinas’ analogy of intrinsic attribution is more adequate because it is applicable not only to the dimension of revelation and grace but also to the dimension of creation and nature. Moreover Aquinas’ analysis of the distinction between modus significandi and res significata is more satisfactory than Barth’s analysis of the distinction between form and content or Tillich’s analysis of the distinction between literal and symbolic meaning. It is by means of these distinctions that Barth, Tillich and Aquinas try to safeguard both God’ stranscendence and immanence and to give an adequate interpretation of theological language. But, through a detailed analysis of the distinction between modus significandi and res significata, Aquinas has arrived at a fourfold classification of names with respect to their applicability to God, that we shall not find either in Barth or in Tillich. The weakness of Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy is that it is couched in a philsophical language very difficult for the modern reader and is based on philosophical principles that the modern mind, very sceptical towards philosophical reason, has great difficulty in accepting.
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Mondin, B. (1963). Aquinas’ Theological Use of Analogy. In: The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6574-9_4
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