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In this chapter we shall examine the main metaphysical presuppositions of the four Thomistic types of analogy.
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References
Cf. Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, p. 89; Penido, Le Rôle de l’Analogie, p. 162 ff.
Physical dissimilarity, as such, is not a sufficient guarantee of ontological analogy. There are dissimilarities which may still keep us in the domain of univocity. In the realm of physical objects there are many kinds of dissimilarity. Dissimilarities within the same essence do not destroy univocation. E.g., the dissimilarities between Chinese, Americans and Africans do not prevent them from belonging to the same human species, which is predicated univocally of all of them. It is only when the dissimilarity transcends the essential level that we enter into the domain of analogy, since transcendental perfections may exist according to modes essentially different. For example, being may exist in a finite and in an infinite mode. Predicamental perfections, e.g. whiteness, may exist according to different degrees, but these degrees are only accidental variations. Cf. Penido, Le rôle de l’Analogie, p. 161 ff.
Cf. also Maritain, Les Degrés du Savoir, p. 822; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 127–128; Mclnerny, “The Logic of Analogy” New Scholasticism (1957), pp. 156 ff.
Cf. Girardi, Metafisica della Causa Esemplare, p. 12.
Aquinas describes analogy as a relation between things that are partly similar and partly different (cf. In IV Meta, no 535). Cajetan expresses this same fact in a different but no less striking form. He says: “things which give rise to analogy are similar in the sense that the foundation of similitude in one is absolutely different from the foundation of similitude in the other. Thus the notion of one thing does not contain in itself what the notion of the other contains. For this reason the foundation of analogous similitude in either of the extremes is not to be abstracted from the extremes themselves” (De Nominum Analogia c.4; English Transl. p. 31). See also Mascall. Existence and Analogy, p. 100; Renard, The Philosophy of Being, p. 94.
Extrinsic attribution may be turned into proportionality when, e.g., “healthy” is predicated of color and urine: we may say that health is to urine as health is to color. This is denied by Goergen (cf. Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, p. 67); but he must take this position in order to be consistent with his view on attribution and proportionality. Analogy of intrinsic attribution is sometimes turned into proportionality by Aquinas himself, as when he says that the analogy between finite and infinite may be turned into the proportionality: the infinite is to the infinite as the finite is to the finite. See In IV Sent. 49, 2, 1 ad 6.
Cf. Vansteenberghen, Ontology (London, 1952), pp. 34–35. The fact that almost every mode of predication may be expressed in terms of proportionality has convinced Suarez that proportionality is not sufficient to obtain analogy of proportionality (Sed advertendum censeo non omnem proportionalitatem sufficere ad constituendam analogiam proportionalitatis. Cf. Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disp. 28, Sect. iii, 10). This fact is probably also the reason why some philosophers, e.g. Robinson (Cf. Review of Metaphysics 1951–1952, pp. 466–467), consider metaphysical analogy as something trivial. See Klubertanz, o.c., pp. 83–4.
Cf. Anderson, “Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy,” Thomist (1941), pp. 575 ff.
Cf. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy, p. 18 ff., and Penido, Le rôle de l’Analogie, pp. 360 ff.
For Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ views on this point see Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, pp. 145 ff.
This hope has been expressed by both Geiger and Fabro. Cf. Geiger, La Participation dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d’Aquin, p. 317, note 3, where he says: “Le fondement ontologique de l’analogie est la participation.” The view that the solutions of the problems of analogy are to be sought in the notion of participation is stated even more vigorously by Fabro when he says: “Un’esposizione definitiva della dottrina tomista sull’analogia non puo’ che dipendere direttamente dalla nozione tomista di partecipazione” (La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, 2 ed., p. 189, note 2). See also J. Habbel, Die Analogie zwischen Gott und Welt nach Thomas von Aquin (Berlin, 1928) pp. 13 & 31;
F. A. Blanche, “Une Théorie de l’Analogie,” Revue de Philosophie (1932), p. 58.
For these distinctions see Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, especially pp. 176
Cf. G. Soehngen, “Analogia Entis in Analogia Fidei,” in Antwort, p. 267 ff.; Geiger, La Participation, pp. 27 ff. & 65 ff.; Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, pp. 39 ff.
The participation of univocal concepts in a common intention is logical; the participation of the secondary analogates in the first analogate is real, at least in analogy of intrinsic attribution. This is one of the cornerstones of St. Thomas’ doctrine of analogy. In his commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics he says: “Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habit-udines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur” (In IV Metaphysicorum, no. 536). Commenting on this passage McInerny says: “There is only one nature which receives the first and complete signification of the name; whatever else receives the same name refers to the first signification. This brings out the difference between things named analogically and those named univocally. The latter communicate equally in the ratio signified by the name: there is not some one nature which is named principally. Greater and lesser participation in the common ratio destroys univocation, but is of the very essence of analogy.” (R. Mclnerny, “The logic of Analogy,” New Scholasticism (1957), pp. 154–155.
Cf. also Gilson, The Christian Philisophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956), pp. 360 ff.;
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism (New York, 1930), pp. 30 ff.
We say that it is possible and not that it is necessary, because efficient causality establishes different kinds of likeness between cause and effect. There are kinds of causality that normally produce a perfect likeness, as when a man generates another man. There are other kinds of causality which produce only a partial likeness as when a painter paints a picture. St. Thomas calls the first mode of causality “univocal causality” and the second “equivocal causality.” Univocal causality is the ontological ground of univocation. Equivocal causality is the ontological ground of analogy. Anderson and many other Thomists exclude analogy of intrinsic attribution from metaphysics and theology because they believe that this kind of analogy is exposed to the permanent danger of lapsing into univocity, (cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 116–117, 122 and Ch. 12). But no such danger exists when intrinsic attribution is based on equivocal causality (cf. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 331 ff.).
Cf. Aquinas, De Veritate 2, 11 and 23, 7 ad 9; Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, no 24.
Cf. St. Thomas, In V Ethicorum, no. 939–940 (in mathematical proportionality there is equality of relations); In IV Sententiarum, 49, 2, 1 ad 2 (in non-mathematical proportionality there is only a similarity of relations). St. Thomas sometimes gives mathematical examples to explain metaphysical and theological analogy (e.g. In I Sententiarum 34, 3, 1 ad 2). In fact we find it convenient to express such analogies in the form of geometrical proportions, e.g., matter/form equals potency/act; creature/participated being equals creator/unparticipated being. Such formulas must not be interpreted in the quantitative mathematical sense. For mathematical analogy differs toto coelo from metaphysical and theological analogy. For differences between mathematical and metaphysical analogy see also Lyttkens, The analogy between God and the world, pp. 46–47; Anderson, “Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy,” Thomist (1941) pp. 572 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 300 ff.
Cf. e.g., Anderson, “Some basic propositions concerning metaphysical analogy,” Review of Metaphysics (1951–1952), p. 465. In Bond of Being Anderson says that analogy is rooted in the doctrine of potency and act. The view that analogy of proper proportionality is based on the real distinction between essence and existence is also defended by Phelan who says that “the ultimate basis upon which such analogies (of proportionality) rest, is the proportion existing between the essence (quod est) and existence (esse) of every being that is.” (Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy, p. 24).
Cf. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1957), pp. 170 ff.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1070b 25–27; 1093b 18–21.
Klubertanz gives another interesting reason. He says that analogy of proper proportionality does not require a real distinction between terms because analogy considers the relation between predicate and subject, and “this relation holds no matter what the relation between these ‘terms’ and what they signify, and no matter what the relation between the ‘significata’ themselves.” (G. P. Klubertanz, “The Problem of the Analogy of Being,” Review of Metaphysics (1957), p. 262. Cfr. Klubertanz, St. Thomas on Analogy, p. 99.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia (English Transl.), pp. 32, 35, 38; Anderson, Bond of Being, pp. 301, 305 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’Analogie, p. 000.
To put the matter in different words; when we predicate love of both God and man, we do not intend to say that there is a similarity between the relation of love to God and the relation of love to man. We intend to affirm that the perfection of love belongs intrinsically to both of them. This predication, then, should be analyzed in terms of intrinsic attribution, not in terms of proportionality.
The reader of Aquinas, however, knows what a sparing use he makes of proper proportionality. He sets up proportionalities only when he has at his disposal a common term (e.g. tranquillitas, visio) for the description of the analogous relation. It is the difficulty of determining the analogous relation and of finding a common term for it, that makes most proportionalities obscure.
Cf. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, p. 289.
It may even be said that the procedure of proper proportionality is misleading. We are not satisfied with saying that both God and man are good; we want to know how the perfection of goodness applies to both of them. Proportionality does not explain how God and man are good. Actually it does something else. It shows there is a similarity between God and man; but this similarity is not rooted in the fact that they are both good. The similarity consists in a proportional relation of goodness to its subjects, God and man !
Cf. E. Przywara, Polarity, (Oxford, 1935) pp. 117–119; Mascall, Existence and Analogy, pp. 108 ff.; Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 96 & 99.
For a different approach to the limitations of the analogy of proper proportionality and the ontological priority of the analogy of attribution see R. Masiello, The Intuition of Being according to the Metaphysics of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), pp. 14, 18 ff. Masiello has developed the same views in the essay “The Analogy of proportion according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas” The Modern Schoolman (1958), pp. 91–105.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 2; Johannes a S. Thoma, Logica (ed. Marietti) II, p. 486; Penido, Le Rôle de l’Analogie, p. 37; Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 338 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 98 ff.
The equality of relations cannot be set up since in reality there are only three terms not four.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, c. 2 (English Transl. no. 9). Cajetan considers as a possible ontological ground of analogy of extrinsic attribution also the relation of efficient causality. But he sees the matter from a different point of view. He is not talking about the analogy between primary and secondary analogate but about the analogy between two secondary analogates (e.g. between food and medicine because of their relation of efficient causality to health) because they have in common a relation of efficient causality to the primary analogate.
No ontological ground is left for intrinsically ascribing the analogous property also to the secondary analogate, because there are only three kinds of ontological grounds for intrinsic denomination: identity of natures (which is the onlogical ground of univocation), the metaphysical principle omne agens agit sibi simile (which is the ontological ground of intrinsic attribution) and relatio convenientiae proportionum. None of these three ontological grounds is present in analogy of extrinsic attribution; therefore, the analogous perfection cannot be intrinsically ascribed to the secondary analogate.
This property of analogy of extrinsic denomination is attentively analyzed by Cajetan in De Nominum Analogia, c. 2, where he uses a great variety of adverbs (formaliter, intrinsece, proprie, absolute, distincte) to say that the first analogate is the only one to realize the idea expressed by the analogous name. He, then, concludes: “sanum ipsum animal est; urina vero, medicina et alia sana dicuntur non a sanitate eis inhaerente, sed extrinsece ab illa animalis sanitate, significative vel causaliter.” (op. cit. c. 2). See also Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 73 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 93 ff.; Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 338 ff.
In this, extrinsic attribution is clearly distinguished from intrinsic attribution of transcendental perfections, where with the destruction of the primary analogate all secondary analogates would also be annihilated. That the ground on which analogy of extrinsic attribution stands is the primary analogate and that, if the primary analogate is eliminated then the whole analogy breaks down, is well stated by Spinoza in the following passage: “A thing is called sacred and Divine when it is designed for promoting piety, and continues sacred so long as it is religiously used: if the users cease to be pious, the thing ceases to be sacred: if it be turned to base uses, that which was formerly sacred becomes unclean and profane. For instance, a certain spot was named by the patriarch Jacob the house of God, because he worshipped God there revealed to him: by the prophets the same spot was called the house of iniquity (cf. Amos 5, 5; and Hosea 10, 5), because the Isarelites were wont, at the instigation of Jeroboam, to sacrifice there to idols” (Spinoza, A Theologico Political Treatise, ch. 12). Cf. also Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, c. 7 (English Transl., p. 53). Cajetan is concerned here with the relation between primary and secondary analogate in improper proportionality.
For a good exposition of the similarities and differences between extrinsic attribution and improper proportionality see Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 84–85; cf. also Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 176–177.
Cf. Penido, Le Rôle de l’Analogie, pp. 43 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 178 ff.; Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, p. 85. That improper proportionality is rooted in a likeness of action is stated again and again by Aquinas. See, for instance, De Malo 16, 1 ad 3 (the likeness consists in a similitudo operationis), De Potentia 7, 5 ad 8 (the likeness consists in a similitudo effectus), De Veritate (the likeness consists in a similitudo effectus); cf. also In IV Sententiarum 45, 1, 1 quaestiunc. 1 ad 2; S. Theol. I, 13, 6.
See, for instance, Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, p. 85; Anderson, The Bond of Being, p. 180.
In philosophical literature the term “analogy” occurs in connection with three epistemological problems: a) reasoning by analogy, whereby certain terms and concepts are obtained, b) analogy of representation, inasmuch as concepts mirror reality only imperfectly, only in an analogous way; it is with this kind of analogy that the contemporary discussion about the ability of our mind to represent reality (cf. Emmet’s Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, Kattsoff’s Logic and the Nature of Reality, Farrer’s Finite and Infinite) has to do; Thomists have not ignored this problem of analogy (cf. Rousselot, Intellectualisme de S. Thomas, pp. 107 ff.; Gardeil, “La Structure Analogique de l’intellect,” Revue Thomiste (1927), pp. 11 ff.), c) analogy among concepts which represent different objects but are designated by the same term, e.g. there is analogy between the concepts of being representing Peter, the moon, the street and the sea. In the present discussion of the epistemological problems of analogy I am concerned only with the last kind of analogy.
Cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being, p. 123, 127 ff., 255 ff.; Maritain, Degrés du Savoir, p. 122; Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, c. 3 (English Transl. no 23); Hayen, L’Intentionnel selon s. Thomas d’Aquin, p. 67.
This difference between analogies due to a modification in the meaning of the verb and analogies due to a modification in the meaning of the predicative attribute will be more thoroughly analyzed in the next section on the logical problems of analogy.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, c. 4 (English Transl., no. 36).
I am indebted to Prof. Wild for some of the terminology used in this section (data, pervasiveness, awareness etc.). See Prof. Wild’s essay “Phenomenologyy and Metaphysics” Return to Reason, where the main traits of all-pervasive data are clearly focused, (cf. especially pp. 53–54).
Cf. Roland-Gosselin, “Peut-on parler d’intuition dans la philosophie Thomiste?” Philosophia Perennis, II, pp. 709–730; A. Hufnagel, Intuition und Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin, Münster 1932;
R. Jolivet, “L’intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique” Archives de Philisophie, 1349;
L. B. Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas,” Revue des Sciences Phil. et Theol. (1947), pp. 3–40;
J.H. Nicolas, “L’Etre et le connaître” Revue Thomiste (1950), pp. 119–153;
J.H. Nicolas, “L’Etre et le connaître” Revue Thomiste (1950), pp. 330–359;
Van Riet, “La Théorie Thomiste de l’Abstraction” Re. Phil. de Louvain (1952), pp. 359 ff.; P. Merlan, “Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas” Journal of History of Ideas (1953), pp. 284–291;
Maritain, Existence and the Existent (1949), pp. 28 ff. note 14;
R. Masiello, The Intuition of Being according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1955); Hayen, L’intentionnel selon s. Thomas, pp. 58–59; Cunningham, “A Theory on abstraction in St. Thomas” Modern Schoolman 1958, pp. 259 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 59 ff.
For a defense of the use of abstraction see Maritain, Existence and the Existent, pp. 28 ff. note 14; for a justification of the use of Intuition by Thomists see Jolivet, “L’intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique,” Archives de Philosophie 1934; for the meaning of separation and precision see Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas” Re. Sc. Phil. et Theol. 1947, pp. 3–40 and Cunningham, “A Theory on abstraction in St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman 1958, pp. 259 ff.; for the use of incomplete abstraction cf. Penido Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 59 ff.; for the use of abstractive intuition cf. De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, pp. 35 ff.
Cfr. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, p. 9, 141.
In analogy of intrinsic attribution the primary analogate may be either the cause or the effect. It depends which one is known first. The one known first is the primary analogate.
With regard to the order of knowledge in our case, the primary analogate is the effect. See Aquinas, S. Theol. I, 13, 6.
Cf. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 361 ff.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, c. 5–6.
Cf. Cajetan, ibid. Both procedures are recognized as valid by Cajetan, but he prefer the procedure of forming an analogous concept that represents one analogate perfectly and the others imperfectly, because it has a better chance of avoiding the danger of univocation.
Cajetan again and again calls the attention of the reader to this danger, which constantly threatens to destroy the analogous concept in its very essence. See, for example, De Nominum Analogia, c. 5 (nos 45–46 & 53–54 of the English Transl.).
Here the reader may wonder whether it is possible at all to arrive at a concept of being as such. We know that this has been the perennial quest of metaphysics. Most metaphysicians have attempted to arrive at a concept of being as such through an analysis of particular beings; but, as Heidegger has cogently shown, they have never gone beyond particular beings. Heidegger himself, however, has not been able to do better than his predecessors. In Sein und Zeit he attempts to arrive at a concept of being as such through an analysis of human existence. But he never gets beyond human existence, to being as such. Heidegger’s attempt is another instance of the inability of metaphysics to arrive at a concept of being as such. Should we, then, conclude with Kant that metaphysics is impossible? As Christian philosopher (and, if Christianity is true, not to be a Christian philosopher is an anachronism) we cannot accept this conclusion because the Christian doctrine of Creation provides an adequate solution to the mystery of being as such. According to this doctrine, beings are called into existence by Being as such, they are an image of Being as such, and, consequently, they provide man in general and the philosopher in particular with an imperfect concept, a very imperfect idea, of Being as such.
See Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 257 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 58 ff.
Cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 256 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 75 ff.; Maritain, Preface to Metaphysics, pp. 64–65; Gardeil, “La Structure analogique de l’intellect,” Revue Thomiste (1927), pp. 8–13; Hayen, L’Intentionnel selon s. Thomas, pp. 68–70; Goergen, K. Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 91 ff.
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Mondin, B. (1963). Metaphysical Presuppositions of Aquinas’ Four Types of Analogy. In: The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6574-9_3
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