Abstract
In the two and a half years which have passed since the manuscript for this book was terminated, two major events occurred: firstly the armed clash between India and Pakistan, which was settled with Soviet mediation while China strongly supported the Pakistani position; and secondly, the explosion of nuclear devices by China.1 The situation on the Sino-Indian border had previously remained relatively quiet and the exchange of notes between the two countries dealt mainly with mutual accusations concerning minor intrusions and violation of air space. The Sikkim-border, the only stretch of the boundary which had been clearly described in a treaty, gave rise to some concern in August 1964 when India protested against a Chinese intrusion.1a It was this sector which Peking used for an ultimatum during the fighting: in Kashmir.
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References
India reacted by accusing China of a reversal of her stand at the Bandung conference, which had appealed for a suspension of nuclear experiments. White Paper XI, p. 80.
a Ibidem, p. 24.
Documents on China’s ultimatum to India, p. 8.
Ibidem, p. 37. “Incidents on the Sikkim border continued during November and Decern” ber and may have been intended to stiffen Pakistan’s determination. The Tashkent a-greement of January 10, 1966, provided for withdrawal of armed personnel to positions held on August 5, the date of the despatch of the raiders. The restoration of the status quo was welcomed by India, but its relevance as a precedent for the Sino-Indian border is small as Peking takes the view that its unilateral withdrawal went as far as the “line of actual control.”
The Times, February 17, 1966.
The Times, March 23, 1965.
The Economist, May 22, 1965.
The Cairo Conference of Non-aligned Nations, New Delhi, 1964, p. 26.
Communiqué at New Delhi, October 25, 1966.
Foreign Minister in Lok Sabha, November 10, 1965.
Lansdowne to Satow, October 6, 1904. Quoted by Lamb, op. cit., p. 34.
Lamb, A., The McMahon Line, p. 42, 45. Lamb also mentions how China paid the instalments for the indemnity due by Tibet, p. 53–54.
Memorandum of August 17, 1912 reproduced by Lamb, op. cit., p. 604.
Seep. 141.
Lamb confirms my view that the concept of suzerainty was foreign to China, op. cit., p. 44, note 18.
Political and Secret Subjects File 464, pt. 4. S. of S. to Viceroy, April 21, 1914. On April 27 the Viceroy’s cable stated casually that the word sovereignty had been dropped, P. 1646.
Proceedings 4th meeting, February 19, 1914. Ibidem, p. 893.
S. of S. to Viceroy, with approval of Grey, July 1, 1914, Reg. No. 2555.
From Viceroy, July 4, 1914. P. 2593. Lamb, p. 518–9, is less complete on the final days of the conference. He believed that the idea for a bilateral declaration originated in or was approved by London, while in fact, the home government thought an oral statement to be sufficient. Lamb was unaware of the late arrival of the cable of July 3. The India Office file contains a note that the delay had been unavoidable, but that McMahon’s actions under the circumstances appeared praiseworthy and could be approved.
From Jordan, August 2, 1915, India Office file 464, pt. 5, 6, P. 2845.
From Viceroy, July 5, 1915, Ibidem, p. 2479. In 1914 Russia had suggested as quid pro quo for British visits to Lhasa the right for a Russian agent to visit Herat. See for a Chinese interpretation of the British soundings p. 17, note 2.
Lamb, A., op. cit., p. 534, 563.
Verbal statement communicated by A. Rose to Ivan Chen on March, 1914. I. O. File 464, P. 1215.
McMahon’s Final Memorandum, P. 536, p. 11 reads: „This secures to us a natural watershed frontier, access to the shortest trade route into Tibet, and control of the monastery of Tawang which has blocked the trade by this route in the past by undue exaction and oppression.“
Lamb makes a similar statement, op. cit., p. 526.
Substantial reviews appeared in International Affairs, October 1965, R.C.A.J., July/October 1965, both by Guy Wint; The China Quarterly, 1965, 202–207, by Alastair Lamb; American Political Science Review, March 1966, by Robert North; A.J.I.L., April 1966, by Alfred Rubin; Indian Express, June 14, 1966, by A. G. Noorani; Das Historisch-Politische Buch, 1965, Heft 7, by Walther Maas. Relazioni Internazionali, Feb. 1967.
See p. 98–99.
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Van Eekelen, W.F. (1967). Postscript. In: Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6555-8_10
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