Abstract
The most valid and surest starting-point for the dialogues of Plato, and, practically for the whole of philosophical consideration, is, in our opinion, the discerning of our own being. If this is correctly posited, we shall in every way, I think, be able more accurately to understand both the good that is appropriate to us and the evil that fights against it. Of the things that are, as it is natural for each one to differ in being, so also their perfection varies in different cases, according to their descent in the scale of being. Either both being and the good proceed from the same hearth and primal spring, as Aristotle1 asserts, in which case individual objects must receive their limit of perfection according to the measure of their being ; or the good has come to things from one source, higher and more holy, and being and existence from another, in which case, as each one shares in being more dimly or more clearly, so also it will participate in the good, the primary beings in a greater and more perfect good, those that are assigned to an intermediate position, according to their own station, in a secondary good, and the lowest beings in a lowest good.
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References
cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 1096a23 “good” has as many senses as “being” (Ross)
cf. Timaeus 30 a–b.
cf. Laws 757a “for when equality is given to unequal things, the resultant will be unequal, unless due measure is applied” (Loeb).
Between gods and men lie intermediate beings of three kinds, angels, spirits and heroes. cf. p. 32.
cf. Homer, Iliad V 440–42.
cf. El. Theol. p. 115, 22: “the primary participant of the supra-existential henads will be undivided Being.” ibid. p. 151, 1: “Every intelligence is an indivisible existence.”
cf. ibid. p. 167, 6–13: “For such principles (i.e. those divided in association with bodies) are wholly inseparable from their substrates; they are partitioned together with partitioned bulk, and falling away from their own nature, which is without parts, they are infected with corporeal extension; if they be of the the order of vital principles, they belong as life principles not to themselves but to their participants; if they be of the order of Being and the Forms, they belong as forms not to themselves but to that which they inform.”
cf. ibid. p. 167, 1: “Every soul is intermediate between the indivisible principles and those which are divided in association with bodies.” cf. also Timaeus 35a and Taylor’s commentary ad loc: Plot. Enneads IV, 1.
cf. ibid. p. 147, 32: “Every intelligence has its existence, its potency and its activity in eternity.”
cf. ibid. p. 153, 34: “as with existences, so in the gradations of activity-there is an intermediate degree between any activity which is eternal and one which is complete in a certain time, namely the activity which has its completion in the whole of time.”
cf. ibid. p. 53, 22: “it is impossible to attach directly to the eternal things which come-to-be in a part of time (since the latter are doubly distinguished from the former, both as things in process from things which are and as dated from perpetual existences).”
cf. in Tim. III p. 328, 25: “But whereas the intelligence is simpler (than the rational soul) by way of superiority, the irrational part is so by way of inferiority.”
cf. El. Theol. p. 113, 33: “the composite is dependent if not upon things external to it, at least upon its own elements.”
cf. Timaeus 43a, a reference to the mode of composition of the young gods, a mode which also applies to the world-soul and individual souls.
cf. p. 237, 7–13.
cp. Timaeus 43a “the cycles of the immortal soul.” The preceding paragraph has described a) undivided, simple, eternal existences of the order of intellect b) an intermediate class, composite but indissoluble and enduring for all time; such are souls with their endless cycles c) existences which are divided in association with bodies, composite and subject to dissolution, that come to be in a portion of time.
A reminiscence of Meno 98a3 (E. R. Dodds: Gnomon 1955 p. 167) cf. the note in R. S. Bluck’s edition.
cp. Phaedo 69c.
i.e. Plato cf. Diog. Laert. III, 45.
cf. Phaedo 85b.
cf. Phaedrus 229e.
cf. El. Theol. props. 194–5 & notes.
cf. Proleg. Phil. Plat. p. 211, 3–5 Hermann: “Simple ignorance is when one is unaware of the essence and knows that one is unaware : twofold ignorance is when one is both unaware of the essence and does not recognise this unaware-ness.”
A reference to contemporary theurgy cf. note on p. 39, 16.
The sense of the word “problem” here seems to be “a subject for intellectual enquiry.” cf. Proleg. Phil. Plat. p. 212, 33–8 Hermann: “It is natural for the problem to be compared to the Intellect; for just as the Intellect is undivided, and is apprehended like a center-spot, while around the Intellect are the processes of discursive reasoning like a circumference unfolding around its center, so it is with the problem, and around it the demonstrations are unfolded like a circumference, desiring to seek out the answer that is emitted by it.” cf. p. 34 Wk.
cf. Proleg. Phil. Plat. p. 210, 21–6 Hermann: “Now since we have learned that the dialogue is a cosmos and the cosmos a dialogue, we shall find as many constituents of the dialogues as of the cosmos. Now in the universal cosmos there are matter, form, nature that implants form in matter, soul, intellect and divinity; and in the dialogue analogous to matter are the characters, the time and the place ... to form the style ... to soul the demonstrations ... and to intellect the subject of enquiry. There is another way also of showing how the constituents of the dialogue are analogous to those in the cosmos. There are six causes in the case of each thing that comes into being, the material, formal, efficient, final, exemplary and instrumental. Analogous to the material are the characters, the time and the place, to the formal the style, to the efficient the soul, to the instrumental the demonstrations, to the exemplary the subjects of enquiry, to the final the good.” (ibid. p. 211. 33–4, p. 212, 20–35). cf. also p. xxxii & xxxv Wk.
cp. Theaetetus 176b.
cf. Proleg. Phil. Plat. p. 219. 24–9 Hermann: “We relate what the divine Iamblichus did. Now he divided all the dialogues into twelve, some of which he termed physical, and others theological; again he reduced the twelve to two, the Timaeus and the Parmenides, the Timaeus as head of the physical and the Parmenides as head of the theological dialogues.” Ten dialogues are then given in the following order : first the Alcibiades (because therein we learn the knowledge of ourselves) and last the Philebus (because its subject is the Good); in between come the Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Symposium, (Timaeus and Parmenides). The probable inclusion of the Sophist and the Statesman brings the number up to twelve. cf. p. xxxii, xxxvii-viii and 46–8 Wk.
The “subsequent two” seem to be the Timaeus and the Parmenides, which summarise all the other dialogues under the respective headings of natural philosophy and theology.
cf. Resp. I 329e.
cf. Resp. X 597e & 602c.
cf. Proleg. Phil. Plat. p. 213, 18–21: “But not even as resulting from the philosophical discussion and the syllogisms should we make our divisions, as some who divide the Alcibiades into the ten syllogisms that are embodied in it.”
cf. Ol. in Ale. p. 11, 7–8: “But as regards its division into headings or parts, you must realise that the dialogue is divided into three : refutation, exhortation andelicitation.”
cf. El. Theol. prop. 17 & notes.
Proclus seems to state that Plato’s introductions should be viewed neither as totally fictitious nor as mere historical narrative, but as something in between, in part adapting what actually took place or was said, and in part supplying any deficiences in the consideration of the subject under discussion, while viewed as a whole they obviously contribute to the main purpose of the dialogue. cp. In Parm. p. 658, 32–659, 10 Cousin: “The ancients held divergent views about Plato’s introductions. Some never even got as far as examining them, on the ground that true lovers of his doctrine must come already informed of them. Some read them in no ordinary manner, but referred their usefulness to the outline of appropriate topics and taught their disposition in relation to the objects of enquiry in the dialogues. Others again claimed that even the introductions lead commentators to the nature of the subject-matter. Following their lead, we shall make a guiding principle of the opening of the introduction that leads to the subject-matter in hand.”
cf. prop. 83 in El. Theol. “All that is capable of self-knowledge is capable of every form of self-reversion.”
cf. El. Theol. prop. 14 & notes, and p. 17, 16–8: “For since there are things extrinsically moved it follows that there is also something unmoved, and an intermediate existence which is self-moved.”
cf. Phaedrus 246C-249C, esp. 248c.
cf. El. Theol. p. 139, 31–2: “anything which reverts may revert either upon itself or upon the superior principle.”
cf. ibid. prop. 153 & notes and p. 135, 38–40: “For if every principle, in so far as it is perfect, is reverted upon its proper origin, then the cause of all the divine reversion has the office of making perfect the order of gods.”
cf. Parmen. 145 b-e, esp. ad fin. “Hence, as a whole the one is in something else; as the totality of its own parts it is within itself, and the necessary result is that the one is both in itself and in another”; cf. also Procl. Theol. Plat. p. 327 para. 4 : “This aspect of being in another is superior to being within itself, if, according to the arrangement of Parmenides himself, in so far as it is a whole, the aspect of being in another is appropriate to a thing; but in so far as it is composed of parts, the aspect of being within itself.”
cf. Resp. VI 509d-511e.
cf. Resp. X 597e.
cf. Timaeus 28a, 29b–c & Taylor’s commentary ad loc.
cf. Cratylus 397b; cp. Procl. in Crat. p. 4, 11–14, p. 72, cxxiii.
cf. Eth. Nic. 1094b, 26 (E. R. Dodds: Gnomon 1955, p. 167).
For examples of symbolic phrases employed by the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle: Select Fragments, p. 135, nos. 6 & 7, Ross; Iamblichus: Protrepticus, c. 21, De Vit. Pyth. c. 103, 105, 186, 227.
cf. Homer, Iliad X, 68–9.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 25 : “For the Paternal, Self-begotten Intellect, thinking of works, sowed into all the fire-laden bond of love”; cf. also Hans Lewy : Chaldaean Oracles & Theurgy pp. 126–9, 345–53 on the subject of Eros as a binding cosmic power.
cf. Timaeus 32c; “... the body of the universe was brought into being, coming into concord by means of proportion, and from these it acquired Friendship so that coming into unity with itself it became indissoluble by any other save him who bound it together.” (Cornford).
Reading E. R. Dodds’ suggested emendation λ̅ννητὴν (Gnomon ’55 p. 166).
cf. Phaedrus 253a.
cf. Theaetetus 210c.
cf. Resp. VII 532a–b.
cf. Phaedrus 246d–e.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 157 & note on props 151–9, esp. p. 138, 7–9: “Every productive cause presides over the bestowal of Form upon things composite, the assignment of their stations, and their numerical distinction as individuals.”
cf. El. Theol. prop. 155 & note; cp. notes on 68, 5 & 52, 8.
cf. ibid. prop. 154 & note, prop. 156 & note.
cf. Symposium 202d.
cf. El. Theol. p. 25, 5: “A series or order is a unity, in that the entire sequence derives from the monad its declension into plurality.” (Dodds). cf. also notes on prop. 21, p. 208.
cf. Symposium 202d–e.
Here, and in the following lines cp. El. Theol. prop. 148 “Every divine order has an internal unity of threefold origin, from its highest, its mean, and its last term.” cf. also the notes on p. 52 of the text.
* Reading ὑτάρχoντoς µέσoυ (NMR). The addition of λὰρ in MR seems an attempt to indicate that παντὸς, ... µέσoυ is a distinct causal clause in the genitive absolute.
For the division of intermediate beings into angels, spirits and heroes and the origin of the doctrine cf. El. Theol. p. 295; and for a more specific description of their particular functions cf. esp. Procl. in Tim. III p. 165, 11–166, 3: ... “For this reason there is also a triad which unites us to the gods, which proceeds on an analogy with the three original causes, although Plato is accustomed to call the whole of it spirit. The division of angels preserves an analogy with the first intelligible that appears from the ineffable and hidden spring of reality, and therefore it manifests the gods and proclaims their secret identity. The division of spirits preserves an analogy with unbounded life, therefore proceeds everywhere in multiple ranks and assumes many forms and shapes. The division of heroes preserves an analogy with intellect and reversion, and therefore it presides over purification and bestows a life of great achievement and exaltation. Further, the division of angels proceeds by way of the intelligent life of the demiurge, and therefore it is itself essentially intelligent; it interprets and transmits the divine mind to secondary beings. The division of spirits proceeds by way of the providence of the demiurge for the universe: it regulates the nature and rightly complements the disposition of the whole world. The division of heroes proceeds by way of reflexive forethought for all these things : therefore this kind is exalted, elevates souls and imparts vigour. Such being these three kinds, they are attached to the gods, the first kind (to the supercelestial gods, the second) to the celestial, and the latter to the overseers of process; and there is about each god his own appropriate numbers of angels, heroes and spirits” ... cf. also Procl. in Crat. p. 75, 9–76, 19 Pasquali, and Hans Lewy op. cit. cap. V “Chaldaean Demonology.”
cf. Phaedrus 251b.
cp. Plot. VI, 7, 22, 8–10: “Then the soul receiving into itself the effluence from (the Good) is stirred, dances wildly and is filled with frenzy and becomes love.”
For the noble purpose of the soul’s descent cp. Plot. I, 1, 12, 21–8; ibid. IV, 3, 17 and Porph. De Abst. IV, 18 ad init.
cf. Timaeus 42e.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 206; “Every particular soul can descend into temporal process and ascend from process to Being an infinite number of times” and notes, where Prof. Dodds refers to Procl. in Tim. III p. 324, 4–7: “We must ask this very question from the beginning, why the soul descends into bodies. Because it wishes to imitate the providential activity of the gods, and on this account it lays aside contemplation and proceeds to birth.”
cf. Phaedrus 265c.
vehicle : i.e. a first body, immediately informed by the soul. cf. El. Theol. props. 196, 207–9 & notes pp. 304–9, also Appendix II p. 313–21 for a description of the origins and development of this doctrine. cf. further: Réflexions sur l’OXHMA dans les Eléments de Théologie de Proclus, par Mr. Jean Trouillard, in Rev. des Etudes Grecques Vol. 70, no. 329–30, 1957; Lewy op. cit. c. III sect. I “The vehicle of the soul” and notes 6, 7, 26–7, 30.
cf. Timaeus 39b.
cf. Phaedrus 250a.
cf. Statesman 273d.
There is no communication between one material thing and another, but the immaterial can communicate itself to the material (e.g. the creator of the universe Procl. in Tim. I p. 365, 26–366, 7 : the work of divine providence in this dialogue p. 54, 10, and of spiritual illumination p. 80, 10). Interpenetration of bodies was a stoic tenet (cf. SVF II 467 etc.)
cf. Enneads II, 3, 11.
cf. Symposium 183d.
cf. ibid. 183e.
cf. Phaedrus 253e.
cf. Sophist 254a–b.
on the impropriety of speaking of the ineffable first principle as if it came down to the level of the inferior cf. p. 181, 11, where the reference is to the Good.
cp. pp. 9, 2; 61, 1o & 142, 4–7. The reference appears to be to the Chaldaean mysteries in which Proclus himself was initiated, although Lewy op. cit. p. 238 and note 41 seems to disagree with Lobeck (Aglaophamus Vol. I, sect. 15, pp. 111–23) and incline to favour Eleusis.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 55; Lewy op. cit. p. 227 note 1, p. 264, note 15.
cf. Phaedo 107d.
cf. Phaedrus 242c; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis § 20.
cf. Kroll De Orac. Chald. p. 62, n. 1; Lewy, op. cit. p. 298 n. 151, where the following references are indicated : Procl. in Remp. II, p. 150, 24 ... “are dragged down by material natures and by the punishing throttling spirits that lead into darkness”; in Eucl. p. 20, 25 ... “the bonds of process and the throttling spirits of matter”; and cp. in Crat. p. 76, 13.
cf. Theaetetus 155a “This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin, and he was a good genealogist who made Iris the daughter of Thaumas”. (Cornford). cf. also Hesiod: Theognis 237, 265–6, 780–1; and Ol. in Alc. p. 24, 21–25, 7. Iris was the messenger of the gods, and the rainbow. Her father was son of Sea and Land, and her mother (Electra) daughter of Ocean.
cf. Resp. IX 588c.
Dionysus was born of Zeus by Persephone and torn into seven pieces by the Titans, partly because they envied his birth from Zeus, and partly at the instigation of Hera; but Athene preserved his heart intact. The heart represents the undivided Nous, and the seven-fold rending the divisions of the soul in Timaeus 35b–c (cf. Taylor ad loa). cf. Kern: Orph. Fgm. 210; Clem. Alex. Protrep. II, 18, 1; Procli Hymni ed. Vogt VII, 11–15 & notes; Procl. in Tim. I p. 168, 15–17; Ol. in Phaed. p. 111 20–25 Norvin; I. M. Linforth: The Arts of Orpheus p. 307 “Myth of the Dismemberment of Dionysus”; W. K. C. Guthrie: Greeks and their Gods (1949) p. 320, Orpheus and Greek Religion p. 82–3, 107–26 & Appendix I.
There seems to be no early mention of a cult of Athene as “Saviour”, but the epithet is used of her in a dedicatory epigram by Antipater of Thes-salonica (Anth. Pal. VI, 10), as A. J. Festugiere notes in “Le Dieu Cosmique” p. 316.
cf. Timaeus 42c.
For this expression cp. Procl. Hymni I, 20 & notes, Vogt; Porph. Vit. Plot. 22, 25 & 31–5; Plot. V, 1, 2, 15; Numenius test. 45, Leemans.
The distinction here seems to lie between the man in himself and some particular function he fulfils, typified by the steersman and the charioteer. The latter were stock examples (cp. Aristot. Top. 105a 13–16), and in particular the steersman was used by Plato and the Platonists to describe the function of Nous in the soul (Phaedrus 247c) or of the soul in the body (cf. Alex. Aphrod. De Anim. Bruns p. 15, 9–10, p. 20, 26–9). The term “subject” is used to refer to the individual man as that which underlies some quality. cf. Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. p. 523, 25–8 Hayduck: “It has been observed that the term subject has two senses, either as this individual being, as for instance the living organism — Socrates, Plato or this horse — underlies the qualities of white and hot and suchlike, or as the matter which underlies act and form.” Soul is not the same as soul using a body: neither is man in himself and man in his function as steersman, nor the underlying subject and the quality of being a charioteer. Soul using a body is merely soul as fulfilling a temporary function : it is not soul in its essential nature. cf. Simpl. De An. p. 17, 35 ff: “Again, the steersman, although possessing activities inseparable from the ship, seems to be separable in essence, because as a man he was separable, possessing other activities too, that were separable”; Avicenna, Kitab al-shifa Bk. VI of the Physics, Sect. I: “This is why the body is included in the definition of the soul, as, for example, building is included in the definition of the builder, although it is not included in his definition in so far as he is man.” (I owe these two quotations to F. Rahman : Avicenna’s Psychology pp. 8–9).
cf. El. Theol. props 23–4 & notes for the relation between the participated and the unparticipated.
cf. Symposium 202d–e.
cf. Timaeus 35a.
cf. Phaedrus 244d.
cf. Homer, Iliad V 451–2.
i.e. His soul, as distinct from his body, at Alc. 1290–131a.
For the function of monads cf. El. Theol. prop. 21 & notes.
A Chaldaean expression. cf. p. 65, 6; p. 66, 8.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 162 & notes: “All those henads which illuminate true being are hidden and intelligible: hidden as conjoined with the One, intelligible as participated by Being .... the gods who illuminate true Being are intelligible, because true Being is a divine and unparticipated Intelligible which subsists prior to the intelligence.” cf. also Procl. in Crat. p. 32, 21–9.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 15; Lewy op. cit. p. 80 & note 52: “Intellect, Will and Power constitute, as the immediate faculties of the Father, the ‘Paternal Monad.’“
cf. Timaeus 30d.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. pp. 26 & 40: “The Iynges are thought by the Father, and think themselves As they are moved to thought by the unutterable Will”; cf. also Lewy op. cit. p. 132–4 & notes 249, 255: the “unutterable” Iynges Chaldaic divinities equated with the first order of the “Intelligible and Intelligent Gods.” cp. Procl. in Crat. p. 67, 18–20; p. 74, 20–27.
“faith” and “truth” and “love”: cp. Procl. Theol. Plat. I p. 61–3 and in Tim. III p. 212, 21–3, where “hope” is added; also Porph. ad Marc. 24: “Let four principles especially be grasped concerning God: faith, truth, love, hope.” But Porphyry’s explanation of the terms refers to subjective attitudes on the part of the believer, not to metaphysical entities. For the Chaldaic meaning of the triad cf. Lewy op. cit. pp. 144–8 : he refers love to the intelligible world, as its primary quality, truth to the sun, as the abode of the oracular Apollo, faith to the material world, and the whole triad to the “rulers” of the three worlds. Different again is the Pauline triad, “faith”, hope, charity (cf. ibid, note 289), which seems to be unrelated to the Chaldaean and Neoplatonic triads. In his commentary on the Gorgias (493c) E. R. Dodds notes that “faith” was one of the great Pythagorean virtues, attached as a description to the Decad (Philolaos ap. Theol. Arith. p. 81, 15–17 de Falco). Plato uses the term not only in relation to the world of sense objects, but also of belief in relation to the existence of gods (Laws 966c). P. Henry (Entret. sur L’Ant. Class. vol. V p. 233–4) notes Atticus’ use of the terms “faith” and “hope” in a religious sense e.g. ap. Euseb. Prep. Evan. XV, 5. “Faith” seems to acquire connotations of a higher trust or belief in Iamblichus e.g. Protrepticus, p. 101, 17 & 28; De Comm. Math. Scient, p. 55, 19, p. 74, 11. The Neoplatonic interpretation of the triad definitely puts “faith” superior to “knowledge” (on the level of truth) and “love.” cp. Lewy op. cit. ibid. note 291 (h).
cf. El. Theol. p. 141–3 : “All deity is in itself unspeakable and unknowable, being of like nature with the unspeakable One.”
The “holding and binding” gods form the middle rank of the Intelligible and Intelligent gods, and are also known as the “protective” gods. Their function is to conserve things in their proper perfection. cf. El. Theol. prop. 154 & notes; Procl. in Crat. p. 63, 7–16, p. 65, 3–5, p. 111, 26–112, 4; in Tim. I p. 156, 5–7, II p. 272, 29–273, 9. cp. also p. 30, 11–12.
The “perfective” gods have the function of turning things back towards their source and so ensuring their perfection. cf. El. Theol. prop. 153 & notes; Procl. in Crat. p. 65, 5–7, p. 112, 1–4.
i.e. assuming some explicit form or shape because of the imperfection of our nature. cf. Procl. in Remp. I p. 39, 28–40, 4: “So every god is without shape, even though he be beheld with a shape; for the shape is not in him but from him, since the beholder cannot behold the shapeless without a shape, but sees it according to his own nature with a shape.” cf. also Procl. in Crat. p. 31, 8–17.
cf. El. Theol. props. 139 & 163, esp. p. 122, 29–32: “So divinity exists on the level of body, soul and intellect. And it is clear that all these things are divine by participation; for that which is primarily divine subsists among the henads.”
cf. El. Theol. prop. 151: “All that is paternal in the gods is of primal operation and stands in the position of the Good at the head of the several divine ranks” etc. ibid. prop. 157: “It is the function of all paternal causes to bestow being on all things and originate the substantive existence of all that is.” cf. also Procl. in Crat. p. 48, 1–4: “The paternal cause begins from above, from the intelligible and hidden gods .... and proceeds through all the intelligent gods to the creative order.”
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 81, 2–15 esp; “ . . The life-giving spring of Rhea, from which is generated all life, both divine, intelligent, soulful and intramundane .....for this goddess moves all things according to the measures of divine movements.....
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 21, 13–17 : “If anyone were to term the actual productive and generative powers of the gods, which they project into the world, arts that are creative, intelligent, generative and perfective, we would not reject such terminology.”
cf. Procl. in Tim. II p. 273, 18–9.....”the sovereign series; for this is assimilative of secondary things to the unitary first principles.”
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 74, 20–2: “And so in our myth in the Phaedrus we have portrayed the liberated gods, the supramundane rulers of the universe, as ‘driving a winged chariot.’“ cp. ibid. p. 78, 4–8. cf. also the Platonic Theology p. 389, 4–9: “And so the sovereign gods have been allocated the highest rank among them (i.e. the supramundane gods), and the position of transcendent cause of subsequent processions, but the liberated gods have been allocated the second rank, subordinate to the sovereign but superior to the intramundane gods.”
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 51, 18–20: “So he (i.e. Kronos) is a pure intellect as giving subsistence to the undefiled rank, and as guide of the whole intelligent order.”
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 58, 17–8 : “Our soul comes to know the undivided and unitary quality of the activity of the gods in a divided and multiple manner.” cf. also Procl. in Tim. I p. 184, 10–14: “For there is both in heaven and everywhere, a power of separation and union, and nothing is without a share in it, but it exists among the superior beings neither in division nor multiplicity but gathered into one and with one impulse” .. For the whole passage covered in notes 107–118, and the scheme of participation implied by the various sets of adverbs, cf. El. Theol. notes on props. 151–9, 162–5.
For a brief note on Theurgy and its connexion with Iamblichus and the Chaldaean Oracles cf. El. Theol. intro. p. xx, xxii-iii, and index s.v., and for a fuller explanation cf. “Theurgy’’ in “The Greeks and the Irrational” by E. R. Dodds pp. 283 ff. cf. also the detailed treatment in Hans Lewy op. cit. # 3 “Theurgical Elevation,” = 4 “The Magical Ritual of the Chaldaeans,” and Excursus IV “The meaning and history of the terms “theurgist and theurgy”.
This is a Chaldaean term. cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 304, note 173; p. 296–7, notes 143 & 147.
On divine fire, cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 168–76; p. 60, note 7. cf. also Kroll De Orac. Chald. p. 53. cp. Procl. in Tim. III, p. 300, 16–19 ... “But to my mind the science of purification makes the greatest contribution, since through the divine fire it removes all the stains that result from coming-to-be, as the oracles teach us.”
i.e. to touch Alcibiades physically, cf. Alc. 131c.
cf. Kern Orph. frg. 153: “For Orpheus your poet says that Zeus slew his own father Kronos and took his own mother Rhea, and from them was born Persephone. Zeus defiled her too ...” cf. ibid. 195 ... “And so they say that the Maiden was violated by Zeus, but carried off by Pluto ....”
cf. Plot. Enn. III, V, 8, 11. 14–23: “Zeus then is the Intellectual Principle. Aphrodite, his daughter, issue of him, dwelling with him, will be Soul, her very name Aphrodite indicating the beauty and gleam and innocence and delicate grace of the Soul. And if we take the male gods to represent the Intellectual Powers and the female gods to be their souls — to every Intellectual Principle
* Omitting διὰ ταῦτα as a dittography. 124* Using ἄ»»ων, the corrected reading of M. its companion Soul — we are forced, thus also, to make Aphrodite the Soul of Zeus; and the identification is confirmed by Priests and Theologians who consider Aphrodite and Hera one and the same and call Aphrodite’s star (“Venus”) the star of Hera.” (McKenna)
cf. Laws I 631b–c, which appears to be apposite.
cf. Phaedrus 244a: “But in reality the greatest of benefits comes to us through madness, when it is given by a gift divine.”
cp. notes 105, 107 & Procl. in Crat. p. 29, 22ft., p. 31, 24ff., p. 32, 18ff.
cf. Kroll de Orac. Chald. p. 16, where he quotes Procl. in Crat. p. 63, 21–6: “For the Timaeus (37d) characterised eternity particularly by its abiding in the one that precedes it and by its establishment at the summit of the intelligibles, and Socrates characterised the heavens by their looking at what lies above (Crat. 396b–c), namely the place above the heavens and all that is embraced by the “god-nourishing silence” of the fathers.” cf. also Procl. in Tim. II, p. 92, 6–9; Lewy op. cit. p. 160 and note 353 — the abode of the supreme god is “silence” described as “god-nourishing” because “every divine intelligence intuits the father” and “the intelligible is nourishment for the intelligent.”
cf. Plutarch: Moralia 826f.
cp. Phaedrus 238a.
cf. Timaeus 42c.
On this use of the term “others” cf. Jean Trouillard: “Sur un pluriel de Plotin et de Proclus” in Bulletin de l’Assoc. Guill. Budé 1958 No. 2 pp. 88–91, where he compares Procl. in Tim. I, p. 375, 28.
cf. Sympos. 197d.
cf. Laws I 6480–6500, II 671a-e.
cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. 1098a16: “The good for man turns out to be an activity of soul in accordance with virtue.”
cf. Timaeus 42e.
cf. Sympos. 212b.
cf. Sympos. 202e–203a.
cf. Kroll De Orac. Chald. p. 26, Lewy op. cit. p. 179–80, note 8; p. 128, note 239; p. 132, note 250. Lyd. De Mens. 4, 20: “The oracle refers to the soul as a god-like triad. For the same Chaldaean says: Having mingled the spark of the soul with two like-minded faculties / With god-like intellect and will, (the Father) added to them as a third chaste Love / The Binder of all things and their sublime guide.”(Lewy).
cf. Sympos. 202d.
* Reading Cousin’s conjecture αυτῷ.
i.e. the intelligible intellect is united to the primary and hidden beauty through Life, the middle principle of the second hypostasis, which was dis. tinguished by the later Neo-platonists into the triad Being-Life-Intellect. cf-note 152.
cf. Orph. Fgm. 82 Kern, and esp. Procl. in Tim. II p. 85, 16–31.
cf. Kroll De Orac. Chald. p. 25; Lewy op. cit. p. 127–8 and notes 233–6.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 166 & notes.
cf. Timaeus 39e: “So as intellect discerns the quality and quantity of the forms that exist in the Living Creature that truly is, such quality and quantity of forms he thought this world should also possess”; and Taylor’s note ad loc. cf. also Procl. in Tim. III p. 101, 24–9: “The Intellect that is creator is not in the participated class, in order that it may be creator of the whole universe and be able to look towards the Absolute Living Creature; but although it is unpartici-pated, it is a really intelligent intellect, and through its simple intuition is united to the intelligible, while through its variegated intuition it hastens toward the generation of secondary beings.”
cf. Timaeus 30b: “He found .... moreover that intellect apart from soul cannot be present in anything. In virtue of this reasoning, when he framed the universe, he fashioned intellect within soul, and soul within body.” (Cornford). cf. also Procl. in Tim. I p. 406: “We must first see which is this intellect, and whether it is substantial, situated above the soul, or whether it is some intelligent condition of it, and we must reckon that it is substantial, both by analogy — for as intellect is to soul, so soul is to body. But the soul does not belong to the body as a state of it, so neither intellect to soul — and by the final cause; for Plato says that the soul is constituted on account of intellect, and not vice-versa; but if the soul is on account of intellect, and intellect is that on account of which, then intellect is not a state; for nowhere is being constituted on account of a state. And thirdly because the creator establishes this intellect, but the intellect by way of a state is established by the soul according to the movement of the circle of the same around the intelligible object, as Plato himself will observe.”
cf. Timaeus 37c: “But whenever discourse is concerned with the rational, and the circle of the Same, running smoothly, declares it, the result must be intellect and knowledge.” (Cornford). cf. also Procl. in Tim. II p. 313, 1–3: “Intellect is threefold: first divine, such as the creative intellect, secondly participated by soul, but substantial and independent, thirdly intellect as a state, on account of which the soul is intelligent.” ibid. 1. 24: “It would be more in harmony with the text to consider this intellect as a state in the soul itself.” ibid. p. 314, 2–5: “It would not be prior to the soul, but a state of it, like knowledge; and therefore Plato says it comes to be in the soul like knowledge, opinion and belief.” cf. also Taylor’s notes on Timaeus 37c.
cf. Orph. Fgm. 83, 74 & 170 Kern, and esp. Procl. in Tim. I p. 433, 26–434, 17: “But why has he described the Living Creature as the fairest of the objects of intellect (Timaeus 3od), although it is at the limit of the intelligibles? Surely because, although there are intelligible grades prior to it, what is fairest is subordinate to these; for they do not participate in beauty, but there is within them the cause that produces beauty, the very first beauty and fairness. So on this level fairness is intelligently disclosed by Orpheus, viz. as beauty already proceeds among the primary intelligibles in a unified and immediate manner, Phanes is called “a very beautiful god” (or “son of very beautiful Ether”) and “dainty Love,” because this god is the first to be filled with the hidden and ineffable fairness. Therefore he is called fairest, being the very first of the participants, even if all the intelligibles are unified one with another; for we must not divide them from one another in the manner of the intelligent orders, but contemplate their one and undivided unification. Now this is a fair opinion. But the most essential point is that Plato described the Living Creature as fairest, not of all the objects of intellect absolutely, but only of living beings; for, comparing the absolute with the more partial living beings, he described it as the fairest of all the intelligible living beings; so that if there is anything superior to the nature of a living being this has no relation to the present discussion. Now there must of necessity be some such thing, because being is simpler than the nature of living being, and so is absolute beauty, and this is why it is found even in non-living beings.”
cf. Kern: Orph. fgm. 168, 6 & 9, where the lines quoted form part of an Orphic hymn to Zeus; fgm. 169, 1 & 4, where in slightly altered form they occur in a quotation from Syrianus of the same hymn. For the respective functions of “Counsel” and “Love,” cf. Guthrie: Orpheus and Greek Religion (1952) pp. 79–83 & 95–107, where he deals with their place in Orphic Religion under their Greek names of Metis and Eros. It was part of Proclus’ task to conflate Orphic teachings and Chaldaean Oracles with Neoplatonism, and an interesting comparison of the three systems is provided by Hans Lewy op. cit. Excursus VII.
cf. Sympos. 202d.
The life-giving goddess is principally Rhea (cf. Guthrie: Orpheus & Greek Religion, pp. 81–2, 117), and secondarily her daughter Persephone, who is referred to as such e.g. Procl. In Remp. II p. 185, 6–12 ... “Pluto and the life-giving goddess who reigns with him”). Rhea was equated with Demeter (cf. Guthrie p. 133–5, Procl. in Crat. p. 80, 10–13; p. 90, 28ff.). For the derivation of the spirits from Rhea as the source of the order of soul, cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 83–5, esp. note 66.
These twelve supercelestial gods seems to originate from the Phaedrus 247a & c, and to be identified here with the “liberated” or “unattached” gods. cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 137 note 267 & p. 158–9.
cp. Procl. in Tim. I, p. 311, 2–4 .. “The creator of the universe is the limit of the intelligences, established in the intelligible but filled with a power by which he brings forth the universe; he turns all things back to himself.”
cf. Sympos. 202d–e: “Love ... is a mighty spirit .... which interprets and transmits messages to gods from men and to men from gods ... being in the midst of both it completes them, so that the universe is bound together in the parts of itself.”
This is a Chaldaean term denoting the Forms which spring from the First Intellect, cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 10, note 26, p. 13, p. 113–14, note 192.
cf. Eurip. Alcestis 1002–3: “She died on behalf of her husband, But now she is a blessed spirit.” cf. also Plat. Crat. 398b, where Socrates, quoting Hesiod and other poets, observes that: “When a good man dies .... he becomes a spirit.” Chrysippus frg. II 812 von Arnim, esp. ad fin.: “If therefore souls endure, they become the same as spirits.” Max. Tyr. IX 6b: “The body is corrupted and descends into the depth, but the soul swims clear on its own, and maintains and establishes itself. Such a soul is now called a spirit, a creature of the upper air, a migrant thither from the earth.”
cf. Resp. X 618b: “But in none of these lives was there anything to determine the condition of soul, because the soul must needs change its character according as it chooses one life or another.” (Cornford).
cf. Polit. 271d.
cf. Sympos. 202d–e.
For a fivefold cosmic division of the spirits in Proclus cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 268 note 34, where he quotes in Tim. I p. 137, 3ff; III p. 108, 2ff.
cp. Olymp. in Alc. p. 17, 10–19, 10.
cp. Procl. in Tim. I p. 415, 27–9: “For the highest intellect is not that which intuits and produces, but that which intuits only, and is on that account a pure intellect.”
cf. Olymp. in Alc. p. 19, 8–10: “Matter is threefold: one heavenly, which forms the substrate of the seven spheres, next starry, which forms the substrate of the stars, and third earthly, which is called the “abyss,” because it is lowest and in a fluid state.” cp. Plot. II, 1, 3; II, 9, 3; II, 4, 4–5.
cf. Sympos. 203a.
For the account from here on until p. 73, 8 cf. Olymp. in Alc. p. 20, 2–14; in Phaed. p. 40, 26–41, 5. cf. also Procl. in Remp. II p. 271, 6–272, 18; in Tim. III p. 276, 22–277, 7: p. 279, 6–280, 8.
cf. Timaeus 42d and Taylor’s commentary ad loc.
cp. Procl. in Tim. I p. 54, 4–7: “For the Zeus of the heavens established the gods in heaven and spirits that lead up individual souls, while others lead them down to birth, in order that the universe may never be devoid of descents and ascents of souls.”
cf. El. Theol. prop. 199 & notes; also Hermias in Phaedr. p. 168, 16–18 Couvreur: “The soul that is to be reinstated must choose a philosopher’s life, in order that thus it may be led back; and this is the life that tends to restore it. If the soul lives it after the manner of a lover of wisdom, when it has left this life, it only remains for it to be led back upwards.”
cp. Procl. in Tim. I p. 140, 9–10: “Individual souls at different times choose different lives: some choose the lives that are appropriate to their own particular gods, but others choose different kinds through forgetfulness of their own.”
cf. Democritus B 171: “Happiness dwells neither in flocks nor in gold; soul is the dwelling-place of spirit.” cf. also Xenocrates ap. Alex. Aphr. in Ar. Top. II, 6, 112a32: “If the soul of each individual is a spirit, as Xenocrates holds, then happiness would consist in a good state of soul.”
cf. Sympos. 202d–e.
* Reading the adjective θεῖoι (E. R. Dodds: Gnomon ’55 p. 166).
cf. Timaeus 90a: “As regards the most sovereign form of soul in us we must bear in mind that God has given it to each one of us as a spirit.” cf. Taylor’s commentary ad loc. and cp. Plut. De Genio Socrat. 591e.
In what follows down to p. 75, cf. Olymp. in Alc. p. 15, 6–16, 6.
cf. Orph. Fgm. 155 Kern, who quotes Procl. in Crat. p. 27, 21ff: “For almighty Cronos from above bestows the principles of intelligent intuitions upon the creator and oversees the whole work of creation; and therefore Zeus calls him a spirit in the writings of Orpheus ...
cf. Timaeus 40d
cf. Resp. V 468e-469b and cp. Crat. 398c.
cf. Phaedo 107d.
The following lines are a specific reply to the views of Plotinus in Enneads III, 4, 3. cf. the introduction in Brehier’s edition. 183 Cf. Resp. III, 391d.
cf. Phaedo 107d.
E. R. Dodds (GNOMON ’55 p. 167) notes that reference is here made to Stoic views and quotes Dio Chrys. 4, 80: “The individual intellect of each person is the spirit of the man who possesses it”; also Marc. Aur. 5, 27: “.. The spirit which Zeus has given to each man as his guardian and guide, a splinter of his own being, is each man’s intellect and reason.”
Proclus seems to disagree with the Stoic idea of fate as “concatenation of causes” and to revert to the view of Plato as he sees it in Timaeus 41e: “.. he showed them the nature of the universe, and told them the laws of fate.” (cf. Cornford’s commentary). Fate is equated with nature. (cf. Procl. in Tim. III p. 272, 5–275, 23). cf. also Alex. Aphro. on Fate p. 169, 18–20 Bruns. On the relations between providence and fate cf. Procl. De Prov. et Fato 7–8 Boese.
cp. Procl. in Tim. I p. 371, 4–7: “For since (god) was good, he wished to make all things good, but since he wished he so made and reduced the universe to order; for his providence depends upon his will and his will upon his goodness.”
cf. Phaedrus 247c & 265c.
cf. Apol. 31d: “something divine and spirit-like happens to me.”
cf. Theages 128d: “There is something that has accompanied me by divine dispensation, starting from my childhood; it is a voice, which, when it occurs, always indicates to me avoidance of what I am about to do, but never encouragement.”
cf. Phaedrus 242b–c
For this reference to the vehicle of the nutritive and sensitive soul cf. El. Theol. pp. 315–16; Aristot. De Gen. Anim. 736b37–737a1 and Appendix B in the Loeb edition.
On the voice that Socrates heard and its nature cf. esp. De Genio Socr. 588b-e (i.e. Plut. Moral. VII pp. 448–51 Loeb).
cf. Euthyphro 3d: “But I fear lest out of love for men I appear to them to pour myself out unreservedly to every man, not only without pay, but even glad to offer some, if anyone be willing to hear me.”
cf. Theat. 183d.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 140; ibid. p. 129, 5–8: “the distinctive character of the divine powers, radiating downwards, is found in every kind, since each thing obtains from its own immediate cause the distinctive character in virtue of which that cause received its being.”
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 100, 27–101, 3: “For everywhere Apollo unifies the multitude and gathers it into one: he uniformly prepossesses every kind of purification, cleansing the whole heavens and birth and all intramundane forms of life; he separates individual souls from the crass layers of matter.”
cf. Kern: Orph. fgm. 211.
Dionysos is equated with the intramundane “nous” (cf. Kern: Orph. fgm. 199) and so “nous” in us is a product of his power.
cf. Timaeus 34b–36d for a description of the formation of the worldsoul and Taylor’s commentary ad loc.
cf. Phaedrus 246a.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 13–14, where he quotes Plat. Theol. p. 365, 1: “For the Father is primary ruler everywhere, power comes in the middle, and intellect completes the limit of the triad”; also Damascius I p. 108, 17: “... the three principles, intellect and power and Father, or substance and power of the substance and intellectual perception of the power.” By equating Chaldaean Oracles with Neoplatonism, Proclus arrives at: 1) essence, substance, Father 2) life, power 3) intellect, activity. cf. also esp. Lewy op. cit. p. 78–9 & note 47; c. II, sect. 6 & note 184.
i.e. the compound nature of man (soul and body), which proceeds from existence via faculty into external operation.
cf. Aristot. De Caelo 271a33: “God and Nature do nothing in vain.”
cf. Plut. Alc. 17, 19, 23.
cf. Xen. Memor. 1, 2, 24–5.
i.e. Syrianus.
* Reading Dr. Westerink’s suggested emendation ὁ τῷ µoχθηρῷ ‹συνὼν ϰερδαίνoι ἄν›, τὸ µὴ χείρων.
cf. Sympos. 218a, 215e-216b, 216e-217a, 222a.
cf. Resp. VI 498c–d.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 199 & notes.
* τoῦ »έγειν is hardly satisfactory as an emendation, but something like it seems to fit the sense. cp. p. 90, 2–3 ἀπόνασθαι τῶν »όγων.
For the simile of the sun cp. Plotinus: De Voluntaria Morte apud Eliam (after Enneads I, 9 Henry & Schwyzer).
The prophecy of Apollo to Laius became a current argument in the discussion of philosophers on fate and necessity. cf. Alex. Aphr. De Fato p. 202, 8–25 Bruns; Oenomaus ap. Euseb. Prep. Ev. VI, 7, 22–5.
cf. Eurip. Phoen. 18.
* Reading αὐτὸν, in view of such Stoic passages as SVF III, no. 2, as a neuter with enclitic v to avoid hiatus.
* Retaining the reading of N, and taking the clause as referring to Socrates. cf. the use of ἐνδέχεται III, 1 in L. & S.
At the beginning of the dialogue, two things are as yet uncertain: a) objectively, what is the nature of man? b) subjectively, will Alcibiades be persuaded by Socrates’ arguments?
cp. Diog. Laert. VII, 88 (SVF III, 4): “In this the virtue of the happy man and his prosperous course of life consists, when everything is done according to the harmony of each man’s spirit with the will of the regulator of the universe.”
cf. Iambi. Vit. Pyth. 17, 71.
Contrast this view of knowledge (which concurs with Timaeus 29b–c) with that expressed p. 87, 10–11.
a For the ascending scale of virtues cf. Plot. I, 2, 1–3. Porphyry adds “theoric” and “paradeigmatic,” Iamblichus also “hieratic” virtues.
cf. Laws X, 896e.
cf. Resp. X, 619b–d.
cf. Laws IV, 717d.
cf. Laws I, 631b–d.
cf. El. Theol. props. 119–20.
cf. ibid. props. 9, 10, 127 & notes.
cf. note 89.
The Greek expression means “halves!” or “shares!,” since Hermes was the god of unexpected finds, and it was used when two or more persons came upon the same windfall. cf. Ar. Rhet. 1401a21; Theoph. Charact. XXX, 9.
For the two expressions in Plato cf. Resp. II 382a–b, Sophist 254a; and in his commentators cf. Alex. Aphr. in Met. p. 672, 30: “Matter is in itself being, but non-being on account of the privation within it”; and esp. Plot. II, 5, 5, 22–4: “So (matter) is actually a mirage, actually a lie; and what is actually a lie is identical with the veritable lie, and this is the really non-existent.”
cf. Plut. Alc. 10.
cf. Ibid. 5.
cf. Theaetetus 144d.
cf. Resp. VI, 485e.
On the precise nature of beauty cp. Plot. I, 6; V, 5, 8, 12; VI, 7, 33.
cf. Sympos. 202d, 204c.
cf. Tim. 92c.
cf. Iliad IV, 58–9.
cf. Tim. 34b-36d; 41b-43a.
cf. Theaet. 174e-175b.
cf. Tim. 41e & 42d. cp. infra p. 114, 5–7.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 185 & notes.
cf. Phaedrus 252C–253C.
This list seems to give well-known epithets of the gods, rather than precise geographical divisions. Proclus gives a different arrangement in Tim. I p. 137, 1–4: “For the universe is one and subsists in five parts; it is divided by-appropriate conformations and presiding gods — of the heavens, empyrean, air, water and earth.” This seems to equate the heavens with the “fifth body” or ether of Aristotle, and the four elements follow. Olympiodorus seems to have a similar order. In Alc. p. 17, 1–3, he expressly says of the vehicle of the soul: “It is of the same substance as the heavenly bodies, i.e. composed of the fifth body”; and ibid. p. 19, 12–15 he observes: “Of the gods, some are supramundane, to which our souls are attached, but nothing corporeal. Others are intramundane, to which bodies alone are attached. Of the intramundane some are of the heavens, others of the ether or fire, others of air, water, earth, and some beneath the earth.” Here again we seem to have the heavens as the “fifth body,” followed by the four elements (ether being equated with fire) with gods of the nether region tacked on. Similar lists are found in Phaed. p. 189, 17–20; p. 230, 27–32 Norvin. For a further discussion, cf. appendix, cp. Iambl. de Myst. p. 262, 9–12; p. 33, 7–8 Parthey.
cf. Procl. in Tim. III p. 276, 22–30: “First of all, then, the sowing of the vehicles not only reveals the soul as intramundane, but also subjects its whole constitution to this particular leader; for it is one thing to be intramundane, and another to be in the train of the moon or Hermes, the latter being a more particular form of life. When mounted on its vehicle, the individual soul becomes a citizen of the cosmic soul, but when sown along with its vehicle, it becomes a citizen of the revolution of the moon or the sun or some other heavenly body (cf. Tim. 41e); cf. also Procl. in Tim. I p. 111, 3–9: “On this account the souls that are sown around the stars that are their consorts receive from their actual leaders a certain individuality in their way of life, so as to be not only a soul but also this particular individual soul, related e.g. to Ares or Zeus or the moon; for whether the god be unchanging or creative or life-giving (cf. p. 30, 8–11 & notes 56–8), some reflection of the individuality of the guardian deity has come down to all the souls that are subordinated to it.”
cf. esp. Emped. frg. B 29 Diels, apud Simplic. in Phys. p. 1123, 44–1124, 2: “For this philosopher supposed ... as productive cause of the intelligible world, Friendship, which makes the Sphere through unification, whom he also calls a a god ...”
cf. Tim. 41a.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 28, 17–29, 11. The source may be a life by Satyrus, concerning Alcibiades and his beauty, quoted in Athenaeus 534bff (E. R. Dodds, Gnomon 1955, p. 167).
cf. Aristaenetus Ep. I, 11, also Clem. Alex. Protrept. IV, 53, 6: “Even the stone-masons made their statues of Hermes at Athens resemble Alcibiades.”
cf. Plut. Alc. 1.
cf. Thucyd. II, 65, 9: “It became nominally a democracy, but in fact rule by the foremost individual.”
cf. Sympos. 203d.
cf. Phaedr. 254e.
cf. Kroll: Orac. Chald. p. 26, Lewy op. cit. p. 264–5 & note 17, where they quote Procl. in Remp. I p. 176, 22–6: “(Socrates), after reviling wanton love, and what the gods have termed “a stifling of true love,” confesses his error, in so far as, instead of the consideration of the divine and elevating love of souls, he has been concerned with its lowest and materialised image”; cf. also ibid. II p. 347, 6–11: “And therefore the oracles bid us expand ourselves through the freedom of our way of life, but not to cramp our style by drawing upon ourselves “a stifling of true love” instead of extending to the whole universe; for those who are stifled narrow the entrances through which we partake of the cosmic breath.”
For this scheme of participation cf. El. Theol. prop. 63 & notes.
For a parallel derivation of falsehood from truth cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 32, 7–11. cp. also Simplic. de Caelo p. 429, 35: ... “the contrary to nature is an offshoot and by-product of what is natural.”
cf. Tim. 29b.
cf. perhaps Hippocr. De Morbis I, 5: “The vital point is when the patient is suffering from the sort of illness which, if a remedy is applied before the life passes away, receives a cure from the reception thereof at the vital moment.” cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 39, 6–9, in Phaed. p. 56, 7–8. cf. also Phaedrus 270c–d. esp. “If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body either except by this form of enquiry” (i.e. into the soul as well as the body).
cf. Resp. VIII 546a–b & Adam’s commentary Appendix I, Part ii, sect. 2.
cf. Aristot. Metaph. 985b 23–30; Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. p. 38, 8–39, 3 (also found in Ross: Select Frag. of Aristot. p. 138); and Iambi. De Vita Pyth. sect. 180–3.
cf. Procl. in Remp. II p. 5, 19–21: “For chance fulfils the assignments of 261* Reading ‹τῳ› as Dr. Westerink suggests. the universe to us, harmonising our affairs with such and such cycles of the universe according to our due, whether these be better or worse.” cf. also ibid. p. 298, 9–299, 28. Our guardian spirit guides us according to the kind of life we have chosen, chance according to the external events assigned to us in the particular cycle in which our life occurs. Both are subject to divine providence, as the text from Plato (Laws IV, 709b) indicates: “God guides everything, and in co-operation with God chance and due season govern all the affairs of men.” cp. p. 78, 1–5.
The reference seems to be to Stoic views on matter and on quality, which they regard as somehow inherent in matter, cf. Sext. adv. Math. X, 312: “So the Stoics supposed that the birth of the universe was from one unqualified body; for according to them the principle of reality is unqualified and completely transmutable matter, and when this changes there come into being the four elements, fire and air, water and earth.” cp. Plot. II, 4, 1, 6–15; VI, 1, 29.
“Agent” and “patient” are Stoic terms. cf. Diog. Laert. VII, 134: “They hold that there are two principles of the universe, the one active and the other passive. Now the passive principle is unqualified substance i.e. matter; but the active principle is the reason within it i.e. God, for he is eternal and fashions each several thing throughout the whole of matter.”
cf. Tim. 30a: “Desiring, then, that all things should be good and, so far as might be, nothing imperfect, God took over all that was visible — not at rest, but in discordant and disorderly movement — and reduced it from disorder to order, since he considered that order was in every way the better.” (Cornford).
cf. Homer, Iliad VI, 138; Odyssey IV, 805.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 40, 18–41, 5.
cp. Resp. VI, 510b & 511b.
Dr. Westerink convincingly restores this passage in the text by recognising a quotation from the Oracles that occurs in Proclus: De Providentia c. 35, 16–17 Boese “te ipsum videns verere,” where the Vatican MSS has a marginal note ἔνδυθι (p. 269 Boese), and he compares the use of the same verb in the Alcibiades commentary p. 301, 12. By supplying ‹µετὰ› after χρῆσθαι, and reading the final word as the middle voice present participle i.e. τε»εoύµενsoν, one arrives at the following text: Kαὶ ‰τὸ› “ὅρpα δή” πως πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφεsι τὧν νενvίαν ϰαὶ ϰατασϰευάξει νῷ ϰαὶ »όγῳ χρῆσθαι ‹µετὰ› τῆς ἀϰρoάσεως, ϰαὶ µόνoν oὐϰ ἐϰεῖνo »έγoν τὸ “σαυτὸν ἰδὼν ἔνδυθι,” ϰαὶ διὰ τ006F;ύτoυ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτöῦ τε»εoύµενoν. cf. Mnemos. S. IV. vol. XV2, 1962 p. 163–4.
cf. Sympos. 204e-206a.
E. R. Dodds (GNOMON ’55 p. 167) notes that this comic trimeter is probably merely an echo from some later poet of Eupolis’ line: “A sort of persuasion sat upon his lips” (frg. 94, 5 Kock).
This appears to be a neo-pythagorean term. cf. Pherecydes of Syros fr. B14 (which Diels notes is probably not genuine): “The followers of Pherecydes too, called the dyad “daring” (apud Laur. Lyd. Mens. II, 7). cf. also Theol. Arith. p. 9, 5–7 De Falco: “For the dyad was the first to separate itself from the monad, whence it is called “daring”; for the monad signifies unification, but the dyad by slipping in indicates separation.” cf. further Ol. in Alc. p. 48 16–18: “He appropriately calls the procession to secondary beings “daring”; for so the Pythagoreans termed the dyad, as having first dared to separate itself from the monad.” cp. Plut. Is. & Os. 381f.
cf. Plot, I, 3, 6 for a brief account of natural virtue and its relation to true virtue.
cf. Diod. IV, 26; Apollod. II, 5, 12 for the rescue of Theseus from Hades by Herakles.
cf. Resp. VI 484a–487a.
cf. Tim. 48a, and for the nature of “necessity” in this context cf. both Taylor’s and Cornford’s commentaries ad loc. It seems to be very near “the material cause” of things, and in the context of the Alcibiades would refer to the natural character and talents of Alcibiades himself.
cf. Phaedr. 250a.
cf. ibid. 249e.
cp. Protag. 352b: “The masses think of knowledge after this fashion, that it has no qualities of power, leadership or rule.”
References are to Phaedr. 252c, 246e–247a, 252e–253a.
cf. Resp. X 619b–d.
cf. Resp. VIII, 545a–550b.
cf. Plat. apud Athenaeum XI 507d: “Last of all we cast off the garment of reputation in death itself, in wills, funeral processions and tombs.” cp. Milton: Lycidas: “Fame is the spur ... that last infirmity of noble mind.”
For the various vestures acquired by the vehicle of the soul in its descent cf. El. Theol. prop. 209 and notes pp. 306–8. Proclus describes the acquisition of successive garments, positing both an imperishable “vehicle” attached to the rational soul, and a perishable “vehicle” attached to the irrational soul, in Tim. III p. 297, 21–298, 2: “The souls as they descend to earth acquire from the elements differing garments, of air, water and earth, until finally they enter into this thick mass; for how, without any medium, were they to pass from the immaterial vehicles to this body ? So before they descend to it they have their irrational life and its vehicle prepared from the simple elements, and from these they have put on a “throng,” so called as being alien to the connatural vehicle of the soul, composed of all sorts of garments, and a burden to souls.”
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 52 where he quotes Procl. in Crat. p. 88, 3–5: “For the divine is not accessible to mortals who think bodily thoughts / But only to those who naked hasten upwards towards the heights.” cf. also Lewy op. cit. p. 170–1, notes 395–6, where he compares Plot. I, 6, 7 and Gorgias 524d–525a; and Proclus: De Mal. Subs. 24, 29–31 Boese: “We must therefore cast off the garments we have donned by our descent, and naked journey from this world to that.”
cf. Archilochus frg. 6 Diehl, where the reading varies between “I saved myself” and “I saved my soul.”
cf. Critias 109c.
cp. Phaedr. 250b–c.
cp. Kern: Orph. Frg. 31, 23; Plut. Consol. ad Uxor. 6nd: “... and the secret signs of the Dionysian mysteries, the knowledge of which we who participate therein share with each other.”
cp. Aristot. frg. 15 (On Philosophy) Ross: “... those who are being initiated should not learn anything but experience it and be conditioned i.e. become disposed.”
The terminology is rather Epicurean, cp. Ep. ad Menoec. 123–4 Bailey.
cf. Resp. X 617d–e and references in Loeb edition.
* The lemma and T read the aorist middle infinitive, while B reads the future middle infinitive, confirmed by Proclus in the body of the text at p. 146, 19. This is evidence that the lemmata were inserted by a later hand.
cf. Phaedr. 269e–270a.
cf. Homer: Odyssey VIII, 223. 297 cf. Laws V 726a–727a.
* Reading the nominative case, with Creuzer.
cf. Phaedr. 246e.
cf. ibid. 252e
cf. ibid. 252c
This line is a paraphrase of the Chaldaean verse: “For the Paternal Intellect has sown symbols throughout the world.” The “secret names” are the “thoughts” of the Father — cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 191–2, notes 55–6.
These are the mediating powers of the order of Iynges, who are equated with the first rank of the “intelligent and intelligible gods,” the first gods whose names are made known to us. (cf. Lewy p. 132–7 & note 252). The Iynges are described as “ferrymen” (ibid. note 254) i.e. mediators of messages. “Their sublime name leaps in tireless revolution / Into the worlds (i.e. the spheres of the planets) / At the mighty command of the Father.” (ibid. note 256). They play an active cosmic role in maintaining the movements of the planets and the Chaldaean threefold division of worlds, acting as containing forces of these otherwise “boundless” worlds. (ibid. p. 128) cf. for the whole passage Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 40, 43–4. By the secret names, watchwords or symbols that are assigned to different spheres of the universe the theurgist and the initiate soul communicate with the cosmic and supramundane powers.
cf. Herod. III, 89; Diod. Sic. IV, 30, 2.
cp. Phaedr. 248d.
cf. Phileb. 52b–c where the pleasures of learning are described as unmixed with pain.
cf. Resp. VII 532b.
cf. Philebus 20c-d, 22b, 67a where “The Good” is described as “complete, competent, the object of choice and desire.” Ol. in Alc. p. 42, 18–43, 3 distinguishes the senses of “complete” and “competent”: “complete and competent are not the same; complete is merely that which has no need of another, but competent not only has no need but also is able to impart to others.”
* Reading τὴν ἀµι»ῆ), as Dr. Westerink suggests.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 54, 10–15; Hippoc. Aph. I 22, Humours c. 6 (Loeb).
cf. Protag. 352b–d; Resp. V 477d.
cf. Theaetet. 151d.
cf. ibid. 157d.
cf. Apol. 30c–d.
For the expression cp. Diog. Laert. VII, 140 (SVF II no. 543): “The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary-result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth.” (Loeb) cp. also Plot. II, 3, 7 16–19: “All things must be joined to one another; not only must there be in each individual thing what has been well termed “a single, united breath of life”, but before them, and still more, in the All.” (Armstrong).
* Reading ἐπωστήµoνα, as Dr. Westerink suggests.
cf. above p. 72, 12–74, 9.
cf. above p. 78, 10–79, 14.
cf. El. Theol. props 21, 141 & notes.
cf. Laws III 689b. 320 cf. Resp. IX 588c.
cp. p. 73,9–10 and note 159, and cf. Tim. 90a & c with Taylor’s commentary ad loa, where he traces some of the origins of the doctrine and subsequent references.
cf. note 202.
Proclus seems to use the term “phantasia” in two senses 1) as intermediate between reason and sense-perception 2) as on the level of sense-perception. Here it seems to have the former sense cp. p. 80, 12–13; p. 199, 7–8. cf. also Procl. in Tim. I p. 352, 16–18: “The same thing is known by God in a unity, by intellect comprehensively, by reason universally, by imagination formatively, and by sense-perception receptively.” Proclus even describes it as a kind of intuitive perception analogous to intellect and intellectual perception. cf. in Crat. p. 76, 26–7: “The imagination is an intellect that is formative but not pure”; in Remp. I p. 235, 18–19: “The imagination, being an intuitive perception that creates forms, yearns to be a knowledge of certain intelligible objects.” Contrast Plato’s description of “phantasia” as “a blend of perception and judgment” at Sophist 264b, where he seems to be using the word of “appearing” in indistinct sense-perception. (cf. Cornford’s notes ad loa). It was Aristotle who seems to have given “phantasia” the fixed meaning of being the faculty of imaging or imagining. (cf. De Anima 428a25–429a2 and Ross and Hicks ad loc). He does distinguish two kinds of “phantasia” at De Motu Anim. 702a19: “Imagining comes about either through thought or sensation”; and at De Anim. 433b28: “All imagination is either calculative or sensitive.” (Ross). A similar distinction is found among the Stoics (SVF II no. 61): “According to them some presentations (phantasiai) are sensible. others not: sensible are those conveyed through one or more sense-organs; non-sensible are those received through the mind e.g. of incorporeal beings and all else grasped by the reason.” (Diocles Magnes ap. Diog. Laert. VII, 51).
For the expression cp. Laws X 893b and Procl. in Remp. II p. 188 2–3. 324* Reading the passive ἀπαιτεῖαι, as Dr. Westerink suggests.
cf. SVF III. p. 158–9, Ol. in Alc. p. 55, 23–56, 3.
cp. Eur. Orest. 735; Porph. Vit. Pyth. 33: “He had an exceeding love of friends, being the first to have declared that the possessions of friends are held in common and that a friend is another self.”
a cp. Phaedo 108c.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 162.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 125 & notes; Procl. in Crat. p. 97, 28–98, 1: “The prophetic (activity of the gods seems to be more prevalent) in the heavens; for there especially the revelatory power of the god (Apollo) shines forth, revealing the intelligible goods to the heavenly bodies”; and Procl. in Remp. II p. I53, 23–5: “Other (souls) are revelatory of the divine prophecy i.e. such as are devoted to the orders that are revelatory of the truth which resides secretly among the gods.” The term “revelatory” is applied to Intellect and the Angels as well as to the gods.
cf. Charm. 158c–d.
cp. p. 87, 10–17.
For what follows cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 59, 22–60, 12.
cf. Aristot. Metaph. 1013a24–6, Phys. 194b23–6.
cf. Tim. 49e–51b and the commentaries of Taylor & Cornford.
cf. Sympos. 215d.
cf. Aristot. An. Pr. 66bn & cp. Soph. Elench. 165a2: “Refutation is a syllogism involving contradiction of the conclusion.”
cf. Phaedo 73a.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 61, 18–23.
cf. Phaedr. 244d–e, 250b–c.
cf. Phaedo 69b–c.
cf. Aristot. An. Pr. 25032–9: “Now when three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism. By “middle term” I mean that which both is contained in another and contains in itself, and which is also by position the middle; by “extremes” a) that which is contained in another, and b) that in which another is contained.” (Loeb). cf. Ross’ commentary ad loc.
cf. Aristot. Cat. 1b10–12.
cf. Meno 85d: “And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection, isn’t it?” cf. also Phaedo 75e.
i.e. the intelligent power of the soul freed from matter. cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 52, Lewy op. cit. p. 194 note 67, p. 203 note 114, where they quote Procl. in Remp. 11 p. 112, 21: “... possessing a soul that despises the body and of a condition to glance upwards even “of its own strength,” as the oracle says...”
i.e. a series of major premisses strung together from a number of syllogisms, all of which are in the first figure. First figure syllogisms are considered by Aristotle in An. Pr. 25b26–26b33.
Just as the major premisses have been combined above, so one can combine the minor premisses also.
cf. note 284. 349 cf. note 285.
* Dr. Westerink now retains the reading of N and cps. in Remp. II, p. 281, 2; Theol. Plat. p. 207, 12.
The positive syllogism (p. 178, 15–19) starts with the state of the good counsellor who knows his subject, and runs through the successive steps that lead thereto, in descending order. The negative syllogism (p. 179, 4–8), by denying the lowest step in the series that leads towards knowledge, denies also all the subsequent higher steps. cp. Denys L’Aréopagite: La Hiérarchie Céleste (Sources Chrétiennes) p. xxv-vi.
Understanding this word (“diathesei”) from the preceding clause. This seems to give a just tolerable sense. The form of construction (by ascent or descent) resembles the ups and downs of the soul, and the subject matter describes the psychological process of the acquisition of knowledge.
i.e. the orders of reality that are nearer to the Good e.g. the spirits and those souls that are less than divine but superior to the human soul. cf. El. Theol. prop. 12, l. 15: “For by the very term “superior” we mean that which in greater measure partakes of good.”
The term originates from Phaedo 109c2, and is used by Plotinus e.g. at Enn. II, 3, 17 l. 24. For its original use in relation to matter cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 384, note 275. On matter in general and its characteristics cf. ibid. note 274, c. 5 sect. 3, c. 6 sect. 11; and El. Theol. p. 231, 275.
cf. Tim. 50c– & Cornford’s commentary; Lewy p. 296, note 141.
cf. Theag. 122b.
cf. Aristot. Rhet. 1358b7–25.
cf. Charm. 174a–d.
cf. Meno 88b–d.
Maia, mother of Hermes by Zeus and daughter of Atlas, is considered as “foster-mother,” “midwife” and “nurse.” Hermes was messenger of the gods, especially Zeus and “guide of souls” (cf. Odyss. XXIV, 1 ff).
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 62, Lewy op. cit. p. 79–80, esp. note 49: “The action of the transcendent God is thought, consequently the first entity that issues from him in His Intellect. His Will acts in harmony with this entity; for his volition is thought, and His thought is action.”
cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 63, 14–19.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 53 where he quotes Th. Pl. p. 118, 11: “Maturing the birth-pangs of souls and kindling the fire within them.” Fire purifies and uplifts, being the lightest element and akin to the divine fire, of which the soul contains a spark. It is identified with the sun and its rays cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 171–4, notes 397–8; c. 3, sect. 2 & 3, esp. p. 197 note 84.
cf. Sympos. 204a.
cp. p. 7, 5–6.
cp. Procl. in Remp. II p. 369, 4–6: “Perhaps we should observe that in the case of such a characteristic there is a dissimilar likeness towards justice, as is customarily said of matter and the first principle.” ibid. p. 375, 24–7: “There is also a fifth element, which we should rank close to simple non-being, matter that is dissimilarly alike to the first principle, because it is as inferior to every form as the first principle is superior.”
cf. Sympos. 203b and p. 236, 4–10.
cp. p. 89, 9–10 & note 209.
cf. Phaedo 75c–e.
cf. Statesman 277d.
cp. Ol. vit. Plat. p. 191, 28–34 Hermann: “The children at Athens were educated in these three subjects viz. letters, music and wrestling, but not without further purpose. They were taught letters in order to regulate the reason within them, music in order to tame the temper, wrestling and physical training in order to strengthen the languidity of sense desire.”
cf. esp. Resp. III 410b–411a.
cf. Resp. VII 533d: “When the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of barbarous ignorance, this method (of philosophical discussion) gently draws it forth and guides it upwards .... (Cornford: who refers to Resp. II 363d). cf. also notes on this passage in the Loeb edition. Burial in mud as a punishment of the uninitiated is referred to in Kern: Orph. Frg. 235 and Guthrie: Orpheus and Greek Religion (1952) pp. 158–162. cf. also Resp. VII 527d–e: “True it is quite hard to realise that every soul possesses an organ better worth saving than a thousand eyes, because it is our only means of seeing the truth; and that when its light is dimmed or extinguished by other interests, these studies will purify the hearth and rekindle the sacred fire.” (Cornford).
cf. Homeric Hymn to Hermes 11. 39–61.
cf. Phaedr. 274c–d: “He it was that invented number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not to speak of draughts and dice, and above all writing”; and Hermias in Phaedr. p. 255, 1–8 Couvreur.
cf. Crat. 407e–408b.
For the following section cf. F. Cumont: Astrology Sc Religion among the Greeks & Romans pp. 119–121; Macrob. In somn. Scip. I, 11, 12, where the descent of the soul involves the reverse process.
To the moon was attributed the function of producing life. cf. Iambi. ap. Procl. in Tim. III p. 65, 17–20: “Observing that the moon is first assigned to the region about the earth, as exercising the role of nature and of mother in regard to generation (for everything turns with her, and increases if she increases, diminishes if she diminishes).”
cp. Julian: Hymn to King Helios 139c: “The midmost perfection of King Helios is of the form of the One, situated amid the intelligent gods.”
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 28, 18–21: “For King Kronos employs all the products of Zeus with transcendent pre-eminence, and proffers the upward path to individual souls through the medium of their imagery.”
For this notion of retirement and devotion to a higher life cf. A. J. Festu-gière: Personal Religion among the Greeks c. 4, where he quotes Plot. I, 1, 12, 18–20; II, 3, 9, 19–30.
cf. Plut. Alcib. 2.
cf. Aristot. Pol. 1341a5-b9.
cf. Resp. III 399c–d and Kathleen Schlesinger: The Greek Aulos (pp. 72–4, 151 & 194), to which the translation of these lines is much indebted. The Greeks played both single and double aulos, and regarded the instrument as the origin of octave-scales.
cf. Homer Iliad X, 279–80.
cp. p. 140, 9 & p. 281, 18, and cf. Critias 109c where the gods are described as guiding mankind by the steering-oar of persuasion. Hence the expression “from the stern,” where the steering-oar was located.
cf. Aristot. de Interpr. 17a 33–5: “And let this be what is meant by contradictories viz. the opposing affirmation and negation.” cf. also 17b 16–20, 18a 8–9.
cf. Aristot. Top. 105a 13–15: “Induction is the progress from particulars to the universal.”
cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 64, 23–65, 10.
cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094a28: “Such appears to be the art of statesmanship; for it is this which prescribes what branches of knowledge should exist in the state, and what particular branch each class of citizens should learn and to what extent.”
cf. Tim. 92c
* Retaining ou and reading ἀ»»ἢin place of ἀ»»ὰ, as E. R. Dodds suggests (Gnomon ’55, p. 165).
There is a reference to the harmony of the heavens in Resp. X 617b (Corn-ford) and Aristotle refers to this Pythagorean theory in De Caelo 290b 12–15: “These results clear up another point, namely that the theory that music is produced by their movements, because the sounds they make are harmonious, although ingeniously and brilliantly formulated by its authors, does not contain the truth.” (Guthrie).
cf. Tim. 35a, 36c-d and the commentaries of Taylor and Cornford. The circle of the Same is the outer sphere of the fixed stars, the circle of the Other is divided into the orbits of the seven planets, and to it the world of process (beneath the moon) is subject.
i.e. air and water, cf. Tim. 31b–32b.
cf. esp. Aristot. de Anim. 406b26–407a2 and cp. Procl. in Remp. I p. 212, 20–213, 19; ibid. II p. 49, 9–50, 7.
cf. Tim. 29e–30a.
* Reading τoῦτo τoῦ νεανίσϰoυ ἀγνόηµα.
cf. Sophist 227d–228e.
Note that the preceding lines play upon the double sense of the Greek word “aischros” which means both “physically ugly” and “morally shameful.”
cf. Iliad III 203–224.
cf. perhaps Resp. V 469d, 471b
cf. Theaet. 146a.
cf. Sympos. 180e.
cp. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1107a8–11: “But not every action ... admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness e.g. ... adultery, theft, murder.” (Ross).
cf. Od. XIX 394–6.
For a discussion of the difference between the “whole” and the “total” cf. Theaet. 204a-205a and Aristot. Met. 1023b12–1024a10.
Perhaps a reference to the “combination” and ‘differentiation” of the early cosmologists e.g. Anaxagoras (Aristot. Met. 984a13–16), Empedocles (ibid. 8–11), Democritus and Leucippus (de Gen. & Corrupt. 315b6–9).
cp. Aristot. Cat. 4b20–22: “Quantity is either discrete or continuous.” Quantity as a continuum is a whole without actual relation of part to part: as discrete it is a totality made up of interrelated parts. cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 85, 6–10.
Cf. Resp. I 348b–349d.
cf. Kern: Orph. Fgm. 158, 160, and cp. Sophocles O.C. 1381–2, Ps.-Demosth. Against Aristogeiton a c. 11, Plot. V, 8, 4, 40–43 and Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique V p. 317–18.
cf. Laws IV 716a: “Attendant upon him (i.e. Zeus) is Justice as avenger of those who fall away from the divine law.”
cf. Gorgias 523a.
cf. Laws IV 714a.
For the expression “Cadmeian victory” cf. Laws 641c, Herod. I, 66: for the thought cp. Plut. Moral. 10a, 488a: for explanations of its origin cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 74, 2 schol. & notes.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 74, 3–7.
cf. Iambi. Vit. Pyth. 33, esp. sect. 240.
cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1155a26–9.
cp. Anaximander fgm A9 Diels.
cf. Resp. II 368e, also IV 434C–435C, 443c–444a.
cf. note 284.
cf. Resp. X 611c–d, and note in Loeb edition.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 82, 7–9: “This reveals the intermediate nature of the essence of our soul; for it is neither always imperfect, as when discovering, nor always perfect, as when learning.”
cp. Tim. 44b1–2 with Taylor’s note, and cf. Procl. in Tim. III p. 348, 3–350, 8, esp. 349, 21–5: “.. Galen would say: the powers of the soul follow the blendings of the body, and while the latter is moist, unstable and variously fluid, the soul is witless and unstable, but when the body is established in due proportion, the soul is straightened out and becomes sensible.” (cf. Galen: Scripta Minora II 42, 3–44, 9 Muller). cf. also Heracleit. (p. 205–6 Kirk & Raven), Diog. Apoll. A 19 (Diels II 56, 24).
cf. Plot. I, 1, 9 e.g. 1–3: “The nature of the soul in us will then be such that it is removed from any cause of the evils which man performs or endures; for they are concerned only with the living organism ...”; ibid. 23–6: “Thus in spite of all, the soul is at peace as to itself and within itself: all the changes and all the turmoil we experience are the issue of what is subjoined to the soul.” cp. IV, 8, 8, 1–3.
cf. Tim. 41d.
cf. Phaedr. 246a–b.
cf. ibid. 248b.
cf. ibid. 249c; 253c–256e.
cf. Theaet. 151d.
cf. Phaedrus 265c. 430* Reading τὸν with N.
cf. note 152a and Kern: Orph. Fgm. 83, 170 and Procl. in Tim. I p. 336,
E. R. Dodds (GNOMON ’55 p. 167) points out that the reference is to Gorgias 466e (cf. his commentary ad loc.) and compares Ol. in Gorg. p. 81 22–3 Norvin: “When about to swear he did not complete his oath, but broke off, thus teaching us that we must form the habit of restraining oaths.”
cf. Phileb. 12b–c.
cf. Laches 186a–e.
cf. Gorgias 514c.
cf. Sympos. 203b–c; Plot. III, 5, 8 & 9.
* Omitting ϰαὶ before ὐπoδέξασθαι, and filling the lacuna with Ψυχῆς. The sense will then be that if a soul requires a kindred soul to achieve its perfection as soul, much more will it require a guide to contemplate what is beyond its essential being. In the former case it needs only to make explicit what is already innate within it; in the latter it needs to lollow its impulses to reach out beyond its own being.
cf. Albinus: Eis. 3: “At this juncture we must learn that ultimately there are two typical forms of dialogue, expository and investigatory: the former adapted towards instruction, action and demonstration of the truth, the latter towards verbal exercise, argument and refutation of falsehood. The former has an objective reference, the latter a personal reference.” cf. also Diog. Laert. III, 49.
cf. Aristot. de Anim. 406b24–407a34. He rejects the view of the soul expressed by Plato in the Timaeus (35a–37d) and maintains: “for, probably not only is it false that the essence of soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves (or is capable of moving), itself but it is an impossibility that movement should even be an attribute of it.” (405b33–406a). The most he will admit is an “incidental” movement due to bodily sensation: “If the soul is moved, the most probable view is that what moves it is sensible things.” (406b10). Even thought and learning are not changes within the soul, but within the man to whom the soul belongs: “It is probably better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul. What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul, but that sometimes it terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it, sensation e.g. coming from without inwards, and reminiscence starting from the soul and terminating in the movements, actual or residual, in the sense organs.” (408b13– 18) — Oxford trans.
cf. Plot. III, 7, 11–12: time is engendered within the soul by its movement away from the purely intelligible: it is annihilated when the soul returns to the intelligible world.
For further elaborations cf. “Time and Eternity in Proclus” in Phronesis vol. vii, no. 2.
cf. Aristot. De Caelo 271a33, and for the preceding thought Ol. in Alc. p. 89, 13–23.
cf. Plut. Alcib. 2.
cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 82, 10–21.
cf. Phaedo 75c–d.
cf. Tim. 41b.
cf. Resp. IX 588c.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 59; Lewy op. cit. p. 212 and note 143.
cf. Phaedr. 242e, Phaedo 69b–c, Crat. 440c.
* One could read oἴησιν in place of νόησιν, since the ν is a likely ductography, as Dr. Westerink and E. R. Dodds suggest (Gnomon ’55, p. 166). However, Proclus does use νόησιν in an analogous and attenuated sense e.g. p. 275, 10 and in Remp. I, p. 235, 18–19: ϰαὶ ἡ µὲν φαντασία νόησις oὖσα µoρφωτιϰὴ) νoητῶν ἐθέ»ει γνῶσις εἶναί τινων, which seems a parallel case to the present context.
For this sense of the word as a passing from point to point in the process of knowledge cp. El. Theol. p. 148, 20 & notes on prop. 170, also prop. 211.
cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1142a25–6: “Intuitive reason is of the definitions, for which no account can be given.”
cf. Tim. 30b: “... intelligence cannot be present in anything apart from soul.” (Cornford).
cf. Aristot. De Anim. 405b15: “Like, they say, is known by like,” but the origin of the saying seems to go back to Homer and the Pre-Socratics.
cf. Kroll: De Orac. Chald. p. 11 & 27, and for a translation and commentary on the relevant verses cf. Lewy op. cit. p. 165–9, also p. 99–100 and note 138.
cf. Tim. 35a–37c for this description of the nature of the soul.
cf. Plot. IV, 4, 36, 9.
For the process of ascent cp. Plot. V, 1, 3 & V, 8, 3 ad init.
cp. Plot. VI, 7, 12, 20–23: “To ask how those forms of life come to be There is simply asking how that heaven came to be; it is asking whence comes life, whence the All-Life, whence the All-Soul, whence collective Intellect: and the answer is that There no indigence or impotence can exist but all must be teeming, seething, with life.” (McKenna).
cf. El. Theol. props. 113–165 and notes p. 257–83.
cf. El. Theol. prop. 100 and notes on props. 67–9.
cf. Protag. 327e–328a.
* The text of this quotation as it stands is hardly intelligible, and is clearly a corruption of the Platonic text, which is here translated.
* Dr. Westerink’s correction seems somewhat more probable than the reading of N.
On the preceding passage cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 91, 14–92, 1.
Timon of Phlius wrote satirical hexameters on the dogmatic philosophers. cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 6.
The “meadow” is the meeting place of souls coming up from earth and down from heaven — cf. esp. Resp. X 614e, 616b.
* The text translated is that of Diels.
cf. Odyssey X, 326.
cp. p. 34, 6 and Statesman 273d.
For the controversy on the question whether men’s souls literally entered beasts, or merely metaphorically, cf. Hermes Dec. ‘57: Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Piatonismus by Heinrich Dorrie esp. p. 423–4, where it appears that the literal interpretation was accepted from Plato as far as Plotinus (cf. Enn. III, 4, 2) but rejected in favour of the metaphorical by Porphyry and Iamblichus, who made a firm distinction between the rational and irrational soul and refused to allow transmigration from one kind to the other. Proclus (cf. Dorrie p. 432) quotes the current opposing views in Tim. III p. 294, 22 ff. “It is customary to enquire what is meant by the descent of souls into irrational animals: some consider that the so-called bestial lives are mere assimilations of men to beasts (for it is not possible that a rational substance should become the soul of a beast), others even concede that this substance enters into irrational beings (for, they assert, all souls are the same in kind, so that these become wolves and leopards and jelly-fish).” Proclus then gives his own opinion, which is a compromise between the opposing views: “But the true account says that although the human soul enters into beasts, yet they retain their own appropriate life which the entered soul as it were transcends, while at the same time bound by affinity to it.” i.e. Proclus admits that man’s soul can enter beasts, but it remains rational and transcendent, and the beasts retain their own life: man’s soul does not actually inform the body of a beast. cp. in Remp. II p. 309, 28ff. “Let us state, then, that at any rate according to the opinion of Plato the soul transfers into irrational animals on account of similarity in way of life, a position which we too affirm, but not that the soul inhabits their bodies (for the differentiations in natural structure militate against such a reduced status) but solely by condition of life is tied to their soul which has animated its own body and has no additional need of the human soul.” So Proclus returns to Plato’s view, but allows for the objections of Porphyry and Iamblichus by preserving the rationality of man’s soul even when it is present in beasts.
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 22, 8–10: “.. Circe who contrives the whole of life in the region of the four elements, and at the same time makes the place beneath the moon harmonious with her spells.” cp. the position of Hecate as mistress of the evil demons, who inhabit the sublunar zone of Nature. These demons are likened to beasts of the earth who lure the soul to an “animal” life. cf. Lewy op. cit. c.v. Chaldaean Demonology esp. p. 263–5 and notes 12–19.
* Reading ἀφoρῶ with E. R. Dodds (Gnomon ’55 p. 166).
i.e. persons of reason. cp. p. 195, 8–10; Procl. in Tim. I p. 148, 5; and Galen: Protrep. 2–3, where Hermes is contrasted with the goddess of Chance.
cp. Schol. in Alc. p. 277, 32–7 Hermann.
The question whether language is natural or conventional is discussed by Jean Daniélou in Rev. des Études Grecques LXIX 1956 in an article entitled “Eunome l’Arien et l’Exégèse Néo-platonicienne du Cratyle,” esp. pp. 415, 422–3. In Plato’s Cratylus, Cratylus declares for nature: “There is a correctness of name that naturally belongs to each reality” (383a); Hermogenes for convention: “I cannot persuade myself that there is any other principle of correctness in name than convention and agreement” (384d). Socrates argues both cases. Aristotle sides with convention: “A name is a sound having meaning established by convention alone .... by convention because no name is established by nature.” (De Int. 16a20 & 28). Among earlier philosophers, Proclus finds Democritus on the side of Aristotle (in Crat. p. 6, 20–7, 17), Pythagoras on the side of nature (ibid. p. 6, 1–19), while among later philosophers both Epicurus (ibid. p. 7, 22–8, 7 and cp. Ep. ad Her. 75 & 76) and the Stoics are at least fundamentally on the side of nature (cf. SVF II no. 146). Proclus agrees with Plato in representing Socrates as giving a compromise solution (in Crat. p. 4, 11–14, p. 8, 7–13). Basically and essentially names are natural, accidentally and materially conventional. This is much the same as the view of Epicurus. Apart from the rational explanation of the origin of names, Proclus is influenced by Iamblichus (De Myst. Aegypt. VII, 4) and the Chaldaean Oracles to allow a higher, mystical origin of some of them (cf. Danielou p. 424–7). The “legislator” of Cratylus 389a is equated with “the universal creator” who is the “most primary bestower of names” (in Crat. p. 20, 1–4) and “assigns appropriate names to each thing” (ibid. p. 20, 25). In all there is a threefold origin of names: “Some names are sprung from the gods and have come down as far as soul, some are sprung from individual souls that are able to fashion them through intellect and knowledge, others again are constituted through the agency of the middle classes of beings; for certain individuals have encountered guardian spirits and angels and learned from them names more appropriate to things than the ones men have given them. (ibid. p. 20, 10–16). cp. Iambi. Vit. Pyth. 56.
cf. Procl. in Crat. p. 5, 27–6, 19; Ol. in Alc. p. 95, 9–15.
Reading the optative ἀνατρέχoιµεν as E. R. Dodds suggests. 479* Reading the present πoιoῦµεν as Dr. Westerink suggests.
cf. Theaet. 152a.
cf. Philop. De Aet. Mundi 83, 12: “For thus unawares we shall be introducing the argument of Anaxagoras, who said that nothing possessed a determinate nature, but that everything had their being in relation to one another.” ibid. p. 464, 3: “One of the friends of Protagoras might say that if such and such absurdities follow upon the hypothesis that nothing has a determinate nature, Protagoras would not have made this hypothesis, even though he appears to make it by the text of his saying.”
* It is difficult to fill the many lacunae on this page with accuracy, but the sense must be such as Dr. Westerink’s conjectures suggest. The text has been translated as it stands in his edition.
These lines are very compressed, but perhaps some light is shed upon them by Aristot. De Int. 17b16–22.: “When their subject is one and the same, but of two propositions the affirmative clearly indicates in its terms that the subject is taken universally, the negative however that the subject is not universally taken, I call them contradictorily opposed. Examples are “every man is white.,” “not every man is white” and the like, or again we have “some men are white,” to which “no man is white” is opposed in the manner of which I am speaking. Propositions are contrarily opposed when affirmative and negative alike are possessed of a universal character — the subject, that is, in both cases being marked as universally taken. Thus “every man is white” or “is just” is the contrary, not the contradictory, of “no man is white” or “is just”; (Loeb). These logical divisions refer to the two types of disagreement described in the previous sentence. In the first case none of those who disagree possesses knowledge — a contrary denial; in the second case, not all those who disagree possess knowledge — a contradictory denial.
cf. Phaedr. 247a, 254b.
cf. Gorg. 478a.
This passage seems to imply a hierarchy of forms. Proclus distinguishes between intelligible and intelligent forms, the former above the highest level of Nous, the latter verging towards the level of Soul. Only the supreme forms are intelligible: lesser forms are intelligent. The “place above the heavens” is the sphere of the intelligibles, and Beauty is made head of the intelligible forms as Form of forms (cf. p. 111, 14–15 and Procl. in Crat. p. 60, 26, p. 64, 8–10). For further description of the power of health cf. Procl. in Tim. II p. 63, 9–64, 9. For the intelligent forms cf. El. Theol. props 176–8, 194 & notes.
cf. Aristot. Top. 114a36–8: “All words which are in the same co-ordinate series are called co-ordinates, for example “justice,” “just man,” “just action” and “justly.” (Loeb).
cf. Demosth. De Falsa Legat. # 148, ad fin.
* Reading ἐν αὐτῷ as Dr. Westerink suggests, cp. 01. in Aie. p. 97, 19–23. 491* Transposing “E»»ηνας ... βαρゲǷρoυς as Dr. Westerink proposes. 492* Reading αὐτὴ) as Dr. Westerink suggests.
* The slight difference in construction in Greek is hard to parallel in English without making it seem unnecessarily complicated.
cf. Aristot. An. Post. 89b24–5: “We ask four questions, the question of fact, the question of cause, the question of existence and the question of essence.” cf. W. D. Ross An. Post. p. 609–10, where he points out that Aristotle probably means by “question of fact and question of cause” what Proclus here indicates by “what kind it is and why it is” i.e. whether a subject has a certain attribute and why it has it.
* Reading ὁµῶς in place of ὅµως.
cf. Aristot. De Anim. 429b31: “The intellect is in a sense whatever is intelligible, although actually it is nothing until it has thought; what it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with the intellect.’’ Ross cites Theaetetus 191c8 ff for our earliest reference to the notion of a tabula rasa, and Hicks compares Alex. Aphr. De Anim. p. 84, 24–7, Prisc. Lyd. Metaph. in Theophrast. 35, 24–8.
cf. Critias 109b and cp. Heracleitus fr. 11.
This phrase seems to refer to the internal entrances of the soul, as opposed to the senses.
cf. Meno 81c–e, Phaedo 72eȓ73b.
cf. Critias 109c.
cf. Theaetet. 150b–d, 157c–d.
cf. Aristot. An. Pr. 24019.
cf. Aristot. De Int. 17a33: “Let this be what we mean by a contradictory viz. the opposing affirmation and negation.’’
* Reading Dr. Westerink’s suggested emendation of the text.
cf. Epictetus: Manuale 5: “To accuse others for one’s own misfortunes is a sign of want of education; to accuse oneself shows that one’s education has begun; to accuse neither oneself nor others shows that one’s education is complete.” (Matheson). cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 101, 7–12.
cf. ibid. “What disturbs men’s minds is not events, but their judgments on events.” cp. also Ol. in Alc. p. 96, 9–12: “.... a way of life begets opinions and opinions beget a way of life. The man who thinks that pleasure is a good tries to enjoy pleasure and live according to it. Again the man who lives like a hedonist professes corresponding opinions viz. that pleasure is a good.”
cf. Gorgias 497a9. The last clause “because ... nonsense” is omitted, transposed or altered by most editors of Plato. cf. note in E. R. Dodds: Gorgias p. 312.
cf. Homer: Iliad VII 124–131, IX 438–443.
cf. Demosth. “Concerning the events in the Chersonesus” 34–7.
cf. Crito 50a–54c: Gorgias 482a“c.
* Retaining the reading of N, as E. R. Dodds suggests (Gnomon ’55 p. 166).
cf. Timaeus 37c.
cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 103, 9–16: “Alcibiades has fallen away from the three primary principles, Intellect, God and Soul: from Soul because he does not know, but knowledge is characteristic of Soul: from Intellect because, not knowing, he thinks he knows, for reversion is characteristic of Intellect — the Intellect is analogous to a sphere that makes each point both a beginning and an end: from God because he is an evildoer — he is about to offer advice concerning matters of which he is ignorant, that he may encompass his listeners with evil, but God is characterised by goodness.” cp. also p. 125, 8–14.
cf. Eurip. Hippol. 352.
cf. Resp. 619c.
cf. Resp. X 617e.
cf. SVF III 662–4 esp. Stob. Ecl. II, 68, 18 W. “Further they say that every worthless individual is mad, since he is unaware both of himself and of what relates to him — which is precisely what madness is.”
cf. Laws IV 716a: “... whoso .... through this pride joined with youth and folly, is inflamed in soul with insolence, as if in no need of ruler or guide, but rather competent to guide others — such a person is deserted and abandoned by God ...”
cf. Aristot. Ars Rhet. 1358b6–8, 20–29, and cp. p. 183, 18 ff.
cf. Hermog. Stat. I, 9: “For we learn the literary forms and styles presumably in order to employ the appropriate form of words in delivering our subject-matter, i.e. in order to handle the forensic, deliberative and declamatory each in its own manner, and each division of oratory as is suitably appropriate to its content.”
cf. ibid. VII: “The subject matter is divided into what is customary, just, advantageous, possible, probable or likely to happen.” cp. Apsines Ars Rhet. 11: “First of all let us speak of purposes. These are the customary, just, advantageous, probable, possible......”
For Thrasymachus cf. Resp. I 343c: Polus, cf. Gorg. 470d: Callicles ibid, 492c: Archelaus ibid. 471a-d.
For Socrates’ curse cf. SVF I no. 558 (Cleanthes).
cf. SVF III no. 17: “... if according to the Stoics to live according to nature is to live well, and to live well both according to them and Epicurus is to be happy, then to live according to nature is to be happy.”
cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1097b6–11, 1101a14–16, 1170b20–29.
cf. Alex. Aphro. De Anim. p. 14, 31–2 Bruns: “... but the ensouled body derives from the soul its differences in relation to other bodies.”
For the whole of the preceding page cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 104, 23–105, 4 and for the arguments against Peripatetics, Epicureans and Stoics cf. Plot. I, 4, 1–4.
* This seems a more accurate translation than “sallies in debate” (Loeb), especially in view of the sense of »όγoυ at p. 298, 1. At p. 301, 16–20 Proclus seems to interpret the phrase as expressing opposition between emotional impulses and the higher influences of providence etc. The verb πρoτέχειν is used with a genitive in the metaphorical sense of “to outrun” e.g. Isocr. I, 41: πo»»oῖς ἡ γ»ῶττα πρoτρέχει τῆβ διανoίαβ — a quotation from Chilon (Diog. Laert. I, 70), and πρόδρoµoς seems generally to have the sense of “outrunning.” Ol. in Alc. p. 107, 14–17 gives a different explanation.
cf. Odyssey VIII, 248–9.
i.e. the image of itself which the soul creates in the body by informing it. cf. Ol. in Phaed. p. 111, 4–13 Norvin, esp. 4–6: “the soul must first make an image of itself to subsist in the body — this is what is meant by ensouling the body — and secondly it must have affinity with this image by way of similarity of form.” cp. Procl. in Tim. III p. 324, 28–9: p. 330, 19–24.
cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 107, 7–13, esp. 8–10: “For possessing a notion of the garments within it, the luminous, elemental and shell-like, (the soul) desires through this externally apparent garb to possess in purity its internal garments.” A reference is made in this quotation to the three vehicles, the luminous attached to the rational soul, the elemental attached to the irrational soul, and the shelllike attached to and perishing with the body. cf. Procl. in Tim. III, p. 285, 1–21 esp. 12–14: “There are then three vehicles, either simple and immaterial or simple and material or composite and material.” The term “shell-like” seems first to occur in the Phaedrus 250c and Philebus 21c, and the expression “shell-like vehicle” seems to be used by Proclus and Olympiodorus as identical with the body, but perhaps especially in its vegetative and nutritive functions. This would give a threefold division of vehicles corresponding to the threefold Aristotelian division of soul into rational, sensitive and vegetative (De Anim. 413b11 ff.). cp. Ol in Phaed. p. 77, 12–15 Norvin: “As informing the body and as an independent principle of movement (the rational soul) is master over it; for the other souls do not endow it with life, but are ways of its living: the irrational soul of the elemental, and the vegetative soul of the shell-like constituents.” For the whole topic. cf. El. Theol. props. 209–10 & notes and Appendix II.
Divine souls have only the luminous vehicle attached to them. cf. El. Theol. p. 319–20.
Athenaeus 534b–535e refers to a Life of Alcibiades by Satyrus: in Diog. Laert. II, 23, Aristippus mentions Alcibiades in a work “Concerning Ancient Luxury.”
For this paragraph cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 99, 6–100, 2.
cf. Hermog. De Invent, III, 6.
cf. Gorgias 498e and Philebus 60a.
cf. Gorgias 490e, 482a“c and Sympos. 221e.
* Reading ἀ[ϰριβῆ], a possible supplement for ἀ***.
cf. Phaedrus 261a.
cp. Socrates’ observations on Rhetoric in Phaedrus 261a–e.
cf. Aulus Gellius VIII, 9.
cf. Apol. 38d: 37a–b.
cf. Gorg. 454e–455a.
cf. ibid. 453a.
cf. Kern: Orph. fgm 202, i.e. Procl. in Tim. II p. 63, 39–64, 7.
cf. Tim. 48a, Taylor’s note on 47e4–5 and Cornford: Plato’s Cosmology, pp. I59-I77-
cf. Tim. 42e.
cf. Sympos. 221e-222a.
cf. Resp. II, 368b.
cf. Parm. 146b.
cf. Epist. 2, 312e: “All things stand in relation to the King of all, all things are for His sake, and He is the cause of all that is beautiful.” (Harward).
Cf. Resp. X, 6o8e.
cp. p. 184, 4–6 (which seems to substantiate the text as it stands). Proclus seems to argue that the soul is compounded by a balance of proportions — cp. Tim. 31c and Procl. In Tim. II, p. 19, 5–8: “Let us now speak about the three means from which Plato constitutes the soul, the arithmetical, the geometrical and the harmonic ...” cf. also the blending of the soul in Timaeus 34C-37C (esp. 37a–b) and Procl. In Tim. II, p. 296–8, where the “faculties” referred to here are equated with the revolutions of the Same and the Other. cf. art. “Convergence des définitions de l’âme chez Proclus” by Jean Trouillard, in Rev. des Sciences Phil. et Théol. Jan. 1961 pp. 14–15.
cf. Aristot. Metaph. 1072a 26–8ff.
cf. note 462.
cf. El. Theol. p. 109, 9–10: “... whilst they (the gods) radiate good to all existents in virtue of their very being, or rather their priority to Being.”
This view is also Stoic. cf. Diog. Laert. VII, 98: “They say that everything good is advantageous.....noble.....and just.”
cf. Aristot. An. Pr. 25b31: “When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.” (Loeb). cf. ibid. 26b 27–34 where this is identified as a first figure syllogism.
This is also a Stoic tenet. cf. SVF III nos. 295 — “They say that the virtues reciprocally imply one another and he who possesses one possesses all” — & 299. cp. Clem. Alex. St. II, 80 and Ol. in Alc. p. 214, 10–215,1.
For the following section down to p. 322, 17 cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 109, 15–111, 2 and p. 126, 3–127, 3.
cf. Phaedrus 250b, d.
For Proclus Being-Life-Intellect are convertible terms only on the level of soul (cf. El. Theol. prop. 197): for Plotinus they are united in the second hypostasis. cf. Plot. V, 8, 4, 35–42: VI, 2, 8 & 21.cp. Jean Trouillard art. cit. p. 11, where he quotes Procl. in Tim. II, p. 166, 26–167, 1.
cf. Timaeus 31c.
cf. Statesman 291a–c, 303c.
cf. Resp. I 348c (Thrasymachus).
cf. Gorg. 483a (Callicles defending Polus).
cf. Resp. I, 349b–350C, esp. 349c
cf. Resp. IV, 445d–e: authority, whether vested in one or more persons, will, if it is just, respect the laws of the state.
cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1131a24℃1132a2.
cf. Timaeus 69c and Taylor’s commentary on 69x3 and 7. 572 cf. Tim. 31c, 32c, 92c and Taylor’s notes on 31C4, 32C2.
* Reading αὐτό, συµφέρoν ἄρα. ϰαὶ ‹to› δίϰαιν (E. R. Dodds Gnomon ’55 p. 166).
* Reading ‹πᾶν› παντί. (sc. ἐπoίησε) (E. R. Dodds Gnomon ‘55 p. 165).
We have already seen that justice is a proportion (p. 325, 13–326, 6), but the universe, which is excellently proportioned, is described as “the fairest of visible beings,” so justice too must be beautiful.
Such seems to be the opinion of Epicurus. cf. fgm. 400 & 513 Usener.
cf. Phaedr. 250a.
cf. Meno 77b–78b.
cf. Sympos. 206a.
cf. ibid. 210a–211c.
For the following paragraph cp. Ol. in Alc. p. 115, 5–14 esp.: “There are two antitheses: noble and base, good and evil. What is noble is opposed to what is base, and what is good to what is evil, but what is noble is not opposed to what is evil.”
cf. Odyssey IV, 187–8; Xenophon: Cyneg. I, 14; Pindar; Pyth. 6, 28–42.
cf. Aristot. De Soph. Elench. 166b28–36.
i.e. a syllogism, the conclusion of which forms the major premiss of another syllogism. It occurred on p. 329, 23–330, 1.
Alex. Aphr. provides a full explanation of this expression in An. Pr. p. 283, 3 ff. esp. 17–29 (cp. SVF II no. 257): “The “overlapping” and “overlapped” syllogisms would receive their name from premisses consecutively taken apart from their conclusions; “overlapped” are those whose conclusions are omitted, “overlapping” those whose major premiss is omitted. For the omitted conclusions of the overlapped syllogsms which are first in order, are the major premisses of the overlapping syllogisms which are second in order. e.g. A is predicated of all B, B of all C, C of all D, therefore A of all D. The first syllogism is overlapped, since its conclusion “therefore A is predicated of all C” is omitted; overlapping is the syllogism demonstrated from the omitted “A is predicated of all C” and “C is predicated of all D,” whose conclusion is “therefore A is predicated of all D.” Now in what we have been discussing both the overlapping and the overlapped syllogism are in the first figure,”
Dr. Westerink notes: idem esse dicit Aristot. An. Post. 73b28–9: “The of itself and the in itself are the same.” But Aristotle has previously distinguished them ibid. 73a34–b24, where “of itself* means “according to specific nature,” while “in itself” means “precisely as itself, as this individual instance of a specific nature.” cf. Ross ad loc. esp. on 73a34–b.16 and 73b25–32.
For the previous section cf. Ol. in Alc. p. 118, 11–27.
cf. Aristot. De Caelo 281b25–282a25.
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O’neill, W. (1971). Proclus the Successor on the First Alcibiades of Plato. In: Proclus: Alcibiades I. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6327-1_1
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