Abstract
After giving a brief description of the functions of the examining judge, embracing both the taking of evidence and the performance of other procedural acts designed to prepare the case for decision by the adjudicating panel (8.01–8.04), this chapter devotes its main attention to a discussion of rules of evidence. This discussion deals with rules concerning the admission and evaluation of evidence (8.05) as well as with rules specifying the various types of evidence and the manners in which they can be obtained, introduced, and contested (8.06–8.50).
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References
This term is derived from the Latin “instruere,“ meaning “to prepare” or “to put in order.” Codice di procedura civile arts. 175–274. See generally C. Leone, L’istruzione della causa nel nuovo processo civile (Bari & Città di Castello, Macri 1942) (partially out-dated).
The term “examining judge” seems more appropriate than either “investigating judge” or “inquiring magistrate,” since, whatever else this judge does, he does not investigate and does very little inquiring. See 8.04.b infra.
2 E. Redenti, Diritto processuale civile 184 (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. reprint 1957); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale di diritto processuale civile (tome 1) 22, 37 (Milano, Giuffrè 1959). The German term mündliche Verhandlung, which describes the stage in a German action that is similar to trattazione, has been translated as “oral argument.” B. Kaplan, A. T. von Mehren & R. Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1211–12 (1958). Since trattazione is not primarily oral and since the term “oral argument” has a more restrictive connotation than the term “trattazione” “oral argument” would be an inappropriate translation for the term “trattazione.“
See 7.27 supra. On the giudice istruttore, see generally Atti dell’ “incontro” fra magistrati professori universitari e avvocati per lo studio del tema: il giudice istruttore nel processo civile (Milano, Giuffrè 1955). See also F. Carnelutti, Storia e natura del giudice istruttore, X Rivista di diritto processuale (part 1) 157 (1955).
Codice di procedura civile art. 174, para. 1.
The principle of immediacy is, therefore, realized only partially. The institution of the examining judge is criticised in 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza della parte nel sistema dell’oralità 149–62 (Milano, Giuffrè 1962) (basing his criticism largely on a comparative and historical study).
See 1.39 supra.
See, e.g., F. Carnelutti, Diritto e processo 189, 190 (Napoli, Morano 1958). These memoranda are exchanged by one of the means provided for in paragraph 4 of article 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 7.20 supra. On oral argument, see 9.02 infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 175, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 175, para. 2; art. 289. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 81 provides that, except in special circumstances, not more than fifteen days may elapse between hearings. In practice, this provision, designed to speed up proceedings, is not complied with. See F. Carnelutti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 8, at 189–90; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 178; S. Costa, Manuale di diritto processuale civile 300 (Torino, UTET 2d ed. 1959); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 40; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso di diritto processuale civile 44 (Milano Giuffrè 1960).
Codice di procedura civile art. 180, para. 1, as amended in 1950.
Codice di procedura civile art. 115.
Codice di procedura civile art. 188.
Codice di procedura civile art. 188. Other powers of the examining judge are specified in Codice di procedura civile arts. 171, 294 (dealing with failures to appear and belated appearances), art. 270 (third party practice), 273, 274 (consolidation of proceedings), 185 (attempt to bring about a settlement). In certain cases, involving penalties imposed on witnesses, expert consultants, and others who violate procedural rules, the giudice istruttore may issue ordinanze on which execution may be levied. Codice di procedura civile arts. 64, 118, 255. These cases form exceptions to the general rule that examining judges have no power to make decisions that go beyond the mere keeping of order in the proceeding. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 37.
Codice di procedura civile art. 176. For the form of an ordinanza, see Codice di procedura civile art. 134.
Codice di procedura civile art. 177 provides for a few exceptions to the general rule that ordinanze may be modified or revoked by the judge who issued them.
Codice di procedura civile art. 178, paras. 2–8. Only a motion attacking an ordinanza dealing with the admissibility or relevance of evidence may be addressed to the panel. It must be made within ten days from its issuance or its communication to the movant. The right to make a motion to the panel was introduced in 1950. Previously, in conformity with the principle of the maximum possible concentration of the proceeding — a principle that does not permit interruption of the proof-taking stage-, no such motion was permitted. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 183–84; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 296.
Codice di procedura civile art. 178, para. 1.
See 2 V. Andrioli, Commento al codice di procedura civile 53 (Napoli, Jovene 3d ed. 1956); Moroni v. Moro, Corte di cassazione, April 17, 1952, No. 1030, Massimario Giuris-prudenza Italiana col. 290 (1952).
Under the code of 1865, many of the present rulings made by ordinanze were made by sentenze interlocutorie. Since these were subject to immediate appeal and review in Cassazione, proliferation into separate proceedings often ensued. To avoid this, the Code of 1942 introduced the rules stated in the text. See, e.g., F. Carnelutti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 8, at 192–95; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 296; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 32–33.
For the form of a sentenza, see Codice di procedura civile art. 132. The three types of court decisions are the ordinanza, the sentenza, and the decreto. The sentenza is the most formal and complex. It is used for a final judgment in ordinary proceedings and for many important orders. The decreto is the type of final order used in many special proceedings, particularly those conducted ex parte. Codice di procedura civile art. 135.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 180–190.
Codice di procedura civile art. 180, para. 1; Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 83 Ws.
Codice di procedura civile art. 180, para. 2; arts. 126, 130. Largely because of lack of funds, stenographers and recording machines are not available to the courts. For a comparison of American transcripts and Italian Processi verbali, see A. P. Sereni L’importanza del processo verbale dell’udienza giudiziaria, in A. P. Sereni, Studi di diritto comparato, I Diritto degli Stati Uniti 469 (Milano, Giuffrè 1956).
Codice di procedura civile art. 163 (7). See 7.08.d supra.
Neither this hearing nor subsequent hearings in the proof-taking stage are open to the public. The parties and their lawyers, however, may always attend. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 84.
The rules discussed here concern parties who have made an appearance and who are absent from the hearing. If no appearance has been made, the party is in contumacia. On contumacia, see 11.01–11.08 infra. On the consequences of absence, see 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 68–71.
For the distinction between dismissal (estinzione) and cancellation from the docket, see 11.23 infra.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 75–80. See 5.01–5.25 supra.
See 7.14–7.15 supra.
This is a marked improvement over the contrary result reached under the old code. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario al codice di procedura civile (part I) 79 (Milano, Vallardi 1960); 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 71, 73; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 42–43. It is unclear whether the giudice istruttore may exercise the powers granted to him by Article 182 even after the first hearing. Some scholars believe that he may, but the Corte di cassazione seems to be of a contrary view. Maraboli v. Uboldi, Corte di cassazione, Aug. 21, 1952, No. 2715, CV Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 1) col. 610 (holding, by implication, that when a party is improperly represented and the defect is not timely cured, the proceeding must be dismissed). See 2 S. Satta, supra, at 81; 2 C. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 43.
The prohibition against the new claims also extends to counter-claims, but not to setoffs. For this distinction, see 4.21 supra; F. Carnelutti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 8, at 207; Mangione v. Purromuto, Corte di cassazione, July 29, 1959, No. 2436, Repertorio Foro italiano, heading: Riconvenzione No. 13 (1959) (counterclaims may not be introduced after the proof-taking stage has developed, but if the plaintiff fails to protest, the court must rule on the counterclaim). The distinction between emendatio libelli and mutatio libelli gives rise to many uncertainties. See, e.g., Soc. Rhodiatoce v. Soc. Grillon, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 20, 1959, No. 2980, Repertorio Foro italiano, heading: Procedimento in materia civile No. 222 (1959) (in an action for declaratory relief regarding the propriety of plaintiff’s introduction into Italian commerce of goods produced under alleged patent rights, plaintiff may later allege additional patent rights); O.N.C. v. Comune Cancello, Corte di cassazione, July 9, 1959, No. 2204, Massimario Giustizia civile 749 (1959); Ditta Anello v. Giumelli, Corte di cassazione (sez. un.), Oct. 23, 1956, No. 3850, VI Giustizia civile (part I) 2002 (1956) (in action for breach of employment contract brought by employee, employer may not, at the conclusion of proof-taking, introduce counterclaim for employee’s failure to account). In general, the courts have held that a change in the legal or factual basis for relief (causa petendi) does not constitute the introduction of a new claim. However, they have disfavored changes in the prayer for relief (Petitum). In a recent decision, the Corte di cassazione broke away from the tendency to treat a mere increase in the amount of money claimed as the introduction of a new claim. Giovannetti v. Colarelli, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 19, 1955, No. 121, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Procedimento civile No. 198 (1955). There are countless decisions turning on the distinction between mutatio and emendatio libelli that are not always easily reconciled. For example, it has been held that an allegation that a will was defective in form could be changed to an allegation that the testator was incompetent. On the other hand, it has also been held that an action for the recovery of goods could not be changed to an action for a recovery of goods different from those specified in the citation. For a discussion of these and other cases, see Rassegna di giurisprudenza sul libro secondo del codice di procedura civile 98, 103 et seq. (Milano, Giuffrè, M. Stella Richter & A. Torrente eds. 1960). See also F. Carnelutti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 8, at 207–08; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 45; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 45 et seq.; G. Giannozzi, La modificazione della domanda nel processo civile (Milano, Giuffrè 1958).
Gargano v. D’Alba, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 17, 1958, No. 81, VIII Giustizia civile (part I) 450 (1958) (although there is no explicit legislative authorization, claims that are a direct consequence of claims and defenses already propounded may be introduced); 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 79.
See cases collected in Rassegna, cit. supra note 32, at 101.
See Mangione v. Purromuto, cit. supra note 32. See also cases collected in Rassegna, cit. supra note 32, at 114.
Codice di procedura civile art. 183, para. 2; art. 117.
Codice di procedura civile art. 117. The personal appearance of the party (comparizione personale or interrogatorio libero), like the similar French comparution personnelle, may also have evidentiary value, although it is primarily designed to clarify the allegations. See 8.44 infra. See generally M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6 passim. Unfortunately, the courts have made little use of the opportunity provided by Articles 117 and 183, para. 2. 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 10, at 49.
Regrettably, this is not always done. See 2 V. Andrioli, op. cit. supra note 19, at 81–82; 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 70–71 n. 31.
Codice di procedura civile art. 185.
Codice di procedura civile art. 84, para. 2; Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 88.
See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 190; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 85–86.
Codice di procedura civile art. 184.
For an example of a defense that is precluded, see Codice di procedura civile art. 38, para. 3 (objection to territorial competence is normally precluded if not made in the defendant’s answer).
See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 188.
See 7.09 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 184; art. 92, para. 1.
See 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 79.
See E. T. Liebman, Figure e forme delta rimessione della causa al collegio, VI Rivista di diritto processuale (part 1) 298 (1951).
Codice di procedura civile art. 187, paras. 2, 3. Typical issues that may dispose of a case in its entirety are those relating to the statute of limitations, giurisdizione, and competence. In practice, the judge will submit the case to the panel on a preliminary issue only when he considers the defense to be reasonably well-founded and when the evidence on the issue may be taken separately from the evidence on the other issues. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 48–49; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 92–93. For other grounds of remittance, see 9.01 infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 189, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 189, para. 2.
However, if the panel resubmits the case to the proof-taking judge, modification of claims and addition of defenses are again possible. Chiefari v. Ministero del Tesoro, Corte di cassazione (sez. un.), Dec. 2, 1959, No. 3487, Massimario Giustizia civile 1180 (1959); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 47, 59.
On this oral argument and its limited importance, see 9.02 infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 190, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 190, para. 2.
For general treatments of evidence and proof-taking, see F. Carnelutti, La prova civile (Roma, Ateneo 2d ed. 1947); P. Calamandrei, Il giudice e to storico, in V. P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 27 (Padova, Cedam 1947); id., Verità e verosimiglianza nel processo civile, in VI ibid. 111 (Padova, Cedam 1957); V. Andrioli, Prova in genere (diritto civile), X Nuovo Digesto italiano 813 (Torino, UTET 1939); A. Giuliani, Il concetto di prova (Milano, Giuffrè 1961). For further bibliography, see G. Laserra, La prova civile 9–12 (Napoli, Jovene 1957). For a collection of cases, see F. S. Gentile, La prova civile (Roma, Jandi Sapi 1960).
See 7.26 supra.
e.g., Codice di procedura civile arts. 240, 241. See 8.23, 8.24 infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 187, para. 4. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 51; id., Figure e forme, op. cit. supra note 48, at 304.
Codice di procedura civile art. 279, para. 4.
Codice di procedura civile art. 280, para. 3.
Fazzolari v. Pellicano, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 16, 1950, No. 402, Repertorio Giuris-prudenza italiana, heading: Procedimento civile No. 182 (1950).
Codice di procedura civile art. 281.
See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 34.
See 6.01 supra. On the damaging consequences of this misevaluation, see V. Andrioli, Atti dell’ “incontro,” cit. supra note 4, at 235–36.
See M. Cappelletti, Studio del diritto e tirocinio professionale in Italia e in Germania 27–28, 79 et seq. (Milano, Giuffrè 1957). Spanish transl., Estudio del derecho y tirocinio profesional 41, 129 et seq. (Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América 1959).
B. Kaplan, A. T. von Mehren & R. Schaefer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1237.
Codice di procedura civile art. 115, para. 1.
In the inferior courts, the pretore and the conciliatore may, on their own motion, call as witnesses persons, referred to by the parties, who seem to be in a “position to know the truth.” Codice di procedura civile art. 317, para. 1. Even wider latitude is given in labor cases, in which there is no limit on the competent witnesses the court may call on its own motion. Codice di procedura civile art. 439, para. 1. For other exceptions, see note 330 infra.
On the broad powers of judges in those states, see 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 504, 644, 660–61, 767, 798 and materials there cited.
See, e.g., 1 E. M. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 60 (Philadelphia, American Law Institute 1957); C. T. McCormick, Evidence 12, 503 (St. Paul, West 1954); 2 E. C. Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence 333–34 (St. Paul, West 1956).
See 8.40 infra.
Common law litigants have broad powers of discovery. At least in the United States, they may examine their adversaries in examinations before trial and may obtain production of documents or other tangible things “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b), 30.
See 8.49 infra.
See generally P. Calamandrei, Per la definizione del fatto notorio, 2 P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 289 (Padova, Cedam 1930). An important influence on Italian doctrine has been F. Stein, Das private Wissen des Richters (Leipzig, Hirschfeld 1893). Closely related to this rule is article 97 of the Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile, which provides that judges may neither receive information about a case privately nor accept memoranda not submitted through the clerk’s office. However, a judge may disqualify himself and give testimony. Codice di procedura civile art. 51.
Codice di procedura civile art. 115, para. 2. See generally P. Calamandrei, Per la definizione, op. cit. supra note 75; E. Allorio, Osservazioni sul fatto notorio, XI Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part II) 3 (1934); G. R. Pistolese, La prova civile per presunzioni e le cd. massime di esperienza (Padova, Cedam 1935); C. Leone, Contributo allo studio delle massime di esperienza e dei fatti notori, X Annali della Facoltà di Economia e Commercio dell’ Università di Bari (nuova serie) (1950); G. de Stefano, Il notorio nel processo civile (Milano, Giuffrè 1947).
The principle that notorious facts need not be proved is expressed in the maxim: notoria non egent probatione. Carnelutti defines a notorious fact as one that is known to the citizens at the time and place of the decision. The following decisions are illustrative of notorious facts: Martone v. Riunione Adriatica Sicurtà, Corte d’appello, Napoli May 30, 1945, LXIX Foro Italiano (part 1) col. 416 (1944–46) (the uprising in Naples in September 1943); Soc. Villa v. Ditta Confalonieri & Gallina, Corte di cassazione, July 17, 1952, No. 2254, Repertorio Giurisprudenza italiana, heading: Prova in genere (materia civile) No. 4 (1958) (the fact and degree of monetary devaluation in the postwar period); Cassa di Risparmio di Treviso v. Piovan, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 12, 1953, No. 63, LXXVI Foro Italiano (part I) col. 1 (1953) (the hatred of the working classes toward certain of the Fascist leaders after the liberation). Courts have also noticed the notorious financial troubles of a local bank and the topography of the center of a city. See 1 V. Andrioli, Lezioni di diritto processuale civile 176 (Napoli, Jovene 2d ed. 1961); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 80.
The court may also notice custom and usage to the limited extent that these are sources of positive law, but it is not obliged to do so without proof. Disposizioni sulla legge in generale arts. 1, 8, 9. See P. Calamandrei, Diritto consuetudinario in cassazione, XV Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part II) 120 (1938); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 79; G. A. Micheli, “Jura novit curia,” XVI Rivista di diritto processuale 575, 590 (1961). A similar rule governs judicial notice of foreign law. See 15.23 infra.
Although the court may apply a rule of law different from the one relied on by the plaintiff, it may not grant relief different from that asked for. Codice di procedura civile art. 112. See 9.06 infra. See also Musi v. Tincalla, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 25, 1960, No. 2896, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Sentenza, ordinanza e decreto in materia civile No. 135 (1960); Baldini v. Soc. Missori, Corte di cassazione, Nov. 13, 1959, No. 3352; id. No. 141 (1959) (both holding that courts may adopt theories different from those advanced by the parties, providing that the relief granted does not go beyond the relief demanded).
In criminal cases, the court may acquit a defendant either as “not guilty,” or, under Codice di procedura penale art. 479, para. 3, “for insufficiency of evidence.”
It is generally asserted that only controverted allegations need be proved. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 77. Contra, 1 V. Andrioli, Commento al codice di procedura civile 246, 340 (Napoli, Jovene 3d ed. 1954). This principle, criticised by 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 88–90, 348, has many exceptions. An allegation not controverted because of the default or absence of a party must be proved. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 46; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 74. Also, in cases involving non-dispositive rights, non-controverted allegations must still be proved. See cases collected in VI Rassegna di giuris-prudenza sul codice civile 65–66 (Milano, Giuffrè, M. Stella Richter editor, 2d ed. 1957). The better view seems to be that an uncontroverted allegation is not proved conclusively, but that the court may regard a failure to controvert an allegation as evidence of the truth of the allegation. See 1 M. Cappelletti, loc. cit.
See generally G. A. Micheli, L’onere della prova (Padova, Cedam 1942); G. P. Augenti, L’onere della prova (Roma, Foro Italiano 1932); P. Saraceno, La decisione sul patto incerto nel processo penale (Padova, Cedam 1940). In Anglo-American law, the term burden of proof is used to describe two different burdens. One is the “burden borne by the party who will lose the issue unless he satisfies the tribunal of fact to the appropriate degree of conviction, and is aptly termed the ‘risk of non-persuasion’ by Wigmore.” R. Cross, Evidence 63 (London, Butterworth 1958). The Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, Rule 1, calls this the “burden of persuasion of a fact.” See 1 E. M. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 71, at 19. The other “is the burden of producing sufficient evidence to justify a finding in favor of the party who bears it,” and must be met to permit the case to go to the jury. R. Cross, supra, at 63–68. The Model Code of Evidence, Rule 1, calls this the “burden of producing evidence of a fact.” See 1 E. M. Morgan, supra, at 19–26. In the Italian non-jury system, this distinction does not exist. Italian law is concerned only with the risk of non-persuasion. Even in the Italian system, however, the question of whether the burden of proof has been met is considered in two stages. Unless the panel decides to hear the evidence itself or to remand the case to the examining judge for the further taking of evidence, the examining judge decides when to close the proof-taking stage, thus preventing the introduction of further evidence. In taking that decision, he makes a preliminary evaluation of whether the burden of proof has been met. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 79–80, 99.
In contradistinction, in jury systems, a jury frequently ignores the rules concerning the burden of proof explained to it by the judge.
On the use of these maxims in the common law, see 1 E. M. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 71, at 17–29.
The burden of proof rests on him who affirms, not on him who denies.
If the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is absolved.
By raising an “exception” the defendant becomes the plaintiff.
For an example of the use of this terminology, see Codice civile art. 2697.
See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 81, 83. Since the question of who has the burden of proof is dependent on the applicable rule of substantive law, it would seem that, for conflict of laws purposes, it raises a problem of substantive rather than procedural law. However, the courts do not so hold. See Anglo Iranian Oil Co. v. SUPOR, Tribunale Roma, Sept. 13, 1954, Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 2) col. 19 (holding that the lex fori governs the burden of proof and rebuttable presumptions, because they are procedural). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 89–90; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 83, 171; G. Morelli, Diritto processuale civile internazionale 37 (Padova, Cedam 2d ed. 1954) (with citations both ways). Logically enough, the recent tendency in American cases has been to apply the burden of proof rule of the lex causae. See 1 E. M. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 71, at 28.
See Soc. “I due Forni” v. De Chirico, Corte di cassazione, April 21, 1956, No. 1220, Massimario Giustizia civile 418 (1956) (holding that the allocation of the burden of proof is unnecessary once the court is fully convinced of the facts, no matter which party furnished the evidence upon which that conviction is based). See also 1 V. Andrioli, Lezioni, op. cit. supra note 77, at 181; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 82,85,102; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 75–76 (pointing out certain exceptions to the rule set out in the text); 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 356, 392–93 (with other references).
See generally M. Cappelletti, Ueccezione come controdiritto del convenuto, XVI Rivista di diritto processuale 266 (1961); id., 1 La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 48 et seq., 328 et seq., esp. 339 et seq.
For exceptions to this rule, see M. Cappelletti, Ueccezione, op. cit. supra note 91, at 270 et seq.
See note 90 supra.
Modern Italian writers call these “defenses in proper sense” (eccezioni in senso proprio) and “defenses in improper sense” (eccezioni in senso improprio). These terms correspond to the German terms Einreden and Einwendungen. See generally G. Chiovenda, Sulla “eccezione,” in 1 G. Chiovenda, Saggi di diritto processuale civile 149 (Roma, Foro Italiano 1930); id., 1 Istituzioni di diritto processuale civile § 13 (Napoli, Jovene 2d ed. reprint 1956); V. Denti, L’eccezione nel processo civile, XV Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 22(1961).
Codice civile art. 2938.
If the fact that extinguishes a right is a notorious fact, such as supervening impossibility because of war, the judge may consider the defense on his own motion even without an allegation to that effect. However, if private dispositive rights or exceptiones juris are created by notorious facts, such facts must be alleged by the party. This, at least, is the solution supported by the modern writers. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 350–51. For a statement of this problem in American law, see 1 E. M. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 71, at 9 n. 18 and accompanying text.
See 1 G. Chiovenda, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 94, at 297 et seq.
Codice civile arts. 1236 et seq.
Codice civile arts. 1230 et seq.
Codice civile art. 1257.
Codice civile arts. 1414 et seq.
Codice civile arts. 2934 et seq.
Codice civile arts. 1241 et seq.
Codice civile arts. 1425 et seq.
See 1.33.b supra. The jury system of the common law made impractical any attempt to create binding rules for the evaluation of evidence. Instead, many exclusionary rules were formulated to prevent jurors from considering relevant evidence that was deemed unworthy of faith. See R. W. Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 22–23 (Law Center of New York University 1952). While the common law for the last century and a half has been modernizing its rules of evidence by eliminating rules of exclusion, the civil law has been eliminating both rules that predetermine abstractly the weight of evidence and exclusionary rules.
Codice di procedura civile art. 116, para, 1 reads: “The court must evaluate the evidence in accordance with its prudent judgment, except as otherwise provided by law.” This provision does not give the court power to weigh the evidence arbitrarily. The court must explain in the judgment the reasons why it accepted or rejected the evidence offered. A failure to explain sufficiently or a contradictory explanation is a ground for review in Cassazione. Codice di procedura civile art. 360 (5). See Dal Moro v. Lucchetta, Corte di cassazione, Dec. 10, 1959, No. 3515, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova civile in genere No. 102 (1960) (a party may not seek review in the Corte di cassazione on the ground that the facts were improperly decided below; however, he may seek review on the ground that the court below did not explain its factual determination).
See generally 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6. See also 8.19 (admissions), 8.22 (party oaths), 8.32–8.33 (testimony) infra.
There are rules of exclusion, such as those similar to the statutes of frauds of common law systems. See 8.16 infra. There is also a limitation on the ways in which evidence may be introduced; for example, cross-examination is not allowed. Codice di procedura civile art. 253, para. 2.
On the evaluation of conflicting evidence, see G. De Stefano, Collisione di prove civili (Milano, Giuffrè 1951). Modern Italian scholars generally maintain that the rules of evidence are an integral part of the rules of procedure. See G. Chiovenda, La natura processuale delle norme sulla prova e Vefficacia della legge processuale nel tempo, in I G. Chiovenda, Saggi di diritto processuale civile 241 (Roma, Foro Italiano 1930); G. Morelli, Diritto processuale civile inter-nazionale 36 (Padova, Cedam 2d ed. 1954); E. T. Liebman, Norme processuali nel codice civile, III Rivista di diritto processuale (part I) 154 (1948); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 70–72; C. Furno, Confessione (diritto processuale civile), VIII Enciclopedia del diritto 873 (Milano, Giuffrè 1961). Contra, F. Carnelutti, Tutela dei diritti, XX Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part I) 3 (1943); S. Satta, Diritto processuale civile 153, 208 (Padova, Cedam 6th ed. 1959). The problem is of practical importance in determining whether in conflicts cases the rules of evidence of the lex fori are to be applied. Article 27 of the Disposizioni sulla legge in generale, providing that procedure is governed by the lex fori, is generally interpreted to include the rules of evidence within the term procedure. G. Morelli supra, at 34 et seq., 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 74. The problem was the subject of discussion at an international congress held at Venice in April 1962. See G. Balladore Pallieri, L’ammissibilità dei mezzi di prova nel diritto internazionale privato (Milano, Giuffrè 1962). On legal evidence, see generally C. Furno, Contributo alla teoria della prova legale (Padova, Cedam 1940). The rules of legal evidence are not fully applicable to proceedings in which non-dispositive rights are in issue. In such proceedings, admissions against interest are not binding on the court [C. Fumo, Confessione (diritto processuale civile), VII Enciclopedia del diritto 895 (Milano, Giuffrè 1961)], party oaths are not permitted, and formal interrogatories are of doubtful propriety. For the opinion that formal interrogatories are not permitted in such proceedings, see M. Cappelletti, Efficada di prove illegittimamente ammesse e comportamento delta parte, VII Rivista di diritto civile 566 (1961); C. Marchetti, Ammissibilità dell’ interrogatorio formale della parte in funzione liberamente probatoria, CXIV Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 2) 541 (1962).
Codice civile art. 2712. A type of primitive record known as taglie or tacche di con-trassegno, in use in certain environments where illiteracy is prevalent, will not be discussed. On this type of record, see Codice civile art. 2713.
Codice civile arts. 2699–2701.
Codice civile arts. 2701–2708.
Codice civile arts. 2701–2708.
Codice civile arts. 2709–2711. Bookkeeping entries, including account books of enterprises that are subject to registration, may be used by anyone as evidence against the enterprise. However, if so used, entries favorable to the enterprise are also considered as evidence. All such evidence may be weighed freely by the courts. Account books, if in the form provided by law and if the necessary tax stamps are affixed, may be used in evidence against other business enterprises, but not against persons not in business. Such evidence is not legal proof; that is, it may be weighed freely by the court. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 248 et seq. (with historical and comparative references); 2 E. T. Lieb man, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 116–17; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 118; Soc. V.I.S. v. Comit. ital. Petroli, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 24, 1955, No. 3466, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documentale, No. 57 (1955).
Codice civile art. 2699.
See 8.10 infra.
On private writings, see generally G. Laserra, La scrittura privata (Napoli, Jovene 1959) (and bibliography at 343–47). A private writing is a document signed by someone other than a notary or other public official authorized to give the document an official character. Although it must usually be signed, the text may be written by mechanical means or by persons other than the author. See cases cited in VI Rassegna di giurisprudenza sul codice civile, directed by R. Nicolò, edited by M. Stella Richter 75–77 (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. 1957). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 111. In many instances, a signature is not necessary. For example, on telegrams (8.12 infra), household papers and registries (Codice civile art. 2707), notes of payment made by a creditor in the margin of a document proving his credit (Codice civile art. 2708), and bookkeeping records (note 113 supra).
See, e.g., Curato v. Lupi, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 19, 1957, No. 3980, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documentale, No. 3 (1957) (a public act is proof “of the statements made by the parties and not of the conformity to the truth of the circumstances that were the subject of the statements”). See also 2 V. Andrioli, Commento al codice di procedura civile 154 (Napoli, Jovene 3d ed. 1956); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 111–112, 114–15. In contrast to the prevailing common law rules, the Italian rule in effect grants any writing a presumption of authenticity. On the common law rules, see C. T. McCormick, op. cit. supra note 71, at 395–96. The archaic common law rules on the subject have been mitigated by pre-trial procedures such as notices to admit and pre-trial conferences. C. T. McCormick, supra at 396–97.
Codice civile art. 2700.
Nor is the document conclusive proof of conclusions recited by the notary. For example, if the notary has stated that the parties were of sound mind or were competent to enter into the transaction recorded, his conclusions may be contested by any type of evidence, and no special proceeding is required to disprove them. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 10, at 109–111; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 315–16.
A private writing that has not been disavowed is deemed “recognized.” See 8. lO.b infra.
Codice civile art. 2702.
See Molinari v. Chiesa, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 27, 1956, No. 3989, Massimario Giustizia civile 1361 (1956) (An actual or presumed recognition of a private writing proves conclusively that the person who appears to have signed it made the statements contained therein, but not that the statements were true. This means that the parties may contest the truthfulness of the contents of the writing by any type of evidence and that the court may freely evaluate the contents together with other elements of the case).
See 8.19 infra.
See generally V. Denti, La verificazione delle prove documentali (Torino, UTET 1957).
See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni del processo civile italiano 75 (Roma, Foro Italiano 5th ed. 1956); 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part 1), op. cit. supra note 31, at 199; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 128; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 158. A querela di falso must be confirmed at the first hearing by the party himself or by his attorney pursuant to a special power of attorney. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 99, para. 1.
A querela di falso served in the course of a proceeding is an example of a collateral issue discussed at 4.21.e supra. The party who has sought to introduce the document is given an opportunity to withdraw his offer of evidence after his adversary has served a querela di falso. Codice di procedura civile art. 222. On the two kinds of querele di falso, see Codice di procedura civile art. 221. Two kinds of lack of genuineness may be raised: (1) The document may have been altered or forged (falsità materiale); (2) the public official may have falsely stated that certain things were said to him or happened in his presence (falsità ideologica). See generally F. Carnelutti, Teoria del falso (Padova, Cedam 1935); A. Malinverni, Teoria del falso documéntale (Milano, Giuffrè 1958). The preparation of a falsified document usually constitutes a crime. Codice penale arts. 255, 476–493.
Codice di procedura civile art. 221, para. 3. This indicates the public interest involved in such a proceeding. The law is interested in preserving the reliability of documentary evidence. The proceeding itself is quasi-criminal in nature and may lead to an actual criminal proceeding. If the pubblico ministero is not joined, the decision may be attacked by ordinary forms of attack as well as by the extraordinary means of revocazione. Codice di procedura civile arts. 158, 161, 397. See 10.09 infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 221, para. 2; Franzi v. Soc. Cartiere Pigna, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 29, 1957, No. 325, VII Giustizia civile (part 1) 1790 (1957); 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 154–55.
San Mauro v. Caropreso, Corte di cassazione, June 20, 1951, No. 1631, Repertorio Giurisprudenza italiana, heading: Falso civile. No. 12 (1951) (any evidence, including testimony, may be used to show falsity of document).
Compieta v. Lucchetti, Corte di cassazione, July 9, 1947, No. 1092, Repertorio Giurisprudenza italiana, heading: Falso civile, No. 22 (1947–48) (circumstantial evidence may be relied on to show that content of document was forged over an authentic signature); 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 158; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 130.
Codice di procedura civile art. 9. If a querela di falso is served during the course of a proceeding before a pretore or a conciliatore, the rules set out at 4.2l.e supra are applicable. If the proceeding is before a court of appeal, the appellate proceeding is suspended (if the appellate court deems the document relevant) and the case is remanded to the tribunal. Codice di procedura civile art. 355. If the case is before the Corte di cassazione, the provisions of Article 355 have been held applicable by analogy. See cases cited in Rassegna di giurisprudenza sul libro secondo del codice di procedura civile (tome 1) directed by M.Stella Richter and A.Torrente 240 (Milano, Giuffrèl960). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 133; 2 S. Satta, Commentario, op. cit. supra note 31, at 199; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 153; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 128.
Codice di procedura civile art. 226 (roughly $6.50 to $65.00).
Codice di procedura civile art. 226.
Codice di procedura civile art. 226; Codice di procedura penale art. 480.
Codice di procedura civile art. 214.
Codice di procedura civile art. 215. If the party against whom the document is introduced into evidence is in contumacia, the document is also deemed recognized as genuine. However, there is a possibility of a belated attack by parties who have failed to appear. Codice di procedura civile art. 293, para. 3. See 11.06 infra. Whenever the law allows a copy of a document to be introduced into evidence in place of the original, the examining judge, on the application of a party, may grant additional time for the party to examine the original of the document to decide whether he wishes to contest its genuineness. See Codice di procedura civile art. 215, para. 2; 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 72; 2 V. Andrioli, op. cit. supra note 19, at 144.
Codice civile art. 2702; Codice di procedura civile art. 216. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 66, 213. However, it has been held that when a party admits the authenticity of his signature, but claims that the text of the document is forged, the burden is on him to show the forgery by serving a querela di falso. Mazzotti v. Vitale, Corte d’appello, Roma, Jan. 9, 1957, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documéntale, No. 36 (1957).
See Vitali v. Soc. Ind. Materiali Edili, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 18, 1956, No. 3699, VI Giustizia civile (part I) 1816 (1956); 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 180.
Unlike a proceeding initiated by a querela di falso, this proceeding is decided by the court before which the proceeding on the merits is pending rather than always by a tribunal. See note 131 supra-, 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 180–81.
Codice di procedura civile art. 216. A separate action is typically brought in cases involving reliance on the probative force of a private writing in recording a lien. See, e.g., Codice civile arts. 2657, 2835; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 215; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 127. But see 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 183.
Codice di procedura civile art. 219.
However, such documents must be offered, or at least indicated to the court, by the party who offered the contested document in evidence. Codice di procedura civile art. 216, para. 1.
The genuineness of handwriting may also be tested with the use of any other type of evidence. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 72; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 145–46; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 125. If a party refuses to give a sample of his handwriting under dictation, or if he refuses to produce for a comparison of handwritings the documents that the court, on motion of his adversary, has ordered him to produce, the court may consider the genuineness of the document admitted. See Codice di procedura civile art. 219; 2 F. Carnelutti, supra, at 73; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 214; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, supra, at 150; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, supra, at 125–26.
Codice di procedura civile art. 220, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 220, para. 2 (roughly $3.25 to $65.00).
Codice civile art. 2703.
See, e.g., 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 143, 145.
Codice civile art. 2704. The date of an unauthenticated private writing may be contested without a special proceeding. Between the parties to a private document, there is no limitation on the type of evidence that may be introduced to show the actual date. See Landoni v. Paradisi, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 22, 1959, No. 3022, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documentale, No. 13 (1960). In relation to third persons, however, the date of a document may not be considered established except from the date of an event that clearly proves the antecedent existence of the document, such as the date of the document’s registration or the death of one of the signers. In short, the parties to the document must prove the truth of the date as to creditors and other third persons by convincing evidence. See Sorlini v. Trevisan, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 22, 1959, No. 3024, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documentale, No. 15 (1959). See generally E. Redenti, Frammenti da “La prova della data riguardo ai terzi,” in 2 E. Redenti, Scritti e discorsi giuridici di un mezzo secolo 223 (Milano, Giuffrè 1962).
The rules of evidence governing telegrams are contained in Codice civile arts. 2705–2706.
Codice civile art. 2712. Some authors maintain that even uncontested mechanical reproductions do not constitute conclusive evidence, but are freely to be weighed by the courts. 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (part I), op. cit. supra note 3, at 118; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 110, at 118. While this position may be a praiseworthy attempt to restrict the scope of legal proof, it seems to contrast with the wording of article 2712.
Codice civile art. 2714. For a discussion of the types of public records and of officials who may make copies, see 15.08–15.09 infra. For the special proceeding to compel a public official to issue a copy of a public record, see 13.16 infra.
Codice civile art. 2715.
Codice civile art. 2719; Porcella v. Soc. Microtecnica, Corte di cassazione, March 22, 1952, No. 782, Massimario Giurisprudenza italiana col. 221 (1952).
Codice civile art. 2718.
The same rule is applicable to statements, made by third persons, that are recorded in public acts. See Del Fabbro v. Venier, Corte di cassazione, July 27, 1956, No. 2902, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documentale, No. 25 (written statements made by third persons outside a proceeding, even if recorded by a public official, do not have the value of testimonial evidence). But see 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 70.
Such writings have the value of circumstantial evidence (prova indiziaria), which may be the basis of a judgment if supported by other evidence. Natale v. Società Farmac. Picena, Corte di cassazione, Dec. 18, 1956, No. 4455, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Documento e prova documentale, No. 23 (1956); Cimma v. Mazzola, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 22, 1956, No. 3814, ibid. No. 24; Pettini v. Mirabile, Corte di cassazione, March 13, 1956, No. 737, ibid. No. 22; Faedi v. Fall. Calisesi, Corte di cassazione, Nov. 17, 1960, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova civile in genere, No. 89 (1961); Sarocco v. Cielo, Corte di cassazione Sept. 5, 1960, No. 2422, and Fanchini v. Ballerin, Corte di cassazione, July 16, 1960, No. 1956, both in Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova civile in genere, Nos. 92–93 (1960). See also 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 116.
See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 123–24.
An incomplete list is contained in Codice civile arts. 1350–1351.
Codice civile art. 2725, para. 1; art. 2729, para. 2. However, it may be proved by admissions made in the proceeding or by a decisory oath. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 72; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 352. The same is not true of acts that are void if not in writing. Codice civile art. 2739, para. 1; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 163.
Codice civile art. 1888.
Codice civile art. 1967.
See 8.33 infra.
Codice civile art. 2725. The Corte di cassazione has held that testimonial evidence is admissible to clarify the intention of the parties expressed in a document that is essential to the validity of a legal act. Scicali v. Floresta, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 22, 1955, No. 540, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile, No. 56 (1955). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (part I), op. cit. supra note 3, at 164.
See 8.49 infra.
See 11.10 infra.
Codice civile art. 2730. See generally V. Andrioli, Confessione (diritto processuale civile), IV Novissimo Digesto italiano 10 (Torino, UTET 1959); C. Furno, Confessione (diritto processuale civile), VIII Enciclopedia del diritto 870 (Milano, Giuffrè 1961); G. Messina, Contributo alla dottrina della confessione (written in 1902), in 3 G. Messina, Scritti giuridici (Milano, Giuffrè 1948). An admission must be of facts, not of the legal qualification of those facts. Often, however, facts are admitted together with a legal conclusion in such phrases as “I purchased” or “I received payment.” Such admissions are conclusive evidence of the facts, but not of their legal qualifications. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 138–39; V. Andrioli, supra, at 15; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 133; C. Furno, supra, at 886–87.
See generally A. Diana, La confessione giudiziale net processo civile, LIII Giuris-prudenza italiana (part IV) col. 81 (1901); L. Montesano, In tema di confessione giudiziale, XXIX Giurisprudenza completa della Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezioni Civili (1st quadrimestre) 312 (1950).
See generally C. Furno, Accertamento convenzionale e confessione stra-giudiziale (Firenze, Sansoni 1948); V. Panuccio, La confessione stragiudiziale (Milano, Giuffrè 1960).
See Codice civile arts. 2730–2735. The rule is sometimes tempered by holdings that the court is not bound by an admission that is clearly false or impossible. See C. Fumo, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 890; 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 406 n. 21 (with historical and comparative references). The tendency in Europe and in the common law is to cut down the binding effect of admissions. See references in 1 M. Cappelletti, supra, at 208, 254–55, 402–03, and volume 2, at 448–49, 477, 529–31, 594–99, 637–40, 706–07, 735–36, 746, 769, 783, 788–89.
Codice civile art. 2731. Not only must the party have capacity, but the right must be a dispositive one and must be within the power of disposition of that party. See C. Furno, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 876, 883–84.
Admissions made by a party’s attorney either in writing or orally in court do not have the effect of party admissions, but may be weighed freely by the court. See C. M. de Marini, Ammissione (diritto processuale civile), II Enciclopedia del diritto 242 (Milano, Giuffrè 1958); 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 47; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 141–42; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 218; C. Furno, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 881, 914; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 74, 135–36; V. Andrioli, Confessione, op cit. supra note 166, at 19. See also Colussi v. Zuppani, Corte di Cassazione, Feb. 12, 1960, No. 222, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Confessione in materia civile, No. 7 (1960) (a statement in an attorney’s writing presented to the court may not be considered a binding admission unless it was signed by the party himself). On the right of an attorney or of his client to retract an admission made by the attorney, see cases discussed in VI Rassegna cit. supra note 81, at 66 sub No. 131.
Codice civile art. 2735, para. 1; Berra v. Pittaluga, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 18, 1960, No. 2813, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Confessione in materia civile, No. 17 (1961).
Codice civile art. 2735, para. 2. On matters that may not be proved by testimonial evidence, see 8.33 infra; 8.16 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 229. The Corte di cassazione, in numerous decisions, has held that an admission made in a citation is binding on the plaintiff. The prevailing view of the scholars is to the contrary. See references in V. Andrioli, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 19. Since a citation is usually signed by an attorney rather than by the party he represents (Codice di procedura civile art. 125), it would seem that an admission made in a citation should be treated as evidence that the court may weigh freely. See note 171 supra.
On formal interrogatories, see 8.21 infra. An admission made in another proceeding is not conclusive evidence, but evidence that may be weighed freely. See Puzzili v. Padroni, Corte di cassazione, June 10, 1961, No. 1355, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Confessione in materia civile, No. 9. See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 142. Contra, in part, V. Andrioli, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 16–17; C. Fumo, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 885–86.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 228, 229.
Codice di procedura civile art. 228.
See at notes 171, 174 supra. See also C. Furno, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 875; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 141; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 170, 172; id., Confessione, op cit. supra note 166, at 16.
That is, by showing that the party erroneously believed the statement to be true. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 140, 143; V. Andrioli, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 13–14, 19–20; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 133–34. An admission made in the erroneous belief that it would have no legal effect is nonetheless a binding admission.
It is immaterial whether the violence was done by the adversary or a third person. Codice civile art. 1434 (by implication).
Note 166 supra.
Note 166 supra.
See 5.08 supra.
Codice civile art. 2733, para. 3; Pedetta v. Calzoni, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 15, 1961, No. 325, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Confessione in materia civile, No. 11 (1961). This rule stems from the requirement that the same decision be rendered toward all parties who are joined together by necessity. Moreover, since necessary joinder implies a community of interest, none of the parties has the power to dispose of the right in issue alone.
Codice civile art. 2734.
This is an example of a complex admission — one that is coupled with statements of facts that change the legal consequences of the facts admitted. See A. Diana, La confessione, op. cit. supra note 167, at col. 168; E. Betti, Diritto processuale civile italiano 342–43 (Roma, Foro Italiano 2d ed. 1936); C. Furno, Appunti in tema d’indivisibilità della confessione, LXIII Foro italiano (part I) col. 1036, 1046–48 (1938).
These are two examples of qualified admissions. They admit an adversary’s allegation of fact, but give it a different legal qualification. See A. Diana, La confessione, op. cit. supra note 167, at col. 169; E. Betti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 186, at 342; C. Furno, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 186, at cols. 1046–47.
The rule was expressed in maxims such as: “Confessio qualifica ta non est dividenda, sed vel tota reicienda, vel tota acceptanda.” See references in F. G. Lipari, Sulla indivisibilità della confessione, II Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part I) 127, 132 et seq. (1925), and in A. Diana, Note, XXVIII Foro italiano (part I) col. 282, 284 et seq. (1903).
See 1.33.b supra; see also M. Cappelletti, Ideologie nel diritto processuale, XVI Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 193, 195–199 (1962), Spanish transl., Ideologias en el derecho procesal, LVIII Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Administración 85, 86–89 (Montevideo 1962).
code civil art. 1356 states that an admission... “fait pleine foi contre celui qui l’a fait... il ne peut être divisé contre lui.”
For historical and comparative references, see 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 254–55, and in vol. 2 at 595, 789. Article 1360, para. 1, of the Codice civile of 1865 provided that an admission could not be divided.
Qualified and complex admissions are made more frequently than “simple” or “pure” admissions. See C. Furno, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 906.
See C. Furno, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 877. This rule conforms to the modern tendency mentioned at note 169 supra.
Since a party is an incompetent witness, his knowledge of the facts can be obtained only through spontaneous admissions, formal interrogatories (provoked admissions), party oaths, and informal interrogatories. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 240 et seq., on the use of the term “party testimony.”
It has been held that the answers to interrogatories favorable to the party who gave them may be used by the judge as “indicia of proof,” which have a lesser value than ordinary evidence since indicia may not usually support a judgment without additional evidence. However, these holdings still represent a minority view. The majority view is that the court may not rely on answers favorable to the party who gave them. The minority view is supported by 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 224. See also G. Laserra, Interrogatorio (diritto processuale civile), VIII Novissimo Digesto italiano 914, 919 (Torino, UTET 1962). The minority view has found favor in the following decisions: Galliano v. Bassignana, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 17, 1953, No. 3418, XXIII Massimario Giuris-prudenza italiana col. 754 (1953); Soc. Athena Cinematografica v. Pizzi, Corte di cassazione, June 4, 1960, No. 1450, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Interrogatorio in materia civile No. 3 (1960). Contra, 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 222. On the common origin, but different purpose, of interrogatories in the common law and the Italian systems, as well as on similar institutions in France and Spain, see 2 M. Cap-pelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 426, 480, 551, 774. See also 1.31.b supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 230, para. 1.
The interrogatio per positiones of medieval law was administered under oath, but the oath has been abolished in most European systems. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 197, and vol. 2 at 563, 774–75. In Spain and in some Latin American countries, interrogatorios de posiciones are still administered under oath. Leading Spanish language writers are severely critical of this antiquated institution. See E. J. Couture, El juramento previo a la absolución de posiciones, in II E. J. Couture, Estudios de derecho procesal civil 281 (Buenos Aires, EDIAR 1949).
On the success of the reform, see 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 785–789, esp. 786 n. 36 (references to French authors).
See 8.44 infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 230, para. 2.
For an example of doubtful propriety, see note 109 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 230, para. 3. The judge does not have inquisitorial power, but is strictly limited to the line of questioning prepared by the moving party. His own initiative may be used only to clarify vague or ambiguous answers.
He may not appoint an agent to answer for him. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 223–24; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 174; id., Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 18–19; G. Laserra, op. cit. supra note 195, at 916. If the party is an incompetent or a corporation, a legal representative may answer the interrogatories, but only if the rights in issue are within his power of disposition. Codice civile art. 2731. See also note 171 supra; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 221; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 174; id., Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 17–18; C. Fumo, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 883; Sanna v. Comune Salorussa, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 26, 1959, No. 218, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Confessione in materia civile No. 10 (1959).
Codice di procedura civile art. 232, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 232, para. 2.
See generally E. Allorio, Il giuramento della parte (Milano, Giuffrè 1937); F. Carnelutti, Natura del giuramento, II Rivista di diritto processuale (part I) 183 (1947); C. Fumo, Natura giuridica del giuramento e liberta di valutazione giudiciale, I Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 362 (1947); V. Andrioli, Giuramento (diritto civile e diritto processuale civile), VII Novissimo Digesto italiano 943 (Torino, UTET 1961); M. Cappelletti, Giuramento (dir. civ. e dir. proc. civ.), III Enciclopedia Forense 965 (Milano, Vallardi 1958). For a critique of this archaic institution, see E. Allorio, supra, and M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, passim. See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 149; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 139.
See M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op cit. supra note 6, passim.
Codice civile art. 2736 (1).
The cases uniformly so hold. Most of the writers are in accord. Contra, 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 76; 2 S. Satta, op. cit. supra note 31, at 227 et seq.
Codice civile art. 2737. Although this article speaks only of competence to make the challenge or to refer the oath back to the challenger, there is near unanimity in holding that the party taking the oath also be competent to dispose of the right in issue. See M. Cappelletti, Il giuramento delta parte net processo litisconsortile, IX Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 1151, 1178 (1955); id., Efficada di prove illegittimamente ammesse e comportamento della parte, VII Rivista di diritto civile 556, 572 (1961); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 139.
Admissions are also effective only if made by competent parties. See 8.19 supra. If a party is incompetent or a corporation, the legal representative may take the oath, but only if the representative has the power of disposition as to his principal’s right. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 157–58; M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 974.
Codice civile art. 2739, para. 1.
Codice civile art. 2900. See 5.06 supra.
See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 234.
A fatto illecito is generally defined as any negligent or intentional act or omission that causes unjust damage. Codice civile art. 2043. The term includes tortious conduct as well as non-performance of contract obligations. In the context of party oaths, its meaning has been restricted by the courts to include only acts involving moral turpitude. However, the recent tendency has been to give the term its ordinary meaning even in the context of party oaths. See Freddi v. Besson, Corte di cassazione, Aug. 9, 1960, No. 2344, LXXXVI Foro italiano (part I) col. 301 (1961) (holding that the term must be interpreted in its widest sense to include not only violations of public policy and morals). According to a minority view, the term involves only violations of the criminal law. On these problems, see 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 3, at 153; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 949–50. See also Coin v. Coin, Corte di cassazione, Nov. 9, 1961, No. 2599, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 22 (1961). The illegal act must be the act of the party who has been challenged to take an oath. Lacilla v. Di Palma, Corte di cassazione, June 7,1960, No. 1493, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 11 (1960). This rule seeks to prevent putting a party into the dilemma of either perjuring himself or confessing illegal conduct. See E. Allorio, Il giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 155 et seq.; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 235; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 949.
See 8.16 supra. However, a party oath as well as testimony and other evidence may be used to prove that the contract was in writing, but was lost without fault. See V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 949 n. 7; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 153. Moreover, if the law requires a writing as evidence of the contract (ad probationem tantum) rather than as an essential element of the contract, a party oath is admissible to prove the contract. See 8.16 supra. De Marinis v. Trasacco, Corte di cassazione, July 8, 1961, No. 1642, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 25 (1961).
A public act may be attacked only by a querela di falso. See 8.10 supra.
Codice civile art. 2739, para. 2. The code speaks of “fatto proprio della parte.” This is interpreted to mean a fact in which the party took part or which he personally saw happen. See M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 972–73 and case there cited.
See M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 969. However, certain authors maintain that any relevant fact may be the subject of an oath. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 64. See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 151, 152, 156.
Codice di procedura civile art. 177, para. 1. See 8.02 supra.
On the issue of revocability, see M. Cappelletti, Ritrattazione del giuramento delta parte e revoca dell’ordinanza ammissiva del giuramento, XXII Annali della Università di Macerata 223 (1958) and references there cited. See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 156 n. 58, 157; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 954, 958; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 138, 142, 143.
See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 224.
2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 138; Salina v. Peruzzi, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 27, 1961, No. 2430, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 55 (1961). On the general problem of improperly admitted evidence, see M. Cappelletti, Efficacia di prove, op cit. supra note 210, at 556 et seq.
See E. Allorio, Il giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 39–40, 116–21, 151–56, 205–09; M. Cappelletti, La “miseria” del giuramento, CXII Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 1) col. 1064, 1068 (1960); id., Ritrattaz., op. cit. supra note 221, at 237; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 138; Guglielmi v. Guglielmi, Corte di cassazione, July 20, 1960, No. 2032, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 27 (1960).
Codice di procedura civile art. 233, para. 2.
See 8.21 supra.
See, e.g., 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 60, 62.
Codice di procedura civile art. 233, para. 1. A challenge may also be made during the proof-taking stage of an appeal or upon remand from a review in the Corte di cassazione. Codice di procedura civile arts. 345, para. 1; 394, para. 3. See also V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 951.
Codice di procedura civile art. 233, para. 1. Although the law is silent, the same rule applies to a reference back of a challenge (8.22.c infra) or to the acceptance of a challenge. See M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 973; Grandini v. Raparelli, Corte di cassazione, July 6, 1961, No. 1621, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile, No. 32 (1961).
Recent cases are cited by V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 951–52 and by M. Cappelletti, Ritrattazione, op. cit. supra note 221, at 245. See also Ormezzano v. Gatti, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 25, 1961, No. 2367, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 1 (1961). The reason for this rule is the superiority (in law, if not in logic) of this type of evidence over any other proof, including admissions. However, a party may expressly subordinate his challenge to the inadmissibility or insufficiency of his other evidence. See V. Andrioli, supra, at 952 and references there cited, as well as E. Garbagnati, Sulla revocabilità dell’ordinanza ammissiva di giuramento decisorio a prestazione avvenuta, XII Foro pad ano (part I) col. 567, 570 (1957); Guanciarotta v. Bellelli, Corte di cassazione, Dec. 29, 1955, No. 3965, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 1 (1955); Erasmo v. Grippa, Corte di cassazione, Aug. 5, 1961, No. 1911, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 3 (1961).
Codice di procedura civile art. 234. The reference back must occur before the challenged party accepts the challenge. A challenge or a reference back is irrevocable after acceptance. Codice di procedura civile art. 235. However, if the court modifies the statement to be sworn to, as it may to eliminate vagueness and to make the statement truly decisive, the challenger may revoke the challenge before the oath is taken. On the power of the judge to modify the statement of facts to be sworn to, see 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 63; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 156; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 947, 952.
On the formalities of a reference back, see note 229 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 237; see V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 953–54; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 141.
Codice di procedura civile art. 238. If the party taking the oath changes the wording of the statements he is challenged to swear to, the oath is deemed not to have been taken, unless the change is a purely verbal one that does not affect the sense of the statement. Giardina v. Trígona, Corte di cassazione, July 26, 1961, No. 1820, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 47 (1961); 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 65; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 158; M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 974. See also 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 225. Contra, V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 956–57 (oath is deemed not to have been taken if there is any change in wording).
See E. Allorio, Il giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 39 et seq. passim; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 153; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 137–38; M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 969.
Judgments obtained by fraud, or based on evidence that has subsequently been proved to be false, are normally subject to reopening (revocazione). Codice di procedura civile art. 395 (1), (2). See 10.09 infra. The same is not true of judgments obtained by a perjurious party oath. Codice civile art. 2738, para. 1; see 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 153–54; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 954; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 138; M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 977. Moreover, if the perjurer is convicted, the party oath is incontrovertible, even if the civil case should be pending on appeal or in the Corte di cassazione.
Codice penale art. 371, para. 1, provides for imprisonment from six months to three years.
Codice civile art. 2738, para. 2. Damages will be calculated on the basis of the loss suffered through total or partial defeat in the civil action in which the perjury occurred. M. Cappelletti, Efficacia probatoria libera del giuramento e risarcimento del danno, VIII Rivista di diritto processuale (part II) 81 (1953); V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 954–55. See also M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 977–78. If the perjurer cannot be convicted because of his death, an amnesty, or for other reasons, a civil court, in deciding an action for damages, may find that perjury was committed. Although compensation may be awarded for damages resulting from a perjurious party oath, the judgment in the case in which the perjury occurred retains its res judicata effect.
See V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 944, who points out the contrast between the disfavor with which legal scholars regard party oaths and the frequency of their use in practice. The large number of reported decisions in the subject indicates the frequency of, and the complexity of the problems arising from, the use of the party oath. See M. Cappelletti, La “miseria” del giuramento, op. cit. supra note 224, at 1064, et seq.
Many legal instruments are subject to a stamp or registration tax. If the required tax is not paid, contracts, receipts, and the like, subject to the tax, may not be produced in evidence until the tax, together with penalties, is paid. See P. Calamandrei, II processo civile sotto Vincubo fiscale, III P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 75, 87–89 (Padova, Cedam 1934); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 150; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 954.
Codice penale art. 42, para. 2, provides that, except as specifically provided by law, no one may be punished for a crime (delitto) if the act was not done wilfully (con dolo). However, there is a category of offenses (contravvenzioni) that are punishable even in the absence of wilful conduct, to which perjury does not belong. Codice penale art. 42, para. 4.
Codice civile art. 2738, para. 2; see M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 979–80.
Codice di procedura civile art. 239, para. 1.
See 8.21 supra.
It has been argued that there are other instances. See M. Cappelletti, Il giuramento delta parte, op. cit. supra note 210, at 1174; followed in 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 154 n. 52. See also Guglielmi v. Guglielmi, cit. supra note 224, holding that a party oath may be weighed freely by the court after the ordinanza admitting it has been revoked; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 954 n. 3.
The challenge may neither be directed to only one of several defendants, nor be referred back to only one of several plaintiffs, since the power to dispose of the right in issue belongs to all of them jointly. See M. Cappelletti, Il giuramento, op. cit. supra note 210, at 1151 et seq., esp. 1173 et seq.; id., La “miseria,” op. cit. supra note 224, at 1065, followed in 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 154 n. 52; V. Andrioli, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 947–48; F. S. Gentile, La prova civile 598 (Roma, Jandi Sapi 1960). Contra, V. Denti, Interrogatorio formale di parte non legittimata a confessare, CXII Giurisprudenza italiana (part. I, sec. 2) col. 865 (1960). See also M. Cappelletti, Efficacia, op. cit. supra note 210, at 567 et seq., replying to the arguments of V. Denti.
See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 257 et seq.
The court may choose freely which party will be asked to take the oath. It is not necessary that the party chosen have the burden of proof. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 63–64; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 74; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 142.
A decisory oath may be ordered whether or not any other evidence has been introduced. See 8.22 supra.
See P. Calamandrei, Verità e verosimiglianza nel processo civile, VI P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 111 (Padova, Cedam 1957).
It continues to be controvertible in France. See 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 791–92.
See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 231; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 151, 154; V. Andrioli, Giuratnento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 957–58; E. Allorio, Efficacia del giuratnento suppletorio, I Rivista di diritto processuale (part II) 129 (1946); Boggio v. Bandini, Corte di cassazione, Dec. 29, 1960, No. 3321, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuratnento in mat. civile No. 29 (1960). For other references, see M. Cappelletti, Giuratnento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 969. Although there is much uncertainty in the decisions and among the writers, it would seem that if the ordinanza admitting the oath is revoked, a supplementary oath may be treated as evidence that may be weighed freely. Note 245 supra. Frequent grounds of revocation are a later finding by the court either that there was sufficient evidence to decide the case without the oath or that there was insufficient evidence to justify the taking of the oath. See Taglialatela v. Pasquali, Corte di cassazione, April 14, 1961, No. 797, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuratnento in mat. civile No. 9 (1961); Huber v. Nodinelli, Corte di cassazione, May 24, 1961, No. 1222, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 17 (1961).
Codice di procedura civile art. 242.
Codice di procedura civile art. 240. 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 10, at 142; M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 972.
Codice civile art. 2736, para. 2. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 142; M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 974–75; Calandruccio v. Barilà, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 31, 1959, No. 309, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Giuramento in mat. civile No. 6 (1959).
Codice di procedura civile art. 241.
Certain secondary types of party oaths have not been discussed in the text. They are the “necessary oath” (jusjurandum necessarium) of article 2960 of the Codice civile (see note 276 infra), the oath concerning a joint indebtedness of article 1305 of the Codice civile, and the oath in accounting matters of article 265 of the Codice di procedura civile. On these oaths, see M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 975–76.
See generally V. Gianturco, La prova indiziaria (Milano, Giuffrè 1958). The text simplifies Italian views. In Italy, the term “presumption” refers not only to a rule such as: “A possessor who now has possession and who has had possession in the distant past is presumed also to have had possession in the intermediate period” (Codice Civile art. 1142), but also to the reasoning process by which the conclusion that intermediate possession existed is drawn from proof of present and past possession. In Italy, circumstantial evidence is not the precise equivalent of a presumption, but only an element to be used in the process of presuming; that is, the known fact (indizio) from which an unknown fact may be deduced.
Codice civile art. 2727 defines presumptions as “consequences that the law or the court draws from a known fact to arrive at an unknown fact.” See generally F. Carnelutti, Presunzione, X Nuovo Digesto italiano 333 (Torino, Utet 1939); A. Coniglio, Le pre-sunzioni NEL processo civile (Palermo, La Celere 1928); E. Protetti, Presunzione, V Enciclopedia forense 826 (Milano, Vallardi 1960); R. Sacco, Presunzione, natura costitutiva o impeditiva del fatto, onere della prova, III Rivista di diritto civile (part I) 339 (1957).
See F. Carnelutti, La prova civile 118 (Roma, Ateneo 2d ed. 1947); V. Andrioli, Prova in genere (diritto civile), X Nuovo Digesto italiano 813, 822 (Torino, Utet 1939); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 87; 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 91–94.
See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 58; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 90; 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 118.
Codice civile art. 2727, quoted at note 259 supra. Sometimes, the latter are also called praesumptiones judicis, because the deduction is made by judges rather than by law. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 58; Giannantoni v. Crocione, Corte di cassazione, Sept. 7, 1948, No. 1584, XLIX Repertorio Giurisprudenza italiana, heading: Presunzioni No. 2 (1947–48) (the court must take legal and simple presumptions into account on its own motion; however, the evidence that is necessary before a presumption may operate must be introduced in the normal manner, that is, usually, by one of the parties).
Codice civile art. 2728, para. 2.
Codice civile art. 2728, para. 1. For a characterization of legal presumptions as “relics of medieval logic,” see 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 158.
See 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 10, at 158; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 216, 358.
See Galli v. Soc. Ferrovie Nord Milano, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 26, 1950, No. 453, LII Repertorio Giurisprudenza italiana, heading: Presunzioni No. 7 (1950) (circumstantial evidence may rebut a presumption imposed by law).
Codice civile art. 4.
Codice civile arts. 231–232. This presumption is conclusive, except in the limited instances provided for by article 235 of the Civil Code.
Codice civile art. 880, para. 1.
Codice civile art. 1142.
Codice civile art. 1147, para. 3. On various presumptions of good faith, see R. Sacco, La presunzione di buona fede, V Rivista di diritto civile (part I) 1, 250 (1959).
Codice civile art. 1199, para. 2. For some of the other presumptions relating to obbligazioni, see Codice civile arts. 1184, 1521, 1709, 1767.
Codice civile arts. 2954–2956. See also M. Cappelletti, Giuramento, op. cit. supra note 206, at 975–76.
Codice civile art. 2954.
Codice civile art. 2959.
Codice civile art. 2960. See P. Calamandrei, Sul giuramento cosiddetto necessario, in V. P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 217 (Padova, Cedam 1947).
Codice civile arts. 2946–2953.
Many authors hold that even rebuttable presumptions are rules of substantive law. See generally 1 G. Chiovenda, Istituzioni di diritto processuale civile 85 (Napoli, Jovene 2d ed. 1935) and vol. 2, at 331, 468 (Napoli, Jovene 2d ed. 1936); 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 58–59; G. Morelli, op. cit. supra note 109, at 38; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 88, 90; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 72, 158. Contra, E. Allorio, Limiti del diritto processuale internazionale, XIII Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part II) 255, 259 (1936).
Anglo Iranian Oil Co. v. SUPOR, cit. supra note 89.
This is one of the remnants of the medieval rules of evidence, which viewed with suspicion the ability of judges to arrive at the truth through empirical data and preferred to provide mechanical standards. See 1.33.b supra.
Codice civile art. 2729, para. 1. The courts have given this a narrow interpretation. Although the wording of this provision which requires that the items of circumstantial evidence be consistent (concordanti), implies that a fact can be proved only by more than one item of circumstantial evidence, the courts have held consistently that a single item of circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. See Scan v. Genovese, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 20, 1961, No. 374, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Presunzioni in materia civile No. 9 (1961). For other case citations, see VI Rassegna, cit. supra note 81, at 116–17. Moreover, the Corte di cassazione has held that circumstantial evidence, as prova libera, may be evaluated freely and that there is no hierarchy of values among the different types of evidence that may be so evaluated. Thus, a court may base its decision entirely on circumstantial evidence. See M. Cappelletti, “Questioni” nuove nelle comparse conclusionali, ed efficacia probatoria “sussidiarià” dell’interrogatorio libero, CVIII Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 1) col. 671, 672 (1956).
Codice civile art. 2729, para. 2. For situations in which testimonial evidence is not admissible, see 8.33 infra. It has been held that the many exceptions to the rules that exclude testimonial evidence are also applicable to circumstantial evidence. De Lithewsks v. Agamen-noni, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 18, 1960, No. 2808, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Presunzioni in materia civile No. 11 (1960). For other cases, see VI Rassegna, cit. supra note 81, at 121.
On testimony generally, see V. Andrioli, Prova testimoniale (diritto civile), X Nuovo Digesto italiano 838 (Torino, Utet 1939).
Out of court oral or written statements are admissible, but not as testimony. See 8.15 supra. See also 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 278, stating that the presence of the judge is an essential for the taking of testimony. Actually, in some tribunals, such as the Naples tribunal, because of the overcrowded docket, the judge may be absent while the lawyers, who sometimes prepare the records themselves, conduct examinations.
Parties give oral evidence when answering interrogatories and taking party oaths, but both the giving and evaluation of such evidence differ from the giving and evaluation of ordinary testimony. The term “party testimony” is not used in legislation and is rarely used by the writers. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 240 et seq. and passim.
Experts ordinarily do not testify. They are considered “technical consultants” to the court and usually submit their opinions in writing. However, an expert may testify to facts he has witnessed. For example, a physician may testify as to the injuries his patient has sustained. Codice di procedura civile art. 61–62, 191–201. See, e.g., Tagliaferro v. Azienda tranv. Milano, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 11, 1961, No. 306, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 1 (1961); 2 P. Calamandrei, Istituzioni di diritto processuale civile 164 etseq. (Padova, Cedam 1943); V. Denti, Testimonianza técnica, XVII Rivista di diritto processuale 9 (1962); G. Franchi, La perizia civile 55–56 (Padova, Cedam 1959); F. Carnelutti, Testimonianza e perizia, XIV Rivista di diritto processuale 186 (1959). See also 8.48 infra.
See 1.33.b supra. The rule providing for free evaluation does not permit arbitrary or unreasoned evaluation. The Corte di cassazione may reverse if the lower court’s evaluation is arbitrary or if it has failed to explain why it found one version of the facts rather than another to be accurate. Carlini v. Castrigiano, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 30, 1960, No. 140. Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 89 (1960). See alse note 106 supra.
On the admissibility of hearsay (de auditu) testimony, see 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 69–70; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 162; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 258, 285; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 146. See also 8.15 supra.
A witness, must limit himself to facts and not express opinions. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 70; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 209; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 146. However, in the context of his narration of facts, a witness may make normal observations and deductions that are related to those facts. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 161–162; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 257–58, 276–77; V. Denti, Testimonianza tecnica, op. cit. supra note 286, at 12 et seq. See also the rule laid down in Saracini v. Pittoni, Corte di cassazione, July 23, 1960, No. 2123, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 99 (1960) (“When a witness refers to an impression he had, he does not express a judgment or a forbidden opinion, but reconstructs his own observations in their entirety. Such references to the immediate mental reactions of the witness may well serve in forming the conviction of the court as to the facts, since they do not constitute present opinions but rememberances of past events.”)
The exclusion applies not only to parties in a narrow sense of that term, but also to legal representatives of incompetents and corporations. Codice di procedura civile art. 75, paras. 2, 3. See 5.03, 5.04 supra; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 166; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 263; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 199; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 146–47. It is doubtful whether a partner or a shareholder is competent to testify in actions involving the partnership or the corporation. See the authors cited supra. It is also in doubt whether an attorney for one of the parties may testify. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 260–61 (incompetent); 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 199 (competent); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 148 (competent).
Most of the writers and some courts have interpreted this provision very narrowly. For an analysis of the various positions, see 2 E. T. Lieb man, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 167 and 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 265. The majority of the cases as well as E. Allorio and P. D’Onofrio, following the literal wording, hold that any person who may intervene is incompetent to testify. See Ghio v. Genzato, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 15, 1960, No. 2764, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 69 (1960). Redenti, Satta, and Liebman favor excluding as incompetent witnesses only those persons who could intervene to support the defense of one of the parties (such as a guarantor). According to Carnelutti and Andrioli and 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 148, such potential intervenors are competent, but all other potential intervenors are incompetent witnesses. See 5.08 supra.
These exceptions are based on the rationale that usually there will be no other persons familiar with the facts. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 227; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 31, at 168.
Codice di procedura civile art. 247. Relatives or in laws in a collateral line are competent. Codice civile art. 75. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 227; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supranote 31, at 268 (see court decision there cited). For a criticism, based on a comparative and historical study, of the disqualifications specified in articles 246 and 247, see M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, passim, esp. vol. 1, at 229 et seq. (pointing out that these disqualifications have been removed in most modern procedural systems). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 167; A. Torrente, Panorama di giurisprudenza della cassazione (primo quadrimestre 1962), VIII Rivista di diritto civile (part II) 351, 364 (1962); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 148. The Corte di cassazione has held on more than one occasion that, although testimony taken in violation of articles 246 and 247 is void and may not be relied on by the court, objections by the interested party to such testimony are waived if not presented at the first opportunity. See references in 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 267; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 168 n. 72; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 205; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supranote 10, at 149–50. See also Vergesi v. Tarasco, Corte di cassazione, July 8, 1961, No. 1638, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 53(1961); Sanna v. Feie, Corte di cassazione, June 19, 1961, No. 1441, ibid. No. 54.
Codice di procedura civile art. 248. They are therefore not subject to prosecution for perjury. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 270. For comparative references, see 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 382.
For a discussion of provisions requiring a writing as an essential element, or as exclusive proof, of a legal act, see 8.16 supra.
See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 165 et seq. and vol. 2, at 792 et seq.
The rule also excludes proof by testimony of payment or waiver of a debt. Codice civile art. 2726.
Codice civile art. 2721, para. 1. This sum has not been increased to take account of post-war inflation. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 151.
The discretionary power nevertheless to admit testimony is granted by Codice civile art. 2721, para. 2. The courts have held that the rule does not exclude testimony to prove fraud, duress, violence, mistake, or incompetence in contracting. Nor may the exclusionary rule be applied to the detriment of third persons. See Soc. Meccanica it. v. Malaisi, Corte di cassazione, March 8, 1960, No. 445, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 17 (1960). Testimony is always admissible to clarify or to interpret the meaning of the contract. See Pigureddu v. Pes, Corte di cassazione, April 18, 1961, No. 842, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 15 (1961). In addition, the courts have held that reliance on the rule may be waived by the parties. See Salvotti v. Oberhofer, Corte di cassazione, March 18, 1961, No. 620, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 7 (1961). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 164; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 151, 153; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 350, No. 57.
On this preference, see 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 162, 163. Underestimation of oral, as opposed to written, evidence characterizes systems of procedure that are not governed by the principles of immediacy, concentration, and orality. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 111 et seq., 134 et seq. On the other hand, common law systems show “a clear tendency to give greater value to oral evidence.” A. P. Sereni, Principi generali di diritto e processo internazionale 29 (Milano, Giuffrè 1955). See also R. W. Millar, Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, in A. Engelmann and others, A History of Continental Civil Procedure 52, 57 (Boston, Little Brown 1927); H. A. Hammelmann, Aspetti del diritto probatorio anglosassone, I Jus 381 (1950).
Codice civile art. 2722 (compare with parol evidence rule of common law systems).
Codice civile art. 2723.
See M. Battaglini, Appunti sul concetto di principio di prova per iscritto, X Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 562 (1956). Perhaps illogically, but not unjustly, the courts have held that oral admissions made by an attorney in the course of an action constitute sufficient “written” evidence for the admission of testimony. On the effect of such admission generally, see note 171 supra. Oral answers by a party to an interrogatory have also been held to be sufficient “written” evidence to justify admission of testimony under this provision. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 152 and case references in VI Rassegna, op. cit. supra note 81, at 104–05. For similar decisions in France, see 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 783–85.
“Moral impossibility” to obtain a writing exists in the case of contractual arrangements that are not at arms’ length and would not ordinarily be reduced to writing because of the relationship between the parties. For example, moral impossibility may result from the attorney — client or family relationship. F. Gentile, La prova civile 352 (Roma, Jandi Sapi 1960).
Codice civile art. 2725.
See, e.g., 4 R. A. Frosali, Sistema penale italiano 262 (Torino, Utet 1958). Codice di procedura penale art. 351, para. 1.
Codice di procedura penale art. 352, para. 1. This rule creates a prohibition rather than a privilege. 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 271; V. An-drioli, Prova testimoniale, op. cit. supra note 283, at 859.
Codice di procedura penale art. 352, para. 2.
The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code of 1930 both reflect to a much greater extent than the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code the fascist political system. See 1.39 supra. See also J. C. Adams & P. Barile, The Government of Republican Italy 143–46 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1961).
Codice penale arts. 616–621. The freedom and secrecy of correspondence are also guaranteed by the Constitution, subject, however, to the right of the courts to order production or inspection pursuant to law. Constitution art. 15. See generally V. Italia, Libertà e segretezza della corrispondenza e delle comunicazioni (Milano, Giuffrè 1963).
Codice penale art. 622.
Codice penale art. 623. Some courts have held that, although not explicitly required by law, a bank secret may also be invoked in the civil courts. Other decisions have held that the courts’ power to obtain relevant evidence cannot be frustrated by reliance on a bank secret. See generally G. D. Pisapia, II segreto istruttorio net processo penale 178 (Milano, Giuffrè 1960); A. Crespi, Segreto bancário e poteri istruttori del giudice civile, XXIV Banca, Borsa e Titoli di credito (part II) 406 (1961); C. Giannattasio, Le fonti del segreto bancario e i suoi limiti specie nei confronti dell’Autorità giudiziaria, CVI Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 2) col. 783 (1954); L. Montesano, In tema di tutela del segreto bancario nel processo civile, XVIII Banca, Borsa e Titoli di credito (part II) 243 (1955); S. La China, L’esibizione delle prove nel processo civile 224–25 (Milano, Giuffrè 1960); A. Crespi, La tutela penale del segreto 176 et seq. (Palermo, Priulla 1952).
Caso Mercurio, Corte di cassazione (penale, sez. I), March 3, 1950, Giustizia penale 634 (1950); Caso Spreafico, Tribunale Lecco, March 29, 1958, LXIII Giustizia penale (part III) 888 (1958); G. Leone, Lineamenti di diritto processuale penale 338 (Napoli, Jovene 4th éd. 1956).
Codice Pen ale arts. 261–262 define the crimes of revelation of state secrets and of classified information. These crimes may also be committed by persons who are not public officials and, thus, not protected by the privileges of article 352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
F. Cordero, Prove illecite nel processo penale, XII Jus 68, 81 (1961); A. Crespi, La tutela, op. cit. supra note 312, at 149 et seq.
4 C. Lessona, Trattato delle prove in materia civile 215 (Firenze, Cammelli 1916); 3 V. Manzini, Trattato di diritto processuale penale italiano 227 (Torino, Utet 1932); Caso Nigrelli, Corte di cassazione, May 29, 1954, LIX Giustizia penale (part III) 524 (1954) (attorneys may waive their privilege).
See F. Cordero, op. cit. supra note 315, at 81; A. Crespi, La tutela penale, op. cit. supra note 312, at 87–97; M. Cappelletti, Efficada di prove, op. cit. supra note 210, at 556, 557–58 (1961).
Vigo v. Formenti, Corte d’appello, Milano, April 5, 1934, XII Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part II) 63 (1935) (stating, however, that the evidence would be admitted if the party offering it could have obtained an order for its production or inspection) (approving note, F. Carnelutti).
Caso Egidi, Corte di cassazione, (penale, sez. I), Dec. 14, 1957, I Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale 564, 576 (1958) (approving note, G. Conso).
P. Barile, Il soggetto privato nella costituzione italiana 218 (Padova, Cedam 1953). M. Cappelletti, Efficada di prove, op. cit. supra note 210, at 557–58, also draws a comparison between these provisions and their counterparts in the United States Constitution. See also M. Pisani, Nuovo contributo alla teoria della caducazione nel diritto processuale penale,bollettino dell’Istituto di diritto e procedura penale dell’Università di pavia 67, 73, 76 et seq. (1960–61).
For extensive criticism, see M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, passim, esp. vol. 1, at 121–279, with comparative and historical references.
See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 163 n. 63.
See 8.50.e infra. See also A. P. Sereni, L’importanza del processo verbale, op. cit. supra note 24, at 469.
The risk of misinterpreting the statements of a witness is increased each time an intermediary steps in. The record of the case read by the adjudicating panel has passed through the mental processes of the examining judge who summarizes it, and through the clerk who may not necessarily be adept at taking dictation. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 134 et seq.
Codice di procedura civile art. 126, para. 2.
For justified criticism of this rule, see 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 162–63. See also F. Carnelutti, Il testimonio, questo sconosciuto, XII Rivista di diritto processuale 177 (1957); A. P. Sereni, Aspetti del processo civile negli Stati Uniti, in A. P. Sereni, 1 Studi di diritto comparato 341–42 (Milano, Giuffrè 1956); 2 V. An-drioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 190; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 150–51.
Unless the examining judge grants a specified additional time, a party, if he does not indicate at the first hearing or in the first document filed after his adversary has submitted a request for the taking of testimony his wish to produce rebuttal testimony, is barred from requesting it. Codice di procedura civile art. 244, paras. 2, 3. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 66–67. Contra, 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 255, who cites cases in support of his position that there is no penalty if a party fails to make a timely request for rebuttal testimony. However, these cases have been disapproved explicitly by Marca v. Fall. Mazzucchelli, Corte di cassazione, May 10, 1961, No. 1102, Repertorio Foro italiano, heading: Prova testimoniale No. 43 (1961) (a party who failed timely to indicate rebuttal witnesses is precluded) and implicitly by other recent cases, such as Fanchini v. Ballerin, July 16, 1960, No. 1956, ibid. Nos. 43–44 (1960). Although Codice di procedura civile arts. 163(5) and 167, para. 1, providing that requests for the taking of evidence must be made in the initial pleadings, do not exclude later requests, strict adherence to the rules governing rebuttal testimony is justified by the desirability of placing all elements of an evidentiary issue at one time before the judge who must rule on the admissibility of the direct and rebuttal evidence offered. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 66–67. The rule that testimonial evidence may be taken on an issue of fact only once provides a further reason for the more rigid rules that apply to rebuttal testimony. 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 170; Vigorelli v. Soc. Viglienzone, Corte di cassazione, June 27, 1961, No. 1543, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 26 (1961).
Codice di procedura civile art. 244, para. 2. Rebuttal testimony is usually divided into two categories: direct rebuttal testimony which tends to prove the contrary of the facts testified to by the witnesses who testified on direct; and indirect rebuttal testimony, based on other facts that tend to contradict or explain away the facts testified to by the adversary’s witnesses. See Vigorelli v. Soc. Viglienzone, Corte di cassazione, June 27, 1961, No. 1543, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 26 (1961).
2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 170; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op cit. supra note 19, at 191.
See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 226; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 254; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 153. This rule is subject to at least three important exceptions, the first two of which are given at note 69 supra. The third exception is provided for in article 257 of the Codice di procedura civile which provides that, if a witness refers to other persons who are likely to know the facts, the examining judge may call persons on his own motion. The examining judge may also call on his own motion, (1) witnesses whom he had at first refused to call as superfluous, (2) witnesses whose testimony had been waived by the parties, and (3) witnesses who were heard before, but whose testimony is needed to clarify prior testimony or to correct irregularities. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 285.
Codice di procedura civile art. 244, para. 1. This rule has been intepreted rather liberally. See Comune Padova v. Pavanato, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 3, 1961, No. 222, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova testimoniale civile No. 39 (1961) (all details of the facts sought to be proved need not be described; it is sufficient if the description is detailed enough to allow the adversary to exercise his right of rebuttal and to allow the judge to relate it to the claim and defenses of the parties).
Codice di procedura civile art. 253, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 253, para. 2. The parties may request that a specific question be put to the witness. On the relation between these rules to the alleged inquisitorial nature of Italian civil procedure, see 8.04.b supra. Despite the degree to which the Italian judge is tied to party formulation of the subject of the examination, the Italian system has been termed inquisitorial even in Italy. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 276.
See F. Carnelutti, Il testimonio, op. cit. supra note 326, at 178; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 163 n. 63; A. P. Sereni, Aspetti, op. cit. supra note 326, at 341–42.
Incompetent witnesses may not be heard, and the examining judge has discretionary power to forego the hearing of witnesses whose testimony will be only repetitive. Codice di procedura civile art. 245, para. 1. The judge may also make more precise the statements of facts on which the witnesses are to be examined and eliminate ambiguities and irrelevant and captious statements. However, he may not add facts on which the witnesses are to be heard. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 67; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 226; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 154.
Once a motion for the taking of evidence has been granted, the right to have it taken belongs to both parties. This rule is described as the principle of “procedural acquisition.” See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 227; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 171; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 195; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 154.
Codice di procedura civile art. 245, para. 2. However, the judge may retract his consent. See note 330 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 250. If the interested party fails to make the request, he waives his right to have the witness examined. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 104. The witness is summoned by a document known as an intimazione, improperly also called citazione. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 227. Contra, 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 272 (upholding the propriety of using the term citazione). It must normally be served on the witness at least three days before the hearing at which he is to appear. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 103.
Codice di procedura civile art. 255, para. 1. On the nature of the duties of a witness, see 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 168; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 281.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 105 (cardinals and certain high state officials are exempt from appearing in court).
Codice di procedura civile art. 255, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 255, para. 2.
See 15.16–15.20 infra.
See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 274.
Codice di procedura civile art. 251. The judge first warns the witness of the religious and moral importance of an oath and of the criminal consequences of false or reticent testimony. He then reads the formula of the oath: “Conscious of the responsibility that you assume before God and man, swear to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.” The witness, standing, answers: “I so swear.” The same formula is used in criminal proceedings. Codice di procedura penale art. 449. In a decision that is subject to criticism, the Constitutional Court has held that the obligatory use of this formula is constitutional and does not interfere with the freedom of thought and conscience of non-believers. Morellato v. Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, July 13, 1960, No. 58, V Giurisprudenza costituzionale 752 (1960).
An employment relationship is not a ground of incompetence but may be considered by the court in weighing testimony. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 263.
Codice di procedura civile art. 252.
Codice di procedura civile art. 124, para. 1, governs the testimony of persons who are deaf, mute, or deaf-mute.
Codice di procedura civile art. 231, referred to by art. 253, para. 3.
Codice di procedura civile art. 254. They may then be questioned simultaneously or in turn. Satta is of the opinion that the witnesses may even question each other. 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 279.
Codice di procedura civile art. 206. The party who has requested that the witnesses be called, or his attorney, must attend. Codice di procedura civile art. 208. See 8.50.d infra. The attendance fees to which the witness is entitled are specified by the judge and must be paid by the party who requests his attendance. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 107.
Codice penale art. 366, para. 2. The crime is punishable by up to six months* imprisonment or a fine from 2,400 to 40,000 lire (approximately $4.00 to $65.00). The concept of contempt of court is unknown in Italian law.
Perjury and withholding evidence are punishable by imprisonment from six months to three years. Codice penale art. 372. See also Codice penale arts. 495–496 (relating to the crime of false identification). See further 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 68; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 275.
Codice di procedura civile art. 256.
Codice di procedura civile art. 117. See generally 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, passim, esp. 195 et seq.
Informal interrogatories have as ancient an origin as formal interrogatories. On formal interrogatories, see 8.21 supra. On the historical beginnings of informal interrogatories, see 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 547 et seq. Under the Code of 1865, informal interrogatories were known as personal appearances (comparizioni personali) and limited to commercial cases. Codice di procedura civile art. 401 (Code of 1865, repealed). “Personal appearances” were later made possible in cases before the pretori and the conciliatori (Royal Decree of Sept. 20, 1922, No. 1316, art. 5), and in disputes between employer and employee. Royal Decree of May 21, 1934, No. 1073, art. 9. The Ordonnance of 1667 of Louis XIV of France provided for the comparution personnelle only in particular cases, but the French Code de procédure civile of 1806 made it available in civil cases generally. For a detailed historical treatment, see 2 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, passim, esp. 776 et seq. (on the French comparution personnelle), 485 et seq. (on the Parteibefragung zur Aufklärung and the Parteivernehmung of German language systems). At the time the 1942 Code was enacted, leading writers hailed the broadened scope of the informal interrogatory as a reform of exceptional importance, destined to play a prominent role in civil procedure. See, e.g., 1 P. Calamandrei, Istituzioni di diritto processuale civile 215–16 (Padova, Cedam 2d ed. 1943); F. Carnelutti, Carattere del nuovo processo civile italiano, XVIII Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part I) 41 (1941); 1 M. T. Zanzucchi, Il nuovo diritto processuale civile 349 (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. 1942). However, they are now practically unanimous in their disappointment with the manner in which the informal interrogatory has been used. See, e.g., 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 51; S. Satta, Forma e sostanza nel ministero del procuratore, VIII Giustizia civile 522 (1958). For other references, see 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 16, analyzing the many reasons for its failure to achieve success.
The informal interrogatory is also for a third purpose; i.e., as a tool to aid in arranging a settlement between the parties. See 8.03.b supra.
See note 37 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 116.
The Code terminology “desumere argomenti di prova” indicates that statements and the behavior of parties may be treated as circumstantial evidence from which the court may deduce or induce the truth of the allegations of the parties. See 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 48 et seq., 77 et seq., and 261 et seq. (foreseeing an evolution of the informal interrogatory into an instrument for obtaining party testimony in the true sense of that term by interpretation).
This rule stems from the principle that admissions made in the course of a proceeding are binding only if made in answer to a formal interrogatory or if made “spontaneously” in a signed procedural paper. Codice di procedura civile arts. 228, 229. See 8.19 supra; Manganaro v. Pautò, Corte di cassazione, Sept. 11, 1958, No. 2998, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Interrogatorio in materia civile No. 13 (1958); Fall. Mannucci v. Panto, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 15, 1957, No. 3831, ibid. No. 15 (1957); 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 60; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 148; 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 341; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 135; C. Furno, Confessione, op. cit. supra note 166, at 875; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento al codice di procedura civile 235 (Torino, UTET 4th ed. 1957). But see 1 S. Satta, Commentario al codice di procedura civile 471 (Milano, Vallardi 1959); S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 222.
See P. Calamandrei, Il processo corne giuoco, in VI P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 67 (Padova, Cedam 1957); 1 M. Cappelletti, La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 93 n. 27.
Bellando v. Bellando, Corte di cassazione, July 23, 1955, No. 2380, CVIII Giuris-prudenza italiana (part I, sec. 1) col. 671, 674 (1956) (critical note, M. Cappelletti). Similar decisions are criticized in 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 339, and commented on favorably in 1 S. Satta, Commentario, op. cit. supra note 361, at 470–71. For more recent cases to the same effect see Campolo v. Campolo, Corte di cassazione, April 5, 1961, No. 718, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Interrogatorio in materia civile No. 12 (1961); Manganaro v. Pautò, cit. supra note 361; Fall. Mannucci v. Panto, cit. supra note 361. But see (judging from the condensed reports) Cimmino v. Minotti, Corte di cassazione, June 6, 1959, No. 1701, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Interrogatorio in materia civile No. 11; Improta v. Improta, Corte di cassazione, June 19, 1957, No. 2338; ibid. No. 17 (1957).
See note 281 supra.
However, they may not be ordered in proceedings before the Corte di cassazione. Bellando v. Bellando, cit. supra note 363. Informal interrogatories may even be ordered and taken after the close of proof-taking. Bassanini v. Sangalli, Corte di cassazione, May 20, 1958, No. 1665, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Interrogatorio in materia civile No. 16 (1958). See S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 221 n. 9.
For the contrasting rules relating to formal interrogatories, see 8.21 supra.
In France, before formal interrogatories were abolished, because of their greater flexibility, informal interrogatories were almost always used instead of formal interrogatories. See 2 M. Cappelletti. La testimonianza, op. cit. supra note 6, at 776 et seq.
Codice di procedura civile art. 117. An order to appear for an informal interrogatory need not be served personally on a party in default. Bellando v. Bellando, cit. supra note 363.
A party may not appoint an agent to appear for him. Sarocco v. Cielo, Corte di cassa-zione, Sept. 5, 1960, No. 2422, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Interrogatorio in materia civile No. 7 (1960); G. Laserra, Interrogatorio [diritto processuale civile), VIII Novissimo Digesto Italiano 914, 916 (Torino, Utet 1962).
They constitute neither falsa testimonianza (Codice penale art. 372), nor spergiuro (Codice penale art. 371), nor any other crime.
On the contrasting rules relating to formal interrogatories, see 8.21 supra. On those governing examinations of witnesses, see 8.40 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 116, para. 2.
See 1 V. Andrioli, Commento. op. cit. supra note 81, at 342; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento, op. cit. supra note 361, at 235. The judge may also dictate his description of the behavior and bearing of the party into the record. Codice di procedura civile art. 207, para. 3.
See generally G. Franchi, La perizia civile (Padova, Cedam 1959); M. Vellani, Consulente tecnico (diritto processuale civile), IV Novissimo Digesto italiano 335 (Torino, Utet 1959); N. Giudiceandrea, Consulente tecnico (diritto processuale civile), IX Enciclopedia del diritto 531 (Milano, Giuffrè 1961).
See 8.31 supra. See also 1 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni del processo civile italiano 118 (Roma, Foro Italiano 5th ed. 1956); 1 E. Redenti, Diritto processuale civile 130 (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. reprint 1957); 1. E. T. Liebman, Manuale di diritto processuale civile 130 (Milano, Giuffrè 1957); id., Vol 2 (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 94; 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 186–87; 1 G. A. Micheli, Corso di diritto processuale civile 166 (Milano, Giuffrè 1959); M. Vellani, Consulente tecnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 335.
See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 91, 93; 1 G. A.Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 375, at 166; id., vol. 2, op. cit. supra note 10, at 73; G. Franchi, La perizia, op. cit. supra note 374, at 56 et seq. Interpreters (Codice di procedura civile art. 122), translators (Codice di procedura civile art. 123), and appraisers (Codice di procedura civile art. 518, para. 1; art. 532, para. 2; art. 535, para. 2; art. 568, para. 3; art. 773; Disposizioni di attuazione arts. 161, 194) are also considered technical consultants. See 2 P. Calamandrei, Istituzioni di diritto processuale civile 168 (Padova, Cedam 1943); 1 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 375, at 118; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 95; 1 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 375, at 167.
P. Calamandrei, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 376, at 166; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 203–04; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 93, 94; 1 S. Satta, Commentario, op. cit. supra note 361, at 221; id., vol. 2 (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 118–19; 1 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 166; M. Vellani, Consulente tecnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 335, 343–44. See also Faicchia v. Faicchia, Corte di cassazione, Aug. 1, 1960, No. 2248, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Consulenza tecnica in materia civile No. 47 (1960). A most interesting decision is that of the Corte costituzionale, Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, VI Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1282 (1961), in which the court held certain provisions of the Law of May 23, 1950, No. 253, to be unconstitutional on the ground that they provided for technical consultations that were both required and binding on the court. The provisions were held to violate article 24 of the Constitution which guarantees judicial protection of individual rights. The court held that a binding technical opinion deprived the courts of their judicial function, and vested it in the consultant. For favorable comments, see M. Cappelletti, Diritto di azione e di difesa e funzione concretizzatrice delta giurisprudenza costituzionale, VI Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1284 (1961); V. Denti, Testimonianza tecnica, op. cit. supra note 286, at 11–12 n. 10. The court’s opinion must, however, explain why the expert’s opinion was not followed. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 89; M. Vellani, Consulente técnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 343–44; G. Franchi, La perizia, op. cit. supra note 374, at 253 et seq., 257 et seq., and cases cited.
See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 18; 2 P. Calamandrei, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 376, at 167; 1 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 375, at 155; 1 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 375, at 130; M. Vellani, Consulente técnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 336.
See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 79–80, 94; 1 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 375, at 166; id., vol. 2, op. cit. supra note 10, at 90; G. Franchi, La Perizia civile, op. cit. supra note 374, at 86 et seq., 104 et seq.; M. Vellani, Consulente tecnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 336. A technical consultant need not be an Italian citizen. M. Vellani, supra, at 337.
F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 19; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 79–80; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 85–86; G. Franchi, La perizia, op. cit. supra note 374, at 86 et seq., 98 et seq.; M. Vellani, Consulente tecnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 336. On the relevance of custom and usage in Italian law, see Disposizioni sulla legge in generale arts. 1, 8, 9.
Normally, experts are named by the examining judge. Codice di procedura civile art. 191, para. 1. However, they may also be named by the adjudicating panel. Codice di procedura civile art. 279; 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 25; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 199, 201; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 105–06.
Codice di procedura civile art. 61, para. 1. More than one expert may be appointed when necessary or when expressly authorized by law. Codice di procedura civile art. 191, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 61, para. 2; Disposizioni di attuazione arts. 22, 23.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 13.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 14. Articles 15–24 regulate the discipline, appointment, compensation, and the like, of technical consultants. See G. Franchi, La perizia, op. cit. supra note 374, at 365 et seq.
Codice di procedura civile art. 63, para. 1. An expert not listed in the register is not obligated to serve. 1 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 375, at 184; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 201; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 95; M. Vellani, Consulente tecnico, op. cit. supra note 374, at 338.
Codice di procedura civile art s. 63, 51; art. 192, paras. 2, 3. See 3.08 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 193.
Codice penale art. 42, para. 2.
Codice penale art. 373 (imprisonment from six months to three years). Technical consultants are also removed from their profession or trade. See also Codice penale art. 366 (refusal to perform official functions; obtaining exemption from official function by fraud).
Codice di procedura civile art. 64.
The parties and their attorneys may accompany the expert during his investigations. They may make oral or written requests or comments. Codice di procedura civile art. 194, para. 2. The expert must notify the parties of the time and place of any planned investigation, Disposizioni di attuazione art. 90.
Admissions made by a party to a court appointed expert are not binding, and statements made to him by third persons do not have the probative strength of testimony. See 1 S. Satta, Commentario, op. cit. supra note 361, at 112. But see De Stefano v. Lo Giudice, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 11, 1960, No. 2651, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Consulenza tecnica in materia civile No. 25 (1960) (information obtained by an expert from third persons, even without authorization, may be evaluated by the court together with all the evidence, as long as the expert indicates his sources so that the court and the parties may check on them). Accord, Brazzafolli v. Hummling, Corte di cassazione, Sept. 8, 1958, No. 2979, ibidem No. 27 (1960). The expert has no coercive powers over parties, witnesses, or other persons. 1 S. Satta, Commentario, op. cit. supra note 361, at 111–12; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 110.
Codice di procedura civile art. 194, para. 1.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 92.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 198–200. He may examine documents and books that have not been produced in the action only if all the parties consent. Codice di procedura civile art. 198, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 195. The report of the expert should include any requests or comments made to him by the parties.
Codice di procedura civile art. 196.
Codice di procedura civile art. 197.
See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 98; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 118.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 87, 201. Disposizioni di attuazione art. 91.
On the production and inspection of tangible evidence, see generally S. La China, L’esibizione delle prove nel processo civile (Milano, Giuffrè 1960); V. Sparano, L’esibizione di prove nel processo civile (Napoli, Jovene 1961); A. Massari, Esibizione delle prove, VI Novissimo Digesto italiano 836 (Torino, Utet 1960); F. Lancellotti, Esibizione di prove e sequestri, II Studi in onore di Enrico Redenti 517 (Milano, Giuffrè 1951); A. Marzano, Ispezione di luoghi, cose e persone (dir. proc. civ.), IV Enciclopedia forense 489 (Milano, Vallardi 1959).
An inspection may be made in or out of court. A report of the inspection, rather than the tangible evidence inspected, is deposited with the clerk. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 173–74.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 118, 210. Although Codice civile art. 2711, para. 2, seems to allow the court to order production of certain documents of business enterprises on its own motion, the interpretation of the provision is uncertain. See F. Lancellotti, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 557–58; A. Massari, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 847; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 124–25. See also Codice di procedura civile art. 213, discussed 8.49.h infra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 118, para. 1. This provision implies that an inspection may not be ordered if the facts of the case may be proved by other means. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 174–75; 1 S. Satta, Commentario, op. cit. supra note 361, at 473; 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 346–47. Although the court may order an examination or inspection on its own motion, it may do so only to resolve factual issues that have been framed by the parties.
The risk of losing the case does not, but damage to the person’s honor does, qualify as “serious damage.” See 1 V. Andrioli, op. cit. supra note 81, at 347; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento, op. cit. supra note 361, at 381.
Codice di procedura civile art. 118, para. 1. On the relationship between the rules of secrecy and rules of evidence, see 8.34–8.36 supra. Articles 13 and 14 of the Italian Constitution, like the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures. See M. Cappelletti, Efficacia, op. cit. supra note 210, at 557 n. 2 (1961). On the admissibility of evidence that has been obtained by artitrary search or seizure, see 8.37 supra.
Codice di procedura civile arts. 259; 260, para. 1. The examining judge must also conduct inspections outside the district of his court unless his workload prevents him from doing so. In the latter case, he delegates the task to the pretore of the place where the inspection is to occur. Codice di procedura civile art. 259.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 93. Physical examinations must be made with all possible regard for the person examined. Codice di procedura civile art. 260, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 261, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 261, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 262. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 80; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 176; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 216; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 103; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento, op. cit. supra note 361, at 438.
Codice di procedura civile art. 116, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 118, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 118, para. 3. Several authors have conjectured that his refusal might constitute a crime. See 1 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 375, at 235; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento, op. cit. supra note 361, at 383. However, these authors who are attempting to provide an effective solution to an important practical problem, constitute a minority. In practice, no criminal penalty is imposed. See 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 348; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 72–73; S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 266 et seq.
See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 101.
Voluntary production is called produzione. 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 3, at 77–78; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 120–21; S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 4–5. A document produced voluntarily is filed in the party’s file at the clerk’s office. See 7.26 supra. Once the document is filed, however, the party may not reclaim it. 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 121.
He may also ask that the documents be sequestered. See 6.05 supra; 15.12 infra; note 435 infra.
See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 121–22, and bibliography there cited. See also P. Calamandrei, Conseguenze delta mancata esibizione di documenti in giudizio, in III P. Calamandrei, Studi sul processo civile 55 (Padova, Cedam 1934); S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 13 et seq., 35 et seq.
See 1 F. Carnelutti, Sistema di diritto processuale civile 726–30 (Padova, Cedam 1930); id., Lineamenti della riforma del processo civile di cognizione, VI Rivista di diritto processuale civile (part I) 3, 31–32 (1929).
See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 122; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 104,108; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 310–11; A. Massari, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 836, 837–40. The Code of Civil Procedure (article 210) makes no mention of a requirement that the moving party have a substantive right in the evidence he wishes produced.
See text at note 69 supra.
F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 375, at 235; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 122; 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 345. The moving party has the burden of proving that the desired item of evidence is in the possession of the person to whom the order is to be directed. Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 94.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 94.
Micheletti v. Crescenzi, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 2, 1961, No. 208, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova civile in genere No. 35 (1961); Leonardi v. I.N.A.I.L., Corte di cassazione, June 6, 1959, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Prova civile in genere No. 24 (1960). Contra, 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 104. See also S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 195 et seq.
This is the same rule that is applicable to inspections. See text at notes 406–407 supra. See also S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 209 et seq.
Codice di procedura civile art. 210, para. 2.
Codice di procedura civile art. 211. The joinder or intervention of the third person does not make him a party to the action. It follows that he need not be represented by an attorney. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 78; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 137; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 105; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento, op. cit. supra note 361, at 382–83; A Massari, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 845, 846; S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 238, 240.
Codice di procedura civile art. 178, paras. 2–8. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 124; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 137; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 105.
Codice di procedura civile art. 212, para. 1. On the evidentiary value of copies of documents, see 8.14 supra.
Codice di procedura civile art. 212, para. 2; Codice civile art. 2711.
Codice di procedura civile art. 213,
See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 70.
Disposizioni di attuazione del codice di procedura civile art. 96.
See 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 135; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 106, 107; S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 255 et seq. It may be possible to obtain sequestration of documentary evidence if the prerequisites specified in Codice di procedura civile art. 670(2) are met. An order of sequestration may be enforced by coercion. Codice di procedura civile art. 677. See 6.07 supra; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 209–10; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 108; 1 P. D’Onofrio, Commento, op. cit. supra note 361, at 383; A. Massari, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 848; F. Lancellotti, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, passim; F. Carnelutti, Sequestro giudiziario delle prove a carico delterzo, XCIX Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 2) col. 127 (1947); E. Betti, A proposito del sequestro giudiziario delle prove a carico del terzo, XXII Temi 494 (1946); S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 257 et seq.; V. Sparano, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 268 et seq.; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 123.
Codice di procedura civile art. 116, para. 2.
See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 3, at 210; 1 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 81, at 348; id., vol. 2, op. cit. supra note 19, at 134; S. Costa, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 10, at 311. Some authors deny that this penalty may be imposed by analogy. 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 150, 161–62; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 104, 105–06; A. Massari, Esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 844; S. La China, L’esibizione, op. cit. supra note 402, at 263 et seq.
Unless the order provides for an out of court inspection, the place specified is normally the courthouse.
Codice di procedura civile art. 203. The taking of evidence abroad is discussed at 15.16–15.20 infra.
On the peculiarities of this type of order, see 8.02 supra.
See 8.39 supra. The judge usually dictates the record to the clerk. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 57.
Generally, however, they are not transcribed verbatim. See 8.39 supra. It has properly been noted that supplementation of the record of the case with phonographic, photographic, or motion picture recordings would not be contrary to the law. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 57.
His description of the bearing of the parties and witnesses can be of great importance and carries great weight with the adjudicating panel. See 8.02 supra. However, he very rarely dictates such a description. It has been held that evidence that has not been recorded must be treated as non-existent. Calderone and De Carlo v. Preve, Corte di cassazione, May 9, 1958, No. 1530, CXI Giurisprudenza italiana (part I, sec. 1) col. 597 (1959) (critical note, M. Cappelletti); and in XV Rivista di diritto processuale 131 (1960) (approving note, F. Carnelutti). See also 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part I), op. cit. supra note 31, at 141–42; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 97.
Codice di procedura civile art. 206. An exception may be made particularly when a physical examination is required, out of respect for the person involved. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 125, at 56; 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 126.
Codice di procedura civile art. 208, para. 1.
Codice di procedura civile art. 208, para. 2. If the adversary does not move to have the evidence excluded, the judge must take it. If the court ordered that the evidence be taken on its own motion, the presence or absence of the parties is immaterial. 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale (tome 1), op. cit. supra note 3, at 101–02; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 10, at 97–98. Contra, 2 V. Andrioli, Commento, op. cit. supra note 19, at 129–30.
Codice di procedura civile art. 208, para. 3.
Codice di procedura civile art. 209. For a discussion of court orders authorized by article 208 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see text at notes 445–46 supra.
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Cappelletti, M., Perillo, J.M. (1965). The Proof-Taking Stage. In: Civil Procedure in Italy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6273-1_8
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