Abstract
A particular situation concerning activity on board or involving a vessel may give rise to possible criminal liability of one or more of the persons involved, as well as potential civil liability, and may also raise questions of administrative control of the problem. In Chapter IV it was attempted to clarify the areas of possible conflict generally between the jurisdiction of a state where a vessel happens to be and that of the state of the vessel’s nationality. The suggestion is that whenever official action by the flag state is indicated, the consul is the most likely official of the flag state to carry it into effect.
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References
Cf. Restatement § 49, Comment on Subsection (3), p. 167. This section deals with the same problem when a vessel is in innocent passage. The rationale would seem to be even more appropriate in the case of a vessel tied up to a dock in port. § 534. 2–6 and 2–7 of the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual distinctly limits consular action in serious criminal matters to investigation, detention and return to the U.S. for trial.
Choice of laws problems do not arise in criminal matters. A state which prosecutes a person for a criminal act always applies its own penal laws. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§427, 611 (1934).
Choice of laws problems do arise where the local authorities take jurisdiction of a civil matter. It may be that the motivation of a court in exercising its discretion and assuming to decide a controversy was to assure that a particular plaintiff is afforded a remedy. However, it by no means follows that it will apply local law. The flag state may well be the only state with any significant contacts with the transaction. Under these circumstances the local authorities would apply the law of the flag state. These questions are beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Having considered the factors which may induce the assumption of jurisdiction, I shall consider the choice of laws problem to the extent necessary to give a clear picture of consular authority.
Many of these same treaties additionally contain special provisions dealing expressly with one branch or the other of consular authority. Those provisions will be considered hereinafter.
44 Stat. 2132.
Article XXII, id. at 2152. This article is expressly caused to survive by Article XXVIII of the treaty of 1954. 7 TIAS 1839, 1868.
Appendix A, #’s 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 130, 131, 136, 138 and 145.
Appendix A, #’s 112, 108, 107, 96, 93, 92, 91, 89, 86, 84, 82, 81, 79, 56 and 50.
Sweden, 1827, Art. XIII, 8 Stat. 346, 352. Similar provisions are found in treaties, Appendix A, #’s 24, 30, 36, 40, 41, 44, 46, 55, 61, 70 and 71.
Art. X, 1 TIAS 247, 270–272.
Art. 22 (1), 3 TIAS 3426, 3443. An identical provision is consined in treaty with Ireland. Art. 23 (1), 5 TIAS 949, 992 (1952).
Art. XXII (5), 5 TIAS 1829, 1897–1899.
See In re Labrasciano, 38 Misc. 415, 77 N.Y. Supp. 1040 (Surr. Ct., Westchester, 1902) construing a similar provision (Art. IX, Treaty of 1853 with Argentine Confederation, 10 Stat. 1001, 1009, through most-favored-nation clause in Treaty of 1871 with Italy — Art. XXIV — 17 Stat. 845, 856.) to merely provide for conformity with local procedural law.
Subdivision 3, (b.), 11 TIAS 1835, 1843–1844.
Supra p. 131.
Art. XXX, 25 Stat. 1444, 1459. Similar provisions will be found in the treaties with: Peru, 1870, Art. XXXII, 18 Stat, 698, 713, and Denmark, 1826, Art. 8, 8 Stat. 340, 342.
Appendix A, #’s 75, 65, 54, 49, 48, 45, 39, 33, 29, 28 and 25.
Appendix A, #’s 135, 78, 74, 69, 58 and 53.
Orange Free State, 1871, Art. V, 18 Stat. 749, 750.
Dominican Republic, 1867, Art. XXVI, 15 Stat. 473, 487–488; Swiss Confederation, 1850, Art. VII, 11 Stat. 1, 5; Hawaiian Islands, 1849, Art. X, 9 Stat. 178, 181–182; Austria, 1829, Art. X, 8 Stat. 398, 400.
Sardinia, 1838, Art. XV, 8 Stat. 512, 518.
202 Calif. 267, 259 Pac. 1094 (1927).
Art. 8, 8 Stat. 340, 342.
Art. XXIV, 44 Stat. 2132, 2153–2154.
202 Calif. 271, 259 Pac. 1095.
In view of the court’s construction, it never reached the question of reciprocity; in other words, whether Denmark would confer the same right on United States consuls as did Germany under the 1923 treaty. That is a question which could best be raised in a Danish court or in diplomatic correspondence between the two governments.
On the question of importing consular authority from treaties with third states because of most-favored-nation clauses, see also In re Labrasciano’s Estate, supra note 13.
Art. XII, 19 Stat. 628 [72], 631–632 [75–76]. This article goes on to make the right conditional upon the other party paying the same price as the third state did for the concession, but this aspect of the article is not immediately pertinent to the problem under consideration.
Art. III, 18 Stat. 698, 700.
Art. II, 13 Stat. 711, 712. Similar articles are found in treaties, Appendix A, #’s 95, 74, 73, 69, 65, 54, 53, 49, 48, 47, 45, 43, 39, 37, 35, 33, 29 and 23.
Supra notes 17 and 18.
See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1901); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57 (1902).
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1923).
278 U.S. 123 (1928).
1911, 37 Stat. 1504.
Emphasis added. 278 U.S. 129–130.
Id. at 128.
91 U.S. 13 (1875).
12 Stat. 1213.
91 U.S. 13, 18(1875).
The fact that the particular clause construed was contained in a treaty which was not reciprocal is not material to its interpretation on this point. It would, of course, bear upon the position of the United States on the question of whether most-favored-nation clauses are conditional. See note 26 supra.
The Ambatielos Case, 1953 I.C.J. 10.
Id. at 34.
The I.C.J. decision in the Anglo-Iranian dispute (1952 I.C.J. 110) that the most-favored-nation clause in the U.K. — Persia treaty did not import the right of Denmark to prosecute an action against Iran in the International Court of Justice is not relevant, since it depended upon a construction of Iran’s declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction, which was held to exclude controversies arising out of treaties concluded prior to the declaration.
See Art. III, Convention with Peru-Bolivia of 1836, 8 Stat. 487, 488.
Supra note 38.
Supra at p. 137.
The treaty with Siam of 1937 uses much more specific terms than the other treaties concluded by the United States. There, the language is: “In all that concerns the entering, clearing, stationing, loading and unloading of vessels” the parties are entitled to most-favored-nation treatment. This language may not be broad enough in meaning to include a grant to a third state of consular authority over seamen, although it is at least open to argument that even such a clause should be interpreted to include such grants. Art. 11, 53 Stat. 1731. 1737.
1947, 61 Stat. Pt. 5, 6.
Treaties in Force, 1 Jan. 1965.
Art. V, 1, 2, 5, 61 Stat. Pt. 5, A 21, A 22. Paragraph 7. of the same article excludes aircraft from the connotation of the word “vessels.” The most-favored-nation clauses in Article I, 1, (61 Stat. Pt. 5, A 12) and Article II, 1 (a) (61 Stat. Pt. 5, A14), are evidently intended only to import third state benefits in importation and exportation which are of direct financial benefit to the competitive position of these goods.
Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116 (1886); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). That case involved benefits of lower rates for duties on imports. However, the Court was prepared to give the benefit provided it was mutual. See statement of Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, Dec. 23, 1817, V American State Papers, For. Rel. 152 — “one nation cannot enjoy as a gift that which is conceded to other nations for a full equivalent.” Contra, Speed, 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 508.
See Convention with Chile, 1832, Art. II, 8 Stat. 434.
See treaty with Guatemala, 1849, Art. II, 10 Stat. 1.
See instruction to American diplomatic officers, dated 18 August, 1923, Diplomatic serial 211, MS Dept. of State, file 611. 0031/1978, V Hackworth, Digest of International Law 272–273.
Id. at 271. E.g., Treaty of 1923 with Germany. Art. VII, 44 Stat. 2132, 2137; Treaty of 1937 with Siam, Art. 8, 53 Stat. 1731, 1736.
Id.
Art. XVII, 44 Stat. 2147–2148; Art. 11, 14, 53 Stat. 1738.
See treaty with Germany, 1954, Art. XX, 1, TIAS 3593, 7 USTIAS 1839, 1868.
See Art. XXVIII of treaty with Germany, id., which causes Art. XXIII of the treaty of 1923 to survive. 44 Stat. 2132, 2147–2148, 1951, Art. XXII, 5 TIAS 3057, 5 USTIAS 1829, 1897–1899.
See treaty with Korea, 1956, Art. XIX, 3 TIAS 3947, 8 USTIAS 2217, 2230; Nicaragua, 1956, TIAS 4024, 9 USTIAS 449, 464.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/12, 57 A.J.I.L. 995.
Art. 5(K), id. at 998.
Art. 5(1), id.
Id. at 1020.
The Law of Treaties 276 (1961). He cites as authority for that conclusion a reference in V Hackworth, Digest of International Law 274, 275. This is rather ancient authority, but I have been able to find no other more recent. He goes on to say that United Kingdom practice in respect of Consular Conventions appears to be the same. Id.
See Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Chev. Hulseman, Austrian chargé d’affaires, May 18, 1896, M.S. Notes to German States, VI, 130; II Moore, Digest of International Law 301.
John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 104 F. 2d. 67, 73 (CCPA. 1939).
Memorandum of the legal Adviser of the Dept. of State (Hackworth), Oct. 30, 1931, MS. Dept. of State, file 711. 6521/192, V Hackworth, Digest of International Law 274.
Similar provision is to be found in the treaties with Viet-Nam, 1961, Art. XI, 3., TIAS 4890, 12 USTIAS 1711; Denmark 1961, Art. XIX, 3., TIAS 4797, 12 USTIAS 908, 925–930; Muscat and Oman, 1958, Art. X, 3., TIAS 4530, 11 USTIAS 1835, 1840 — This treaty is supplemented by a protocol which expressly deals with the question of consular authority over seamen. Korea, 1956, Art. XIX, 3, TIAS 3947, 8 USTIAS 2217, 2230; Nicaragua, 1956, Art. XIX, 3., TIAS 4024, 9 USTIAS 449, 464; The Netherlands, 1956, Art. XIX, 2., TIAS 3942, 8 USTIAS 2043, 2074; Iran, 1955, Art. X, 3., TIAS 3853, 8 USTIAS 899, 907–908; Japan, 1953, Art, XIX, 3., TIAS 2863, 4 USTIAS 2077–2078; Israel, 1951, Art. XIX, 3., TIAS 2948, 5 USTIAS 550, 570; Ethiopia, 1951, Art. XIV, 2., TIAS 2864, 4 USTIAS 2134, 2145.
TIAS 4683, 12 TIAS no.
Art. XIV, 5., id. at 118. Similar provisions are found in the treaties with Germany, 1954, Art. XIV, 4., TIAS 3593, 7 USTIAS 1839, 1855; Korea, 1956, Art. XIV, 5., TIAS 3947, 8 USTIAS 2217, 2228; Nicaragua, 1956, Art. XIV, 5., TIAS 4024, 9 USTIAS 449, 460; The Netherlands, 1956, Art. XIV, 5., TIAS 3942, 8 USTIAS 2043, 2070–2071; Iran, 1955, Art. IX, 2., TIAS 3853, 8 USTIAS 899, 907.
Germany, 1954, Art. III, 1., TIAS 3593, 7 USTIAS 1839, 1842. A similar provision will be found in the treaty with Korea, 1956, Art. III, 1., TIAS 3947, 8 USTIAS 2217, 2220.
Art. III, 1., TIAS 4024, 9 USTIAS 449, 452.
Iran, 1955, Art. XIII, 1., TIAS 3853, 8 USTIAS 899, 909–910; Ethiopia, 1951, Art. III, 1., TIAS 2864, 4 USTIAS 2134, 2137–2138.
Art. 1 , 2., TIAS 2045, 1 USTIAS 247, 255.
Supra note 75.
Oppenheim says: “Universal International law is created only when all or practically all the members of the Family of Nations are parties to these treaties.” I Oppenheim’s International Law 27 (6th ed. 1947).
See IV Hackworth, Digest of International Law 878–879.
The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 363–364 (1884); Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1886); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 177–178 (1903). The question of the circumstances which render it unjust not to take jurisdiction will be considered in a later portion of this chapter.
22 C.F.R. 83.5; 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 532. 1.
22 C.F.R. 83.6; 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 53 2.2.
22 C.F.R. § 83.8 (b); 7 Foreign Affairs Manual 533. 2–2. The reference to “diplomatic” representatives having authority in these matters is to recognize the fact that diplomatic officers sometimes perform consular duties and that the consuls are generally under the administrative control of the embassy.
7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 534. 2–2.
22 U.S.C. 256, 257, 258, 258a; R.S. 4079, 4080, 4081 (1878), 36 Stat. 1163.
The statutes referred to will be considered in detail post.
See supra p. 146.
TIAS 2494, 3 USTIAS 3426.
Art. 22, id. at 3443. Identical provisions are found in the treaty of 1950–1952 with Ireland. TIAS 2984, Art. 23, 5 USTIAS 949, 992–995.
Ch. IV, pp. 112 et seq.
TIAS 4530, 11 USTIAS 1835.
Id. at 1843–1844.
Supra note 90.
Art. X2., TIAS 2045, 1 USTIAS 247, 272.
See Ch. IV, p. 125.
Art. XXIII, 44 Stat. 2132, 2152–2153, preserved by Art. XXVIII of treaty of 1954, 7 TIAS 1839, 1867. Similar provisions were incorporated into treaties with Cuba, 1925, Art. XII, 44 Stat. 2471, 2477–2478 (except that there is no like provision envisaging the possibility that local law may permit consular jurisdiction even in case of serious crimes.); Honduras, 1927, Art. XXII, 45 Stat. 2618, 2635; Latvia, 1928, Art. XXIII, 45 Stat. 2641, 2649–2650; El Salvador, 1926, Art. XXI, 46 Stat. 2817, 2833–2834; Norway, 1928, Art. XXII, 47 Stat. 2135, 2152–2153; Poland, 1931, Art. XXV, 48 Stat. 1507, 1530–1531; Finland, 1934, Art. XXV, 49 Stat. 2659, 2677–2678; Liberia, 1938, Art. X, 54 Stat. 1739, 1756–1757; Mexico, 1942, Art. X, 57 Stat. 800, 812–813–814 (except does not exclude local jurisdiction); Philippines, 1947, Art. XI, 62 Stat. 1593, 1599–1600.
Art. VII, 10 Stat. 992, 996. Similar clauses will be found in the conventions with Italy, 1868, Art. XI, 15 Stat. 605, 609–610; Belgium, 1868, Art. XI, 16 Stat. 757, 761; and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1870, Art. XI, 17 Stat. 821, 827–828.
Treaty with Germany of 1871, Art. XIII, 17 Stat. 921, 928. Similar provisions are found in the treaties with New Granada, 1850, Art. Ill, 8, 10 Stat. 900, 903 (except that it does not use the term “exclusive”); Salvador, 1870, Art. 33rd 8th, 18 Stat. 725,743–744 (also gives consul exclusive jurisdiction when a national of sending state not a crew member is involved); The Netherlands, 1878, Art. XI, 21 Stat. 662, 668; Italy, 1878, Art. XI, 20 Stat. 725, 729–730; Belgium, 1880, Art. XI, 21 Stat. 776, 781; Italy, 1881, Art. I, 22 Stat. 831, 832; Roumania, 1881, Art. XI, 23 Stat. 711, 714; Spain, 1902, Art, XXIII, 33 Stat. 2105, 2116–2117; Greece, 1902, Art. XII, 33 Stat. 2122, 2129; Sweden, 1910, Art. XI, 37 Stat. 1479, 1485.
See Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 294 et seq. (1962); I Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 396–397 (1922).
273 Fed. 305 (C.A.D.C. 1921).
Id. at 310. There was no treaty jurisdictional provision.
Being between two passengers as to whether one had stolen something from the other.
The statement of the court was dicta, since it merely supported the court’s holding that the passenger was not entitled to recover from the shipowner upon the theory that the captain was obliged to intervene with the local authorities and prevent them from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff. The court held that the captain had done all that could reasonably be expected under the circumstances, and at any rate a passenger leaving a vessel was not a member of the ship’s company entitled to the benefit of the rule.
120 U.S. 1 (1887).
Treaty with Belgium, 1880, Art. XI, 21 Stat. 776, 781.
Supra note 104 at 12.
See Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 178 (1903).
Id.
262 U.S. 100 (1923).
Id. at 124. The Court cited with approval the language in Patterson, supra note 108, recognizing an unlimited local jurisdiction over foreign vessels in port and ascribing the exemptions normally accorded them to comity.
E.g., Art. XIX 3, treaty of 1951 with Israel, TIAS 2948, 5 USTIAS 550, 570.
See supra, p. 144.
II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 209; see also the Ass’t Sec. of State (Carr) to the Atty. Gen., Nov. 24, 1926, MS Dept. of State, file 195.8/813.
See Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Schenck, March 12, 1875, II Moore, Digest of International Law 295–297.
See also Acting Sec. of State (Wilson) to Ambassador Dudley, Nov. 4, 1909, MS. Dept. of State, file 17753/3, II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 217–218, also a situation involving a state with which no controlling treaty existed.
Vol. 7, § 533–2–2.
If a treaty provision did exist on the subject, it would of course be the controlling law between the parties.
22 U.S.C. 256–258a, R.S. §§4079–4081, 36 Stat. 1163.
See supra at p. 147 et seq.
It should be recalled initially that if the act occurred anywhere else except in the territorial or inland waters of the state where the vessel is located, the local authorities will probably have no authority over the perpetrator regardless of the nature of the act. See Chapter IV at p. 114.
Supra at pp. 147–148.
Supra note 104.
“It is not alone the publicity of the act, or the noise and clamor which attends it, that fixes the nature of the crime, but the act itself. If that is of a character to awaken public interest when it becomes known, it is a ‘disorder’ the nature of which is to affect the community at large, and consequently to invoke the power of the local government whose people have been disturbed by what was done.” Id. at 18. The State Department has taken a similar position: “[T]he killing of one human being by another was ‘a disorder of such a nature as to cause, or be likely to cause a breach of the peace or serious trouble in the port or on shore.’“ Sec. Knox to Minister Riano, no. 22, Dec. 7, 1910, MS. Dept. of State, file 711.5211/-, II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 211–212.
See Ex parte Anderson, 184 Fed. 114 (D.Me. 1910), involving physical chastisement of a crew member by an officer on the dock.
Supra note 104.
In a similar situation, the Supreme Court of Mexico declined local jurisdiction. Case of Antoni, Hudson, Cases and other Materials on International Law 630 (1929).
Acting Sec. of State (Wilson) to the Mexican Ambassador (Crespo), no. 29, Aug. 31, 1911, MS. Dept. of State, file 812.858, II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 219–220.
7 Foreign Affairs Manual (1961) §§ 534.2–1, 534.2–2.
See Murphy v. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 273 Fed. 305 (C.A.D.C. 1921).
Ex parte Anderson, 184 Fed. 114 (D. Me. 1910).
The Acting Sec. of State (Polk) to Consul Wallace, May 8, 1919, MS. Dept. of State, file 195.8/158, II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 212.
Whether the result was accomplished by comity or by international law is not clear. However, the instruction to the consul suggested that his request be directed to the discretion of the French authorities. That would appear to be consistent with the United States position that all surrenders of jurisdiction by local authorities are discretionary and therefore result from considerations of comity rather than law.
Wheaton, Elements of International Law 153–154 (3rd ed. 1846).
Director of Consular Affairs (Carr) to Mr. Hostetter, Mar. 6, 1911, M.S. Dept. of State, file 195.8/5, IV Hackworth, Digest of International Law 880.
22 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
Judicial assistance could only be granted to consular officers of states which reciprocally offered the same to the United States. Id. at 885. 22 U.S.C. 256 et seq., R.S. 4079–4081.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion was sound on the question of the effect of the treaty provision in question. Judge Dickenson held that, even conceding that this was a matter arising out of the internal economy of the ship, the term “exclusive jurisdiction” really meant primary jurisdiction. The United States, he insisted, retained secondary jurisdiction which it could exercise with the consent or upon the request of the consul. Id. at 885–886. In Petition of Georgakopoulos, 81 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa 1948), the court held that a similar situation was one within the “exclusive charge” of the Consul of Greece under the treaty with that state, and therefore that it would enforce his award against the seamen. Greece had reciprocal judicial assistance provision, so the United States court was statutorily authorized to enforce his decree. 22 U.S.C. 256, R.S. 4079.
1921, MS. Dept. of State, file 196.32/294, 196.32/322, IV Hackworth, Digest of International Law 880.
1922, MS. Dept. of State, file 311. 6221, II Hackworth, Digest 0) International Law 223.
Multilateral convention of 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187; Convention of 1925 on Traffic in Opium and Drugs, III Hudson, International Legislation 1589; Convention of 1931 on Narcotic Drugs, 48 Stat. 1543.
Art. 19, 1. (d), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52.
262 U.S. 100 (1923).
Id. at 125 et seq.
People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729 (1922).
18 Phil. 573 (1910).
Convention on Consular Officers with the United Kingdom, 1951, Art. 22 (1), TIAS 2494, 3 USTIAS 3426, 3444; Ireland, 1950–1952, Art. 23, TIAS 2984, 5 USTIAS 949, 992–995.
See, e.g., Treaty of 1951 with Greece, Art. XXII (5), TIAS 3057, 5 USTIAS 1829, 1897–1899; Treaty of 1923 with Germany, Art. XXIII, 44 Stat. 2132, 2152–2153.
E.g., Treaty of 1878 with Italy, Art. XI, 20 Stat. 725, 729–730.
22 U.S.C. 258a, 36 Stat. 1163.
46 U.S.C. 703, 38 Stat. 1167.
The Acting Sec. of State, (Wilson) to Ambassador Dudley, Nov. 4, 1909, MS. Dept. of State, file 17753/3, II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 218.
22 U.S.C. 258a, 36 Stat. 1163.
A question of the operation of this statute in a problem context may be seen in The Wind, 22 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
197 U.S. 169 (1905).
United States District Court.
Supra at note 89.
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Baron Schaeffer, Austrian min., Nov. 13, 1883, For. Rel. 1883, 30; II Moore, Digest of International Law 302.
Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Count Lewenhaupt, Swed. and Nor. min., July 30, 1880, MS. Notes to Swed. and Nor. VII 204, II Moore, Digest of International Law 316.
See Cushing, 8 Ops. Att’y Gen. 73 (1856) and Dana’s Wheaton, Section 95, note 58.
See e.g., Consular Convention of 1954, U.K. — Italy, Art. 28 (1), U.K.T.S. No. 51 of 1960.
See Chapter II at p. 150.
See The Director of Consular Service (Carr) to Consul General Robertson, No. 320, Nov. 7, 1917, MS. Dept. of State, file 196.3/29; II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 253-
Act of Feb. 3, 1917, Ch. 29, Sec. 34, 39 Stat. 896. See also the Act of May 26, 1924, Ch. 190, Sec. 19 and 20, 43 Stat. 164.
See 44 Stat. 141–143.
Title 8, Consolidated Laws, § 167 (b), 44 Stat. 142.
8 U.S.C. 1281, 66 Stat. 219.
8 U.S.C. 1282 (c), 66 Stat. 221.
8 U.S.C. 1282 (b), 66 Stat. 221.
Vol. 7, § 529.6.
46 U.S.C. 701, R.S. § 4596, 38 Stat. 1166.
Vol. 7, § 529–529.9.
Id. at § 529.4–1.
Id. at § 529.4–2.
Cf. The W. F. Babcock, 79 Fed. 92 (S.D. N.Y. 1897); rev’d on other grounds, 85 Fed. 978 (2d Cir. 1898).
28 U.S.C. 1740, 62 Stat. 947.
Cf. Suey Fong v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Wis. 1958); Nieto v. McGrath, 108 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Tex. 1951).
Cf. The Sachem, 59 Fed. 790 (S.D. N.Y. 1894).
See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–285 (1922); cited with favor, United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187–188 (1955).
5 U.S.C. 1001–1011, 60 Stat. 237–244 (1946).
5 U.S.C. 1003 (1), 1004 (4), 60 Stat. 238, 239.
5 U.S.C. 1009, 60 Stat. 243.
5 U.S.C. 1009 (e), 60 Stat. 243.
44 Stat. 2132.
Art. XXIII, id. at 2152. Similar provisions are found in the treaty with Esthonia, 1925, Art. XXII, 44 Stat. 2379, 2387; Cuba, 1926, Art. XII, 44 Stat. 2471, 2477; Honduras, 1927, Art. XXII, 45 Stat. 2618, 2634; Latvia, 1928, Art. XXIII, 45 Stat. 2641, 2649; El Salvador, 1926, Art. XXI, 46 Stat. 2817, 2833; Norway, 1928, Art. XXII, 47 Stat. 2135, 2152; Poland, 1931, Art. XXV, 48 Stat. 1507, 1530; Finland, 1934, Art. XXV, 49 Stat. 2659, 2677; Liberia, 1938, Art. X, 54 Stat., 1739, 1756; Mexico, 1942, Art. X, 57 Stat. 800, 812; Philippines, 1947, Art. XI, 62 Stat. 1593, 1599.
Fed. 170 (D. N.J. 1910).
Cf. The Neck, 138 Fed. 144 (W.D. Wash. 1905). It is true that the Koenigin Luise construed the treaty of 1871 rather than the one currently in force with Germany. However, the only material difference for the purpose of this discussion is that the old treaty did not reserve primary jurisdiction to the local courts in cases of wage and contract disputes as does the current one.
The Welhaven, 55 Fed. 80 (S.D. Ala. 1892); The Ester, 190 Fed. 216 (E.D. S.C. 1911). The fact that the action was joined with one for wages is not significant, since the court declined jurisdiction as to both claims.
Gerradin v. United Fruit Company, 60 F. 2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932); treaty at 45 Stat. 2634.
Id. at 930.
282 U.S. 234 (1931).
Id. at 241.
Cf. The Falls of Keltic, 114 Fed. 357 (D. Wash. N.D. 1902), involving general international law rule embodied in most treaties; Bolden v. Jensen, 70 Fed. 505 (D. Wash. N.D. 1895), same.
Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
The Albergen, 223 Fed. 443 (S.D. Ga. 1915); The Welhaven, 55 Fed. 80 (S.D. Ala. 1892).
The Koenigin Luise, 184 Fed. 170, 173 (D. N.J. 1910); The Albergen, 223 Fed. 443, 444 (S.D. Ga. 1915).
Emphasis supplied.
1789, Ch. 20, Sec. 9, 1 Stat. 76–77; emphasis supplied.
Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. 185 (1870) The wording of the statute currently controlling is: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U.S.C. 1333, 62 Stat. 931, amended 63 Stat. 101. Apparently, this change of language has no effect upon the prior law that the action may be brought in a state court. See Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556, 560, n. 12 (1954); cf. Cline v. Price, 39 Wash. 2d 816, 239 P. 2d 322 (1951).
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 472–474 (1891).
Supra, p. 167.
See treaty with France, 1853, Art. VIII, 10 Stat. 992, 996 [114, 118]. This one carefully excluded any possibility of local interference “particularly in reference to the adjustment of wages and the execution of contracts.” Similar clauses are contained in the treaties, Appendix A, numbers 22, 24, 30, 36, 40, 41, 44, 46, 55, 61, 70, 71, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 96, 107, 108 and 112.
38 Stat. 1164–1185.
Sec. 4, 16, 18, id. at 1165, 1184, 1185.
Id. at 1164.
The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F. 2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953).
252 U.S. 348 (1920).
See treaty with Costa Rica, 1948, Art. X, TIAS 2045, 1 USTIAS 247, 270–272; Greece, 1951, Art. XXII, TIAS 3057, 5 USTIAS 1829, 1897–1899.
Protocol, § 3 b), 1958, TIAS 4530, 11 TIAS 1835, 1843–1844.
1951, Art, 21(3), 22(1), TIAS 2494, 3 USTIAS 3426, 3442–3443, 3444. Similar provision is contained in the treaty with Ireland. 1952, Art. 22(3), TIAS 2984, 5 USTIAS 949, 992.
Art. 21(4)(5), id. There are similar provisions in the treaty with Ireland. Art. 22(4)(5),
39 Stat. 733, 4i Stat. 996, 46 U.S.C. 812.
A deferred rebate is a return of part of the freight paid, at some time after the service for which it was paid is performed.
3 TIAS 3426, 3442, Ireland treaty 21(2), 5 TIAS 949, 990–991.
1928, 47 Stat. 1976, 1978.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/12, April, 1963; 57 A.J.I.L. 995 (1963).
Art. 5k, 57 A.J.I.L. 995, 998.
Art. 5L, id.
The provision in these treaties authorizing consular action only consistently with local law should not be construed to permit arbitrary emasculation by law makers of the general authority grant. See supra at p. 148 et seq.
Supra at 170.
E.g. the treaty with Germany of 1923, Article XXIII, 44 Stat. 2132, 2152.
46 U.S.C. 570, R.S. § 4517. For failure to comply, he is subject to fine, and the vessel may be held for its payment. 46 U.S.C. 571, id.
Vol. 7, §§ 525–525–8–2.
In The Karoo, 49 Fed. 651, 652. (W.D. Wash. 1892), the court assumed the authority of a British consul in such matters notwithstanding that there was no treaty with Britain conferring it.
Ktistahis v. Liberian S.S. Star, 304 F. 2d 356 (4th Cir. 1962).
Cf. Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas, S.A., 280 F. 2d 568, 570–571 (2d Cir. 1960), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 915 (1960); Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia. Nav., S.A., 291 F. 2d 624 (2d Cir. 1961); Grivas v. Alianza Compania Armadora, S.A., 276 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir. 1960).
Id.
Supra note 224.
See discussion, id. at 571–574.
Supra at p. 173.
46 U.S.C. 677, R.S. §4576 (1878), makes him liable for a fine of $400 per person signed on but not brought back to the United States unless, inter alia, he has been “discharged in a foreign country with the consent of the consul or vice consul there residing, certified in writing, under his hand and official seal ....”
46 U.S.C. 682, R.S. § 4580 (1878).
59 Fed. 790 (S.D. N.Y. 1894).
Id. For examples of cases in which hearings were actually conducted, see The T. F. Oakes, 36 Fed. 442 (D. Cir. Ore. 1888); The Oregon, 254 Fed. 752 (E.D. N.Y. 1918) and Uriarte v. United States, 14 F. 2d. 164 (E.D. N.Y. 1926).
46 U.S.C. 656, R.S. § 4557 (1878).
46 U.S.C. 658, R.S. § 4561 (1878), 23 Stat. 54.
299 Fed. 52 (9th Cir 1924).
167 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1908).
36 F. 2d 381 (E.D. La. 1929).
46 U.S.C. 657, R.S. § 4560 (1878).
46 U.S.C. 685, 30 Stat. 760.
See The Golden Sun, 30 Fed. Supp. 354, 357 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
46 U.S.C. 682, 23 Stat. 54 — “has completed his shipping agreement, or is entitled to his discharge under any Act of Congress or according to the general principles or usages of maritime law recognized in the United States ....”
Vol. 7 (1961), §§ 526–528.4.
§§ 526.2, 526.3–2, 526.3–6, 526.3–8, 526.9–3, 526.9–5, 526.9–6.
§ 528.2.
Mattes v. Standard Transp. Co., 274 Fed. 1019, 1022 (S.D. N.Y. 1921); see also The Havenside, 14 F. 2d 851 (E.D. N.Y. 1926).
Id.
See Story, J., in Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6,047) (D. Cir. Me. 1823).
The Harvard Draft Convention on the Legal Position and Functions of Consuls puts the matter as follows: “National regulations often contain provisions authorizing consuls to take measures for the relief and assistance of seamen, such as accepting money from them for remittance home ... furnishing them money if sick, shipwrecked, destitute, or abandoned by their vessel ... or furnishing them transportation home .... It is difficult to see why a receiving state should object to such action by the consul ....” 26 A.J.I.L. Supp. 285. Perhaps it is for this reason that treaties seldom refer to the problem.
See Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, ch. 16 (New York, 1936); Comment to Article 4(1.) I.L.C. “Alternate Draft Article on Consular Intercourse and Immunities,” 55 A.J.I.L. 235 (1961).
46 U.S.C. 593, R.S. § 4526 (1878), 48 Stat. 395.
46 U.S.C. 683, R.S. § 4581 (1878), 23 Stat. 55, 30 Stat. 759, 38 Stat. 1185.
See note from The Acting Sec. of Commerce (Sweet) to Mr. Lansing, Feb. 5, 1919, MS. Dept. of State, file 196.7/748, IV Hackworth, Digest of International Law 917.
46 U.S.C. 678, R.S. §4577 (1878). Masters of American merchant ships are required to carry back destitute seamen at the request of consular officers. 46 U.S.C. 679, R.S. § 4578 (1878), 23 Stat. 55.
Cf. The Santa Elena, 271 Fed. 347 (D.C. N.Y. 1920).
1 Comp. Gen. 583–584; IV Hackworth, Digest of International Law 915–916. Transportation has not been provided under these circumstances, however. Id.
See 2 Comp. Gen. 317, 318.
7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 543.1–1, 2 Comp. Gen. 317.
Id. at § 543.1–2. The Foreign Affairs Manual thereafter defines in great detail the authority of consuls to give aid to distressed seamen.
46 U.S.C. 685, R.S. § 4583 (1878), 23 Stat. 54, 30 Stat. 760.
The fact that it is unlikely that such a dispute would be submitted to him is not material to this inquiry.
See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise ch. 18. (4 vol. 1958).
Id.
Restatement, Judgements §41 (1942); Developments in the Law — Res Judicata, 65 Har. L. Rev. 818, 835 (1952).
Restatement, Judgements § 68(1) (1942).
See Schopflocker, “The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law” [1942] Wis. L. Rev. 198, 215–218.
46 U.S.C. 653–660, R.S. §§ 4556–4563.
46 U.S.C. 653, R.S. § 4556.
46 U.S.C. 656, R.S. § 4559.
46 U.S.C. 701 First., R.S. § 4596 (1878), 38 Stat. 1166.
The C. F. Sargent, 95 Fed. 179, 181 (D. Wash. N.D. 1899) What would be the position if a number were involved insufficient to demand a survey is not raised.
Heino v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 116 Wash. 148, 205 Pac. 854 (1921).
R.S. § 4558, 30 Stat. 764.
Supra at pp. 175–177.
McCrea v. United States, 294 U.S. 23 (1934); 46 U.S.C. 685, R.S. §4583 (1878), 23 Stat. 54, 30 Stat. 760.
In the case of unseaworthiness, it is arguably not even subject to review. Supra at p. 182.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 59 (1948).
See Heino v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, supra note 271.
Supra at p. 180.
Supra at p. 183.
28 U.S.C. 1733 (a), 62 Stat. 946 (1948). Another statute makes authenticated copies “of all official entries in the books or records of any such office [consular] ... admissible equally with the originals.” 28 U.S.C. 1740, 62 Stat. 947 (1948).
193 U.S. 599 (1903).
In United States v. Dumas, 149 U.S. 278 (1892), it had been held that the prior administrative determination was final.
141 F. 2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944).
Id. at 572. This is consistent with Rule 516, American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence (Phila., A.L.I. 1942). See also Wigmore on Evidence § 1638 (3rd ed. 1940).
Reid v. American Express Co., 241 U.S. 544 (1915).
Kilgust v. United States, 191 F. 2d 69 (2d Cir. 1951).
30 F. Supp. 354, 356 (S.D. Calif. 1939). Accord, The Oregon, 254 Fed. 752 (E.D. N.Y. 1918). Contra, E.A. McMillin v. Androscoggin Pulp, 291 Fed. 134 (S.D. Me. 1923).
See supra pp. 183. See also Ennis v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 49 F. Supp. 685, 688 (1943), which treated the seaman’s failure to seek a consular determination on the alleged cruelty of the officers as strong evidence of the falsity of that claim.
5 U.S.C. 1009, 60 Stat. 243 (1946).
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1938).
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
See 4 Davis, Administrative Law § 29.02 (4 vol. 1958).
See Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F. 2d 222, 236 (2d Cir. 1962).
248 U.S. 185 (1918).
The Seamen’s Act of 1915, ch. 153, § 11, 38 Stat. 1168.
Supra note 294 at 195.
275 U.S. 463 (1928).
46 U.S.C. 599(e), 1920, 41 Stat. 1006.
U.S. For. Rei.: 1928 at 830–838 (State Dept. 1942); id.: 1929 at 1005–1009 (State Dept. 1943); id.: 1932 at 959–960 (State Dept. 1948).
353 U.S. 138 (1956).
29 U.S.C. 141–188, 61 Stat. 136–160.
353 U.S. 138, 146–147 (1956). It should perhaps be noted at this point that since the executive has been Constitutionally delegated the power to control international relations, Congress too should not interfere. It is, however, too late to question the competence of Congress to domestically neutralize by statute the efforts of the executive in international relations.
29 U.S.C. 141, 61 Stat. 136. “It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of commerce ....”
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
See Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers, 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960), rehearing denied, 363 U.S. 809 (1960).
300 F. 2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id. at 236.
305a McCulloch v. Sociedad de Marineros de Honduras, 372. U.S. 10, 19 (1963).
305b 372 U.S. 24 (1963.
(1958) TIAS 5200, 13 USTIAS 2312.
13 USTIAS 2315
The convention under consideration has been ratified by the United States but has not yet come into force. However, it does represent a consensus among the representativef of nearly all maritime states as to what the law is or should be. See Dissenting Opion os Judge Quintana in Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I. C. J. 150, 178.
Supra at p. 65. Of course, Congress can intentionally and explicitly pass such a statute, but we do not have that problem here.
60 U.S. 183 (1856).
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198–199.
Concluded in 1883, revised 1900, 1911, 1925, 1934, 53 Stat. 1768.
Article 5 ter., 53 Stat. 1768, 1776.
“The use of any invention in any vessel ... of any country which affords similar privileges to vessels ... of the United States, entering the United States temporarily or accidentally, shall not constitute infringement of any patent, if the invention is used exclusively for the needs of the vessel ... and is not sold in or used for the manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the United States.” 35 U.S.C. 272, 66 Stat. 812 (1952).
46 U.S.C. 801–842, 40 Stat. 900–903.
31 F. 2d 663 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929).
The employment relationship is wholly internal to the vessel, whereas in the patent situation, an American national has a direct interest.
60 F. 2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932).
(1927) Art. XXII, 45 Stat. 2618, 2634–2635.
Supra note 320 at 930.
Id. at 929.
See V Hackworth, Digest of International 802, which describes common nationality of the claimant and the plaintiff state as a prerequisite to a valid international claim.
II Hackworth, Digest of International Law 703–708.
Supra at p. 170.
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
See The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927); Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946). It is not pertinent to discuss the dimensions of the remedy at this point. At any rate, all elements of recovery could be had under a tort theory in most situations, although not all elements of tort damages may be recovered under the theory.
For a discussion of the origin of the theory, see Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955). Dixon leaves open the question whether the remedy is one in tort or contract, but the logic of the reasoning would seem to indicate contract. See also Le Gate v. The Panamolga, 221 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1955), also leaving the question open. This theory too results in a recovery of tort damages for personal injuries.
259 U.S. 255 (1922).
The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462 (1898), and The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903).
Work v. Leathers, 97 U.S. 379 (1878); The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895).
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
See Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664 (2d Cir 1960) and Brillis v. Chandris (U.S.A.). Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. N.D. 1963).
See Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F. 2d 651, 653 (4th Cir. 1960).
345 U.S. 571 (1952).
Id. at 587. Cf. Central Vermont Co. v. Durning, 294 U.S. 33 (1935).
Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932); cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932).
See the discussion of the I’m Alone case, supra at pp. 194–195.
Supra at p. 190.
See e.g., Article X, Treaty of 1937 with Honduras, 45 Stat. 2618, 2625–2626.
Supra at pp. 194–195.
Supra at p. 152 et seq.
345 U.S. 571 (1952).
358 U.S. 354 (1958).
p. 575.
346a 372 U.S. 10, 19 n. (1963).
358 U.S. 354, 382–384.
345 U.S. 571, 584 (1952).
The place of contracting too is purely fortuitous and should have no bearing on the choice of governing law. Id. at 588.
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Rainey v. New York & P.S.S. Co., Ltd., 216 Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1914).
345 U.S. 586.
Gambeta v. Bergoty, 13z F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942); Bolden v. Jensen, 70 Fed. 505 (D. Wash. N.D. 1895). It should be pointed out that this does not affect the constitutional argument discussed previously. Supra at pp. 169 et seq.
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587 (1952).
As a matter of cutomary international law, there can be no question of the right of, the United States to prescribe rules of conduct binding on its own nationals anywhere in the world and to apply these rules to them at will. Supra at p. 108. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1940); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952).
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 588–589 (1952); cf. Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901); Hatzoglou v. Asturias Shipping Co., 193 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
345 U.S. 589.
See Kontos v. The S.S. Sophie C., 184 F. Supp. 835. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1937), cert, denied, 302 U.S. 750 (1937); Berendson v. Rederiaktiebolaget Volo, 257 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1958); The Ivaran, 121 F. 2d 445 (2d Cir. 1941); The Knappingsborg, 26 F2d 935 (E.D. N.Y. 1928); The Ferm, 15 F.2d 887 (E.D. N.Y. 1926); Radovcic v. The Princ Pavle, 45 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. N.Y. 1942) — in a prior decision in the same matter, the court had declined to dismiss the action because there was no showing that the remedy by the Yugoslav official in New York would result in getting mony into the hands of the seaman. That defect was corrected before this decision. See 43 F. Supp. 1013. The Lynhaug, 42 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1941); The Astra, 34 F. Supp. 152 (D. Md. 1940).
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, zyy F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1960).
7 F.2d 741 (E.D. Va. 1925), aff’d, 12 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1926).
Bickel, Alexander M., “Forum Non Conveniens in Admiralty,” 35 Cornell L.Q. 12, 28 (1950).
See Kontos v. The S.S. Sophie C., 184 F. Supp. 835, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
In Kontos v. The S.S. Sophie C, id., the court retained jurisdiction notwithstanding that the plaintiffs had returned to Greece, the country claimed to constitute a more convenient forum to resolve the dispute. However, in that case, the vessel was registered in Liberia, owned by a British corporation, the beneficial interest in which was held by an Argentine national. It was therefore by no means clear that the Greek court would not be applying Liberian law which incorporates the non-statutory maritime law of the United States, a law which United States courts are more competent to apply. Id. at 837. At any rate, there was no forum common to plaintiff and defendant, which would have been a much more persuasive argument for dismissal. See The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 368–369 (1884).
The S.S. Emmy, 39 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); The Seirstad, 12 F.2d 133 (E.D. N.Y. 1926). In the latter case, the motion to dismiss was originally granted upon a showing that the Norwegian consul was prepared to provide the plaintiff with free transportation to Norway where an effective remedy for his injuries existed. However, on reargument, the court was satisfied that the seaman had taken out “first papers” for American citizenship and would in all probability because of the seriousness of his injuries be unable to return to the United States. The court felt that it would be an undue hardship under these circumstances to relegate him to his remedy in Norway.
See The City of Carlisle, 39 Fed. 807 (D. Ore. 1889); The Seirstad, id; cf. O’Neill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947).
See The Seirstad, 12 F.2d 133 (E.D. N.Y. 1926); The Troop, 128 Fed. 856, 862–863 (9th Cir. 1904).
Cf. The Walter D. Wallet, 66 Fed. 1011 (S.D. Ala. 1895).
The Noodleburn, 30 Fed. 142 (D. Ore. 1887); The Troop, supra note 367.
See The City of Carlisle, 39 Fed. 807 (D. Ore. 1889).
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Garbesi, G.C. (1968). Consular Authority Specifically Defined. In: Consular Authority Over Seamen from the United States Point of View. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6267-0_5
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