Abstract
In philosophy, the view of existence as something accidental to the nature of things and accruing to them from a creative source is due to’ Alfarabi and Avicenna. Alfarabi was the first philosopher to transpose into the metaphysical order the Aristotelian distinction between knowledge of what a thing is and knowledge of its existence. He interpreted this logical distinction as an indication of a real difference in things between their essence and their existence. In this distinction, he saw what separates the Necessary Being from all contingent beings and the dependence of all finite beings on God. Alfarabi did not explain how he regarded existence, except to say that it is accidental in contingent beings. Nevertheless, if he did not exploit the implications of his distinction, he added a new dimension to metaphysics and started an agelong controversy.1 Its first echo is heard in the opposition of Averroes to Algazali and Avicenna.
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References
I. Madkour, La place d’Alfarabi dans l’école philosophique musulmane (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1934), p. 221;
J. Chevallier, Histoire de la pensée (Paris: Flammarion, 1960), Vol. II, pp. 262–63;
E. Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 185. It may be that the Gem of Wisdom is not Alfarabi’s but Avicenna’s; however, the same doctrine in found in the Fontes Questionum recognized as a work of Alfarabi
cf. M. Cruz Hernandes, “El Fontes Questionum,” in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, XVIII (1951), 304–5, with the Latin text on pp. 316–18;
A. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sina (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), pp. 151–55.
On the discussed authorship of the Gem of Wisdom, cf. M. T. D’Alverny, “An-niya-Anitas,” in Mélanges offerts à E. Gilson (Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), 71–72;
for references, N. Rescher, Al-Farabi, An Annotated Bibliography (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), s.v. Strauss (1934), Georr (1941–46), Pines (1951).
Avicenna, Metaphysica (Opera per canonicos regulares s. Augustini emendata, Venitiis, 1508), IV, 2, fol. 85v: Omne enim quod incipit esse, antequam fit, necesse est ut sit possibile in se. Si enim non fuerit possible in se, illud non erit ullo modo. Non est autem possibilitas sui esse eo quod agens sit potens supra illud cum ipsum non fuerit possible. Metaphysica, IX, 4, fol. 104v: Possibilitas sui esse est ei propter se, non propter principium, sed est ei a principio necessitas sui esse. The metaphysical essentialism of Avicenna has often been scored: L. Gardet, “En l’honneur du millénaire d’Avicenne,” Revue thomiste, LI (1951), 335–37;
E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 75–80;
G. Smith, “Avicenna and the Possibles,” in New Scholasticism, XVII (1943), 346–48;
B. Zedier, “St. Thomas and Avicenna in the De Potentia Dei,” in Traditio, VI (1948), 152–56.
G. Vajda, “Notes d’Avicenne sur la Théologie d’Aristote,” in Revue thomiste, LI (1951), 346–406, and comments of L. Gardet, pp. 335–40; on Avicenna’s theory of creative emanations
D. Saliba, Etude sur la métaphysique d’Avicenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1926), pp. 125–46;
A. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sina, pp. 224–43; L. Gard et, “Quelques aspects de la pensée avicennienne,” in Revue thomiste, XLVII (1939), 552–63. There is no evidence that Avicenna knew of the Book on Causes’, but he knew Proclus
cf. L. Gardet et M. Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 246–47.
Metaphysica, VIII, 6, fol. 100v.
A. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sina, pp. 114–23; M. D. Roland-Gosselin, Le “De Ente et Essentia” de s. Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 151–56;
A. Forest, La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1956), pp. 140–41, 160–65.
Metaphysica, VIII, 5, fol. 99v.
J. Paulus, Henri de Gond, essai sur les tendences de sa métaphysique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. 274–77. Although Avicenna starts his metaphysics with an analysis of the notion of being, we must not overlook his frequent references to the allegory of The Floating Man, cf. De Anima, V, 7, fol. 27v, which shows the possibility of an experience of pure existence, at least of one’s own existence.
See, A. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1951), pp. 21–23, and La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ihn Sina, pp. 13–15;
E. Gilson, “Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,” in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age, IV (1929–1930), pp. 40–42.
T. O’Shaughnessy, “St. Thomas Changing Estimate of Avicenna’s Teaching on Existence as an Accident,” in The Modern Schoolman, XXXVI (1959), 253–57.
For the history of the Maqacid and the Tahafut, cf. B. Zedier, Averroes’ Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin Version of Calo Calony-mos, ed. B. Zedier (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 5–9. For Algazel’s criticism of Avicenna’s theory of being, cf. fol. 33vb–34ra, pp. 248–49; fol. 34vb–35ra, pp. 254–59.
A verroes’ Destructio Destructionum, fol. 34va, p. 252: Nam ipse [Algazel] existimat quod entitas, scilicet quod res sit, est quid additum quidditati extra animam, et quasi accidit ei.... Quod autem esse apud Avicennam sit accidens eveniens quidditati, id indicat sermo Algazelis hic.
Cf. M. D. Roland-Gosselin, Le “De Ente et Essentia”, pp. 157–59.
A verroes’ Destructio Destructionum, fol. 34va, p. 252.
Metaphysics, IV, 2, 1003 b 26–33; cf. J. Tricot, Aristote, La Métaphysique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), I, pp. 112–13;
W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), I, pp. 257–58.
Averroes, Aristotelis metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Av err ois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et Epitome (Venetiis: apud Juntas, 1562), Vol. VIII, Epitome, I, fol. 357vm–358ra. Istae ergo sunt famosiores res de quibus dicitur nomen entis in philosophia; et est de nominibus transumptivis, quia id quod a vulgo significatur per ipsum est aliud quam id quod significatur in hoc loco; nam plebs indicat aliquid inesse alicui rei, cum dicit invenitur perditum, tandem apud eos significatur aliquid inesse subjecto, licet non declaraverint ipsum. Hinc est quod aliqui existimaverunt ipsum significare accidens aliquod in re existens, et non ejus essentiam, quia illud apud plebem est de nominibus denominativis. Sed nos non debemus hoc recipere.
Cf. E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 75–82.
Averroes’ Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis, ed. B. Zedier, Disp. V, fol. 34va, p. 253: Nomen entis dicitur de duobus. Unum quidem de vero, et alterum de eo quod opponitur privationi. Et hoc est quod dividitur in decern praedicamenta, et est tanquam genus eis.... Et hoc modo dicitur de substantia quod sit ens ex se et de accidenti quod sit ens, ex eo quod reperitur in ente ex se. Ens vero, quod est de vero, communicant in eo omnia praedicamenta aequaliter. Cf. again In Meta., V, 7, fol. 117rb; Epitome, I, fol. 358rb.
Averroes’ Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis, ibid., p. 253: Ens quidem quod est verum, est quid in intellectibus, et est esse rei extra animam, prout in anima.... Cum autem aliquis dicit quod esse est additum quidditati, et non constituitur eo ens per se, est sermo fallax nimis....
Averroes’ Destructio Destructionum, Disp. III, fol. 25 ra, pp. 187–88: Quod autem est necessarium ex causa, non est necessarium ex se. Et nemo dubitat quod istae differentiae non sunt differentiae substantiates, idest dividentes substantiam, nee additae substantiae; sed sunt res negativae et relativae; sicut dicimus de re inventa quod non significat rem additam substantiae extra animam, eo modo quo dicimus de re quod sit alba. Et ex hoc erravit Avicenna… For the source of the doctrine in Plato, cf. Timaeus, 41 a 7–9: Gods, children of gods, who are my works and of whom I am the maker and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is compounded can be resolved ... Wherefore, since you are creatures, you are not altogether imperishable, but you shall certainly not be dissolved… Cf. Calcidius, Timaeus, II, CXXXIX (ed. J. H. Waszink, Corpus Platonicorum Medii Aevi, Vol. IV; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), pp. 179–80. St. Thomas frequently refers to this view, e.g. In II Sent., I, 1, 3, obj. 1; I, 50, 5, ad 2; De Spir. Great., I, arg. 18; De Coelo et Mundo, I, 12, lect. 29, n. 8.
Cf. L. Kendzierski, “The Doctrine of Eternal Matter and Form,” in The Modern Schoolman, XXXI (1953–1954), 171–83;
M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 118–24;
G. Jalbert, Nécessité et contingence chez saint Thomas et chez ses prédécesseurs (Ottawa: Editions de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1961), pp. 37–42. The case of the celestial bodies seemed to make exception; but Averroes explained their immutability, as Aristotle had, by recourse to the doctrine of quintessence.
Phys., VIII, 1, 251 b 10–28; De Coelo, I, 12, 281 b 26 – 282 b 12; De Generatione et Corruptions II, 10, 337 a 15 – 337 b 35.
A verroes’ Destructio Destructionem, Disp. III, fol. 24ra, p. 181; cf. M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, pp. 129, 131, 138.
Meta., XII, 7, 1072 b 14.
In Phys., VIII, lect. 2, nn. 1996–2006: Ex hac autem Aristotelis probations Averroes occasionem sumpsit loquendi contra id quod secundum fidem de creatione credimus.... Sed si quis recte consideret, ex simili causa ipse deceptus fuit ex qua causa nos deceptos arbritatur, scilicet ex consideratione particularium entium... Si fiat aliquod particulare ens non fit ex omnio non ente; sed si fiat totum ens, quod est fieri ens inquantum est ens, oportet quod fiat ex penitus non ente; si tarnen et hoc debeat dici fieri, aequivoce enim dicitur.... R. Jolivet, Essai sur les rapports entre la pensée grecque et la pensée chrétienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955), pp. 48–49, comments: “St. Thomas intends to prove that fidelity to Aristotelian principles leads inevitably to the distinction, which he here advocates, between generation and the production of the whole entity of beings. The reasoning of St. Thomas is simply an extension of Aristotelian doctrine. One might say that St. Thomas forges to the end of the trail opened by Aristotle.” — Our contention is that the trail to creation is not along the path of essence, but along that of existence. It leads from existence as a fact to existence as existential act.
The case of Siger de Brabant is instructive. In Quaestiones in metaphysicam (ed. C. Graiff, Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1948), qu. 7, pp. 16–22, Siger confessed that he could not make any sense of a real distinction between esse and essence. Later, qu. 18, p. 153, Siger was exercised by the objection that an absolute beginning or creation ex nihilo is a contradiction in terms. Siger claimed that Aristotle nowhere proves that it is a contradiction, but merely asserts that it is. Siger believed that Aristotle was wrong from the viewpoint of Christian faith; but, speaking as a philosopher, he admitted that he could not meet the objection.
S. Mansion, “Les positions maîtresses d’Aristote,” Aristote et saint Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1957), pp. 66–67.
In I Sent., XIX, 2, 2 (ed. Mandonnet, I, p. 470): sicut motus est actus ipsius mobilis, inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est.
Meta., L, 9, 1074 b 34.
De Subs. Sep., 7, n. 49: Oportet igitur supra modum fiendi quo aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod esse at-tribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente quod est suum esse.
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Thibault, H.J. (1970). Two Views of Creation. In: Creation and Metaphysics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6255-7_3
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