Abstract
There are almost as many ways to approach an investigation of the nature of science as there are investigators. Historically, two points of view have been taken, each of which has led to fruitful results. Science has been viewed either as a method of acquiring knowledge or as a systematic body of knowledge. All through history, however, the idea of a system has been a regulative one in the minds of scientists. Even if a specific method had to be used, the feeling was that one had no science until the information gathered could be expressed in systematic form. In fact a great deal of the controversy over the question of the scientific nature of sociology or psychology seemed to revolve around this. These two fields of knowledge were not systematic and hence did not have the formal appearance of sciences. The best example of a system is to be found in geometry and for this reason the deductive form came to be the ideal of all scientists, a form each ardently desired for the particular branch of science in which his interest lay. The work of people like David Hilbert and the Formalist school of logic soon revealed the fact that the structure of geometry was not peculiar in any way to geometry but one which could be generalized and applied to many fields.
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Bibliography
G. Bergmann, Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1954).
Ludwig van Bertalanffy, “An Outline of General System Theory,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, 1950–51, pp. 134–173.
R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), chapter 2.
Chapter 2 contains a very good but technical discussion of the nature of a system.
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A good concrete discussion of the structure of physical theories.
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A good but relatively technical introduction to the logical analysis of languages and especially formal systems.
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—, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), chapter 1.
A good discussion of language but oriented towards the verifiability theory of meaning.
J. H. Woodger, “Science Without Properties,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, 1950–51, pp. 193–217. Uses method of formal structure of science to attempt to construct a language for scientific purposes without terms for properties.
—, “From Biology to Mathematics,” Ibid., Vol. III, 1952–53, pp. 1–21. A continuation of “Science Without Properties” and valuable in showing how one goes about constructing a language.
—, “The Technique of Theory Construction,” International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2, No. 5, 1939.
A discussion of the way to go about constructing a theory using biology as its field.
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© 1957 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Kattsoff, L.O. (1957). Science as a Language. In: Physical Science and Physical Reality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6048-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6048-5_2
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