Conclusion

Abstract

It was stated at the outset that the aim of this study was to examine a particular theory of certainty developed in England between 1630 and 1690, first in the area of theology and then in science. The major features of the theory as we have examined it can be set out as follows. In the first place there is a recognition of an ideal in knowledge, that the real essence or internal structure of things — the inner springs and wheels of nature, to use the common mechanical metaphor — can be known. Second, there is a hope that science as a demonstrative system and metaphysics are both possible. But whatever the expectations may be, there is a realistic recognition that they cannot be fulfilled since critical arguments can be raised against any claim to absolute certainty. The senses are recognized to be deceptive in their reports — distance, medium, size, and familiarity of the object all affect perception — and subjective in orientation. The mind’s ability to weigh evidence and to see connections among its ideas as well as between ideas and real objects, is problematic on account of prejudice, the passions, the failure of memory, and the fall of man. The complexity of nature is recognized as a problem too. These three factors, if taken together and considered seriously, could lead to a complete skepticism about nature. However, an attempt is made to avoid such a conclusion as destructive of life, if not of knowledge alone.