Abstract
Women and men suffer from violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Both sexes suffer from discrimination based on religion or belief. Women and men are harassed, oppressed, arrested, incarcerated, assaulted, and even killed for their beliefs. Considering the international community’s growing emphasis on the application of a gender perspective on human rights violations,2 one has to wonder whether women suffer abuses of their right to freedom of religion or belief due to the very fact that they are women or whether these abuses are unassociated with their gender. More specifically, one should ask to what extent and under which circumstances questions of gender are directly or indirecdy relevant to the area of freedom of religion or belief.
“States... must take measures to ensure that freedom of thought, conscience and religion... will be guaranteed and protected in law and in practice for both men and women, on the same terms and without discrimination... States... should... provide information on the status of women as regards their freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and indicate what steps they have taken or intend to take both to eliminate and prevent infringements of these freedoms in respect of women and to protect their rights against any discrimination.”1
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of the author’s articles that appeared as “Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief,” BTU Law Review (2000): 967, and as “The Advancement of Women’s Equal Enjoyment of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief,” Freedom of Religion: A Precious Human Right, ed. Jonneke M. M. Naber (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorkum, 2000), 54.
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author alone.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Human Rights Committee General Comment 28 (2000) concerning equality of rights between men and women (ICCPR, art. 3), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.lO, para. 21.
Closer attention is also being paid to the application of a gender perspective in the area of freedom of religion or belief. See Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/42 (2001), para. 7.
It has, for instance, been stated that “Few issues are as capable of raising so much emotion as those relating to our religion or belief.” See “Keynote Address by Hilde Johnson, Former Norwegian Minister for International Cooperation and Human Rights,” Seminar on Freedom of Religion or Belief in the OSCE Region; Challenges to Law and Practice, ed. Chantai Grotens and Bahia Tahzib-Lie (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001), 27.
The right to freedom of religion or belief embraces theistic, nontheistic, and atheistic beliefs. For a discussion, see Cornelis D. de Jong, The Freedom of Thought: Conscience and Religion or Belief in the United Nations (1946–1992) (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2000), 20–34. Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 (1993) (art. 18 ICCPR), UN Doc. A/48/40 (Pt. I), para. 2.
The Human Rights Committee has observed that: “The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents of other religions or non-believers” (General Comment 22, para. 9). equality and nondiscrimination between women and men, as well as women’s equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, do not occur automatically as a result of the overall protection and promotion of human rights. See report by the UN Secretary General, Integrating the Gender Perspective into the Work of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/MC/1998/6, para. 17 (1998) (hereinafter “Report by the UN Secretary General”).
Women’s right to freedom of religion or belief has been specifically acknowledged in two global and one regional instrument specific to women, namely, the outcome document of the 23rd special session of the UN General Assembly entitled Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty- First Century, para. 98(c) (2000) (hereinafter “Beijing +5 document”); BDPA, Annex I, para. 12 and Annex II, paras. 24, 72, 80(f) and Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, art. 4(i) (hereinafter “Convention of Belém do Para”).
See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 2(1); CEDAW, art. 1; BDPA, paras. 214,216; United Nations Millennium Declaration, para. 4. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 21(3), UN Doc. A/CONF.183/
See generally Douglas Cassel and Jull Guzman, “The Law and Reality of Discrimination Against Women,” Women and International Human Rights Law, 3 vols., ed. Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999), 1:287. Whereas “sex” refers to biological and physical differences between males and females, “gender” refers to socially defined or socially constructed differences, taking into account such factors as power imbalances, socioeconomic disparities and culturally reinforced stereotypes. See Report by the UN Secretary General, para. 16. Nevertheless, the concepts of “sex” and “gender” tend to be used inconsistently or interchangeably in international instruments in the areas of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law. See, e.g., Corinne Packer, “The Development of the Human Rights of Women,” 14 June 1999, The Hague (a report submitted to the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, DCE), 26–27; Koenig and Askin, “International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes against Women,” in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 2:3.
For compilations of international norms regarding freedom of religion or belief, see Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), Appendix B, 499–551; Helsinki Monitor 9, no. 3 (1998): 106–15; Tad Stahnke and J. Paul Martin, eds., Religion and Human Rights: Basic Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18 (hereinafter “UDHR”); ICCPR, art. 18(1); 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, art. 1(1) (hereinafter “1981 Declaration”); European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9(1) (hereinafter “ECHR”); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 12(1) (hereinafter “ACHR”); Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, principle 9(4) (1990) (hereinafter “Copenhagen OSCE Document”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 10(1). For a discussion on internal freedom, see de Jong, Freedom of Thought, 19–75. From the UDHR onward, the wording of internal freedom in global human rights instruments has, by and large, become more restrictive. The wording in later global instruments no longer explicitly guarantees free, ongoing choice for each individual in terms of religion or belief. At best it is alluded to. However, an interesting development is that the UN Commission on Human Rights has affirmed in recent years that the right to freedom of religion or belief also embraces the freedom to change. See, e.g., Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/42 (2001), para. 4(a); Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2000/33 (2000), para. 4(a). See also General Comment 22, para. 5 and General Comment 28, para. 21.
UDHR, art. 18; ICCPR, art. 18(1). For a similar definition, see 1981 Declaration, art. 1(1); ECHR, art. 9(1); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 10(1). For less elaborate definitions, see, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 3; ACHR, art. 12(1); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, principle 7, adopted 1 August 1975; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 8, adopted 27 June 1981. For a discussion on external freedom, see de Jong, Freedom of Thought, 77–168, 249–606.
For a comprehensive list of examples of external freedom, see 1981 Declaration, art. 6; General Comment 22, para. 4; Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, principle 16,4 November 1986–17 January 1989 (hereinafter “Vienna Concluding Document”).
For a description of these human rights, see ICCPR, art. 19, 21, and 22.
For a description of these human rights, see ICESCR, art. 12, 13, and 6.
It has been pointed out that the right to freedom of religion or belief lies at the interface between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. Christine Chinkin, “Cultural Relativism and International Law,” Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women, ed. Courtney W. Howland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 55, 56. [1] ICCPR, art. 4(2); ACHR, art. 27(2). See also Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; art. 27: “Protected persons are entided, in all circumstances, to respect for... their religious convictions and practices” (hereinafter “Fourth Geneva Convention”). For an elaborate discussion on derogation clauses, see Human Rights Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1985): 1–14,23–34, 89–131.
ICCPR, art. 18(2); 1981 Declaration, art. 1(2). For the three possible meanings of coercion, see Peter Cumper, “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion,” The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law, ed. David Harris and Sarah Joseph (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 355,370–71.
See General Comment 22, para. 5. Opinions are divided as to what constitutes indirect forms of impermissible pressure. For a framework of four interrelated variables designed to help disentangle the different factors that states have used to draw the line between “proper” and “improper” proselytism, see Tad Stahnke, “Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law,” BTU Law Review (2000): 251, 326–38.
The draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (hereinafter “Draft Articles on State Responsibility”), adopted by the UN International Law Commission (hereinafter “ILC”) on 3 August 2001, provides that: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State” (art. 2). Article 3 sets forth that “[t]he characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.” The Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 5, 7, 8, 9, also refer to the conduct of a person or group of persons. The final version of the articles (including some oral amendments made during the adoption of the commentaries) will be issued as part of the report of the ILC to UNGA and posted on the website of the ILC: www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/ 53/53sess.htm. This chapter uses the last available version of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which does not incorporate oral amendments, contained in UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.l (2001).
The concept of due diligence emerged in some other areas of international law, such as international environmental law, international alien law, and international law concerning diplomatic immunity. However, the term due diligence has not always been explicitiy utilized; it has been interchanged with “due care” and “all appropriate steps.” In the area of the prevention of transfrontier water pollution, see, e.g., J. G. Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses: A Search for Substantive Rules and Principles of Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 348–56, 378–81, 597, 614–15, 632–33, and 661; UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, art. 7(1). In the area of the prevention of injuries to aliens, see, e.g., Richard B. Lillich and John M. Paxman, “State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities,” American University Law Review 26 (1977): 245—49. In the area of the protection of the premises of the mission, diplomats and their private residences, see, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 22(2), 29(1), and 30(1); Case Concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (ICJ, 24 May 1980), particularly paras. 63, 67; Agbor v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 1 WLR703 (1969) (CA).
Amnesty International, Broken Bodies, Shattered Minds: The Torture of Women Worldwide, AI ndex ACT 40/003/2001—News Service No. 26 (2001), 7.
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Series C: Decisions and Judgments, no. 4 (1988) (Inter-Am. CtHR, 29 July 1988), paras. 174,177, International Legal Materials28 (1989), 294. See generally Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, UN Doc. E/ CN.4/1996/53, paras. 32–39 (1996). For a questionnaire to assess state adherence to the due diligence standard, see Coomaraswamy, Violence against Women in the Family: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68, para. 25 (1999).
US Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2000 (November 2000), 188, 434; Abdelfattah Amor, Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, report submitted by Special Rapporteur in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/39, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/65, para. 50 (2000) (hereinafter Special Rapporteur’s Report 2000); UN Secretary General, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. A/51/542/Add.2, para. 105 (1996) (hereinafter “Implementation Report of the Secretary General”); Amor, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1996/95/Add.l, para. 66 (1996).
Amor, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/6, para. 62(e) (1998) (hereinafter “Special Rapporteur’s Report 1998”).
Special Rapporteur’s Report 2000, para. 79 (2000).
Amor, Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58, para. 72 (1999) (hereinafter “Special Rapporteur’s Report 1999”).
Ibid., paras. 61 and 111; Special Rapporteur’s Report 2000, para. 79 (2000).
Bahâ’i International Community, The Bah a’is: A Profile of the BahdH Faith and its Worldwide Community (n.p., 1994), 58–59.
Ibid.
Secretary General, Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. A/54/386, para. 137 (1999) (hereinafter “Elimination of Religious Intolerance”).
It has been argued that the state may not demand to know what belief a person holds. The obligation to reveal one’s religion or belief in a census or other registration conflicts with internal freedom. It has been explained that perhaps the explanation for this very strong protection of internal freedom is “that there is no good reason why the state needs the information (though there are bad ones)” (D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights [London: Butterworths, 1995], 361). See also P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 542.
Section II.B explains that a state may interfere under strict circumstances with a particular manifestation of a person’s religion or belief.
This grey area is often not acknowledged. For instance, it has been explained: “This absolute freedom to entertain any thought, moral conviction or religious view is not without practical importance. It is true that thoughts and views, as long as they have not been expressed, are intangible and that convictions are really valuable for the person concerned only if he can express them. This does not render the (inner) freedom of thought, conscience and religion useless. Its guarantee also implies that one cannot be subjected to a treatment intended to change the process of thinking, that any form of compulsion to express thoughts, to change an opinion, or to divulge a religious conviction is prohibited, and that no sanction may be imposed either on the holding of any view whatever or on the change of a religion or conviction: it protects against indoctrination by the State” (van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention, 541–42; footnotes 1392 and 1393 omitted).
See, e.g., Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.l, UN Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960), 16.
See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992, art. 2(1); Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, opened for signature 1 February 1995, ETS no. 157, art. 7; Copenhagen OSCE Document, principle 32.3.
For a further discussion of this issue, see Nazila Ghanea, “Apostasy and Freedom to Change Religion or Belief,” in this volume.
See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, art. 1 (hereinafter “DEVAW”) and BDPA, para. 113. See also Convention of Belém do Para, art. 1 and General Recommendation 19 concerning violence against women adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1992) (hereinafter “General Recommendation on Violence Against Women”). For examples of acts of violence against women, see DEVAW, art. 2; Convention of Belém do Para, art. 2; BDPA, Section D.
See, e.g., Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 10 June 2000, para. 13 of Resolution II, UN Doc. A/S-23/10/Rev.l (2000); DEVAW, art. 4(c); BDPA, para. 124(b). See also General Recommendation on Violence Against Women, para. 9; Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/49 (2001), paras. 2,10; Special Rapporteur’s Report 1999, para. 101. It has further been argued that ICCPR, art. 2(1), imposes such an affirmative obligation on states. See Howland, “Safeguarding Women’s Political Freedoms under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the Face of Religious Fundamentalism,” in Religious Fundamentalisms, 93–103.
It was apparent during the six-week negotiations on the Dutch-sponsored resolution “Working Towards the Elimination of Crimes Against Women Committed in the Name of Honor” (UNGA Resolution 55/66) in the Third Committee of the 55 th session of the UN General Assembly in October/November 2000 that the scope and precise meaning of “due diligence” needs to be clarified. For instance, before asking for a vote on the draft resolution, the Permanent Representative of Jordan, HRH Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (in his oral statement in explanation of vote on 3 November 2000), critically commented: “How could states possibly exercise due diligence to prevent such crimes, if the crime in question is committed in a sudden state of rage? All states, wherein we find crimes of passion, would in due course leave themselves open to potential accusations of human rights violations for not having exercised ‘enough’ due diligence to prevent the commission of this crime.” Due diligence does not impose impossible burdens on states; it merely requires them to take reasonable and appropriate steps where these may fairly be expected. the mission, diplomats, and their private residences. It has been interchanged with phrases such as “due care,” “special duty to take all appropriate steps,” and “all appropriate steps.” For references, see footnote 20. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights referred to “reasonable steps.” See Velasquez Rodriguez Case.
For the relevant limitation clauses, see, e.g., ICCPR, art. 18(3); ECHR, art. 9(2). Under these provisions, limitations are permissible only with respect to manifestations of religion or belief. The ECHR determines that the third condition should be necessary “in a democratic society.” In the view of the European Court of Human Rights, democratic society necessarily presupposes religious pluralism. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 EHRR 397 (1994) (ECtHR260-A, 23 June 1993), para. 31; Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 23 EHRR 387 (1997) (ECtHR 1996-IV, 26 September 1996), 1362–63. With this understanding, practice has shown that this addition is more a case of verbiage than of substance. Certainly, a human rights violation does not become more “necessary” just because it happens in a nondemocratic society. For a detailed discussion on limitation clauses, see Human Rights Quarterly?, no. 1 (1985): 1–22, 35–88,155. The European Court of Human Rights generally is reluctant to question a government’s rationale for limiting manifestations of freedom of religion or belief. See T. Jeremy Gunn, “Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights” in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspectives: Legal Perspectives, ed. John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 305. There have been, however, some exceptions to this general reluctance. See Darby v. Sweden, 13 EHRR 774 (1991) (EctHR 187-A, 23 October 1990), para. 34; Thlimmenos v. Greece, App. no. 34369/97 (ECtHR, 6 April 2000), para. 47.
ICCPR, art. 4(2); ACHR, art. 27(2). See also Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 27.
General Comment 22, para. 8; the UN Human Rights Committee also recommended that in “[interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, State’s Parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, including the right to equality and nondiscrimination on all grounds specified in Articles 2, 3 and 26.” This has also been emphasized by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (formerly: Religious Intolerance). See, e.g., Amor, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, paras. 110(b), 122 (1998) (hereinafter “Report on Question of Religious Intolerance”).
See, e.g., Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolâin, “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 627.
The doctrine of a margin of appreciation was first explained by the European Court of Human Rights in Handyside v. U.K. (ECtHR24-A, 7 December 1976), paras. 48^9. For a discussion, see Paul Mahoney et al., “The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention on Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice,” Human Rights Law Journal 19, no. 1 (1998): 1–36; Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Human Rights Jurisprudence (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996); Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000); van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention, 82–95.
Eloquendy put by Harris, O’Boyle, and Warbrick in Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14.
See also Paul Mahoney, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?” Human Rights Law Journal 19, no. 1 (1998): 5; Jeroen Schrokkenbroek, “The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights: General Report,” Human Rights Law Journal 19, no. 1 (1998): 34–35. See also Rasmussen v. Denmark (ECtHR 87- A, 28 November 1984), para. 40.
Noted in connection with the ECHR by van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 87.
Ibid., 91.
No value judgement concerning the beliefs involved or the interpretations of the beliefs involved are intended. It has been critically noted that “[i]f one’s religious beliefs dictate... the subjugation of women, they do not cease to do so merely because this is deemed incompatible with human rights protection. One might be required as a matter of public order or in the interests of preserving the rights of others to refrain from manifesting those rights, but is it the place of human rights law to attempt to influence and judge the validity of those beliefs themselves?… [I]t needs to be accepted that in recognizing the freedom of religion, the international system is recognizing the intrusion of systems of belief which are of fundamental importance to the believer and which may dictate patterns of behaviour which simply cannot be contained within the existing web of human rights thinking” (Malcolm D. Evans, “Religious Diversity and Religious Liberty as Human Right” [paper submitted for presentation at the International Conference on Human Rights and Our Responsibilities Towards Future Generations: An Inter-Religious Perspective, 6–8 May 1999, Valetta, Malta], 13 [endnotes 50 and 51 omitted]).
This can be concluded from the second prong of the three-pronged test for permissible restrictions. Traditional Practices: Female Genital Surgery,“ in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 1:651–82; Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Girls, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/42, paras. 25–138 (1986) (hereinafter ”Report ofWorking Group“).
See Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000), para. 84. See also Larissis and Others v. Greece, 27 EHRR 329 (1999) (ECtHR 1998–1, 24 February 1998), 378, para. 40; Report on the Question of Religious Intolerance, paras. 107(d), 110(b); Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1985/4 (1984), annex, principles 15–18 (hereinafter “Siracusa Principles”).
It has been suggested that the “prescribed by law” test also extends to unwritten norms of common law which are clearly expressed. Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (KM: N. P. Engel, 1993), 324.
uprincipies on Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation,“ Article 19, Defining Defamation (London: Article 19, 2000), 4. See also Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996), annex Principle 1.1(a). For examples of vague, imprecise, and so-called ”catch-all“ provisions, see Report on Question of Religious Intolerance, para. 107.
The Arab Human Rights Charter, which has been presumably adopted by the Council of the Arab League on 15 September 1994 and which has not been ratified by a single Arab state since, is “weak on mechanisms for the implementation of the rights it recognizes, since the powers and competence of the committee of human rights experts it provides for are confined to examining reports submitted to it by states parties to the Charter, and reporting on them to the Permanent Commission of Human Rights of the Arab League” (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, “Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 [2001]: 701–32, 715 [footnote 25 omitted]).
A wealth of literature is available on these international supervisory bodies, including a discussion on how to bring a case successfully before them. See, e.g., Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Martin Scheinin, “The Human Rights Committee,” in this volume; Ineke Boerefijn, The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights Committee (Antwerp: Intersentia, 1999); Javier Martinez-Torrôn and Rafael Navarro-Valls, “The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe”, in this volume; van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention; Chidi Anselm Odinkalu and Camilla Christensen, “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures,” Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998): 235–80; Evelyn A. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); David Harris and Stephen Livingstone, The Inter-American System of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
For other examples, see General Comment 28, para. 13.
The World Health Organization estimates that 138 million women worldwide have undergone the procedure; Carol Midgley, “Why Must We Still Be Mutilated?” The Times, 24 August 2001, http:// www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0„7–2001293129,00.html.
See, e.g., Rahman and Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide, 6, 31, 34; Halima Embarek Warzazi, Preliminary Special Rapporteur’s Report on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/6, para. 40 (1995); Halima Embarek Warzazi, Third Report on the Situation Regarding the Elimination of Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and the Girl Child, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/14, paras. 41,47–50 (1999) (referring to a decision of the Egyptian Council of State and a symposium of twenty-six religious leaders and medical personnel from eleven African countries held in Banjul, Gambia, 20–24 July 1998, which emphasized that FGM is not prescribed by any religion); Guidelines on the Prevention of Female Genital Mutilation, 2d rev. ed. (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1986), 4, 19.
General Comment 22, para. 4. respected, or restricted, irrespective of the question of whether it constitutes the manifestation of a major religion or of a less well-known belief’ (ibid., 153).
For an explanation on the ramifications of the uses of the different terminologies, see Gunning, “Women and Traditional Practices,” 651 n.l.
It has been argued against approaching FGM as an “arrogant perceiver... [one who] sees himself as the center of the world” (Gunning, “Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 23 [1992], 229). See Coomaraswamy, “Different but Free: Cultural Relativism and Women’s Rights as Human Rights,” Religious Fundamentalisms, 83, 84, 86, 87, who rather speaks of “the communal arrogance of the international community.” Although vehemently opposed to the practice, a circumcised Somali woman, born and brought up in the UK, explains that she is not angry with her mother: “People think ‘Oh God, those mothers, how could they hurt their children?’ but I know they did it for the love of us. In the old days a man wouldn’t marry a woman who wasn’t circumcised. To women in our culture, getting married and having children is everything and there is great shame on a woman who doesn’t achieve that. Our mothers and grandmothers had had it done to them, yes, but they had forgotten the physical pain they went through. In fact, they had it worse. In the old days they used to use thorns to hold the skin together” (Midgley, “Why must we still be mutilated?” http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0„7–2001293129,00.html).
See Siracusa Principles, principle 25.
See, e.g., Traditional or Customary Practices Affecting the Health of Women: Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/54/341 (1999); Report of the Working Group, part I.
For instance, hemorrhage is a common and almost unavoidable immediate result. See “General Fact Sheet on Health Consequences,” in the World Health Organisation’s Information Kit on Female Genital Mutilation (WHO/FHE/94.4,1994) (there are no pages given to the Fact Sheets). For more detail on the health effects, see, e.g., Rahman and Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide, 8–9; Heidi Jones et al., “Female Genital Cutting Practices in Burkina Faso and Mali and Their Negative Health Outcomes,” Studies of Family Planning 30 (1999): 220; Report Of Working Group, part I.
For a concise overview of action taken by the UN system, see Traditional or Customary Practices Affecting the Health of Women: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/54/341 (1999). See also Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA Statement. For a denunciation by the UN General Assembly, see UNGA Resolution 54/133 (1999), para. 3(d), UN Doc. A/RES/54/133 (2000). See also General Recommendation 24 on article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women—Women and Health, adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc. A/54/38/Rev.l, 3–7 (1999) (hereinafter “General Recommendation on art. 12 CEDAW”) and the Beijing +5 document. For an overview of regional, national and international initiatives, see Warzazi, Fifth Report on the Situation Regarding the Elimination of Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and the Girl Child, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/27 (2001), paras. 8–83.
Declaration, art. 5(5). See also Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24(3) (hereinafter “CRC”); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 21(1); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12 ICESCR), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 22 (2000) (hereinafter General Comment on art. 12ICESCR). Although a specific reference to female genital mutilation was omitted in CRC, art. 24(3) (Brigit C.A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law [Antwerp: Intersentia, 1998], 57–58), the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its evaluation of state reports, has consistently characterized FGM as a “harmful traditional practice” that governments must work to eliminate. See generally Rahman and Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide, 48–49.
Michael Freeman, The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of the Child (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), 145.
This line of reasoning has been delineated in the context of refusals of a blood transfusion of children: “If… a Jehovah’s Witness were to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion for his or her child, the State (doctor), in our opinion, not only has the right but also the duty to intervene with this manifestation of freedom of religion and exercise of parental rights in order to protect the life of the child” (Manfred Nowak and Tanja Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” in Grotens and Tahzib-Lie, Seminar on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 65, see also 70). The authors doubt, however, whether the state may also prevent an adult from refusing a blood transfusion (ibid., 61–62, 65).
Principle 11(2) of the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (UNGA Resolution 46/119 [1991]) defines “informed consent” to be “consent obtained freely, without threats or improper inducements.” Prior to giving consent, the patient must be provided with “adequate and understandable information in a form and language understood by the patient” on such matters as alternative treatments and “possible pain or discomfort, risks and side effects of the proposed treatment.” Informed consent thus requires that a woman be free from coercion and have adequate information in order to make her decision.
It has been argued that public health should be interpreted in a restrictive way and that “it is difficult to see how public health at large can be affected by female circumcision” (de Jong, Freedom of Thought, 153).
For an analogous case regarding the balancing of state and individual interests in cases of safety concerns relating to an adult, see K. Singh Bhinder v. Canada, Comm. No. 208/1986 (UN Human Rights Committee, 9 November 1989), UN Doc. A/45/40 (Vol. II), Annex IX, sec. E (1990). This case deals with a naturalized Canadian citizen and a Sikh by religion, whose labor contract as a maintenance electrician with the Canadian National Railway Company was terminated as a result of his refusal to wear safety headgear during his work, which would require him to relinquish his turban. From the views of the Human Rights Committee, it can be inferred that paternalistic safety legislation falls within the scope of legitimate restrictions. For a discussion, see Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief, 294–300. See also Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 57.
See, e.g., Bert B. Lockwood et al., “Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on Limitation Provisions,” Human Rights Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1985): 35, 64, 65. See also Siracusa Principles, principle 25; Alexandre Kiss, “Commentary by the Rapporteur on the Limitation Provisions,” Human Rights Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1985): 15, 20. Doubts as to whether the state may invoke public health to protect individual health are expressed by Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 61–62. At the same time, at 61, they argue that external freedom may be restricted “if the manifestation of a specific religion includes activities which as such are detrimental to the health of its members and possibly others. This applies, for instance, to the practice of female genital mutilation in certain African cultures and religions.
World Health Organization, Regional Plan of Action to Accelerate the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation in Africa (Brazzaville: WHO Regional Office for Africa, 1997), 4. See also the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDSpara. 61; the agreed conclusions of the UN Commission on the Status of Women on Women, the girl child and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), para. 3, UN Doc. E/2001/27 (2001), 9.
Logistic regression analyses have shown significant positive relationships between the severity of genital cutting and the probability that a woman would have gynecological and obstetric complications. See Jones et al., “Female Genital Cutting Practices,” 219–28.
See CRC, art. 24(3). See also 1981 Declaration, art. 5(5); CEDAW, art. 10(h). Although not expressly mentioned in ICESCR, art. 12, and CEDAW, art. 12, this obligation can be inferred from these provisions. See Toebes, Right to Health, 57–58,129,148,154, 258,267–68, 332. See also General Comment on art. 12 ICESCR, para. 21; General Recommendation on art. 12 CEDAW.
Rahman and Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide, 49–50. See also UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Resolution 2000/10 (2000), para. 2.
This line of reasoning has been used in regard to the state obligation to inform the public, including children, of the risks of contracting HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. See Corinne Packer, “Sex Education: Child’s Rights, Parent’s Choice or State’s Obligation,” in Of Innocence and Autonomy: Children, Sex and Human Rights, ed. Eric Heinze (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2000), 163, 172; Rahman and Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide, 49–50.
This fact must be emphasized when stating the possibility to undergo an operation to reverse FGM. This is, for instance, not clear in David Charter and Dominic Kennedy, “Doctors Put on Alert for Girl ‘Butchery,’” The Times, 21 August 2001, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0„2–2001290802,00.html. When a female’s external genitalia are removed with the remainder being stitched together leaving a matchstick- sized opening for the passage of urine or menstrual blood, an operation to widen the orifice is, however, possible.
World Health Organization, Regional Plan of Action, 4.
Naber, “Introduction,” in Naber, Freedom of Religion: A Precious Human Right, 1,5.
Elaine Eliah, “Reaching for a Healthier Future,” Populi23, no. 1 (1996): 14; Rahman and Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide, 77–78.
Most notably, this has been recognized by the UN Human Rights Committee. See General Comment 22, para. 4. Incomprehensibly, however, the European Commission on Human Rights held that the wearing of religiously prescribed or religiously motivated headscarves is not embraced by external freedom. See Karaduman v. Turkey
Decisions and Reports 93 (EComHR, 74 App. No. 16278/90, 3 May 1993), 93, 108–09; Bulut v. Turkey, App. No. 18783/91 (EComHR, 3 May 1993). Clearly, this indicates “a very restrictive view” of what counts as external freedom. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 312. See also Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 58. However, the European Court of Human Rights does recognize the wearing of headscarf to be within the ambit of external freedom. See Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (ECtHR, 15 February 2001). See also Case of Refah Partisi, Erbakan, Kazan, and Tekdal v. Turkey (ECtHR, 31 July 2001), para. 72, where the Court came fairly close to making a pronouncement. It should also be noted that the Court has found that “but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.” See Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000), para. 78. See also Manoussakis v. Greece, 23 EHRR 387 (1997) (ECtHR 1996-IV, 26 September 1996) (commented on by Willi Fuhrmann, “Perspectives on Religious Freedom from the Vantage Point of the European Court of Human Rights,” BTU Law Review [2000]: 833).
For a detailed analysis and interpretation of the passages of the Koran relating to the hijab, the veil, see Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1991), 85–101. For the meaning and implications of wearing the veil for Muslim women who choose to do so, see, e.g., Fatheena Mubarak, “Muslim Women and Religious Identification: Women and the Veil,” Many Religions, All Australian: Religious Settlement, Identity and Cultural Diversity, ed. Gary D. Bouma (Kew, Australia: The Christian Research Association, 1997), 123. It has been argued, however, that the function of the veil at the time of Muhammad was to protect women, and thus the veil’s most appropriate modern equivalent is education and schooling which, in our times, gives the most protection to a woman. Soheib Bencheikh, Mariane et le Prophète: L’islam dans la France Laïque (Paris: Éditions Grasset and Fasquelle, 1998), 142^5.
See, e.g., US Department of State, Annual Report, 295, 302, 341, 396; Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance: note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/280/Add.l, paras. 18–21,48 (2000).
See, e.g., US Department of State, Annual Report, 302, 341, 396; Amor, Civil and Political Rights, Including Freedom of Expression, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.l, para. 37(a) (1998). See also Oral Statement on Freedom of Religion or Belief by the Finnish Presidency of the European Union to the OSCE Review Conference, Human Dimension, 23 September 1999, Vienna, OSCE Doc. RC.DEL/103/99, para. 5.
For a discussion of the variety of reasons advanced by Muslim women who make an informed choice to wear Muslim dress and a réfutai of state justifications for a ban of such dress, see Barbara Roblin Mirza, “Selected Personal Rights and Freedoms: Rights to Wear Clothing of One’s Choice, to Drive, and to Travel Unattended and Without Permission,” in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 3:123.
The “public safety” ground has been defined to mean “protection against danger to the safety of persons, to their life or physical integrity or serious damage to their property” (Siracusa Principles, principle 33. See also Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 56–57).
The “public health” ground may be invoked “in order to allow a state to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the population or individual members of the population. These measures must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the sick and injured” (see Siracusa Principles, principle 25. See also Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 61–62).
See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, et al., 475 US 503 (1986). Goldman involved an orthodox Jewish rabbi who served as a clinical psychologist in an US Air Force hospital. His religious obligation to wear a yarmulke conflicted with military regulation that required him to keep his head uncovered while on duty indoors. The US Supreme Court, in a narrow five-to-four decision, rejected his application for an exemption, emphasizing the military interest for uniformity in dress. Justice Brennan, in sharp dissent, lamented that the Court had abdicated “its role as principal protector of individual liberties in favor of credulous deference to unsupported assertions of military necessity.” Critical questions have been asked in relation to this decision: “If wearing headcovering indoors were a Christian religious obligation rather than a Jewish one, one wonders if the result would have been the same. In fact, would the problem ever have arisen in the first place?” (Samuel Rabinove, Religious Rights and Freedoms: What They Mean for Jews [New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1988], 13). Congress subsequendy passed legislation to exemptyarmulkesfrom the military dress code which the Court refused to craft judicially; see 10 USCA, sec. 774 (1988). By contrast, the British army has traditionally allowed Sikh soldiers to wear turbans. See Leon Shaskolsky-Sheleff, “Rabbi Captain Goldman’s Yarmulke, Freedom of Religion and Conscience, and Civil (Military) Disobedience,” Israel Tearbook of Human Rights 17 (1987): 206.
For a case in which a practising Sikh working at an electrical facility had to remove his turban, see K. Singh Bhinder v. Canada, Comm. No. 208/1986 (UN Human Rights Committee, 9 November 1989), UN Doc. A/45/40 (Vol. II), Annex IX, sec. E, para. 6.2, (1990). For a discussion, see Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief 294–300.
In this context, the reference to “public schools” is to be read as referring to schools maintained by public funds and supervised by municipal, county, or state authorities.
Although this case deals with public employment, it should be emphasized that states should take all steps necessary to put an end to discriminatory actions both in the public and the private sector which impair the equal enjoyment by women of their right to freedom of religion or belief. See General Comment 28, para. 4.
For instance, throughout much of the OSCE area, wearing the hijab in a particular way is interpreted as a sign of extremism. See Statement by Laila Al-Marayati, US Delegation to the OSCE Implementation Review Meeting, 27 October 1998, OSCE file IMP/98, no. 85, 7.
The state in question can refer to European Court’s holding in Dahlab v. Switzerland, where the Court declared that to wear the Islamic veil “seems to be imposed to women by a koranic prescription which... is difficult to reconcile with the principle of equality of sexes. To wear the Islamic veil is also difficult to reconcile with the message of tolerance, of respect for others, and above all of equality and nondiscrimination that every teacher must transmit to the students in a democracy” (unofficial translation; the text of the decision is available only in French in the website of the European Court: http://www.echr.coe.int).
For a description of the “fundamental rights and freedoms of others” ground, see Siracusa Principles, principles 35–37.
For parental rights to direct child education, see, e.g., ICCPR, art. 18(4) and 24(1); ICESCR, art. 13(3); CRC, art. 14(2); 1981 Declaration, art. 5; Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, art. 2; ACHR, art. 12(4); Vienna Concluding Document, principle 16(7); Convention Against Discrimination in Education, art. 5(1)(b); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 14(3).
This has, for instance, been argued by Paul B. Cliteur in a Dutch newspaper. See Cliteur, “Hoofddoekje past niet bij neutrale rechter [Headscarf does not suit a neutral judge],” NRCHandelsblad, 30 June 2001,9.
See Micheal Prowse, “Take a Peek Behind the Veil of Tolerance,” Financial Times, 18–19 August 2001, xxiv.
International human rights instruments refer to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 14(1); UDHR, art. 10; ECHR, art. 6(1). See also Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the 7th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by UNGA Resolutions 40/32 (1985) and 40/146 (1985) (hereinafter “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary”). The latter, principle 10, does state that “[i]n the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, color, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.”
In reply to questions of members of the Dutch Parliament regarding the permissibility of headscarves in the Dutch judiciary, the Dutch Minister of Justice, Albert Hendrik Korthals, has taken this position. For the Minister’s reply, see his letter to the Chairperson of the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament of 30 August 2001, reference 5109689/01/6, http://www.minjust.nl/c_actual/persber/pb0809.htm (only available in Dutch). In this letter reference is made to the following excerpt of a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights: “The existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 [ECHR] must be determined according to… an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect” (Fey v. Austria, App. No. 14396/88 [ECtHR 255-A, 24 February 1993], para. 28).
The European Court of Human Rights has stated, in a different context, that “[un]der the objective test, it must be determined whether... there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public.... What is determinant is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified” (Fey v. Austria, para. 30). por instance, in connection with the above-mentioned case Goldman v. Weinberger, it has been pointed out that “there is a clear-cut differentiation between the Jew wearing a yarmulke (which is optional, as a military cap will serve just as well) and a Sikh, for whom wearing a turban is obligatory and exclusive.” Leon Shaskolsky-Sheleff, “Rabbi Captain Goldman’s Yarmulke, Freedom of Religion and Conscience, and Civil (Military) Disobedience,” 201. Hence, “the difference between a turban or a dreadlock on the one hand, and a yarmulke on the other, is not merely a difference in ‘appearance’—it is also the difference between a Sikh or a Rastafarian, on the one hand, and an Orthodox Jew on the other” (Justice Stevens in Goldman v. Weinberger, 1316).
For instance, principle 22 of the Siracusa Principles incorrectly states: “The expression ‘public order’(ordre public) as used in the Covenant may be defined as the sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on which society is founded. Respect for human rights is part of public order (ordre public).”
Unlike comparable limitation clauses in ICCPR, art. 18(3), lacks the parenthetical term ordre public. Furthermore, the French text of this provision refers to “la protection de l’ordre.” This means that the expression “public order” may therefore only be used to “avoid disturbances to the order in the narrow sense” (Nowak, CCPR Commentary, 327; Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 57), namely, “the prevention of public disorder” (UN Doc. E/CN.4/528, 59–62 [1951]) and not “to protect ordre public with its general connotations of national public policy” (Karl Josef Partsch, “Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms,” The International Bill of Human Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ed. Louis Henkin [New York: Columbia University Press, 1981], 212–13). It should be emphasized that “the protection of public order” in ECHR, art. 9(2), which deals with limitations on external freedom of religion or belief, should also be equated with the prevention of disorder. For an explanation, see Lockwood, Working Paper, 56–61. See also de Jong, Freedom of Thought, 696 n. 23. It has also been argued that “public order” in this provision refers only to the notion of “order in places accessible to everyone” (van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention, 554).
Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 58.
It should be noted that even in a relatively homogeneous region such as Western Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has struggled to agree upon a common European concept of “morals” in the domestic law of European states. The Court concluded that notions of morals vary “from time to time and from place to place especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolutions of opinion on the subject” (Handyside v. U.K., 1 EHRR 737 [ECtHR24-A, 7 December 1976], 22).
General Comment 22, para. 8. In this context, it has been argued that “Since religions usually claim that their respective value systems constitute the most important moral guidelines, at least for those who adhere to this particular religion or belief, it seems difficult to conceive of a kind of higher and quasi universally accepted concept of morals which States could invoke to justify restrictions on religious manifestations. The only universally accepted value system one can think of is in fact human rights, which means that the protection of morals coincides with the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (Nowak and Vospernik, “Permissible Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” 62).
David Litde, “Studying ‘Religious Human Rights’: Methodological Foundations,” Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives, 60.
For a discussion on liberals being nowhere near as tolerant as they seem, see Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives, xxiv.
Argued by Martinez-Torrôn and Navarro-Vails, “The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe,” in this volume.
For a description of the concept of proportionality, see Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study (London: Kluwer International Law, 1996), 6.
For a discussion on the relevance of the ILO conventions for female workers, see Anne Trebilcock, “ILO Conventions and Women Workers,” in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 2:301–18.
ILO Convention No. 122 Concerning Employment Policy, art. l(2)(c) (hereinafter “ILO Convention No. 122”). CEDAW, art. 11 also prohibits discrimination in employment.
ILO Convention No. 122, art. l(l)(a).
International Labor Office, ILO Standards and Action for the Elimination of Discrimination and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity in Employment, UN Doc. HR/GENEVA/1984/WP.15, para. 32 (1984).
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Article 18: Ereedom of Religion and Belief (Sydney: Commonwealth of Australia, 1998), 78 (in particular recommendations R4.1.1 and R4.1.2).
See, e.g., CEDAW, art. 1; 1981 Declaration, art. 2.
See, e.g., General Comment 18 of the Human Rights Committee on Non-Discrimination, UN Doc. HRI/ GEN/1/Rev. 1, para. 13 (at 26–28) (1989); Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, App. Nos. 01474/62, 01677/62, 01691/62, 01769/63, 01994/63,02126/64 (ECtHR 6-A, 23 July 1968), para. 10. See also Italy v. Commission, case 13/63 (ECJ, 17 July 1963), ECR 1963, para. 4 (at 375); Brown case, case C-394/96 (ECJ, 30 June 1998), ECR 1998, para. 29 (at 1–4185). For a discussion, see Cassel and Guzman, Law and Reality, 309–12.
For a definition of discrimination based on religion or belief, see 1981 Declaration, art. 2(2).
This was the holding of the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission—an independent organization established by the Dutch Government to receive unequal treatment complaints by individuals—in a case where a female applicant was not offered the job of acting clerk at a Dutch court of law. For the Commission’s decision, which is not legally binding, see www.cgb.nl/oordelen_frameset.html (only available in Dutch).
Situations in which the purpose is discriminatory are commonly referred to as direct or intentional discrimination. See Titia Loenen, “Indirect discrimination: Oscillating Between Containment and Revolution,” Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Loenen and Peter R Rodrigues (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999), 195–211.
Situations in which the result or effect is discriminatory are commonly referred to as indirect or incidental discrimination (see ibid.). To establish indirect discrimination on the basis of, for instance, religion or belief, the result or effect of a certain measure or treatment on a particular religious or other belief group is determining, not the question whether the measure purports to treat all religious and belief groups in the same manner.
See Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (ECtHR, 15 February 2001), inadmissibility decision.
See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 27; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, art. 8 (1995); Vienna Concluding Document, principles 16 and 19; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, art. 2(1) (1992) (hereinafter “Minorities Declaration”). See also General Comment 22, para. 9.
See Minorities Declaration, art. 4(2), in conjunction with Asbjorn Eide, Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/ CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2, paras. 56–58 (2001).
See Minorities Declaration, art. 2(3), in conjunction with Eide, Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, para. 49 (2001).
Juliet Sheen, “Living within the Tensions of Plurality: Religious Discrimination and Human Rights Law and Policy,” in Bouma, Many Religions, All Australian, 171–72.
This decision was announced in combination with the Association of Muslim Police in Britain on 24 April 2001. The introduction of the optional headscarf follows a similar move by London’s Metropolitan Police for Sikh officers who are allowed to wear a turban on duty. For more information, see Cindi John, “Police Hope for Muslim Head Start,” BBC News, 24 April 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/ newsid_1294000/1294417.stm; Hwaa Irfan, “Racism, Bigotry, and the Association of Muslim Police,” in IslamOnline. Net, 29 May 2001), http://www.muslims.net/English/Society/2001/05/articlel0.shtml . By contrast, for instance, the Netherlands Police Institute has recendy decided not to introduce religious headcovering, in distinctive police blue, as a uniform option. See Frits van Veen, “Plan voor keppeltjes, hoofddoeken en tulbanden blijkt stille dood gestorven: Alternatief politiepet van de baan” [Plan for yarmulkes, headscarves and turbans appears still-born: Alternative policeman’s cap is off], De Volkskrant, 6 September 2001, 3 (in Dutch).
See, e.g., 1981 Declaration, art. 4; CEDAW, art. 2.
See 1981 Declaration, art. 4(2).
At its 56th session in 2000 the UN Commission on Human Rights decided to change the title of the Special Rapporteur from Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, to be implemented at the next extension of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate in 2001. See Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/42 (2001), para. 11; Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2000/33 (2000), para. 11. This chapter uses the new title of the Rapporteur’s mandate.
Implementation Report of the Secretary General, para. 140. See also Amor, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2, para. 97 (1996) (hereinafter “1996 Report of Special Rapporteur”).
Article 18: Freedom of Religion and Belief 78 (in particular recommendations R4.1.1 and R4.1.2).
See Dahlab v. Switzerland. For a discussion of a dispute in Germany involving the place of Muslim dress in the public schools, see William Barbieri, “Group Rights and the Muslim Diaspora,” Human Rights Quarterly!! (1999): 921–25.
For critical remarks regarding this case, see Martinez-Torrôn and Navarro-Valls, “The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe,” in this volume, n.78.
For a case in which a teacher of religion and ethics was no longer allowed to teach at a public school, see Delgado Paez v. Colombia, Comm. No. 195/1985 (UN Human Rights Committee, 12 July 1990), UN Doc. A/45/40, vol. II, Annex IX, sect. D (1990), reprinted in Human Rights Law Journalll (1990): 313.
Martinez-Torrôn and Navarro-Valls, “The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe,” in this volume, n.78.
It has been observed that “[w]hile wearing a scarf-like headcovering is relatively innocuous, full covering is clearly more obvious than the wearing of a cross or a yarmulke. Yet, minority religious rights are drained of much of their meaning if ‘acceptable’ religious practices are defined by reference to majority religious traditions” (Mirza, “Selected Personal Rights,” 151 n.134).
de Jong, Freedom of Thought, 354. Such situations give rise to a variety of questions regarding the law to be applied to different religious or secular groups living within the same nonsecular country including: “Should the same law be applied to everyone or should it be so only as long as it is nonreligious or secular law? If only religious law governs, what of those persons who do not want to be governed by religious law? If the state only allows religious law, then is each religious community entided to its own laws? Should a state have some persons governed under religious law and some under secular law? May an individual chose the system of law by which she wants to be governed?” (Howland, “Introduction,” Religious Fundamentalisms, xviii). Religious fundamentalism and national laws are addressed by Ratna Kapur, “The Two Faces of Secularism and Women’s Rights in India,” Religious Fundamentalisms, 143; Frances Raday, “Religion and Patriarchal Politics: The Israeli Experience,” ibid., 155; Marie-Claire S. F. G. Foblets, “Family Disputes Involving Muslim Women in Contemporary Europe: Immigrant Women Caught Between Islamic Family Law and Women’s Rights,” ibid., 167.
See, e.g., United States Department of State, Annual Report, 494; Special Rapporteur’s Report 2000, paras. 7, 8; Elimination of Religious Intolerance, paras. 41, 42; Special Rapporteur’s Report 1998, para. 60(a); Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/52/477, para. 31(a)(i) (1997) (hereinafter “1997 Religious Intolerance Note”); Implementation Report of the Secretary General, para. 51; 1996 Report of Special Rapporteur, para. 27; Amor, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91, 10 (1994). The UN Human Rights Committee has requested States Parties to the ICCPR to provide information on any specific regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public. See General Comment 28, para. 13.
It has been argued that “The inclusion of group rights within a catalogue of human rights creates conceptual confusion, particularly in situations where assertions of individual liberty do not conform with those of the group to a collective identity, including a religious identity. For example, article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides individuals the right to manifest religious belief’individually or in community with others,’ but says nothing about an individual’s right to be free from the imposition of the teachings and practices that a community might espouse as essential to religious conformity” (Chinkin, “Cultural Relativism and International Law,” 56–57 [endnote 11 omitted]).
For a discussion, see Bouthaina Shaaban, “The Muted Voices of Women Interpreters,” Faith Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World ed. Mahnaz Afkhami (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 61. For instance, in her book al-Sufur wa’l-hijab, published in 1928, Nazira Zin al-Din, a Muslim woman interpreter, set out to demonstrate that neither the text of the Koran nor the hadith require Muslim women to wear hi jab and concluded that hi jab is prohibited by the Islamic Shari’a.
See, e.g., United States Department of State, Annual Report, 494; Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report, ed. Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen (London: Routiedge, 1997), 78; Saudi Arabia: A Secret State of Suffering (London: Amnesty International, 2000), 2.
Yasmeen Hassan, “Stove Burning, Acid Throwing, and Honor Killings,” in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 2:589.
See van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention, 547.
It has been pointed out that it is not clear to what extent internal freedom also implies protection against the imposition of a particular conception of morals (ibid., 547–48).
Littie, “Studying ‘Religious Human Rights,’” 143–55.
Report of the UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. A/53/40, para. 133 (1998).
In this connection, 1981 Declaration, art. 7, should be recalled, which reads: “The rights and freedoms set forth in the present Declaration shall be accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail himself of such rights and freedoms in practice.”
Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97 (ECtHR, 14 December, 1999), para. 53.
The obligations are referred to in note 22 of this article. It should furthermore be noted that “[s]tates should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any (…) religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination.” See, e.g., DEVAW, art. 4; BDPA, para. 124(a). See also Committee on Human Rights Resolution 1999/42 (1999), paras. 3 and 12, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/ 42(1999).
See T. Jeremy Gunn, “The Law of the Russian Federation on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations from a Human Rights Perspective,” in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls, ed. John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), 260.
It must be realized that dress restrictions imposed by a religion-based or religion-dominated state on women in public may also affect policies of states that do not impose such restrictions on women. For instance, when American female military personnel leave their bases in Saudi Arabia, they are required by the Pentagon to abide by Saudi religious clothing restrictions for women. Major McSally, America’s highest-ranking female top gun, has laid her career on the line in a crusade to oppose a US policy that requires female military personnel to wear Muslim robes in public in Saudi Arabia. While understanding that the Pentagon is reluctant to offend its host, McSally considers the rule an affront to her Christian faith: “It is a customary Muslim outfit for women, but I’m not Muslim and I’m not Saudi. I am a Christian…. Just as we don’t want to make someone who is not Jewish wear a yarmulke on their head, why would we have our female troops being mandated to wear Muslim clothing?” (Laura Peek, “America’s First Woman Combat Pilot Fights Cover-Up Order,” The Times, 19 April 2001, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0„3–116757,00.html). [1]1981 Declaration, art. 7.
Vienna Concluding Document, principle 19; Copenhagen OSCE Document, principles 32 and 33 (1990); Charter of Paris for a New Europe, para. 5 of the section on “A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity: Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law” (1990).
See Minorities Declaration, art. 4(2).
Implementation Report of the Secretary General, para. 140. See also 1996 Report of Special Rapporteur, para. 97.
The UN Human Rights Committee has, for instance, stressed that regulations of clothing to be worn by women in public may involve a violation of ICCPR, art. 26, on nondiscrimination. See General Comment 28, para. 13.
See 1981 Declaration, art. 4; CEDAW, art. 2.
See 1981 Declaration, art. 4(2).
General Comment 28, para. 13.
Karima Bennoune, “S.O.S. Algeria: Women’s Human Rights Under Siege,” in Faith and Freedom, 187 n. 19.
This has, for instance, been pointed out by Ron Keller, Director-General for International Cooperation, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his keynote speech “Freedom of Religion or Belief and Cultural Development in the Context of Development Co-operation” (Speech to the International Conference on Muslim Women and Development, The Hague, 9–11 October 2000). See Report of the International Conference on Muslim Women and Development, ed. Harriëtte Mingoen (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001), 58.
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, part II, para. 22, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, 32 ILM 1661 (1993).
Ibid., part II, para. 38.
Beijing +5 document, paras. 27 and 59; Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/42 (2001), para. 4(c).
It has been noted that “Religion in itself is not the problem, but the ways in which religion has been practiced and used, or, in fact abused, throughout history.… I know that women are often severely disadvantaged in the name of religion” (“Keynote Address by Hilde Johnson, former Norwegian Minister for International Cooperation and Human Rights,” in Grotens and Tahzib-Lie, Seminar on Freedom of Religion or Belief 27).
Boyle and Sheen, A World Report, 13 and 14.
For a discusssion on this collision, see, e.g., Kari Elisabeth Borresen, “Religion Confronting Women’s Human Rights: The Case of Roman Catholicism,” in this volume; Rebecca J. Cook and Mahmoud F. Fathalla, “Advancing Reproductive Rights Beyond Cairo and Beijing,” in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 3:73–90; Maja Kirilova Eriksson, “Abortion and Reproductive Health: Making International Law More Responsive to Women’s Needs,” in ibid., 3–71; Rebecca Cook, “Human Rights and Reproductive Self-Determination,” American University Law Review 44 (1995): 975; Rhonda Copelon and Rosalind Petschesky, “Toward an Interdependent Approach to Reproductive and Sexual Rights as Human Rights: Reflections on the ICPD and Beyond,” in From Basic Needs to Basic Rights: Women’s Claim to Human Rights, ed. Margaret A. Schuler (Washington, DC: Institute for Women, Law, and Development, 1995), 343; Lynn P. Freedman, “Finding our Feet, Standing Our Ground: Reproductive Health Activism in an Era of Rising Fundamentalism and Economic Globalization,” in Religious Fundamentalisms, 181; Frances Kissling, “Roman Catholic Fundamentalism: What’s Sex (and Power) Got Do With It?,” ibid., 193; Asma M. Abdel Halim, “Reconciling the Opposites: Equal But Subordinate,” ibid., 203.
For relevant pronouncements on reproductive rights by the international community, see in particular Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, adopted 13 September 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994), Chapter VII, in particular paras. 7.2–3; BDFA, paras. 94–97; Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, Chap. IV; Beijing +5 document, paras. 55, 72(i)-(l), 72(o), 79(f). For a critical scrutiny of the definition of reproductive rights enshrined in such pronouncements, see Corinne Packer, “Defining and Delineating the Right to Reproductive Choice,” Nordic Journal of International Law 67 (1998): 77–95.
For a discussion on issues affecting the human rights of religious women, see, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Issues Affecting the Human Rights of Muslim Women,” in Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 3:367–77; Azizah al-Hibri, “Islam, Law, and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights,” ibid., 3–71, 379^20; Janice Love, “Issues Affecting Christian Women,” ibid., 443–59; Martha L. Schweitz, “Women’s Rights in the Baha’i Community: The Concept of Organic Equality in Principle, Law, and Experience,” ibid., 3–71, 461–509; Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Thinking about Women, Christianity, and Rights,” Religious Human Rights in Global Perspectives: Religious Perspectives, ed. John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 143–55; Michael S. Berger and Deborah E. Lipstadt, Women in Judaism From the Perspective of Human Rights,“ ibid., 295–321; Riffat Hassan, ”Rights of Women Within Islamic Communities,“ ibid., 361–86.
Accordingly qualified in, for instance, the introductory statement on the draft resolution on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance by Ambassador Richard Ryan, permanent representative of Ireland to the United Nations, 7 November 2000. process, including in information collection and in recommendations“ (Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/42 (2001), para. 7).
See, e.g., Special Rapporteur’s Report 1999, para. 6; Special Rapporteur’s Report 1998, para. 110.
As announced in 1997 Religious Intolerance Note, para. 89.
Amor, Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63, para. 194(b) (2001) para. 191(b) (hereinafter “Special Rapporteur’s Report 2001”). See also Special Rapporteur’s Report 1999, para. 6(a); Special Rapporteur’s Report 2000, para. 113 (2000); Elimination of Religious Intolerance, para. 100; Special Rapporteur’s Report 1998, para. 119. This topic first appeared in a 1986 study of the current dimensions of the problems of intolerance and of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, commissioned by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (now called the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights). Special Rapporteur’s Report 1998, para. 119 (which incorrectly states that the study was first recommended by the 1984 UN Seminar on the encouragement of understanding, tolerance and respect in matters related to freedom of religion or belief). For the 1986 study, see Elizabeth Odio Benito, Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and of Discrimination on Grounds of Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1987/26, para. 221(i) (1986).
In 1987, the UN General Assembly rejected a recommendation from the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that the UN and the specialized agencies “promote or undertake studies on the status of women under Islamic laws and customs and in particular on the status and equality of women in the family on issues such as marriage, divorce, custody and property rights and their participation in public life of the society, taking into consideration the principle of El Itjihad in Islam” (Siobhân Mullally, “Beliefs That Discriminate: A Rights-Based Solution?” Understanding Human Rights, ed. Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins [London: Mansell, 1996], 484–85). See also UNGA Resolution 42/ 60 (1987), UN GAOR, 42d Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/42/60, 188 (1987); Andrew Byrnes, Report on the Seventh Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 7th CEDAW/IWRAWreport, 6–7(1988).
In November 2001, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 1981 Declaration, the Rapporteur convened in cooperation with the Spanish Government an international consultative conference on school education in relation to freedom of religion or belief. The aim of the conference was to discuss the curricula and text books of primary or elementary and secondary schools which relate to tolerance, nondiscrimination, and freedom of religion or belief
Special Rapporteur’s Report 2001, para. 194(b) (2001); Special Rapporteur’s Report 1999, para. 125(b); Secretary-General, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief UN Doc. A/53/279, para. 91 (1998).
Special Rapporteur’s Report 1998, para. 119. This proposal was made pursuant to Committee on Human Rights Resolution 1997/43 (1997) (Cooperation with Representatives of United Nations Human Rights Bodies, report of the Secretary-General Submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/70, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/50, para. 4 [1997]) which encouraged the strengthening of cooperation and coordination among all human rights treaty bodies in order to integrate a gender perspective in the UN system.
See, e.g., Askin and Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, 3:367–512; Howland, “The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter,” Columbia Journal Of Transnational Law 35 (1997): 271; Muslim Women and Development Action Research Project: Presentation of Main Findings and Conclusions (Amsterdam, Royal Tropical Institute, 2000); Mingoen, Report of the International Conference on Muslim Women; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “A ‘Benign’ Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 5 (2000): 237; Dinah Shelton,“Human Rights Within Churches: A Survey Concerning Discrimination Within Religious Organisations,” Human Rights Journal 6 (1973): 526–57; Religious Fundamentalisms, A World Report, passim (especially the entries dealing with women); Donna J. Sullivan, “Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution,” NTU Journal of International Law and Policy 24 (1991): 834^i8; Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 77–160.
See Committee on Human Rights Resolution 2001/42 (2001), para. 7.
Report by the UN Secretary-General, para. 70(h).
It has been noted that although this dilemma cannot be resolved permanendy in an ever-changing society, “the basic rule of respect for the choice and the rights of the individual is actually easy to apply if there is a political will” (“Keynote Address by Hilde Johnson, former Norwegian Minister for International Cooperation and Human Rights,” 27).
This change has been implemented at the latest extension of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate in 2001.
General Comment 28. 2001. For the publication on this seminar, see Grotens and Tahzib-Lie, Seminar on Freedom of Religion or Belief [1] As noted in Section III of this chapter, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, in cooperation with the Spanish Government, convened an international consultative conference on school education in relation to freedom of religion or belief in Madrid from 23 to 25 November 2001.
For instance, sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Justice and Peace Commission, the Dutch Missionary Council, and the Dutch Ecumenical Institute for Advocacy on International Cooperation organized an international expert meeting on religious freedom that took place in Soesterberg from 23 to 25 January 2000. Furthermore, the International Commission on Freedom of Conscience and the George Washington University Law School sponsored an international conference of experts on “The Role of Religious Pluralism in Contemporary Society” in Washington DC from 29 to 30 January 1999 and the Norwegian Council for Religious and Lifestance Communities, the Council on Ecumenical and International Relations of the Church of Norway, the Diakonhjemmet College Research Center, the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, the Tandem Project, and the Roman Catholic Church of Norway held an international meeting of experts entitled “The Oslo Conference on Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in Oslo from 11 to 15 August 1998.
The area of women and their right to freedom of religion or belief has, for instance, been addressed at an academic conference on “Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women,” organized by the International Rule of Law Center at the George Washington University Law School in Washington DC from 18 to 19 May 1998 and at the Sixth Annual Law and Religion Symposium on “Emerging Perspectives on Religion and Human Rights” held at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah from 3 to 5 October 1999. For the book which grew out of the former conference, see Howland, Religious Fundamentalisms, and for the journal which grew out of the latter symposium, see BTU Law Review (2000).
For instance, the UN Secretary-General convened an international seminar on “The Encouragement of Understanding, Tolerance and Respect in Matters Relating to Freedom of Religion or Belief’ in Geneva, from 3 to 14 December 1984. Over one hundred representatives of UN Member States, the Holy See, UN organs and bodies, specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations, national liberation movements, and NGOs attended the seminar.
Such a seminar would be a follow-up to a number of special OSCE meetings earlier held on the subject of freedom of religion or belief. For instance, from 16 to 19 April 1996 a human dimension seminar on “Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Freedom of Religion” took place in Warsaw and on 22 March 1999 a supplementary OSCE human dimension meeting on “Freedom of Religion and Belief’ was convened in Vienna. At these meetings a variety of issues concerning freedom of religion or belief were raised in an open and unofficial setting. The meetings were well attended by states, international organizations, NGOs and media.
For instance, the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe organized in cooperation with F. M. van Asbeck Centre for Human Rights Studies of the University of Leiden an international seminar on “Freedom of Conscience” in Leiden from 12 to 14 November 1992.
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tahzib-Lie, B.G. (2004). Dissenting Women, Religion or Belief, and the State: Contemporary Challenges that Require Attention. In: Lindholm, T., Durham, W.C., Tahzib-Lie, B.G., Sewell, E.A., Larsen, L. (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5616-7_19
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5616-7_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-04-13783-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-5616-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive