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Apophantics, as theory of senses, and truth-logic

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Formal and Transcendental Logic
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Abstract

The result of these observations — which have concerned the manners of judging [Urteilsweisen] that belong to, and the intentionality that holds sway in, the sciences — will help us to progress in our structural understanding of the idea of logic. We recall that, from its inception, logic intended to be theory of science. Accordingly it always looked to the antecedent beginnings, or the extensively executed projects, of the sciences as its field of examples; and it understood reason and rational production according to that moment in scientific projects which, though not at hand as an actualization of the ideal, nevertheless evinced in itself the ideal final sense of scientific intentionality. This makes it comprehensible that, for logic, the judgment-sphere purely as such had to be set apart and first of all become a thematic field by itself. / Logic, as theory of science, therefore constituted itself, from the very beginning, as a science that intended to serve that criticism which creates genuine science. The cognitions, the sciences, which it looked upon as examples, it took as mere claims — that is: as werejudgments” (suppositions) and judgment-systems, which must be submitted to criticism and which then, as determined with the aid of criticism, must be fashioned in such a manner that the predicate “truth” can be rightly ascribed to them. Thus logic followed the attitude of the critic — who judges, not straightforwardly, but rather about judgments. Only mediately, therefore, as long as it remained a logic of judgments, was logic directed to the existent itself as possibly making its appearance in activities that fashion and give something itself; immediately it was directed to judgments, of something existent. As “formal logic”, which was, after all, traditionally meant and developed entirely as a logic of judgments, it had as its theme those judgment-forms that, as eidetic laws, are conditions for possible adequation to something existent itself.

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References

  1. Author’s note: That would be noetical reflection, reflection on the noetic multiplicities constituting the noematic unity. Cf. Ideen, [I, 97f.,] pp. 201–207. [English translation, pp. 282–289.]

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  2. Author’s note: Cf. Ideen, [I, § 128,1 p. 265. [English translation, p. 359.] For more about the relationship between sense and noema, see op. cit., [§ 90,] pp. 185 and [§§ 129–131,] 266–273. [English translation, pp. 261f. and 361–368.)

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  3. Translator’s note: Reading oder Willenstätigkeiten instead of oder in Willenstätig-keifen.

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  4. Author’s note: This universal concept of sense, a concept extending to all intentional spheres, had already emerged in the Logische Untersuchungen. The “psychology of thinking” [“Denkpsychologie”] developed in our times has adopted it, but unfortunately without taking into consideration the deeper intentional analyses, particularly the much more extensive analyses presented in my Ideen. (Cf. op. cit., [ 124,] pp. 256ff. [English translation, pp. 345ff.])

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  5. Translator’s note: The preceding note is attached here in the text.

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  6. Author’s note: Emotional evidence was first brought to light by Franz Brentano. See the statements about “right love” and “love characterized as right” in his lecture, Vona Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis [On the Origin of Moral Cognition (1889)], edited and republished by Oskar Kraus (Leipzig, 1921), p. 17. [English translation, by Cecil Hague, under the title, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Westminster, 1902.]

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  7. Author’s note: In the summer semester of 1902 and subsequently, I attempted to develop systematically the ideas of a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice, not only in lecture courses and seminars devoted to this particular matter but also in the context of lectures on logic and on ethics. All expositions with a similar sense that have since appeared in the literature derive, I dare say, from those lectures and seminars — however considerable the modifications that the thoughts communicated may have undergone. Above all, Theodor Lessing’s [Studien zur] Wertaxiomatik [(Studies pertaining to Value-Aziomatics), [Archiv für systematische Philosophie, XIV, 1908; 2d ed., Leipzig, 1914,] derives from them quite immediately.

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  8. Author’s note: Obviously there lies behind this the primitive fundamental law of the analytics of pure consistency: Two judgments (in the broadest sense) that follow as consequences from a harmonious judgment are compatible in the unity of one judgment; they may be “multiplied”. “Multiplication” in the “logical calculus” signifies just this operation of the conjunctive combination of judgments, thought of as non-contradictory in themselves, to make up one judgment. The corresponding operational law (with a reiterational sense) enunciates as a principle: A priori, any judgment (any “distinct”, internally non-contradictory one) can be united with any other such judgment that is an analytic consequence of the same internally non-contradictory antecedent> to make up another non-contradictory judgment. In the sphere of consistency, the validity of judgments signifies their harmoniousness in themselves, the possibility of performing them distinctly, sc. as the possibility of phantasying such a performance.9 Author’s note: It actualizes them, naturally, with the hierarchical structure that, in the particular case, belongs to them according to their sense; and therefore it actualizes them in a hierarchy of evidences founded one upon another, which, in their synthetic unity, make up precisely the one evidence of the one categorial objectivity, structured thus and so: the unity of the having of the objectivity itself in consequence of actualizing it itself.

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  9. Author’s note: See the criticism of Lotze’s false problem in my VI. Logische Untersuchung, [§ 65, 2d and] 3d ed., pp. 199f. [Cf. Farber, op. cit., pp. 474ff.]

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© 1969 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Husserl, E. (1969). Apophantics, as theory of senses, and truth-logic. In: Formal and Transcendental Logic. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4900-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4900-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-017-4638-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-4900-8

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