Abstract
Having made clear to ourselves the necessity of our first series of critical investigations, let us now make clear their insufficiency. We now require a criticism of analytic logic that can make us conscious of a number of idealizing presuppositions / with which logic operates as if they were truisms, not on the basis of a method that has become thematic, but again on the basis of a method used naïvely — presuppositions that we ourselves had consequently taken over without noticing them. This new criticism is a continuation of the one we practised at the first level, to clear up the division into three strata; and it therefore presupposes that criticism’s investigations.
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© 1969 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Husserl, E. (1969). The idealizing presuppositions of logic and the constitutive criticism of them. In: Formal and Transcendental Logic. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4900-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4900-8_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-4638-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-4900-8
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