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Abstract

A glance at the many antitrust1 statutes of Western countries might suggest that the antitrust problem is purely domestic in character, since these laws are largely, sometimes exclusively, concerned with restrictions affecting the home market. But there is in truth no reason to expect that the antitrust problem ends at the water’s edge. Just as enterprises collude in fixing prices and allocating customers in home markets, so they concert policy in fixing export prices and allocating the world market. The major legal issue in the study is concerned with the fact that enterprises operating under the law of one country can act in a way which has anticompetitive effects in another country. To be able to control such restrictions — which are often referred to in literature as international restrictive business practices2 — and to do so in an equitable way, it may be necessary for a country to claim, or to appear to claim, “extraterritorial jurisdiction”.

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References

  1. In North America competition law would be referred to as antitrust law. In this study these two terms are used quite interchangeably. In fact the term “antitrust law” is more convenient in the present context of law against restrictive business practices since the European Economic Community has explored many other avenues concerning competition, such as.State aids, taxes and technical barriers to trade which are not topics under the study (see 1–7).

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Barack, B. (1981). The International Dimensions of the European Economic Community Competition Rules. In: The Application of the Competition Rules (Antitrust Law) of the European Economic Community to Enterprises and Arrangements External to the Common Market. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4482-9_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4482-9_1

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