Abstract
The Frenchman Auguste Comte (1798–1857) — main work Cours de la Philosophie Positive — gave the name ‘Positivism’ to the empiricist scientific ideal to which he adhered. According to Comte, science must confine itself to ‘positive facts’. Philosophical positivism is a theory of knowledge which does not differ very greatly from Hume’s empiricism. Hume’s study of causality, says Comte, formed
‘the only major step which the human mind had ever taken towards a true and direct appreciation of nature seen in a purely relative way as befits a sound philosophy since the great controversy between the realists and nominalists.’ (CPP VI, p. 255)
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Maris, C.W. (1981). Comte and positivism. In: Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-4432-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-4430-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive