Abstract
The empiricist moral philosophers posit that what we experience as morality belongs to the natural world and can therefore be explained empirically. In many cases the starting-point of their analysis is an experience of a moral consciousness as described by Kant. However there is a radical difference between their explanation of this experience and Kant’s metaphysical interpretation. According to them, moral consciousness is a natural product of certain emotions, attitudes, dispositions, vital inclinations or social processes. There is no objective normative order. As Ross says,
‘No one has given a more penetrating analysis of this phenomenon than Kant, although he took the awareness of duty to be a revelation of the transcendental and not as one psychological phenomenon among others.’ (Directives and Norms, p. 85).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Maris, C.W. (1981). Conclusion. In: Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-4432-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-4430-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive