Abstract
As we saw, Smith and Spencer think that although a theory has no influence over moral sentiments, it can nevertheless justify those sentiments retrospectively. But how is such a justification possible since they have reduced morality to natural phenomena? For do the empiricists not maintain that norms cannot be derived from natural facts?
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© 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Maris, C.W. (1981). The empiricist justification of the claims of morality. In: Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4430-0_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-4432-4
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