Abstract
The notions of language, mind and mythology are intertwined in certain passages in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Even when these intertwined themes are not expressly identified, their intertwinement often seems to serve as a general thematic backdrop for many of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical deliberations. However, there is a danger of misinterpreting the intertwinement of these themes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as an indication that he shared the outlook of others who have tended to intertwine these themes in their writings. This danger is especially acute, because the intertwinement of these themes in the writings of others has tended to be intimately linked to an outlook which runs counter to some of the central critical thrusts of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. This paper offers some reflections on the nature of the intertwinement of the themes of language, mind and mythology in Wittgenstein’s later writings, and examines the import of that intertwinement for an appreciation of his later philosophy, and in particular his fairly recently published volumes of remarks in the philosophy of psychology.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
B. Russell, Symposium on ‘The Meaning of Meaning’, Mind, 29 (Oct. 1920), p. 401.
B. Russell, ‘On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean’, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society,1919, Suppl. Vol. II, pp. 27–28.
P. M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1988, pp. 179–180.
TS 213, p. 434. All references to Wittgenstein’s papers are to the Cornell microfilm version, `The Wittgenstein Papers’, Cornell University Microfilms, Ithaca, N.Y. The system of reference is that of
G. H. v. Wright, ‘The Wittgenstein Papers’, in Wittgenstein, Oxford, B. Blackwell 1982. Within quoted material, double obliques mark off terms or phrases that Wittgenstein entered as possible alternate wording. Broken or wavy underlines (reproduced here simply as broken underlines) were used by Wittgenstein to indicate that he was not sure about the appropriateness of a word or phrase. M.Anscombe & G. H. von Wright. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1967, § 211.
MS 160, pp. 43–44; see my discussion in S. Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1987, nn. 174–5 and pp. 55 ff.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen. Philosophical Investigations (PI), ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe & R. Rhees. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1953.
MS 137, p. 29; see L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen. Culture and Value (CV), ed. by G. H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman. Trans. by R Winch, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1980, p. 44.
MS 137, p. 30; published in Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II (RPP II), ed. by G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman. Trans. C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1980, § 453.
See, for example, G. Bergmann, ‘The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein’, in Essays on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, ed. by I. Copi & R. Beard, Hafner Press, New York 1973, pp. 354–355; C. Mundle,A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy, Glover & Blair Limited, London 1979, p. 199; G. Bowie,’ Wittgenstein’s `Behaviorism“ and Psycho-physical Laws’, in Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought.- Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. by E. Leinfellner et al., Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1978, p. 445.
MS 124, pp. 5–6. See MS 161, pp. 79–80.
S. S. Hilmy, ‘Wittgenstein and Behaviourism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien: Wittgenstein in Focus - Im Brennpunkt: Wittgenstein, ed. by B. McGuinness & R. Haller, Rodopi, AmsterdamAtlanta,Ga, 33–34, 1989, pp. 335–352.
B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, G. Allen & Unwin, London 1921, p. 86.
See my discussion in S. S. Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, cit., p. 116.
B. Russell, ‘The Meaning of Meaning’, The Dial (August 1926), p. 116. See Carnap’s adoption of a form of this causal explanatory principle, R. Carnap, ’Psychology in Physical Language’, in Logical Positivism, ed. by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, London 1963, pp. 196–197.
L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, ed. and with a Preface by R. Rhees, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1958; Harper & Row, New York 19652, p. 5.
MS 117, pp. 127–129. For a more extensive discussion of this passage in the broader context of Wittgenstein’s later view of the nature of language, see S. S. Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, cit., pp. 163 ff.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hilmy, S.S. (1995). Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Mythology. In: Egidi, R. (eds) Wittgenstein: Mind and Language. Synthese Library, vol 245. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3691-6_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3691-6_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4475-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3691-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive