Abstract
Several aspects of trust relationships make the connection between formal modeling and empirical applications troublesome. One of the main problems is that trust relations are typically both interdependent and dynamic. As a result, formal modeling is often non-trivial (since it needs to be based on repeated game theory) and statistical testing laborious or even infeasible (because the degree of trust depends on parameters of the situation under study in a nonlinear or even discontinuous way).
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Raub, W., Snijders, C. (2001). A Reluctant Match: Models for the Analysis of Trust in Durable Two Party Relations. In: Castelfranchi, C., Tan, YH. (eds) Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3614-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3614-5_10
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