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On the Harmful Effects of Excessive Anti-Whiggism

  • Aristides Baltas
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 151)

Abstract

You don’t need me to remind you that the coming of age of the history of science has relegated to the discipline’s prehistory all the enlightened amateurs’ attempts to collect past curiosities which, under some unspecified criteria, appeared as ‘interesting’. By the same token, “history of science” has become a legitimate academic discipline in its own right, one possessing a well-delimited subject matter. History of science is now the methodologically principled study of past scientific achievements, in light of all factors which determined their production, their acceptance, and the diffusion and which gave them meaning and significance in the first place.

Keywords

General History Methodological Principle Current Framework Current Science Cultural Framework 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aristides Baltas
    • 1
  1. 1.National Technical UniversityAthensGreece

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