Historiographical Trends in the Social History of Mathematics and Science

  • Michael Otte
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 151)


In this paper I will attempt to consider the connection between epistemology and the sociology of knowledge by sketching the historical development and I want to show how both come to bear upon, in different ways, similar issues in mathematical and scientific knowledge. Mathematics in fact becomes a touchstone for these attempts as a constructivist epistemology that is pointedly expressed in mathematical cognition, substitutes traditional empiricism, nominalism and behaviorism thereby providing a basis for understanding that connection.


Social Theory Social Character Formal Knowledge Propositional Function False Consciousness 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Otte
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany

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