The One in the Philosophy of Proclus: Logic Versus Metaphysics
An important issue concerning the history of logic and philosophy is the appearance of paradoxes in various logical or philosophical systems of the past. This issue is methodologically interesting, from a historiographical point of view, because sometimes one has to make use of logic and metaphysics in juxtaposition to be able to deal with them. That is, one has to make use of criteria which, although not available at the time, are necessary to examine, interpret and understand logical scientific and philosophical systems of the past. This is especially the case whenever one is forced to deal with the issue of examining first principles in a philosophical system, which are postulated so that their indescribability is one of the basic ingredients of their nature.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.See, for instance, Carl R. Kordig: Proclus on the One. Idealist Studies 3 (1973), pp. 229237. Kordig uses the last part of Proclus’s commentaries to the platonic Parmenides. [Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevii,ed. R. Klibansky; Plato Latinus III, Parmenides usque ad ftnem primae hypothesis nec non Procli Commentarium in Parmenides, pars ultima inedita,eds. R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe and L. Labowsky (London: Warburg Institute,1953).]Google Scholar