The Nature and Diversity of the Soul’s Sensations

Abstract

Following what I have said so far about the nature of the mind, in general and in particular, and about the way in which the human mind is united with the body, I think I could give a definition which accurately expresses its essence by saying that ‘the human mind is a substance which thinks and, since it is united with the human body in the way which suits its nature, it is capable of acting and being acted on with the body and thus of being the human form or soul, that is, the principle of all the actions and passions which distinguish human beings from what is not human.’ We call this mind ‘a substance which thinks’ because, as we have said at the beginning of this treatise, we understand by the word ‘mind’ the principle of thought and the subject in which each particular thought is received. We also say that it is ‘capable of being united with the human body’;¹⁶⁴ for on the one hand, who could prevent it from having a certain thought at the same time as the body undergoes a certain movement? On the other hand, who could prevent the body from being moved when the mind has a certain thought or prevent all this from happening when the mind and body depend on each other in the way that we described and which is specific to human nature? We call this mind ‘the human form’ because thought (of which it is the principle and subject) differentiates human beings from all other animals which lack thought and because, by means of its union with the body and the way this union is realized, human beings are distinct from all other substances, not only from those which are purely corporeal or purely spiritual, but also from those where body and mind may be joined in a different manner than in their case.