Abstract
Those propositional modalities which deal with such normative conceptions as the permitted, the obligatory, or the forbidden, are characterized as deontic modalities. The extensive investigations of the logical theory of these concepts which have been carried on in recent days have been stimulated by an important paper published by G. H. von Wright in 1951.1
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References
Deontic Logic’, Mind 60 (1951) 1–15. For a general bibliography of the subject see A. R. Anderson ‘The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems’, in N. Rescher (ed.) The Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1967).
The principal ideas and results of the present chapter are drawn from the author’s paper on ‘Semantic Foundations for Conditional Permission’, Philosophical Studies 19 (1968). For other interesting applications of this line of approach see G. H. von Wright, ‘Deontic Logics’, American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967) 136–143.
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Rescher, N. (1968). Deontic Logic. In: Topics in Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3546-9_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3546-9_16
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