Abstract
The present attempt seeks in a very modest way to present a model that would avoid the perceived faults of what is hitherto on offer, and to provide a basis for a sounder theory. It is not merely the case that previous work has not gone far enough, but also that it was wrongheaded. Assumptions were made that should not have been made, and these precluded the success of the venture from the start. More, and more work was done on the consequences of these assumptions. Deeper, and deeper, questions were asked, but the offending main assumption was left untroubled. That permitted it to subvert all efforts. Not, I haste to say to the point that no good results emerged, clearly many did, and splendidly. But it fails in so far as the main objective of the work remained beyond reach.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Husserl, accepted that, yet landed himself in well rehearsed difficulties (Husserl, 1982).
Heidegger with his Dasein (Heidegger, 1962/78) attempted to present an idea as just, and only the immediate content of consciousness, and this as equivalent to its acceptance. Even if we were to accept Dasein, this would not be sufficient, for we cannot deal in this fashion with structural matters. This is evident even in the other forms of being supposed by Heidegger himself. Brentano, of course gave expression to this point in his doctrine of Doppelurteile (Brentano, 1924/8). Here, and now is neither the time nor the place to discuss such doctrines. I merely wish to point out that where everything goes nothing has, or can have any point whatever. But then our whole enterprise again reduces to zero.
This is precisely the difficulty that baffled Parmenides (1948). He, of course thought that such an item can have only negative ramifications, all of them concerned with logic.
F.H. Bradley (1897) relied on this point to criticise relations. Kant attempted to resolve it via the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. That ploy will not work for us. Kant does say that the `I-know’ must accompany all judgments, clearly then he assumes that some judgment/knowledge is antecedently possible. For us that is the bone of contention.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Srzednicki, J. (1995). Conclusion: A Picture of the Theory. In: To Know or Not to Know. Synthese Library, vol 244. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3542-1_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3542-1_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4418-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3542-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive