Advertisement

Conclusion: A Picture of the Theory

  • Jan Srzednicki
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 244)

Abstract

The present attempt seeks in a very modest way to present a model that would avoid the perceived faults of what is hitherto on offer, and to provide a basis for a sounder theory. It is not merely the case that previous work has not gone far enough, but also that it was wrongheaded. Assumptions were made that should not have been made, and these precluded the success of the venture from the start. More, and more work was done on the consequences of these assumptions. Deeper, and deeper, questions were asked, but the offending main assumption was left untroubled. That permitted it to subvert all efforts. Not, I haste to say to the point that no good results emerged, clearly many did, and splendidly. But it fails in so far as the main objective of the work remained beyond reach.

Keywords

Ontological Commitment Normative Constraint Infinite Regress Epistemic Theory Subjective Side 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 2.
    Husserl, accepted that, yet landed himself in well rehearsed difficulties (Husserl, 1982).Google Scholar
  2. 3.
    Heidegger with his Dasein (Heidegger, 1962/78) attempted to present an idea as just, and only the immediate content of consciousness, and this as equivalent to its acceptance. Even if we were to accept Dasein, this would not be sufficient, for we cannot deal in this fashion with structural matters. This is evident even in the other forms of being supposed by Heidegger himself. Brentano, of course gave expression to this point in his doctrine of Doppelurteile (Brentano, 1924/8). Here, and now is neither the time nor the place to discuss such doctrines. I merely wish to point out that where everything goes nothing has, or can have any point whatever. But then our whole enterprise again reduces to zero.Google Scholar
  3. 5.
    This is precisely the difficulty that baffled Parmenides (1948). He, of course thought that such an item can have only negative ramifications, all of them concerned with logic.Google Scholar
  4. 6.
    F.H. Bradley (1897) relied on this point to criticise relations. Kant attempted to resolve it via the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. That ploy will not work for us. Kant does say that the `I-know’ must accompany all judgments, clearly then he assumes that some judgment/knowledge is antecedently possible. For us that is the bone of contention.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Srzednicki
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MelbourneAustralia

Personalised recommendations