Abstract
In The Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel argued that there is an important parallel between the recognition that the present is simply a time among others and the recognition that oneself is merely an individual among others.1 The former grounds prudence as a rational requirement on desire and action; the latter provides like grounds for altruism. Nagel concluded in that work that the only acceptable reasons are timeless (in the case of prudence) or agent-neutral (in the case of altruism). He later abandoned the latter of these positions.2
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Das, R. (2003). Prudence, Identity, and Value. In: Dyke, H. (eds) Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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