Abstract
Before Derek Parfit’s revolutionary book, Reasons and Persons (1984), it was assumed that a necessary condition for moral and legal responsibility is personal identity. After all, what could be more obvious than the thesis that to hold a person culpable for misconduct he or she must be the person who engaged in the deed? As F. H. Bradley once expressed it:
Now the first condition of the possibility of my guiltiness, or of my becoming a subject of moral imputation, is my self-sameness; I must be throughout one identical person. … If, when we say, “I did it,” the I is not to be the one I, distinct from all other I’s; or if the one I, now here, is not the same I with the I whose act the deed was, then there can be no question whatever but that the ordinary notion of responsibility disappears (Bradley (1927) p. 4).
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Oaklander, L.N. (2003). Personal Identity, Responsibility and Time. In: Dyke, H. (eds) Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_11
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