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Saying and Showing the Good

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Part of the book series: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy ((LOET,volume 14))

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s distinction in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus between what can be said and what can only be shown provides a welcome alternative to the stark choice between contemporary realism and anti-realism.1 It concerns what he thought was “the cardinal problem of philosophy.” One may ask, “What are those things that can only be shown?” But the question misses the point of the distinction. What can only be shown is not a part of reality. But neither is it unreal.

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Butchvarov, P. (2003). Saying and Showing the Good. In: Dyke, H. (eds) Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6297-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3530-8

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