Abstract
Richard Taylor has enlivened various fields of analytical philosophy during the past three decades, especially with his ingenious attacks upon commonly held beliefs. I recall being particularly stimulated to reflection by his challenge to one pair of seeming truisms: our certainty that we no longer have any control over what has already happened; and the complementary assumption that some forthcoming events — notably our own deliberate acts — do remain ‘up to us’. Taylor has argued separately for backwards causation, and for a fatalistic view of what is going to occur. Most significantly, he seems able to transform every objection we produce against fatalism into an unwanted rationale for supposing that we can shape bygone events — and vice versa.
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Notes
D. F. Pears, `Time, Truth, and Inference’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51 (1950–1951), 1–24.
M. A. E. Dummett, with A. G. N. Flew, `Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?’, Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society (supplement) 28 (1954), 27–62.
R. M. Chisholm and R. Taylor, `Making Things to Have Happened’, Analysis 20 (1960) 73–78.
Gilbert Ryle, `It Was to Be’, in Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1954.
R. D. Bradley, `Must the Future Be What It Is Going to Be?’, Mind 68 (1959), 193208. Reprinted in Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays, Anchor-Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1967, pp. 232–251.
Richard Taylor, `Fatalism’, Philosophical Review 71 (1962), 56–66. Reprinted in Gale, op. cit., pp. 219–231. The page numbers here refer to the Gale volume.
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974, p. 60f. See also his `Fatalism’, p. 221; Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1918, pp. 201ff.; A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1956, pp. 16–175; and Steven M. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1967, p. 9.
Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 67f.
Ibid., p. 65f.; see Cahn, op.cit., pp. 8ff., 15, 19, 23.
Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 59; see also p. 65 and Cahn, op. cit., pp. 16–23.
Taylor, `Fatalism’, p. 223, some emphasis added.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.223f.
Ibid., p. 225. is Ibid., p. 224, emphasis added; see also Calm, op. cit., pp. 32–44.
Taylor, `Fatalism’, p. 224f.
Ibid., p. 225.
Ibid., pp. 223, 226.f
Ibid., p. 226.
Ibid., p. 227.
Ibid., p. 224.
Ibid., see Calm, op. cit., p. 92, and Calm, `Fatalistic Arguments’, Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964), 295–305, p. 297.
Taylor, `A Note on Fatalism’, Philosophical Review 72 (1963), 497–499, p. 498f., emphasis added; see Cahn, `Fatalistic Arguments’, p. 299f.; and Fate, Logic and Time, pp. 92–95.
Chisholm and Taylor, op. cit., p. 73f.
Ibid.
Taylor, `Prevention, Postvention and the Will’, in Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism, Random House, New York, 1966, pp. 65–85; Action and Purpose, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966, pp. 31–39, 188–195.
Taylor, `Prevention’, p. 70; see Action, p. 189ff., and also A. J. Ayer, `Fatalism’, in The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, Macmillan, London, 1963, pp. 253–268, p. 239.
Taylor, Action, p.33.
Ibid., p. 34f.
Dummett, `Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?’, p. 31.
Sarah Waterlow, `Backwards Causation and Continuing’, Mind 83 (1974), 372–387.
Taylor, Action, p.193.
Ibid., p. 194f.
Irving Thalberg, `Free Will and Chisholm’s Varieties of Casusation’, Idealistic Studies 1 (1971), 149–159, p. 152ff.; `Constituents and Causes of Emotion and Action’, Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1973), 1–14, pp. 8–12; Perception, Emotion and Action, Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, pp. 66–71.
See J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categoriae and De Interpretatione, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, pp. 53ff., 132–142.
Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 60.
Ibid., p. 65ff.; see also “Diodorus Cronus”(i.e., Richard Taylor and Steven M. Cahn), `Time, Truth and Ability’, Analysis 25 (1965), 137–141, p. 139ff.
Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 69f.
Ibid., p. 65.
I read a version of this paper at Illinois State University in December 1976, and thank listeners for their comments. My colleague Daniel Berger gave me a number of valuable criticisms. Peter van Inwagen offered me detailed reactions to the penultimate draft, and kindly sent me two interesting manuscripts of his own on fatalism.
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Thalberg, I. (1980). Fatalism Toward Past and Future. In: Van Inwagen, P. (eds) Time and Cause. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3528-5_3
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