Abstract
If a noema is an entity of some sort, what sort of entity is it? In Husserl’s ontology, there are just two kinds of entities: those that are real and those that are ideal. A noema clearly is not a real entity, it is not—as Husserl requires of everything that is real—spatio-temporally individuated. Is it then ideal? If a noema is an entity, it must be an ideal entity. An ideal entity is either an essence or belongs to the class of entities Husserl calls meanings. Is noema an essence?
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References
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einfiiluung in die reine Phänomenologie,ed.Walter Biemel, Husserliana III (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), §36, p. 80.
Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester, 1925, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana IX ( Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968 ), pp. 166–67.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Mohanty, J.N. (1992). Noema and Essence. In: Drummond, J.J., Embree, L. (eds) The Phenomenology of the Noema. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3425-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3425-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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