Abstract
Conventional facts are based on mutual beliefs which work as reasons for actions. The question remaining is: How can other peoples’ beliefs in something, which leads them to act accordingly, be a reason for someone else acting in a similar way? What is the compelling force of conventional facts noticed by Durkheim?
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Lagerspetz, E. (1995). Game Theory and Mutual Beliefs. In: The Opposite Mirrors. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3409-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3409-7_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4511-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3409-7
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