Abstract
Since ethical concepts are not empirical concepts, bridge principles cannot be found in the class of empirical laws, neither of the deterministic nor of the statistical sort. If we draw the parallel to scientific theories, then ethical norms and values have to be considered as theoretical concepts, like the concept of force in Newtonian physics. In science, laws containing such theoretical concepts are confirmable only in an ‘indirect’ holistic way, via the confirmation of the entire theory. One might conjecture that ethical theories, containing synthetic bridge principles as a part, can be justified in a similar manner. Do we find here a last ‘rescue’ for the possibility of an intersubjective justification of ethical theories? This last possibility shall be investigated in this last chapter of our study.
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Already Carnap’s classical study (1936/37) was driven towards this conclusion. Confer Hempel’s discussion of Carnap’s (1936/37) in Hempel (1950, 1951) and Camap’s reaction in Carnap (1956, 1963 ).
This phenomenon is usually called the holism of falsification, but I think it is more accurate to speak of the holism of confirmation (and disconfirmation). It was rediscovered by Quine (1951, § 5–6), Sneed (1971, pp. 89f) and Stegmüller (1986, ch. 7), but was originally detected by Duhem (1908, ch. 10, § 2–3).
A complete reconstruction of theories would have to include their language framework, their purely logical and mathematical part, and their semantics in terms of a specification of their models. For our purpose the consideration of the set of the synthetic statements of T is sufficient.
Cf. Schurz (1983a, ch. I.5.2) and (1989b) for an elaboration of this view.
Cf. Sneed (1971); see also Schurz (1990).
A precise explication of a “nonredundant” theoretical concept or statement is given in Schurz (1989a) and (1991b).
This is also one of the main claims of Maclntyre (1981, ch.s 2, 5).
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Schurz, G. (1997). Are Synthetic Bridge Principles Scientifically Justifiable?. In: The Is-Ought Problem. Trends in Logic, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3375-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3375-5_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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