Abstract
In the famous passage of his Treatise (1739/40, p. 177f), David Hume put forward a basic argument against the argumentative praxis of ethicists of his time. He stated that from what is (or is not), nothing about what ought to be (or ought not to be) can logically be concluded. This is Hume’s is-ought thesis. Consequently, the is-ought problem is the question whether, and under which conditions, this thesis is true.
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Notes
Cf. Singer (1979, pp. 81fí), Hoerster (1991, pp. 69fí).
Cf. also Hare (1952, p. 31), and Black (1969, p. 99). Further prominent defend¬ers are, for example, Moore (1903, p. 15f), Hare (1952, pp. 29, 44), Frankena (1963, pp. 984–6) and v. Wright (1963, p. 161).
For arguments in this direction cf. Macintyre (1969, pp. 36–9) and Toulmin (1950, pp. 38–40, 52–62).
Cf. Carnap (1955, × 3), Mates (1951), pp. 531–3.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Schurz, G. (1997). Philosophical Background and Program of the Study. In: The Is-Ought Problem. Trends in Logic, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3375-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3375-5_1
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