Abstract
In this chapter we shall trace how the political agenda of the Enlightenment Project has impacted analytic social and political philosophy.1 This will involve two distinct elements: (a) exhibiting the historical origins of analytic social and political philosophy and (b) showing how the conceptual ramifications within the evolution of analytic thought are reflected back into the politics of the Enlightenment Project.
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Notes (Chapter 10)
What binds analytical figures together is that they endorse the distinctive assumptions of the Enlightenment. These assumptions go, roughly, as follows: 1. There is a reality independent of human knowledge of which we human beings are part. 2. Reason and method, particularly as exemplified in science, offer us the proper way to explore that reality and our relationship to it. 3. In this exploration traditional preconceptions - in particular, traditional evaluative preconceptions - should be suspended and the facts allowed to speak for themselves “ Pettit (1993), p. 7.
In the plethora of theories, currents, and individual positions which figure in post-analytic thought, liberalism is still a crucial problematic. Rorty reproposes it in an epistemological key, as a requisite of solidarity among the disciplines; Rawls’s theory of justice gives it a neo-contractualist twist in which the egalitarian principle is based on a mental experiment, or at least stipulated by individual entities from behind `a veil of ignorance’; Sandel opposes himself to Rawls, maintaining that no contractualist choice can be made in the abstract about precise contents; Nagel, in turn, eliminates the model of antagonistic social interests and suggests the simple coexistence of diverse `modes’ of the egalitarian principle. These positions of general reevaluation are joined by more critical readings of liberalism. Among its critics are Scanlon, who is inclined to a historical recontextualization of contractualism; Wolin, who attempts the redefinition of a project of Jacobin revolutionary action as a premise for the global transformation of society; and, finally, Roberto Unger who, mediating between Habermas’s theory of communicative action and Rawls’s new contractualism, is committed to launching a new version of `emancipatory’ social experimentalism “ Borradori (1994), p. 23, n 9.
Maclntyre in Borradori (1994), p. 145.
Please note the existence of the following alternatives: (1) those who reject modernity tout court in favor of some form of classicism; (2) those who conceptualize the modern political predicament and liberal culture outside of the framework of the Enlightenment Project - of which there are many varieties.
See Livingston (forthcoming) for Hume.
Randall (1962), p. 924.
Cranston (1986).
External’ may taken either narrowly to mean outside the body or widely to include the body as long as it denotes something not capable of direct control by the will.
The classic discussion of gnosticism is to be found in Voegelin (1952). Voegelin provides (in Chapter IV) an historical progression that begins with medieval immanentism, then progresses to humanism, and then to the Enlightenment to progressivism to liberalism to positivism and finally to Marxism.
According to Hayek (1960), there are “two different traditions in the theory of liberty the victory of the Benthamite Philosophical Radicals over the Whigs in England concealed the fundamental difference which in more recent years has reappeared as the conflict between liberal democracy and `social’ or totalitarian democracy” (pp. 54–55).
Mably (1776), Book I, chap. ii, p. 308. Benjamin Constant, in his celebrated essay “On the Liberty of the Ancients and the Moderns,” accused Mably of distorting Rousseau into a totalitarian.
am indebted here to J. Hasnas (1995).
These rights are sometimes called `option’ rights. See M.P. Golding (1978), p. 44.
There are other interpretations and defenses of a market economy relative to the moral foundations of liberal culture that are not reflections of liberal social philosophy (e.g., Hume, Kant, Weber, Oakeshott, etc.).
There are classic difficulties in any utilitarian account. See D. Lyons (1965).
The original argument against making such a calculation is to be found in Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals the most famous version is in Hayek (1944).
While socialism is a complex phenomenon with many roots, the term `socialism’ was first introduced in 1827 in a periodical, Co-operative Magazine,which expressed the views of Robert Owen, an early critic of Bentham. Socialism is not a coherently defined set of doctrines but a reaction to the shortcomings of Benthamite social theory. Its resilience is a reflection of both the intellectual shortcomings of Benthamism and the practical problems created by industrial dislocation and the large numbers of people who have failed to be absorbed into liberal culture.
See Hook (1967) for an elaboration of the different versions of Marxism.
See Capaldi (1990), as well as the other essays in that issue. A case can be made that what distinguishes the social epistemology of liberal culture is the promotion of autonomous individuals or the recognition of the capacity for free and responsible individuals.
Mention could be made here of such diverse figures as the Frankfurt School, Habermas, Charles Taylor, communitarians, etc.
The following major contemporary political philosophers will never appear on analytic reading lists: Jacques Maritain, Ortega y Gasset, Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Michael Oakeshott. Historical figures to be ignored are Edmund Burke, Kant, Hegel, and David Hume (whose political writings are totally ignored despite the prominence of his epistemology for analytic philosophers). No doubt the list could be lengthened considerably.
For reactions to Russell’s social and political views see Santayana (1936) and (1940); Einstein, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.) (1961), pp. 288–89, 291; for a balanced view see Ryan (1988).
I am in complete agreement with the aims for which you are fighting at present: serious negotiations, instead of the Cold War, no bomb-testing, no fall-out shelters.“ Letter from Carnap to Russell, dated May 12, 1962.
Carnap (1963), p. 83.
Otto Neurath, “Through War Economy to Economy in Kind” in (1973), p. 140. By 1942, Neurath had changed his mind, and moved from a socialist position to a more clearly liberal one. In “International Planning for Freedom” (Ibid.),he recognized that “Some muddle thus seems to be unavoidable in a society of free men” (p.430), and that “Merchants are sometimes better guardians of freedom than enthusiasts having the State as their highest ideal” (p. 440).
Wedberg (1984), vol. 3, p. 222.
Reichenbach (1951), p. 7.
Popper made this statement at the annual Philosophical Lecture read before the British Academy on January 20, 1960. It was reprinted in (1962), p. 6.
Ibid.,p. 5.
Popper (1983), pp. 162–63.
Rorty (1985), p. 16.
Romanos (1983), p.193.
See Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,Chapter Five.
Cohen (1986), pp. 61–62.
Brian Barry (1990) describes political philosophy during this period as a sort of utilitarianism which is then handed over to experts for implementation (p. xxxv).
Earlier, in our discussion of metaphysics, we questioned whether a conception of endless progress is meaningful without implicitly assuming a terminus.
If we could scientifically explain the factual deep structure of human decisions and if these decisions had some underlying systematic structure, then democracy could itself be increasingly replaced by social and political expertise with scientific progress. Popper attempted to circumvent this possible line of objection by developing a kind of argument in favor of some form of human freedom based on unpredictability. That argument is now considered largely implausible.
Hayek (1973).
Popper (1982a).
Popper (1982).
Popper (1983).
For another exposition of the relation between liberalism and empiricism see Hooker (1987), p. 207.
We have already had occasion in our discussions of ethics to point out the nihilistic implications of emotivism and the same would hold of analogous versions of liberalism. The nihilistic implications of orthodox Marxism were prominently discussed in the works of the Frankfurt Marxists such Habermas. These Marxists emphasized the early Hegelian Marx and saw Marxism in terms of philosophical idealism rather than materialism. Habermas made a famous critique of positivism for using philosophy to rationalize social control and advocated, instead, liberation. For our purposes, what is important here is the recognition that scientism and materialism constitute serious intellectual challenges to moral agency. See Habermas (1968).
Reichenbach (1951), pp. 292–302.
Laslett (1956), pp. vii, ix.
We’re not concerned with the historical question here. We’re not concerned about how principles are in fact chosen. We’re concerned about which principles are just “ Ronald Dworkin, quoted in Magee (1982), p. 216.
In a way, we’re [i.e., Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin] all working the same street liberalism.“ Dworkin in Magee (1982), p. 223.
Rawls (1974–75) maintains that his position is not the reflection of a philosophical school.
This [Rawls’ book] is certainly the model of social justice that has governed the advocacy of R.H. Tawney and Richard Titmus and that holds the Labour Party together,“ Stuart Hampshire in his review of the book in the New York Review of Books, 1972. Rawls’s conclusions have ”enormous intuitive appeal to people of good will, “ Ronald Dworkin in Magee (1982), p. 213.
Rawls (1971), pp. 46–53.
In morality as in everything else, the Rationalist aims to begin by getting rid of inherited nescience and then to fill the blank nothingness of an open mind with the items of certain knowledge which he abstracts from his personal experience, and which he believes to be approved by the common `reason’ of mankind“ Michael Oakeshott, ”Rationalism in Politics,“ p. 40 [1962 (1991)].
Rawls (1971), p. 579.
Ibid.,p. 137.
Ibid.,p. 74.
There is no recognition of the possibility of individuals who might actually choose to be disadvantaged, say for religious reasons. One can only speculate that such choices would be viewed as “abnormal” or as evidence that all interference had not been removed. Clearly “abnormal” and “interference” would have to be specified relative to some implicit teleological view.
For an elaboration of this point see Gourevitch’s (1975) review of Rawls, especially the discussion of “the ideal of the person” (pp. 216f).
Rawls (1971), p. 151 (see also pp.522, 527, 570–77).
For an insightful look at how Rawls moves from Kant almost to Hegel see Kukathas and Pettit (1990). “Its [Rawlsian philosophy] aim, ultimately, is not to challenge or repudiate such competitors but to subsume them. ” (P. 149).
Ibid.,pp. 152–53.
Ibid.,p. 75.
Ibid.,p.440.
This is the polar opposite conception of self-respect from what one would find if the autonomous moral agent were taken seriously.
Ronald Dworkin in Magee (1982), p. 220.
Allan Bloom in his (1975) review of Rawls maintained that Rawls misunderstands both Kant and Aristotle.
Nozick (1981), p. 515.
In (1981), Nozick recognizes a context in which there is a possibility that rights can be “transcended” (p. 504), and in his discussion of the barrier to self-development (p. 514), we are reminded how difficult it is to specify criteria for when all barriers have been removed. We cannot, according to Nozick himself, specify the sufficient conditions for such an event.
Rawls (1971), p. 560.
Dworkin quoted in Magee (1982), p. 223.
Ibid.,pp. 228, 226.
Dworkin (1984), p. 64.
One of the most acute and perceptive critics of the relationship between analytic philosophy and liberal social philosophy has been Maurice Cornforth. Speaking from a Marxist perspective, Cornforth (1971) writes that “the promotion of the sciences is part of the very life-blood of the bourgeois social order. The dilemma consists of this -that either you take your stand by the sciences and sacrifice your illusions, or else you take your stand by your illusions and sacrifice the sciences. But they are prepared to do neither so some third way has to be found. The most fruitful, the most plausible, and at once the simplest and most flexible way was that discovered by Locke. It enables the explorers at one and the same time to accept the empirical approach and the discoveries of the natural sciences, and to reject all materialism (such as that of Hobbes or, more to the point later, of Marx) and keep the discussion of social and moral problems on a plane where the real contradictions and motive forces operating in society, behind the facade of social consciousness, remain hidden and are never allowed to intrude” pp. 38–39.
Indirect evidence of this can be seen in the persistent fact that many of the brightest intellects have been attracted to Marxism despite the debacle of communist inspired regimes in the former USSR and elsewhere. That so many highly intelligent people continue to be drawn to a position that fails in practice has to be accounted for by its theoretical strength. Its theoretical strength is that it is the consistent outcome of the entire Enlightenment Project and that an individualist moral culture cannot be defended by analytic philosophy.
Unger (1986). One might also want to consult the writings of Andrew Altman and Duncan Kennedy.
Gray (1995b), p. 144. See also Gray (1995a).
For a brilliant exposition of this thesis and its use as a critique of liberal social theory in Rawls, a critique of Habermas, and a critique of postmodernism see Seung (1992) and (1994).
Maclntyre in Borradori (1994), p. 143.
See Taylor (1992).
Wittgenstein’s argument against a private language and his discussion of following rules can now be seen as a critique of epistemological individualism and an argument in favor of the social context of individual thought, i.e., what we have been calling the “We Do” perspective. For the bearing of these issues on social and political thought see O’Hear (1991).
Certainly Kant himself denied this was possible as can be seen from detailed consideration of his writings on specific political and social issues. Unfortunately, analytic philosophers tend to be familiar only with the discussion of the categorical imperative.
To his credit, Rawls (1985) has clarified in a later essay that the content of `justice’ cannot be understood independent of a specific cultural context. In this essay he makes clear that his analysis was intended to reconcile, within our culture, a libertarian version of liberalism (originating in Locke) with an egalitarian version of liberalism (originating in Rousseau). Two things are to be noted about this essay. First, it confirms our contention that Rawls’ analysis had a hidden agenda. We are not here disputing that agenda but calling attention to its existence. Second, despite what Rawls said in this 1985 essay readers continue to ignore it and use his original analysis as a model of analytic political philosophy.
Maclntyre in Borradori (1994), p. 146.
We must distinguish between an individualist axiology and the axiology of individualism. That is, there are many ways of both understanding and defending individualism and autonomy without initiating the attempt in epistemological individualism or methodological individualism. One can imagine an account of individualism that is rooted in certain cultural practices and discovered in action. I take it that this is the mainline account to be found in Western Philosophy with its roots in classical Greek culture, Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, Hume, Kant, etc.
Rawls’ latest work (1993), eschews exploration for the social epistemological perspective he describes as “the public culture of a democratic society.”
Maclntyre (1988), p. 335.
Once more we would like to call attention to the charge made by Maurice Cornforth that positivism is a mask for a private political agenda: “ the methodology of bourgeois social science to misrepresent the methods and findings of the natural sciences in such a way as to represent the officially recognized social sciences as practicing the same scientific method to bolster up bourgeois views about the social system and its workings the effect was to stress the inadequacy of mere scientific modes of knowledge [the is-ought distinction?] and to leave scope for every kind of obscurantist authority, to stake a claim for recognition as essential elements in human consciousness, which supplement but do not conflict with the findings of the sciences” Cornforth (1971), pp. 72–73.
See Maclntyre in Borradori (1994), p. 149.
Suppose that a liberal is asked to found a new state. He is required to dictate its constitution and fundamental institutions. He must propose a general theory of political distribution, that is, a theory of how whatever the community has to assign, by way of goods or resources or opportunities, should be assigned“ Ronald Dworkin (1978/1984), p.65.
Earlier, in our discussion of socialism, we noted that the demand for equality is frequently made by or on behalf of those who have been “left behind” by the progress of liberal culture. Is it possible that the problem with these people is not economic or political but moral? That is, is it possible that for a variety of reasons these people have failed to grasp or embody the moral foundations of liberal culture? This is what is suggested by Oakeshott (1961).
See MacIntyre in Borradori (1994), p. 151.
One could delineate alternative political agendas in terms of which favored past practice is seen as a panacea, e.g., the market, majority rule, the supreme court, the referendum, the general strike, or even initiating a violent revolution construed as a traditional practice.
Putnam “Beyond Historicism” (1983), p. 288.
See Avineri and de Shalit (1992), MacIntyre (1981), Sandel (1982) and (ed.) (1984), and Taylor (1982).
Archard (1996), p. 269.
This is evidenced in MacIntyre’s book on education (1990).
Compare to the discussion of Nozick in Chapter Four.
See Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991) and (1997).
See Novak (1993) and Capaldi (1995).
We are not here advocating a particular morality, nor does it follow from this that the function of the state is to impose a morality. What the state can and cannot do will follow from the particular moral preconceptions that one finds to be operative. For example, in Mill’s On Liberty,the moral principle of individuality (autonomy) makes it immoral and illogical to impose on individuals in certain ways.
The classic account is in Oakeshott (1989). A more recent account is Gray (1993).
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Capaldi, N. (1998). Analytic Social and Political Philosophy. In: The Enlightenment Project in the Analytic Conversation. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3300-7_11
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