Abstract
The import of the Enlightenment Project is to respond to the human condition by means of a social technology. The understanding of norms must, therefore, be a scientific understanding that eventuates in and is compatible with such a technology.
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Notes (Chapter 9)
Schneewind (1992), p. 89.
Quoted in Randall (1962), p. 932.
We say “seemingly” because this was how Mill was read, and it is a reading that has had enormous influence on the analytic tradition. However, Capaldi (1983) has argued that Mill’s discussion of utilitarianism must be read in the light of an autonomy theory as expressed in On Liberty , not the other way around. If so, this would be another example of the rewriting of the history of philosophy in order to subtend analytic preconceptions.
A distinct line of criticism developed in response to utilitarianism. Critics were apt to charge that utilitarianism confused axiological hedonism with psychological hedonism. That is, the critics denied that our common axiological intuitions could be understood hedonistically or eliminated in favor of psychological hedonism. H.A. Prichard (1912) criticized the utilitarian account of our prima facie axiological intuitions. J.H. Muirhead subsequently coined the term `deontological’ to characterize Prichard’s position. Deontology is to be understood as opposition to any purely teleological or consequentialist account of our common axiological intuitions. According to Prichard, and others, some actions are morally obligatory independent of their consequences and without regard to long range prudential considerations. Our common evaluative and specifically moral intuitions could not in the first instance be explained solely in terms of the principle of utility or any purely teleological conceptual scheme.
Moore (1903), section 8. I think it is important that Moore’s example is of something whose parts are related organically (and, therefore, teleologically).
Moore (1956) [1903], p. 8.
Moore did not subscribe to scientism. For this reason, Moore is not part of the Enlightenment Project in analytic philosophy as we have understood it. See our discussion of ordinary language philosophy at the end of Chapter Six. Later analytic philosophers who borrowed Moore’s point against naturalism did not follow Moore’s own positive program in ethics. Jennifer Welchman (1989) has argued that Moore“s Principia did not have a revolutionary impact on Anglo-American ethics. ”Stevenson claimed that although he had altered the form of the argument [open-question argument] he believed himself to have preserved `the spirit of Moore’s objection.’ The claim is disingenuous…. Stevenson simply used the language of Moore’s argument as a convenient devise for translating his own position into terms more familiar to his audience“ p. 325.
Russell (1910) reprinted in Sellars and Hospers (1952), p. 7.
As we saw in Chapter One, Hylton (1990) dates the beginnings of analytic philosophy in 1912; we suggested that a program was formulated about 1914; in either case the 1910 work on ethics predates Russell’s full blown analytic philosophy.
After the scientific revolution, purpose was denied to the universe as a whole and confined to the narrowly human world. It became increasingly difficult to defend even this limited teleology. “... this essentialist teleology is precisely the element of Aristotle’s ethics that now seems least likely to be refurbished….” Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), p. 168. It is against this background that one can understand the catastrophic intellectual effect of Darwin’s views on evolution. According to Russell (1945),p. 753, Darwin destroyed the doctrine of `natural rights’ [i.e., natural rights based on the belief in natural law] in politics by undermining belief in the fixity of the human species.
Schlick declared ethics to be a branch of psychology (1938). Carnap, in The Logical Structure of the World, asserted that values could be understood scientifically. A version of this original view is still present in the work of those who engage in rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists conceptualize evaluative judgments from the point of view of epistemological atomism and the representative function of language that derives from an extreme modern naturalism. Ethical judgments, then, are construed as being about objective items of information or reducible to such information. Individual preferences are treated as items of information ultimately reducible to causal accounts (i.e., more information). See for example Gauthier (1987), and a group of critical essays on Gauthier, by Paul, Miller, Paul and Ahrens (1988). Rational choice theory adopts the substitution of the economic agent for the moral agent that we discuss in the section of this chapter subtitled “Analytic Ethics and the Loss of the Moral Agent.”
Russell (1938), p. 247.
The use of the term `values’ as a substitute for moral norms is relatively recent. For a good brief history see Frankena (1967). The following facts about the use of the term `values’ are relevant to an understanding of analytic ethics. First, `value’ is ambiguous in a way useful to analytic ethics, because it connotes that something is valued as opposed to possessing an intrinsic quality that makes it valuable, i.e., the subjective dimension is made primary over the objective dimension. It also ambiguously connotes either personal preference or social custom, both understood in a non-objective way. Second, the term originally was used within the social sciences, specifically economics, and thereby lends itself to the notion that we can examine the factual substructure of what is merely subjective. Third, the subjectivity of “values” is welcomed by some as a defense of liberal democracy against any dogmatism because each person’s or group’s preference (or pleasure in Bentham’s sense) counts for as much as any other.
Russell (1935).
It significant that Russell himself was unsatisfied with this turn of events in analytic ethics. He expressed that dissatisfaction in Schilpp (1961), p. 724:.. I am not guilty of logical inconsistency in holding to the above interpretation of ethics and at the same time expressing strong ethical preferences. But in feeling I am not satisfied.“ In (1967–69) the first volume of his Autobiography, Russell claimed that one of his earliest ambitions, one inspired by Hegel, was to unite science with ethical or social issues (p. 162). ”I thought that I would write one series of books on the philosophy of the sciences from pure mathematics to physiology, and another series of books on social questions. I hoped that the two series might ultimately meet in a synthesis at once scientific and practical. My scheme was largely inspired by Hegelian ideas.“ See also (1959b), pp. 14143.
See Reichenbach’s defense of democracy (1951), pp. 295–96: “Everybody is entitled to set up his own moral imperatives and to demand that everyone follow these imperatives.... I do not derive my principle from pure reason. I do not present it as the result of a philosophy. I merely formulate a principle which is the basis of all political life in democratic countries, knowing that in adhering to it I reveal myself as a product of my time…. I do not claim that it applies to all forms of society; if I… were placed in a different society I might be willing to modify my principle.” For critiques of positivism as leading to nihilism and its disastrous influence on public affairs see Strauss (1989) and Voegelin (1952).
Rorty (1982), p. 33.
“We can distinguish two broad trends in contemporary moral theory depending upon how `the problem of placing ethics’ is identified…. The first… approach depends upon finding some substantive contrast or discontinuity between facts… and norms or values. Perhaps most philosophers find such a contrast prima facie plausible…. The second broad trend... accepts the challenge of showing that moral judgments are factual in the paradigm sense afforded by empirical or theoretical judgments in the natural sciences” Darwall, Gibbard, Railton (1992), pp.128–30. Note, however, that with regard to analytic philosophers in the second group (Railton, David Lewis, Harman, Sturgeon, and Boyd) the continuity is established through a form of supervenience or reductionism that reflects the two-tier view.
Moore (1951), Chapter Eight, “The Conception of Intrinsic Value”, pp. 253–275.
A similar view is defended at the same time by Bertrand Russell in a paper he presented to the Apostles on March 4, 1922. This was called to my attention by Alan Ryan. See Ryan (1988), p. 47 n66.
R.M. Hare (1972).
Deontologists would claim that our moral intuitions cannot be explained in wholly consequentialist or empirical terms. Those who engage in exploration can deny this claim by appeal to the hidden structural level. Explorers, while beginning with our ordinary intuitions, may modify our common sense understanding by appeal to hidden structure.
The analogue to this approach in the law is the work of Hans Kelsen in his attempt to articulate the structure of a legal system in terms of a basic norm which, in turn, requires psychological analysis.
Prominent analytic meta-ethicists who have followed Kant (and Hare) in stressing the “objective” or “social” or “intersubjective dimension” to ethical discourse include: Thomas Nagel (1970); Gewirth (1978); Rawls (1980); and Darwall (1983). Alan Donagan (1977) is sometimes put into this group, but, unlike analytic meta-ethicists, Donagan combined his Kantianism with a commitment to teleology, natural law, and Judeo-Christian morality. Finding some neutral meaning to the word `objective’ so that ethical discourse can be construed as `objective’ is not to be confused with the rejection of scientism. In (1986) Thomas Nagel argued that `objective’ was not simply equatable with knowledge as attained in the empirical sciences (p. 144). However, Nagel nowhere challenges scientism.
Nielsen (1967), vol. III, p. 118.
Rawls (1974–75), p. 22: “We must not turn away from this task because much of it may appear to belong to psychology or social theory and not to philosophy. For the fact is that others are not prompted by philosophical inclination to pursue moral theory; yet this motivation is essential, for without it the inquiry has the wrong focus.”
This consequence is not unwelcome to many social scientists. It reinforces a claim made earlier in this book, namely, that analytic philosophy has served for a long time as the rationalizer of the position that the social sciences are really sciences. It is in performing this role that philosophers are welcome within certain circles of social science.
Quine’s reversion to some form of eliminativism in the face of the implications of the radical indeterminacy of exploration can be seen now as a consistent move on his part.
Henry Sidgwick was among the first utilitarian writers to try to harmonize utilitarianism with Kant. When the `Kantian Turn’ was taken, Sidgwick, who had been largely ignored, was once again taken seriously among analytic philosophers of ethics. See Schneewind (1987).
Donagan (1982), p. 147. Among these prominent utilitarians are Rawls, Toulmin, Baier, and Singer. Rawls insisted that his approach was Kantian. However, in his review of Rawls, R.M. Hare stressed the extent to which Rawls never surrendered Utilitarianism. See the next chapter on analytic social and political philosophy. R.M. Hare, for one, has stated explicitly that “I am in fact a Utilitarian, in the tradition of Mill.” Quoted in Magee (1982), p. 128. Properly qualified, it is also easy to see Moore, Russell and Sidgwick as utilitarians.
Darwall, Gibbard, Railton (1992), p. 150. These writers rightly point out that supervenience, in the end, is not distinguishable from reducibility (p. 172). Straightforward reductionists among analytic meta-ethicists include Harman (1977), David Lewis (1989), and Railton (1986).
R.M. Hare, quoted in Magee (1982), p. 141.
Hare, specifically, singles out Amartya Sen, who is a very good philosopher as well. The philosophers (utilitarians in particular) have a lot to learn from economists like him. Ibid.
Rawls’ `veil of ignorance’ is an instance of how these questions are rejected as extraneous.
Prominent analytic meta-ethicists who employ a neo-classical economic approach include Baier (1958); Gauthier (1987); and Gibbard (1990).
The main line of analytic ethical theorizing tends to dismiss libertarianism and rights theorizing on the grounds that it is still stuck at stage one. Traditional natural law theories are dismissed for the same reason as well as the fact that their adherents tend, at times, to want to connect natural law to religion.
Nozick (1981), p. 292.
See Chapter Four on analytic metaphysics for a further discussion of what Nozick means by a self-subsuming explanation. The reader should be reminded of our contention that such a conception of explanation is Hegelian.
Nozick (1981), p. 339.
Ibid., p. 317.
Ibid., pp. 285–86.
Ibid., p. 401.
Ibid., p. 555.
Ibid., p. 568.
Ibid., p. 524.
Ibid., p. 421.
Ibid., p. 449.
In his earlier work, Anarchy , State and Utopia (1974), Nozick had defended a more robust theory of individualism, some would even say libertarianism. However, in Philosophical Explanations , Nozick not only makes the `Kantian Turn’ but comes close to a Hegelian theory of the individual as organically linked with the community. Nozick, while not embracing such a Hegelian view, does recognize that this theory may not be congruent with his earlier work (Philosophical Explanations , pp. 498–99n), and he concedes that he is not linking this view of ethics with his earlier book.
MacIntyre (1981).
MacIntyre attacks positivism in particular and not analytic philosophy. Curiously, Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992) recognize that MacIntyre is offering what we have called an exploration and thus remains a meta-ethicist (pp. 182–83).
MacIntyre (1981), p. 111.
Ibid. , p. 107.
Maclntyre stresses that he is trying to vindicate “the moral tradition to which Aristotle’s teaching about the virtues is central” (Ibid. , p. 238).
Ibid., p. 188.
Ibid., p. 56.
Ibid., p. 183.
The suggestion was made as far back as Hume that moral qualities are like secondary qualities. Such a view is to be found in recent theorists like Blackburn and Wiggins (1976). But such secondary qualities are not isolable in that they still ultimately depend on a selected perspective.
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), pp. 150–51.
Once we move the universal substructure away from the cultural and/or conscious level the domain of the moral can easily be extended to encompass either animals, plants, or the environment in general. There are, of course, other roots for both the animal rights movement and environmental ethics, but both of those concerns are legitimated in special ways by analytic ethics.
To his credit, Popper tried to defend the possibility of human freedom. However, what is curious about his defense is that it relies upon appeals to indeterminacy in quantum mechanics. What makes this appeal a reflection of the Enlightenment Project is that Popper still tries to ground his defense in something drawn from the physical sciences. Hence, Popper’s defense of freedom is still done within the framework of scientism. We find this defense superfluous; hard line analytic philosophers reject Popper’s contentions.
Contrast the analytic treatment of the problem of free will as a technical problem involving the redefinition of freedom with the reactions of J.S. Mill and William James to the threat of the dissolution of the traditional notion of the moral agent as free. See Mill’s Autobiography, and note as well that when Mill came to defend the freedom of the individual in his essay On Liberty he specifically dissociated that defense from utilitarianism. See James’ correspondence with Renouvier in his Letters (ed. Henry James, Jr., 1920), reprinted in Revue de metaphysique et de morale (1935).
See Schlick (1965).
Ginet (1966).
See Honderich (1988) (e.g., p. 207) and Double (1991) (e.g., p. 218), both of whom treat free will in this fashion. Their arguments both amount to the claim that since free will cannot be conceptualized, it cannot be meaningful. This presumes that everything meaningful is in some sense conceptualizable. It therefore, presumes, that there is no pre-theoretical domain. This part of their case is not argued but merely presumed.
Quine quoted in Magee (1982), pp. 146–47.
G. Strawson (1991), p. 17.
Ibid., p. 29. “There is a clear and fundamental sense in which no being can be truly self-determining in respect of its character and motivation in such a way as to be truly responsible for how it is in respect of character and motivation” (p. 311). “It follows that there is a fundamental sense in which we cannot possibly be truly responsible for our actions” (p. 312).
Rawls (1971), p. 74.
Ibid., p. 100.
Feinberg (1965): see articles by Beardsley, Chisholm, Ayer, and Stevenson for evidence of the loss of moral agency.
Nozick (1981), p. 374.
Ibid. , p. 378.
Feinberg (1965): see articles by Mabbot, Glover, and Rawls for the issue of punishment.
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), p. 187.
Wittgenstein, (1965) p. 11.
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), p. 159.
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), p. 161–62: “... addressing underlying worries about the possible arbitrariness of our evaluative practices…. This is not the sort of thing that carries much justificatory weight even within our moral scheme. Not only is it hard to imagine appealing to this feature in an attempted justification aimed at outsiders; it is hard to imagine it succeeding very far in showing nonarbitrariness to ourselves.”
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992),p. 143, make just this kind of criticism of Rawls: “It amounts to dogmatically claiming that some specific version of hypothetical contractarianism is correct: that the valid principles of justice are the ones we would have framed in such and such circumstances. Adherents of rival versions of hypothetical contractarianism will dispute this claim, and then, again, old metaethical issues reappear.”
This is why an historical dimension is an integral part of any explication or philosophical examination, and why we maintain that philosophy is an essentially explicatory activity. This theme is developed in Chapter Eleven. Any serious history of Western morals demonstrates an ongoing and persistent set of fundamental moral issues.
Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992): “… examples of continuity founded on a thoroughly noncognitive interpretation of both scientific and ethical language are scarce” (p. 130 n.34); “Or, one might find that a notion of objectivity developed for ethics could provide an unorthodox [italics added], but superior, understanding of objectivity in mathematics and science” (p. 127 n29).
Hence there is a reason why we begin from within Western morality. This is not an arbitrary choice. Others may disagree with our explication, but that is not to deny that we who are thinking within Western culture must begin by explicating “Western” morality.
The history of “Western” Civilization is just such a history of growth and absorption (Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Germanic, etc. cultures).
The intellectual legitimation that analytic ethics provides to anti- establishment moral, social, and political movements is to be found in the postulation of an ideal perspective from the point of view of which all actual regimes are inherently inadequate. This is not to say that the ideal perspective is rooted only in analytic ethics, but it is to say that analytic ethics helps to sustain it by legitimating the “view from nowhere”.
“Thought seems to have made little advance since David Hume and Immanuel Kant…. It was they who came nearer than anybody has done since to a clear recognition of the status of values as independent and guiding conditions of all rational construction. What I am ultimately concerned with here… is that destruction of values by scientific error which has increasingly come to seem to me the great tragedy of our time–a tragedy, because the values which scientific error tends to dethrone are the indispensable foundation of all our civilization, including the very scientific efforts which have turned against them. The tendency of constructivism to represent those values which it cannot explain as determined by arbitrary human decisions, or acts of will, or mere emotions, rather than as the necessary conditions of facts which are taken for granted by its expounders, has done much to shake the foundations of civilization, and of science itself, which also rests on a system of values which cannot be scientifically proved” Hayek (1973), pp. 6–7.
One of the claims to be defended in the chapter on analytic history of philosophy is that curious distortions or reinterpretations of historically important material results from taking an exploratory view. Within the context of this chapter we suggest that the interpretations of Kant and Mill to be found in the analytic ethical literature partakes of this sort of distortion. For example, Kant is best understood as offering an explication of moral life and not an exploratory hypothesis. We suggest, further, that a great deal is lost by treating Mill as a utilitarian; for example, the discussion of freedom in On Liberty is in no way reconcilable with utilitarianism and/or a deterministic conception of human nature. With regard to issues in social and political philosophy, we suggest that Locke is grossly distorted when interpreted independently of his theological views.
Literature is, thus, closer to philosophy as explication than is social science or physical science. Philosophy as exploration is closer to the sciences. The closeness of literature to philosophy as explication does not mean there are no differences. Kant’s treatment of freedom is still different from a literary treatment.
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Capaldi, N. (1998). Analytic Ethics. In: The Enlightenment Project in the Analytic Conversation. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3300-7_10
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