Appendix: Interpretationism and Mental Realism
There may seem to be a strong parallel between the position outlined in the latter half of the last chapter and a position known as ‘interpretationism.’ Interpretationism is widely considered to be at odds with mental realism. Since I want to defend the claim that my position is at least compatible with realism about the mental, it is imperative that the extent to which the parallel holds and the extent to which it doesn’t are clearly stated. That is my first aim in this postscript. A second aim, equally important, is to give a further articulation of the view presented above through a comparison with a well known position.
KeywordsMental State Social Reality Intentional Stance Theoretical Entity Logical Construct
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- 1.The theory is elaborately expounded in Dennett 1978, 1987.Google Scholar
- 2.Dennett 1991b.Google Scholar
- 3.Dennett 1987, pp. 43–68.Google Scholar
- 4.Cf. e.g. Dibrell (1988) on the ‘as if’ character of interpretationism.Google Scholar
- 5.Philosophical Investigations,Part II, p.iv.Google Scholar
- 6.See for further criticism of Dennett my Slors 1996.Google Scholar
- 7.See Dennett, 1991b.Google Scholar