Abstract
In the previous chapter I explained the alliance between a conception of psychological continuity based on a (diachronic) mental atomistism and the concurring idea that causal connections between psychological states co-analyse psychological continuity on the one hand and a physicalist ontology of mind on the other. I labelled this alliance ‘the substratum-oriented conception of psychological continuity.’ The main purpose of the present chapter is to argue that the substratum-oriented conception does not suffice as an analysis of psychological continuity and hence (according to the position I am investigating) personal identity.
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Notes
I will use the terms `psychological states’ and `mental states’ when I do not want to refer specifically to such states in either their content-or their substratum aspect. In other cases I will speak either of `brain states’ or of `mental or psychological contents’. Thus, to give an example of the way I will use these terms, while contemporary philosophy of personal identity often individuates mental states in terms of brain states, I will claim that instead they should be individuated in terms of mental contents.
In this chapter, page number references without a year will refer to this book.
Pp. 231–3, the argument is borrowed from Williams (1970).
In normal human beings the two hemispheres perform distinct functions. This thought-experiment is based on an idealisation of rare but actual cases of persons whose different hemispheres are capable of performing the same tasks. In such cases each hemisphere is more or less like a complete brain, function-wise.
Cf. Sperry (1966).
Parfit adds that “Two other relations might have some slight importance: physical continuity, and physical similarity.” In his theory, these other relations do not play a major role. We may ignore them here.
Cf. Nagel (1971).
Noonan (1989, pp. 198–201); Nozick (1981, pp. 60–1).
See Lewis (1976), Mills (1993), and in one reading also Perry (1976).
Cf. Schechtman (1990a, 1994b); see also Slors (forthcoming).
Cf. Schechtman (1990a, pp. 79–86).
Cf. e.g. Dennett (1982, pp. 168–9)
It need not count against a theory of memory to drop the requirement that an experience-memory should resemble an original experience in its entirety. In fact, the requirement is too strong anyway. If my recollection of seeing a bear last summer vacation was accompanied by the thought I had then—“I am seeing a bear now”—I am not remembering that event but having an illusion. If, on the other hand, my memory is accompanied by the thought “I saw this bear so many months ago,” I am having a memory of that event even though the contents of my mind do not completely resemble those at the time when I saw the bear.
Cf. e.g. McDowell (1997, pp. 240–1).
See the next chapter for reasons why perceptual states cannot be isolated from their contexts without loosing content.
Cf. e.g. Fodor & LePore (1992).
Cf. e.g. Block (1981), Dennett (1981b), Tye (1991).
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Slors, M. (2001). Parfit’s Reductio of a Substratum-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity. In: The Diachronic Mind. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 86. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3276-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3276-5_3
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