Abstract
The immediate purpose of this paper is the examination of a correspondence between two major philosophers which thus far has hardly been noticed, largely because it was practically inaccessible. I believe that it will add to our knowledge of both Brentano and Husserl and especially of their relationship. My own interest in this exchange goes back to my initial research on the beginnings of the Phenomenological Movement, where I found letters and exchanges one of the most important tools for my historical reconstructions. The Brentano-Husserl correspondence was no exception.
From Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978), 95–116.
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Notes
I am greatly indebted to Karl Schuhmann for his support and criticism.
See Chapter 8 “Brentano’s Husserl Image”, pp. 119–124.
Oskar Kraus in his contribution to Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen, ed. Raymund Schmidt, vol. 7 (1929) p. 10.
Anhang to Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano (1919) p. 163; English translation in The Philosophy of Franz Brentano, ed. Linda L. McAlister. London: Duckworth 1976, p. 53.
Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano, loc. cit.,p. 163; trans]. p. 53.
Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p. 499.
The term “continuum” in this context is significant. Husserl’s first datable manuscript page (K I 50/47) of June 28, 1886 hence written soon after the beginning of his three months summer vacation with the Brentanos at St. Gilgen and additional pages deal with “homogene and inhomogene Continua” (Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, pp. 16, 17). Brentano’s life-long interest in the problem of the continuum based on Aristotle’s Physics is documented particularly in his Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit and Kontinuum, herausgegeben and eingeleitet von Stephan Körner and R. M. Chisholm. Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1976. According to Husserl’s “Recollections of Brentano” (Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano, p. 159; tr. p. 49; also Husserl-Chronik p. 14) his lectures on “Elementary Logic” in the winter semester 1884/85 dealt in particular detail with the descriptive psychology of the continua (p. 157). It seems more than likely that this was also one of the topics of Brentano’s and Husserl’s St. Gilgen conversations, all the more since, according to Brentano’s letter of introduction to Carl Stumpf of October 16, 1886, he knew that Husserl was working on a habilitation thesis dealing with the problem of continuity, which may very well have been inspired by Brentano.
I shall not enter into this proof, which apparently does not escape circularity. Brentano offered an even briefer proof of the parallel axiom in the Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit and Kontinuum, loc. cit., p. 48.
Such a response could have been planned in connection with the missing, but acknowledged birth announcement of Husserl’s son Gerhart on December 22, 1893. In fact, Karl Schuhmann found the draft of two long paragraphs, addressed to Brentano, written probably in the beginning of 1894 (K I 7/111b) in which Husserl raises a new “metaphysical question” concerned with a “simple and certain” proof of the law of causation based on certain properties of continua, especially in movements.
Recollection of Franz Brentano, loc. cit.,p. 165, trans]. p. 54.
“Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (1946), 93.
Oskar Kraus, the first editor of the Brentano papers, in his singular devotion to his teacher was understandibly perturbed by the fact that his older, less faithful students Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl increasingly overshadowed their former master without taking account of his later teachings. In passionately advocating Brentano’s new views he became at times so preoccupied with this historical injustice that his picture of their relationships, especially that with Husserl, became unbalanced. I would like to counterbalance some of this slant, especially in view of the fact that new English translations of Kraus’s editions and introductions may otherwise perpetuate his perspective. His bias and its dangers become apparent especially in the following places: (1) In Kraus’ edition of the Psychologie vorn empirischen Standpunkt of 1924 his editorial preface (fortunately moved to the Appendix in the English translation) focusses immediately on the relation of this Psychologie to Husserl’s Phänomenologie and Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie. Also five editorial footnotes to Brentano’s text deal exclusively with Husserl’s supposed misunderstandings and errors. What should be realized is that Brentano himself refers to Husserl only once in an appendix to the second edition of the second Book on Psychologismus, expressing his agreement with Husserl’s position. (2) In Wahrheit and Evidenz the second subsection deals with Psychologismus and Phänomenologismus. “Phinomenologismus” is not defined, but seems to be identified by Kraus with anti-psychologism. His Anhang, entitled “On the General Validity of Truth and the Basic Mistakes in a So-called Phenomenology,” consists exclusively of Brentano’s answer to Husserl’s letter of January 3, 1906 and the draft of his answer to Husserl’s subsequent letter. But, as shown above, neither Husserl’s nor Brentano’s letters on this occasion dealt with phenomenology. (3) Kraus entered into the original of Brentano’s lectures on “Deskriptive Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie” of 1888/89 (a course Husserl could not have attended) on the first page in ink the words “irref¨¹hrend. Husserl dadurch verwirrt.”
Recollections of Franz Brentano, loc. cit.,p. 164; trans]. p. 53. Apparently the emancipation
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Spiegelberg, H. (1981). On the Significance of the Correspondence between Brentano and Husserl. In: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. Phaenomenologica, vol 80. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3270-3_9
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