Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct the concept of natural necessity upon which the empirical causal (Humean) type of scientific law rests. In my opinion, this effort will enable one to grasp the ontological dimension of the epistemological concept: “empirical causal (Humean) type of scientific law.” The “empirical causal type of scientific law” was exemplified in the previous chapter by the following two propositions: Whenever the temperature of a gas increases while its pressure remains constant, its volume increases; and Whenever a wire loop is moved across a magnetic field, then current flows in it.
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Notes
Explicitly it became the subject matter of a special investigation for first time, to best of my knowledge, in U. Will’s (1984) paper.
Ianalyze neither Popper’s article (1967) nor his 1968 addendum to Chapter X*, where he gives up the attempt to provide a definition of natural necessity. I also do not analyze Suchting’s response to them in (1969).
Introduced by J. S. Mill in (1950).
A strict conceptual differentiation of these two types of conditions will be given in Part H, subchapter 4.1, in connection with the reconstruction of the theoretical causal law.
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hanzel, I. (1999). Popper’s Moa. In: The Concept of Scientific Law in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 208. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3265-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3265-9_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5275-9
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