Abstract
The aim of this chapter is, by comparing Hegel’s approach to logical categories with those used by Marx in his economical works, to show to what degree Marx relied on Hegel’s Science of Logic and Encyclopaedia Logic, as well as to show the points of their principal disagreements.
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In the Science of Logic Hegel, because he treats problems of the organic in the cluster “Notion,” provides a typology of scientific laws which is poorer than that found in the Phenomenology.
Hegel characterizes scientific laws in Science of Logic in a similar way. He states that “the realm of laws is the quiet (ruhende) image of the world of existence or manifestation” (1923, T. 2, 127; 1969, 503).
Nor is such a reconstruction provided in Part HI of L. Nowak’s (1974) treatment of the principles of the development of theoretical science, where he reconstructs several models of the development of a scientific law. In the last two of them he even considers the case when the understanding of what the principal factors of a phenomenon are undergoes a profound change. But he claims that the universe of discourse does not change in the course of such a development of knowledge.
For a detailed analysis of Hegel’s approach to the organic see O. Breidbach’s (1982).
I draw here upon M. Wolff’s (1995a; 1995b).
I draw here upon A. Nuzzo’s excellent (1995) paper.
On Kant’s views about ideas as schemes see his (B698; 1965, 55); for a commentary see H. Pilot’s (1995) and T. Leiber’s (1996).
For an overview of this criticism see H. Priest’s (1987a).
This quotation appears in the second introduction to the Encyclopaedia,which is not translated in (Hegel 1959).
In §3 of the Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel does not view thoughts as a lower-level form of consciousness as compared to that of notion (1840a, 6; 1991, 26–27; 1959, 6–8).
On this merger see H. F. Fulda’s (1990).
On this see N. Rottenstreich’s (1974).
In the `Notion-cluster, according to Kollman, “truer forms replace the category of causality, substance, mutual interaction,” because they “have no validity (Gelten) any more” (1970, 413). Categories of this cluster, Hegel claims, replace `forms such as categories and determinations of reflection, whose finitude and untruth has demonstrated itself in logic“ (1923, T. 2, 231; 1969, 592).
A detailed analysis of Marx’s `Method of Political Economy“ is given in Janoska and Bondeli and Kindle and Hofer (1994).
For an analysis of Hegel’s approach to contradiction by means of the symbols +A and —A, see M. Wolff’s (1981; 1986).
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hanzel, I. (1999). Hegel’s and Marx’s Categories: A Comparison. In: The Concept of Scientific Law in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 208. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3265-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3265-9_11
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